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Abstract.
This t h e s i s  s tud ie s  the  e f f o r t s  of a number of l a rge  e l e c t r o n i c s  
f irms to  e n t e r  and survive in th e  computer i n d u s t r i e s  o f  th e  USA and 
B r i t a i n ,  from th e  Second World War t o  the  e a r l y  1970s. I t  c o n t r a s t s  the  
r e l a t i v e  f a i l u r e  of these  fi rms with th e  g re a te r  a b i l i t y  to  su rv ive  in t h i s  
s e c to r  d isp layed  by s in g le  product  bus iness  machine companies and a number 
of new, s t a r t  up, computer f i rm s .
The p o t e n t i a l  advantages t h a t  the  m u l t i -p ro d u c t  e l e c t r o n i c s  
e n t e r p r i s e  should have had in the  new computer market a re  seen to  have been 
outweighed by the se  firms being over  burdened by the  very scope of t h e i r  
o p e ra t io n s .  The ir  e f f o r t s  to  cover th e  whole e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry ,  r a t h e r  
than c o n ce n t ra t in g  on a few s e c t o r s ,  m i t iga ted  the  p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  they  had.
A number of  case s tu d ie s  of  such f i rms, both B r i t i s h  and American, 
form the  h e a r t  of  t h i s  study. The main s tud ies  a r e : -
UK: F e r r a n t i ,  E l e c t r i c a l  and Musical In d u s t r ie s  and 
English E l e c t r i c .
US: Radio Corporation of America, and G e n e ra l .E le c t r i c .
To c o n t r a s t  the  s t r a t e g i e s  and s t r u c t u r e s  of  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
combines, a number of shor t  s t u d i e s  are  made of B r i t i s h  and American 
bus iness  machines and s t a r t - u p  companies:
UK: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Computers and Tabu la to rs .
US: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Business Machines,
and s h o r t e r  s tud ie s  on Burroughs,  Control Data Corp. ,
D ig i t a l  Equipment Corp. ,  Honeywell, National Cash 
R e g i s t e r ,  and Sperry-Rand.
Study of  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms  in the computer in d u s t ry  sheds l i g h t  
on the  o v e r a l l  weakness of  th e  broad-based, m u l t i - p ro d u c t ,  B r i t i s h  and 
American e l e c t r o n i c s  company in th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry  as a whole.
There i s  a l so  some comment on the  ro le s  of  the  two governments in 
shaping th e  computer in dus try .
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Glossary of terms.
APL: (GE' s) Advanced Product Line 
ADG: (RCA's) Advanced Development Group.
BoT: Board of  Trade.
CBI: Char les  Babbage I n s t i t u t e ,  U n ive rs i ty  of Minnesota.
CDC: Control  Data Corporation.
COBOL: COmmon Business O r ien ta ted  Language, US m i l i t a r y  language which 
became s tandard  f o r  bus iness  a p p l i c a t i o n s .
(Magnetic) ( F e r r i t e )  Core Memory: core  memory was the  major random 
access f a s t  computer memory used up u n t i l  the  in t ro d u c t io n  of 
semiconductor memory in the  e a r l y  1970s.
CSD: (RCA's) Computer Systems D iv is ion .
DEC: D ig i t a l  Equipment Corpora tion.
Delay l i n e :  a f i r s t  genera t ion  computer memory using loops of n icke l  or 
mercury to  da ta  as e i t h e r  a loop of e l e c t r i c a l  impulses o r  in a co u s t i c  
waves in a mercury bath .
Diode: d i s c r e t e  e l e c t r o n i c  component u sua l ly  thought of  as a second 
genera t ion  dev ice  made out of semiconductor m a te r i a l .  However, f i r s t  
genera t ion  diode valves  were a common device .
(Magnetic) Disk Memory: the  most important form of mass computer 
s to rag e ,  a technology dominated by IBM.
(Magnetic )Drum memory: the  f i r s t  magnetic s to rage  d ev ice ,  an extremely 
large  dev ice  which s to red  small amounts of da ta  in the  same way as a 
f ixed  d i s k .  I t  had the  advantage of  very f a s t  access  t ime.
EMI: E l e c t r i c a l  and Musical I n d u s t r i e s .
ERA: Engineering Research A sso c ia te s ,  became a p a r t  of  Remington 
(Sperry) Rand.
FORTRAN: s tan d a rd  engineer ing  and sc ience  language, developed by IBM. 
GE: General E l e c t r i c  (America).
GEC: General E l e c t r i c  Company ( B r i t a i n ) .
IC: I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t ,  t h i r d  genera t ion  e l e c t r o n i c  component, a number 
of components on a s in g le  semiconductor wafer.
LSI: Large Sca le  I n t e g r a t io n ,  r e f e r s  to  den s i ty  o f  components on an 
in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t .
MinTech: M in i s t ry  of Technology.
MIT: Massachusett s  I n s t i t u t e  of  Technology.
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MSI: Medium Scale I n te g ra t io n .
NCR: National  Cash R eg is te r .
NAHC: National  archive f o r  th e  h i s t o r y  of computing (UK).
NRDC: National  Research and Development Corpora tion (UK).
ONR: O ff ice  of Naval Research (USA).
Operating  System: the con t ro l  program of  a computer.
RCA: Radio Corporation of America.
Real-Time: a computer used to  i n t e r a c t  with a number of p e r ip h e r a l s  
s imul taneous ly  to  o f f e r  n e a r ly  i n s t a n t  response ,  such as a t i c k e t  
booking a p p l i c a t i o n .
(Magnetic) Tape Drive: The s tandard  form of mass da ta  s to r a g e ,  i t s  g r e a t  
weakness i s  t h a t  information has to  be s to red  s e q u e n t i a l l y  making access  
very slow, thus  the  move to  d isk  technology.
Time-Sharing: method by which a number of users  can s im ul taneous ly  run 
t h e i r  own programs on a s in g l e  computer.
T r a n s i s t o r :  second genera t ion  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  ind iv idua l  e l e c t r o n i c  
component made out of semiconductor m a te r i a l .
USAF: United S ta te s  Air Force.
Vacuum tube :  f i r s t  genera t ion  e l e c t r o n i c  component.
Valve: same as vacuum tube .
VLSI: Very Large Scale I n t e g r a t io n .
Williams Tube: f i r s t  genera t ion  computer memory s t o r in g  d a ta  in a 
cathode ra y  tube ,  used in e a r l y  F e r r a n t i  and IBM machines.
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Notes on a rch iv a l  r e f e r e n c e s ,
A number of  a rc h iv a l  sources  form the  ba s ic  raw m a te r i a l  o f  t h i s  
t h e s i s .  The re fe ren ce  format used f o r  the  var ious  c o l l e c t i o n s  w i l l  be 
o u t l i n e d  here ( f o r  f i r t h e r  in format ion  see B ib l iography) .
The major B r i t i s h  source  used is  the  National  Archive f o r  th e  H is to ry  
of Computing's c o l l e c t i o n  of  the  papers of the  National  Research and 
Development Corpora tion.  The format of  these  r e fe ren ces  i s :
NRDC 86/box num ber / f i le  number.
i . e .  NRDC/86/31/5.
Other papers from the  National  Archive use th e  a p p ro p r ia t e  c o l l e c t i o n  
number:
NAHC/collection r e fe re n c e /p a p e r  r e fe ren ce .
i . e .  NAHC/Fer/bl.
The major source of  m a te r i a l  in the  US h a l f  of th e  t h e s i s  i s  the  
Char les  Babbage I n s t i t u t e ' s  c o l l e c t i o n  of the  records  o f  th e  a n t i - t r u s t  
case ,  US vs IBM. There a re  two major sources w i th in  t h i s  body of  m a t e r i a l .  
The f i r s t  a re  th e  e x h ib i t s  t h a t  were lodged with the  c o u r t  as suppor t ing  
evidence.  The format of  the  r e fe re n ce  to  t h i s  a re :
US vs IBM, px*** o r  dx***.
p x = p l a i n t i f f ' s  e x h i b i t :  dx=defendants e x h i b i t .
i . e . ,  US vs IBM. px344 or  US vs IBM. dx3453.
The second su b - se c to r  o f  m a te r ia l  i s  the  c o l l e c t i o n  of th e  t r a n s c r i p t s  of  
the  examination o f  w i tn e s se s .  Here th e  format of  the  r e f e r e n c e  w i l l  inc lude  
both th e  page number of  th e  t r a n s c r i p t  and the  name of th e  person g iv ing  
evidence:
ie  US vs IBM. t r2420 ,  Beard,
A second major source of m ate r ia l  from the  CBI a rch ive  is  th e  
c o l l e c t i o n  of  papers  donated by General E l e c t r i c  engineer  George J acob i .  
The format of  th e se  r e f e r e n ce s  i s :
CBI Jacobi C o l l e c t i o n ,  (d e s c r i p t i o n  of m a te r i a l )
The many o th e r  sources  used a re  i n d iv id u a l ly  annota ted .
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Chapter 1
Studying the  e l e c t r o n i c s  and computer i n d u s t r i e s .
For an e s t a b l i s h e d  i n d u s t r i a l  power l i k e  the  United Kingdom, main ta in ing  
i t s  economic s tanding  in the  world depends on e i t h e r  p re se rv in g  i t s  
com pet i t ive  advantage in e s t a b l i s h e d  i n d u s t r i e s ,  or us ing i t s  economic 
power t o  develop new in d u s t r i e s  and markets.  In t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i e s  
B r i t a i n  has been los ing  market share  f o r  many decades.  Even in the  e a r ly  
p a r t  o f  the  cen tu ry  d e c l in in g  world market share  was the  t r e n d  in many 
i n d u s t r i e s  inc luding  coal mining, sh ipbu i ld ing  and t e x t i l e s ,  t o  name but 
the  c l a s s i c  examples. Since then ,  r e l a t i v e  d e c l in e  has spread to  most of 
B r i t a i n ' s  o ld e r  manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s .
In i t s e l f  t h i s  does not m a t te r  to  th e  ove ra l l  manufactur ing s t r e n g th  of a 
country .  Pas t  p r o f i t s  from th e  o ld e r  s ec to r s  could have been invested  in 
new i n d u s t r i e s .  The pace of tech n o lo g ica l  change in the  tw e n t i e th  century  
has been as tounding .  This has meant t h a t  the  leading in d u s t r i e s  have 
changed. Many of  the  w o r ld ' s  top  companies now come from th e  ranks of the  
automobile ,  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  pharm aceut ica ls ,  and aerospace  i n d u s t r i e s ,  
i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  b a re ly  e x i s t e d  before  the  1914-18 war. Leadership  in these  
i n d u s t r i e s  would more than make up f o r  r e l a t i v e  d ec l in e  in o ld e r  s e c to r s .  
B r i t a i n  was undoubtedly well  placed t o  e x p lo i t  th e se  new i n d u s t r i e s ,  a f t e r  
a l l  B r i t a i n  had on c a l l  the  r e sou rces  accruing to  i t  from having been the  
w o r ld ' s  most powerful n a t io n .  Indeed in many of  th e  new i n d u s t r i e s  B r i t a in  
was one of  the  g re a t  innova to rs ,  but i t  has not been able  t o  b u i ld  on i t s  
e a r l y  p o s i t i o n  and has seen r e l a t i v e  dec l ine  even in newer t e chno log ie s .
The purpose of t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  to  take  one of these  s e c t o r s ,  and to  
examine i t s  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  to  see  i f  t h e re  was any d e f i c i e n c y  which 
could exp la in  the  lack of  success .  The broad area  chosen i s  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
in d u s t ry .  In many r e s p e c t s  t h i s  i s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  th e  most important 
in d u s t ry  in the  world.  E lec t ro n ic s  a r e  now a l l - p e r v a s i v e ,  not only forming 
the  core  of  e l e c t r o n i c  p roduc ts ,  but a l so  performing the  c o n t ro l  func t ions  
of much of in d u s t ry  and provid ing  th e  information needed f o r  th e  se rv ice  
s e c to r  o f  the  economy. Successfu l a p p l i c a t i o n  of e l e c t r o n i c s  technology is  
v i t a l  t o  improving compet it iveness  in new and old  i n d u s t r i e s ;  i t  i s  a t  the  
h ea r t  o f  compet it ion  between manufacturing n a t io n s .  This c o n s id e ra t io n  has 
led many c o u n t r i e s  to  use s t a t e  in te rv e n t io n  to  underpin t h e i r  e l e c t r o n i c s  
in d u s t ry .  France i s  the  c u r r e n t  leade r  in t h i s  t r e n d ,  having s t a t e  support  
fo r  both th e  computer and e l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and i s  t r y i n g  to  c r e a te  
a nuc lea r -power- to -m icroch ip ,  s ta te -backed  conglomerate.  Whether or not
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s t a t e  support  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e 1 , i t  does show t h a t  weakness in the
e l e c t r o n i c s  s e c t o r  i s  seen by governments as fundamental .
Before 1939, B r i t a i n  was ab le  to  compete with the  United S ta t e s  in 
most a reas  of  e l e c t r o n i c s .  For example, i t  was the  UK t h a t  f i r s t
commercialised t e l e v i s i o n 2 . A f te r  th e  war, B r i t a i n  was th e  USA's only
se r io u s  compet itor in e l e c t r o n i c s .  Indeed many of the  most important 
e l e c t r o n i c s  innovations  had been developed in B r i t a in  t o  a id  the  war
e f f o r t .  From t h i s  p o s i t io n  o f  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g th ,  the  UK's p o s i t i o n  has 
s l ip p e d ,  which i s  not s u r p r i s i n g  as o th e r  coun t r ie s  were bound to  catch up. 
However, the  UK's o v e ra l l  loss  of compet it iveness  i s  excess ive .  In 1963 the  
UK had a p o s i t i v e  balance of t r a d e  in e l e c t r o n i c s ,  amounting to  £105.7m. 
By 1982, t h i s  had become a negat ive  balance of -£l ,504m3 . In 1982 one of 
the  l a r g e s t  nega t ive  f e a tu r e s  was e l e c t r o n i c  consumer goods a t  -£922m*, 
a f i g u r e  r e c e n t l y  counterbalanced  by Japanese inward investment in to  low 
wage d i s t r i c t s  of  B r i t a i n ,  producing t e l e v i s i o n s  f o r  the  European market.  
While t h i s  is  u s e f u l ,  many of the  s k i l l  based a c t i v i t i e s  of R&D, design and 
marketing remain ou ts id e  the  UK.
The UK has fa red  b e t t e r  in some a re a s .  In 1982 the  c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  and the  s c i e n t i f i c  inst ruments  su b -sec to rs  posted t r a d e  
surp luses  o f  £227m and £78m r e s p e c t i v e l y 5 . Capi ta l  e l e c t r o n i c s  is  
dominated by m i l i t a r y  product ion ,  the  major s t r e n g th  of  B r i t a i n ' s  la rge  
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. However, in two o ther  a r e a s ,  both o f  which d i r e c t l y  
underpin p r o d u c t iv i t y  elsewhere in th e  economy, the  UK has seen a major 
f a l l  in com pet i t iveness .  In th e  f i e l d  of  ac t iv e  e l e c t r o n i c  components the  
UK i s  running a s i g n i f i c a n t  t r a d e  d e f i c i t 6. Almost a l l  mass produced la rge  
s ca le  semiconductors manufactured in B r i ta in  a re  made by s a t e l l i t e  
f a c t o r i e s  of overseas  f i rm s ;  B r i t i s h  companies have tended t o  concen t ra te  
on s p e c i a l i s t  c h ip s ,  mainly used in m i l i t a r y  products .  In the  f i e l d  of
xI t  i s  the  general  conclus ion  of t h i s  t h e s i s  t h a t  inc reas ing  
conglomerate s i z e  and scope does not  n e c e s sa r i ly  lead to  g r e a t e r  market 
power.
2See below, chap te r  3, plOl.
3L. Soete and G. Dosi,  Technology and Development in th e  E lec t ro n ic s  
In d u s t ry . 1986, p67.
* Ib id  p67; see a l so  E. Arnold Competition and te ch n ica l  change in the  
t e l e v i s i o n  i n d u s t r y . 1982. This g ives  an o u t l i n e  of B r i t a i n ' s  dec l in ing  
fo r tune  in the  consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry .
5Soete and Dosi,  Technology and Development. p67.
6F. Malerba ( The Semiconductor I n d u s t ry . Madison, Wisconsin,  1985) 
o u t l in e s  the  i n a b i l i t y  of  B r i t a i n  to  mainta in i t s  p o s i t io n  in t h i s  market.
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computers,  the  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  has grown s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  From being the  only 
compet i to r  to  the  US computer in d u s t ry ,  B r i t a i n ' s  p o s i t io n  has co l lap sed .
The fo llowing graphs show th e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in t h i s  t r a d in g  
s i t u a t i o n .  Figure  1.1 g ives  an e s t i m a te  of how th e  balance o f  t r a d e  in 
e l e c t r o n i c s  d e t e r i o r a t e d  in th e  e a r l y  1970s. This was mainly due to  the  end 
of th e  UK's i s o l a t i o n  from th e  world consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  t r a d e ,  fo llowing 
the  adoption of the  PAL co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  system, which rep laced  the  UK's 
unique black and white system. However, Figure 1.2 shows t h a t  computers 
were a l r ead y  a s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t o r  to  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  t r a d e  d e f i c i t :
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Figure 1.1
UK Balance of Trade in Electronics.
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Figure 1.2
UK balance of trade in computers.
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Additional data; LSoete & G.Dosi. Technology and development in the electronics industry. 1986, p67.
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To a id  p o l icy  makers to  a s s e s s  whether t h i s  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  in 
e l e c t r o n i c s  has been impor tan t,  i t  i s  necessary  to  know how i t  occurred,  
whether the  t r e n d  i s  r e v e r s i b l e ,  and whether p a s t  po l icy  has co n t r ib u te d  
to  th e  problem o r  has slowed down th e  lo s s  of world market sh a re .  Only then 
can th e  weakness be a ssessed  in the  con tex t  of th e  whole B r i t i s h  economy.
An i n i t i a l  look a t  B r i t i s h  in d u s t ry  shows t h a t  the  f a i l u r e  o f  the  UK 
in th e  consumer, component and computer markets i s  l inked  v ia  the  same 
group of  companies. Equally ,  the  same firms t h a t  showed weakness in these  
th re e  s u b - s e c to r s ,  were a l so  the  ones to show g r e a t e r  r e s i l i e n c e  in 
m i l i t a r y ,  c a p i t a l  and telecommunications  techno log ies .
The UK market f o r  e l e c t r o n i c s  has tended to  be dominated by la rge ,  
m u l t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c  combines. Almost every e l e c t r o n i c s  
technology was in troduced t o  the  UK by the l a rge  g e n e r a l i s t  e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies. Up u n t i l  the  1970s, f i rms such as AEI, EMI, English  E l e c t r i c ,  
F e r r a n t i ,  GEC, and Plessey  dominated almost every e l e c t r o n i c s  market.  There 
was a l s o  a second level of f i rms  which,  though more r e l i a n t  on a s in g le  
market,  a l so  t r i e d  to  expand in to  o th e r  aspects  o f  e l e c t r o n i c s ;  examples 
were E l l i o t t  Automation, Decca and STC.
By th e  1990s, much of th e  in d u s t ry  had been merged in to  a s in g le  
major conglomerate ,  GEC, with p a r t i c u l a r  s t r e n g th s  in defence and c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s ,  to g e th e r  with a s i g n i f i c a n t  s take  in the  UK's leading 
telecommunicat ions and e l e c t r i c a l  engineer ing  companies. Around t h i s  s in g le  
firm a re  a few sm al le r  companies with  a base in the  same marke ts ,  RACAL, 
STC and Thorn-EMI, being th e  prime examples. However, t h e  consumer 
e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry  i s  now c o n t r o l l e d  by fo re ig n  m u l t i - n a t i o n a l s .  The 
computer market i s  dominated by fo r e ig n  computer s p e c i a l i s t  p lus  the  UK- 
based, bu t  Japanese  c o n t r o l l e d ,  ICL. Standard e l e c t r o n i c  components are  
a lso  now produced (or so ld) in th e  UK by overseas  s p e c i a l i s t  f i r m s .
The q u e s t io n  t h e r e f o r e  begins to  s h i f t :  away from whether th e  UK has 
been p a r t i c u l a r l y  weak in c e r t a i n  areas  of  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  t o  whether 
B r i t a i n ' s  m u l t i -p ro d u c t  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies have been th e  main cause of 
the UK's d e c l i n in g  compet it iveness  in th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  market? The weakness 
in c e r t a i n  a re a s  of  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry  co inc ides  with  th e  withdrawal 
of th e  m u l t i -p ro d u c t  combines in to  co re ,  p ro tec ted  product a r e a s .  S trength  
and s a f e t y  seems to  have been synonymous with th e  defence and 
te lecommunicat ions markets,  both o f  which have been i s o l a t e d  from 
in t e r n a t i o n a l  com pet i t ion .  Commercial s t reng th  in c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  is  
a s p i n - o f f  from th e  m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s  f o r t e s  of these  companies.
I f  such a hypothesis  i s  t r u e ,  then in order  to  unders tand why B r i t a in  
has s l ip p e d  from near duopoly with th e  USA to  being an ' a l s o - r a n '  by the
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1990s, the  workings of  the  broad-base  e l e c t r o n i c s  co rpo ra t ion  has to  be 
unders tood. This must be framed w i th in  the  con tex t  o f  how o th e r  co rpora te  
s t r u c t u r e s  have performed in the  e l e c t r o n i c s  market.  Many mass produced, 
commercial p roduc ts ,  such as in t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s  and computers, became 
dominated by s p e c i a l i s t  o rg a n i s a t i o n s  which d i sp la ce d  th e  g e n e r a l i s t  
producers ,  not only in the  UK but a l s o  in the  USA; most o f  th e se  s p e c i a l i s t  
producers came from the  USA.
However, a comprehensive s tudy of  e l e c t r o n i c s  co rpo ra t ions  is  not 
easy.  Information on these  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  is  sp a r se .  To unders tand  how they 
opera ted in the  market,  and how they  evaluated  investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  
r e q u i r e s  d e t a i l e d  in t e rn a l  informat ion .  Archival records  a re  a problem in 
many i n d u s t r i e s ;  in the  e l e c t r o n i c s  indus try  documents cover ing the  
bus iness  o p e ra t ions  of the  f irms a re  not u sua l ly  a c c e s s ib l e  to  academics. 
Few companies admit to  having a rch iv es  and those  t h a t  do do not encourage 
access .  At the  t ime of t h i s  r e s e a rc h ,  Fe r ran t i  and Marconi stood out by 
having archives-cum-museums. These a r e  useful sources ,  bu t they  emphasise 
the  proud t e c h n ic a l  h i s t o r y  of the  companies and t h e i r  no tab le  founders ,  
r a t h e r  than having a g re a t  amount of  ope ra t iona l  informat ion.
Research in to  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
a number of  reasons .  The withdrawal of  many of th e se  f i rms in to  defence 
c o n t r a c t in g  i s  used as an excuse t o  compound th e  usual r e lu c ta n c e  in 
B r i t a in  to  al low access  t o  r e c o rd s .  Secur i ty  i s  used as a convenient 
excuse. An in d u s t ry  which can be perceived as being comparatively  
unsuccessfu l  w i l l  not want c lo se  s c r u t in y  by academics.  Firms recognise  
t h a t  s tu d i e s  of  the  post-war  e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry  may not be wholly 
complimentary.
N ever the le s s ,  study of  the  ind u s t ry  is  p o s s ib l e .  I t  i s  f e a s i b l e  to  
take  one s u b - se c to r  of the  in d u s t ry  and ga ther  enough in format ion from 
d i s p a r a t e  sources  to  produce a worthwhile study o f  t h i s  s i n g l e  a r e a .  The 
s tudy can look a t  the  r e l a t i v e  success  of  d i f f e r e n t  types  of  company in the  
s ec to r  and can be used to  see i f  the  same p a t t e r n s  a re  found in the  same 
s e c to r  in o th e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  and a l s o  whether th e  same p a t t e r n  can be 
expected in o th e r  p a r t s  of the  in d u s t ry .
One s u b - se c to r  which can be used to  s tudy the  op e ra t io n s  of th e se  
m ul t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  and which a lso  o f f e r s  a chance to  c o n t r a s t  
t h e i r  methods to  those  of more s p e c i a l i s t  companies, i s  the  computer 
market. This was one of the  key post-war i n d u s t r i e s ,  being one of  the  
d r iv ing  fo r c e s  behind economic growth s ince  1945. I t  was an a rea  in which 
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies t r i e d  unsuccess fu l ly  to  e s t a b l i s h  themselves as major
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producers .  There were a l so  a number of  o ther  types  of  bus iness  in t h i s  
s e c t o r  t o  compare with the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. A dd i t iona l ly  th e  B r i t i s h  
exper ience  can be compared with the  exper ience of  companies in th e  w or ld ' s  
l a r g e s t  market f o r  computers,  the  USA. The US in format ion g ives  f u r t h e r  
i n s i g h t  in to  th e  indus t ry  in general  and the  methods employed by broadly  
based e l e c t r o n i c s  companies; th e  weakness of the  c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  
e l e c t r o n i c s  company seems c o n s i s t e n t  in both c o u n t r i e s .  The g r e a t e r  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  information in the  USA allows f o r  more in-depth  study of 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm, as well  as a llowing an oppor tun i ty  t o  i n v e s t ig a t e  
more succe ss fu l  bus iness  forms.
Mate r ia l  a v a i l a b l e  on the  B r i t i s h  and American companies in the  computer 
market.
The sources  of in format ion a v a i l a b l e  in B r i t a i n  and th e  United S ta te s  
vary a g r e a t  d e a l .  In B r i t a i n  th e  information is  d isper sed  and fragmentary ,  
al though the  es tab l i shm ent  o f  the  National Archive f o r  the  H is to ry  of 
Computing (NAHC) in Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  has improved the  s i t u a t i o n .  The 
s t a r t i n g  po in t  f o r  studying th e se  companies was the  company annual r e p o r t s  
and the  bus iness  and t r a d e  p r e s s ,  th e  aim being to  a s c e r t a i n  which fi rms 
were a c t i v e  in th e  indus t ry  and what they were marketing.  However, these  
sources only  give an ex te rn a l  view. The NAHC has product l i t e r a t u r e  and 
some a r c h iv a l  m a te r ia l  c o l l e c t e d  from ind iv idua ls  who were in the  indus t ry .  
The NAHC a l so  holds  a copy of  a p r i v a t e  paper w r i t t e n  by the  computer s a l e s  
manager of F e r r a n t i .  This forms a n e a r ly  complete h i s t o r y  of the  F e r r an t i  
Computer Department7 . However, the  NAHC's most important a s s e t  is  the  
a rch ive  of  the  National Research and Development Corpora tion,  p rev ious ly  
held by the  I n s t i t u t i o n  of  E l e c t r i c a l  Engineers.  The NRDC helped to  fund 
many of  th e  computer a c t i v i t i e s  of  th e  B r i t i s h  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. I t s  
aim was to  underpin th e  UK's t echno log ica l  and i n d u s t r i a l  base by 
encouraging th e  development o f  new technology-based products .  The NRDC's 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  with the  companies t h a t  i t  funded, and i t s  involvement with 
the  in d u s t ry ,  can be s tu d ied  through these  a rch iv es .  This g ives  some 
in s ig h t  in to  how the  fi rms t h a t  were supported worked. An e x c e l l e n t  h i s t o r y  
of the  NRDC's involvement in the  computer indus t ry  a l r e ad y  e x i s t s 8 and 
uses much the  same sources .  John Hendry has a l so  c a r r i e d  out in te rv iews 
with leading  f i g u r e s  involved in the  computer indus t ry ,  a r e sou rce  t h a t  has
7NAHC, B.B. Swann 'The F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' ,  p r i v a t e  paper 
prepared  f o r  th e  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  Computer Department,  1973.
aJohn Hendry, Innovat ing f o r  f a i l u r e :  Government p o l icy  and the  e a r lv  
B r i t i s h  computer indus t ry .  Cambridge, Massachusetts ,  1989.
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been made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h i s  t h e s i s .
Another i n t e r e s t i n g  source i s  the  c o l l e c t i o n  of  seminar papers held 
by the  London School of Economics, from the Edwards and Townsend s e r i e s  o f  
t a l k s  given by leading i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  on the  o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  h i s t o r y  of 
t h e i r  companies9 . A number of e l e c t r o n i c s  companies were included in t h i s  
s e r i e s .  Useful information on s p e c i f i c  po in ts  can a l so  be gleaned from the  
a rch ives  of F e r r an t i  and Marconi.
Outside the  e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry ,  the  records  o f  the  B r i t i s h  bus iness  
machines f i rms t h a t  were merged in to  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Computers and 
Tabu la to rs ,  which then went on to  form I n t e r n a t io n a l  Computers Limited,  
have been made a v a i l a b le  t o  academics.  Martin Campbell -Kelly 's  h i s t o r y  of  
t h a t  company10 i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  source fo r  the  chap te r  on ICT.
Fur ther  informat ion on the  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  is  a v a i l a b l e  in the  
United S t a t e s .  The Charles Babbage I n s t i t u t e  (CBI) in th e  U n ive rs i ty  of 
Minnesota has a c o l l e c t i o n  of product da ta  on B r i t i s h  computers.  In common 
with the  NAHC in Manchester,  i t  has copies  of the  computer s a l e s  s t a t i s t i c s  
compiled by Computer Consultants  Ltd in the  1960s11. I t  a l s o  has a 
c o l l e c t i o n  of American investment a p p ra i sa l  documents t h a t  cover the  
computer in d u s t ry .  Of th e se ,  the  bi -weekly p u b l i c a t io n s  o f  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
Data P u b l i sh in g 12 prove a usefu l  source of information on the  UK as well 
as the  USA, e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  the  launch of i t s  European a p p ra i s a l  
paper13. A r e a l  bonus in analyzing  th e  UK computer ind u s t ry  i s  th e  CBI's 
copy of a l a rge  and comprehensive eva lua t ion  document prepared  by the  
London Branch of  the  United S t a t e s  Navy's Off ice  of Naval Research14. 
This document seems to  have been an assessment of the  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  
c a r r i e d  out to  eva lua te  compet it ion  to  the  US in dus t ry ,  though t h i s  i s  not
9London School of  Economics, a rc h iv a l  c o l l e c t i o n ,  'Seminar on the  
problems in i n d u s t r i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' .
10Martin Campbell-Kelly,  ICL: a bus iness  and t e c h n ic a l  h i s t o r y .  Oxford
1989.
“ Computer Consultants  Ltd, B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t . 1963 
and 1965.
“ I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Data Publ i sh ing  Co. EDP Indus t ry  (and Market) Repor t . 
Newtonville,  Mass. ,  publi shed from 1964. The company name was changed in 
the  l a t e  1960s to  In te r n a t io n a l  Data Corpora tion,  and is  coiranonly r e f e r r e d  
to  as IDC.
“ I n t e r n a t io n a l  Data Corp. ,  EDP Europa Repor t . London, publ ished  from
1970.
14CBI Archive,  J .  Cowie, J.W. Hemann, P.D. Maycock, 'The B r i t i s h  
Computer Scene ' ,  Off ice  of Naval Research Branch Off ice  London, Technical  
Report,  ONRL 27-67, unpublished,  17/5/67.
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e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d .
This p u l l i n g  to g e th e r  of  va r ious  sources i s  not such a problem in the  
United S t a t e s .  The CBI has been in e x i s t en ce  f o r  a number o f  y ea r s  and has 
acquired  a wide ranging c o l l e c t i o n .  The t r a d e  p r e s s ,  r e g u l a r l y  published 
investment rev iews,  and product l i t e r a t u r e  a re  a l l  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  As 
well as th e  aforementioned IDC p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  Moody's indus t ry  a p p r a i s a l s  
are  u s e f u l 15, much more so than the  s tandard  t r a d e  p re s s .  The CBI a lso  
has a l a rg e  o ra l  h i s t o r y  c o l l e c t i o n .
The most important a s s e t  t h a t  th e  CBI has f o r  studying the  bus iness  
h i s t o r y  of  the  indus t ry  i s  i t s  near complete copy of th e  evidence and 
t r a n s c r i p t s  of  th e  1970s a n t i - t r u s t  case  US v IBM. This i s  a v a s t  body of 
in format ion ,  some of which has a l r e ad y  been drawn on16.
The evidence from t h i s  t r i a l  can be used in a number of ways. This 
t h e s i s  has concen tra ted  on the  evidence and t r a n s c r i p t s  which were 
submitted during d i scuss ions  of the  r o l e s  played by the  Radio Corporation 
of America and General E l e c t r i c  in th e  computer indus t ry .  A s i g n i f i c a n t  
p ropor t ion  of  th e  bus iness  records  of  th e se  companies were submit ted  to  the  
c o u r t ,  both from the  co rpo ra te  l eve l  and the  o p e ra t io n a l  l e v e l .  These 
records  were used in the  t r i a l  to  argue t h a t  RCA and GE had been fo rced  out 
of the  computer indus t ry  by u n f a i r  compet it ion  from IBM. This in format ion 
allows a very d e t a i l e d  s tudy of t h e i r  h i s t o r y  in th e  computer in d u s t ry  and 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  improves our a b i l i t y  to  unders tand why broad-based 
e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c s  companies were in h e re n t ly  f r a g i l e  in the  computer 
market.  This m a te r ia l  i s  a l s o  used t o  a ssess  th e  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  
adopted by the  s p e c i a l i s t  US bus iness  machines companies compared to  those 
adopted by the  c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies.
15Moody's Inves to rs  Serv ice  Inc .  Moody's Computer Indus t ry  Survey. New
York.
1SK.D. Fishman, The computer e s t a b l i s h m e n t . New York, 1981; R. Malik, 
And tomorrow the  World? Ins ide  IBM. 1975; F.M. F i sh e r ,  J.W. McKie, R.B. 
Mancke, IBM and the  U.S. da ta  p rocess ing  indus t ry :  an economic h i s t o r y . New 
York, 1983. An e a r l y  d r a f t  of  t h i s  l a t t e r  book was a c t u a l l y  submitted as
evidence in th e  case  i t s e l f .
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Themes and Questions.
The aim of  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  t o  expla in  why la rg e ,  m u l t i -p ro d u c t ,  
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies did no t  succeed in t h e i r  a t tempts  to  become major 
p lay e r s  in the  computer in d u s t ry .  I t  draws upon as much a rch iva l  m a te r ia l  
as p o s s ib le  and uses t h i s  to  determine which c o rpo ra te  s t r u c t u r e s  stood the  
b e s t  chance of success .  Five major case s tu d i e s  on such f irms are  
p re sen ted :
From the  UK: F e r r a n t i ;  Engl ish E l e c t r i c ;  EMI 
From the  USA: RCA; GE.
There is  a l so  a s h o r t e r  s tudy of the  more success fu l  US f i rm ,  
Honeywell, which is  used t o  show an a l t e r n a t i v e  approach to  the  new 
in d u s t ry .  Many o th e r  B r i t i s h  and American e l e c t r o n i c s  firms became involved 
in the  commercial computer in d u s t ry .  Some of the se  had a moderately  
important  r o l e ,  inc luding  f i rms such as E l l i o t t  Automation,  P le ssey ,  Bendix 
and Ph i lco .  However, th e re  i s  l i t t l e  informat ion on most of  t h e se  f i rm s ,  
or  they  have been excluded from th e  study because what in format ion is  
a v a i l a b l e  adds l i t t l e  to  the  a n a l y s i s .  The f i v e  major s tu d ie s  p lus  t h a t  of 
Honeywell cover the  main e l e c t r o n i c s  firms which made a major and 
s t r u c tu r e d  a t tem pt  to  cap tu re  a l a rg e  market share .
Two c h a p te r s ,  one cover ing the  UK and the  o th e r  the  USA, look a t  the  
b us inesses  which o u t l a s t e d  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms in the  in d u s t ry ,  many of 
which s t i l l  su rv ive  in one form or  ano ther  in t o d a y ' s  computer market.  Some 
of th e se  were e s t a b l i s h e d  bus iness  machines f i r m s ,  o th e r s  were newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d  companies s p e c i a l i s i n g  in computer technology:
Chapter 4: ICT/L.
Chapter 8: IBM; NCR; Burroughs; Remington/Sperry-Rand;
Honeywell; CDC; DEC.
This s tudy  looks a t  the  development of th e  var ious  types  o f  f i rm  over 
a pe r iod  of  twenty f i v e  y e a r s .  While t h i s  i s  a r e l a t i v e l y  sh o r t  pe r iod ,  
even in the  l i v e s  of  many of the  f irms s tu d ie d ,  in a world o f  ever 
a c c e l e r a t i n g  tech n o lo g ica l  change i t  covers th e  development o f  the  
mainframe computer from infancy through to  near  m a tu r i ty .  The s tudy of any 
indus t ry  over such a per iod  involves th e  unders tanding of numerous t o p i c s .  
Business h i s t o r i a n s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  economists and management s c i e n t i s t s  have 
a l l  p re sen ted  frameworks f o r  a n a l y s i s .  A few of th e se  themes a r e :  the  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  f i rm ,  the  p rospec ts  f o r  innovation in an o l i g o p o l i s t i c  
market, t h e  i n c en t iv e s  to  innovate ,  s t r a t e g i e s  to  compete with a dominant 
market l e a d e r ,  m u l t i -p roduc t  company s t r u c t u r e s  versus s in g l e  product
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s t r a t e g i e s ,  and resource  a l l o c a t i o n  with in  the  f i rm .
However, none of the se  themes should be viewed as f ix e d  or  dominant.  
As a market develops the  r e l a t i v e  importance of  d i f f e r e n t  f e a t u r e s  changes 
and the  f i rms can r e a c t  t o  t h i s  changing c l im ate  in a number o f  ways. As 
the  computer indus t ry  developed, as b r i e f l y  descr ibed  below17, the  
f a c t o r s  c r u c i a l  to  the  success  or  f a i l u r e  of  f i rm s  changed. This t h e s i s  
comes to  the  conclusion t h a t  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms coped l e s s  well  with the  
commercial computer market than bus iness  machines f i rm s;  bu t  i t  does not 
conclude t h a t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  were th e  weakest f irms in th e  in d u s t ry  a t  
every s ta g e ,  nor t h a t  they had no freedom of a c t i o n  to  deal adequate ly  with 
t h i s  new in d u s t ry  i f  they had adopted d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s .
The case  s tud ie s  p resen ted  below, b a s i c a l l y  d iv ide  the  h i s t o r y  of 
each f i rm  in to  two s tages .  The f i r s t  phase is  the  e n t ry  of th e  company in to  
the  new market.  The second phase i s  th e  process of  coping with th e  r ap id  
growth in demand f o r  computers - th e  phase when companies needed t o  develop 
a s t r a t e g y  to  deal with both ra p id  growth and inc reas ing  compet i t ion  in the  
market f o r  computers.  The important i s sues  changed during t h i s  process  and 
companies needed to  adapt to  t h i s  change.
Such arguments resemble th e  l i f e  cycle  hyp o th es i s18. L i f e - cy c le  
theory  argues  t h a t  the  f a c t o r s  caus ing  change in an in d u s t ry  a l t e r  as i t  
develops .  This hypothesis  sugges ts  t h a t  change in an ind u s t ry  is  i n i t i a l l y  
driven by product  innovat ion and t h a t  technolog ica l  compet it ion  is  based 
on the  p r o p e r t i e s  of  the  product i t s e l f .  As the  technology develops  and the  
market expands, emphasis s h i f t s  to  process innovat ions ,  th e  t a r g e t  being 
to  produce the  product more e f f i c i e n t l y .  Abernathy and Utterback concluded 
t h a t  innovation in an in d u s t ry  s h i f t s  from a f l u i d  per iod  to  a s t a t i c  
pe r io d 19. In th e  i n i t i a l  s t ag es  of  a new indus try  when the  product i s  not 
completely  s e t t l e d  on, t h e r e  i s  room f o r  f u r t h e r  improvements to  i t .  At 
t h i s  s tage  t h e r e  may not even be a s i n g l e  view on what i s  th e  b e s t  format 
fo r  the  p roduc t .  Competition and f u r t h e r  innovation improves th e  product 
and shakes out th e  l e s s  succe ss fu l  product ideas ,  ev en tu a l ly  reach ing  a 
po in t  o f  near s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n .  This i s  the  s t a r t  o f  the  s t a t i c  s tag e  where 
t e ch n ica l  compet it ion  i s  p r im a r i l y  focused on the  e f f i c i e n t  production  of 
a known commodity, leading to  g r e a t e r  emphasis on process  innovation and
17See below pp .35-43.
1SM.E. P o r t e r ,  Competit ive S t ra tegy :  Techniques f o r  analyzing  
in d u s t r i e s  and c o m p e t i to r s . New York, 1980, chap te r  8.
19W.J.Abernathy and J.M.Utterback,  ' P a t t e r n s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l
in n o v a t io n ' ,  Technology Review, vol 9,  1978.
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the  growing importance of s ca le  economies. The examples they  used to  show 
t h i s  development were the  semiconductor i n d u s t ry 20 and the  automobile 
i n d u s t ry 21.
The l a s t  sec t ion  of t h i s  ch ap te r  o u t l in e s  th e  growth of  the  computer 
market.  Undoubtedly the  market d id  change, as d id  the  na ture  of innovation 
and th e  s ca le  o f  production.  However, i t  would be wrong to  d e sc r ib e  the  
tech n o lo g ica l  b a s i s  of the  product as  s t a b l e ,  though by th e  e a r l y  1970s 
change had become more p r e d i c t a b l e .  The focus of  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  how the  
firms a l t e r e d  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s  to  deal with the  changing market and whether 
f i rms with d i f f e r e n t  s t r u c t u r e s  and s t r a t e g i e s  were b e t t e r  ab le  to  cope 
with changing c ond i t ions .  Fundamentally,  we want to  know whether the  
d i f f e r e n t  s t r u c t u r e s  of the  broad based e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms and bus iness  
machines f i rm s  led to  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  fo r  d ea l in g  with the  developing 
market.
The f i r s t  question  to  cons ide r  in each case s tudy i s ,  how and why the  
fi rm e n te r ed  th e  market f o r  commercial computers.  I t  i s  important to  
e s t a b l i s h  why a f i rm  should d i v e r t  resources  from i t s  o the r  a c t i v i t i e s  in to  
a new technology.  While t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  not  about th e  s c i e n t i f i c  development 
of the  computer, the  technology had to  be acquired by the  f irm; i t  cannot 
be assumed t h a t  a f irm could produce a computer. Firms have a c t i v e l y  t o  
develop technology ,  or  acqu i re  those  s k i l l s  from elsewhere,  i f  they  in tend 
to  e n t e r  th e  in d u s t ry .  Two f a c t o r s  a r e  looked a t  in some d e t a i l  in the  case  
s tu d i e s .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  has to  be e s t a b l i s h e d  from where the  technology came, 
e s p e c i a l l y  whether the  f irm in ques t ion  developed technology i n t e r n a l l y  o r  
whether i t  had t o  look f o r  s k i l l s  from o u ts ide .  Secondly,  given t h a t  the  
firms in q u es t io n  were able  t o  acqu i re  th e  necessary  s k i l l s ,  the  under ly ing  
dec is ion  t o  use these  s k i l l s  to  b u i ld  commercial computers has to  be 
considered .  There are  two b a s ic  d r iv i n g  fo rces  behind innovation: changes 
in market demand re q u i r in g  f i rms to  in troduce new technology, o r  a push 
from technology i t s e l f  which changes market supply c o n d i t io n s ,  or  which 
makes i t  e a s i e r  f o r  ou ts ide  f i rms  to  e n te r  the  indus t ry .
In th e s e  s e c t io n s ,  an a t tempt  i s  made to  decide  th e  r e l a t i v e  weight 
of i n c en t iv e s  t o  e n te r  the  in d u s t ry .  A major ques t ion  i s  whether the  
incen t ive  f o r  a f i rm  to  develop a commercial computer was d r iven  by 
ex te rna l  f a c t o r s ,  changing demand or  th e  t h r e a t  o f  new products  from o th e r
zoI b i d , th e  example used in Abernathy 's  and U t te rb a ck ' s  a r t i c l e  comes 
from J . T i l t o n ,  In t e r n a t io n a l  d i f f u s i o n  of technology, the  case of 
semiconductors . 1971.
21W.J.Abernathy, The p r o d u c t i v i t y  dilemma: roadblock to  innovation in 
the automobile i n d u s t r y . Bal t imore ,  1978, chap te rs  4 and 7.
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s u p p l i e r s ,  or by the  d e s i r e  to  d i v e r s i f y ,  based on i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s ,  such 
as th e  i n t e r n a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  technology. This a n a ly s i s  takes  in to  
account the  previous h i s t o r y  of th e  company, the  markets in which i t  
a l r e a d y  opera ted ,  i t s  i n t e r n a l  r e s o u rc e s ,  and i t s  p ro p en s i ty  to  undertake 
c o n c e n t r i c  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  t o  show t h a t  th e  in cen t ive  
f o r  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms and th e  bus iness  machines f i rms  to  develop 
computers was d i f f e r e n t .  I t  i s  shown below t h a t ,  a f t e r  an i n i t i a l  period 
when the  computer was used f o r  enhancing s c i e n t i f i c  and engineer ing  
c a l c u l a t i o n ,  computers s t a r t e d  to  be used both to  extend th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
of  commercial automation and to  r e p l a c e  the  old da ta  p rocess ing  techn iques .  
The bus iness  machines f i r m s '  main i n t e r e s t  in computers was a measure of 
s e l f  p r e s e r v a t io n ;  they  had to  produce computers once d i g i t a l  technology 
s t a r t e d  to  r e p la ce  the  o ld e r  types  o f  business  machines. However, some 
moved e a r l i e r  than o the rs  and some were a c t u a l l y  a t  the  f o r e f r o n t  of the  
new technology: a good example i s  Sperry-Rand22. This t h e s i s  in v e s t ig a t e s  
why t h e r e  were leads and lags  between the  companies. The most important 
a spec t  of t h i s  was the  a t t i t u d e  taken by the market l e ade r ,  IBM, to  the  new 
technology and the  way i t  en te red  th e  market i s  considered  in chap ter  
e ig h t .
The same ques t ions  can be asked of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  I t  is  
important to  e s t a b l i s h  a t  what t ime in the  i n d u s t r y ' s  l i f e  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
fi rms t r i e d  to  e n t e r  the  market.  A second issue i s  whether th e  managements' 
view o f  t h i s  new indus t ry  changed as both the market and th e  technology of 
computing developed. At what t ime did  th e  co rpora t ion  pe rce ive  th e  computer 
ope ra t ion  as a new business  a c t i v i t y  in i t s  own r i g h t ?  This i s  an important 
is sue  and a number of case  s tu d i e s  w i l l  poin t  to  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry  
making a major push in to  computers a t  a tu rn ing  p o in t  in th e  technology and 
a t  a p o in t  when the  market was becoming s i g n i f i c a n t  in s i z e .
The ques t ion  to  be answered when looking a t  the  bus iness  machines 
firms i s :  i f  th e  e n t ry  of th e se  f i rm s  was d i f f e r e n t  to  th e  e n t ry  of the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, both in t iming and r a t i o n a l e ,  d id  t h i s  lead  to  any 
su b s ta n t iv e  d i f f e r e n c e  in s t r a t e g y ?  An at tempt i s  made to  e s t a b l i s h  how the  
s t r a t e g i e s  of  th e  bus iness  machines f i r m s ,  which a l read y  had exper ience  of 
the  market f o r  commercial automation equipment, d i f f e r e d  from those  of  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s .  A second i s su e ,  and one which is  taken up in the  
conclus ion ,  i s  whether the  d i f f e r e n t  en t ry  motiva t ions  led to  commercial 
computer technology being viewed d i f f e r e n t l y  a t  the  c o rp o ra te  l e v e l 23.
22See below chap te r  8,  pp358-367.
23See below, chap ter  9,  pp379-382.
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The b u i ld in g  of  computers was an extens ion  of  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s '  
h o r i z o n ta l  scope,  an ex tens ion  of  th e  ways in which they e x p lo i t e d  t h e i r  
core  technology.  There i s  some d iscuss ion  in each chap te r  of where the  
product champions came from in t h i s  ' i n t e r n a l  co rpora te  ven tur ing  
p r o c e s s ' 24 . The p o s i t io n  of th e  product champion i s  an important i s sue  
and g r e a t l y  a f f e c t s  the  p o l i t i c a l  s tanding  of d i v i s i o n s  w i th in  a company, 
which in i t s e l f  in f luences  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  success fu l  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n 25 . I t  i s  important to  e s t a b l i s h  whether the  product 
champions of  a new a c t i v i t y  in the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  in t h i s  case  those  
b u i ld in g  computers,  had as much in f luence  as those  r e p r e se n t in g  o ld e r  
a c t i v i t i e s .  This is  v i t a l  in determining who had the  most say in how 
c o rpo ra te  r e sou rces  were a l l o c a t e d  between d i f f e r e n t  d i v i s i o n s .  The s in g le  
most important theme of t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  how th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies 
handled t h i s  process  of a l l o c a t i n g  l im i ted  re sou rces  between t h e i r  many 
p o t e n t i a l  growth pa ths .  This process  o f  dec is ion  making i s  g r e a t l y  a f f e c t e d  
by the  p o l i t i c a l  standing of  the  va r ious  d iv i s io n s  in each company, t h i s  
p o l i t i c a l  i s sue  w i l l  be considered  in the  case  s tu d i e s  and in the  
conclus ion .
The r e s t  of  each case  s tudy looks a t  how the  fi rms a l t e r e d  t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i e s  as th e  computer market grew. Growing sca le  and growing R&D 
expend i tu res  increased  the  oppo r tu n i ty  cos ts  of  s tay ing  in the  computer 
in d u s t ry ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when t h i s  meant tak ing  on one of th e  w o r ld ' s  most 
entrenched monopolis ts ,  IBM. This t h e s i s  examines whether th e  s t r a t e g i e s  
adopted by the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  d i f f e r e d  from the  s t r a t e g i e s  of  th e  s in g le  
product companies t h a t  a l so  competed a g a in s t  IBM. I t  a l so  c ons ide rs  whether 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms were helped o r  hindered by t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e  and 
whether they  were handicapped by l eg ac ie s  from t h e i r  p a s t .
A major theme in t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  v e r t i c a l l y  i n t e g ra te d  
and c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  B r i t i s h  and American companies when faced 
with com pet i t ion  from fi rms t h a t  were concen tra ted  on a s i n g l e  market 
segment. The development of  th e  f i rm  has been analyzed by Chandler26 and
24R.A Burgelman 'Managing the  i n t e rn a l  co rpo ra te  ven tu r ing  process :  
some recommendations f o r  p r a c t i c e ' ,  in ,  S t r a t e g i c  management of technology 
and in n o v a t io n . R.A. Burgelman & M.A. Maidique eds ,  Homewood, I l l i n o i s ,  
1988, pp348-362.
25R. Rothwell e t  a l ,  'SAPPHO Updated - P r o jec t  SAPPHO Phase I I ' ,  
Research P o l i c y . 1974, vol 3, pp258-291.
26A.D. Chandler j r ,  S t r a t eg y  and S t r u c t u r e . New York, 1966.
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b u i l t  on by Williamson27. The case s tu d ie s  cons ide r  th e  development of 
each f i rm  and whether the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  d i f f e r e d  from 
t h a t  o f  the  bus iness  machines f i r m s .  Channon's work on B r i t i s h  indus t ry  
i l l u s t r a t e s  a d i f f e r e n c e  between m ul t i -p roduc t  f i rms and s in g l e  product 
companies28. Channon showed t h a t  s i n g l e  product f i rms were l e s s  l i k e l y  
to  adopt the  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  m-form s t r u c t u r e  than m u l t i -p ro d u c t  f i rm s .  He 
showed t h a t  the  s in g le  product f i rm  was more l i k e l y  to  use  a fu n c t io n a l  
framework. This study w i l l  i l l u s t r a t e  j u s t  how much d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  t h e r e  
was in th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms compared to  the  bus iness  machines companies 
and why t h i s  was s i g n i f i c a n t .
I t  i s  important to  e s t a b l i s h  how the s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  f i rm  a f f e c t e d  
s t r a t e g y  and performance.  This r e q u i r e s  an unders tanding o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  
s t r u c t u r e s  of th e  two types  o f  f i rm .  Key to  whether c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  
d i v e r s i f i e d  companies can achieve  an advantage over s i n g l e  product 
companies is  the  s ig n i f i c a n c e  of  the  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between bus iness  
u n i t s 29 . Williamson sugges ts  t h a t  th e  m-form s t r u c t u r e  i s  optimized when 
general  management i s  i s o l a t e d  from the  day to  day o p e ra t io n s  of  the  
company and confined to  s t r a t e g i c  dec is ion  making30, but t h a t  the  amount 
of d i v i s i o n a l i s a t i o n  depends on the  ' f i r m ' s  s i z e ,  f u n c t io n a l  s e p a r a b i l i t y ,  
and th e  s t a t e  o f  informat ion tech n o lo g y '31. Following t h i s  l i n e ,  the  
u l t im a te  o rg a n i s a t i o n  becomes an in te rn a l  c a p i t a l  market,  where th e  
d e c i s io n  makers have p e r f e c t  knowledge of  the o pe ra t ing  d i v i s i o n s  on which 
to  base t h e i r  investment judgements. Po r te r  looks more c l o s e l y  a t  the  
o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  ga ins  t h a t  a f i rm  can achieve by e x p l o i t i n g  v e r t i c a l  and 
h o r i z o n ta l  l inks  between bus iness  u n i t s .  Achieving th e  advantages  p re d ic ted  
by i n d u s t r i a l  economics f o r  th e  l a rg e  v e r t i c a l l y  and c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  
d i v e r s i f i e d  f i rm  depends on g e t t i n g  the  ba lance o f  o p e ra t io n s  and th e  
i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of th e  f i rm  r i g h t .  Separa ting o p e ra t io n a l  u n i t s  too much 
can lead to  th e  f irm not achieving  the  advantages o f  synergy between 
c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  products :  they  can lo se  out on shared economies of s c a le
27O.E. Will iamson, Markets and h i e r a r c h i e s ,  a n a l y s i s  and a n t i t r u s t  
im p l i c a t i o n s . New York, 1975, ppl48-154.
2aD.F. Channon, The s t r a t e g y  and s t r u c t u r e  of  B r i t i s h  e n t e r p r i s e .
1973.
29P o r t e r ,  Competit ive Advantage. 1985. P o r t e r  c o n s id e r s  in d e t a i l  the
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i th in  companies and the l i k e l y  advantages  h o r iz o n ta l  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  can g ive .
3°Will iamson, Market and H ie r a r c h i e s . p p l48 -150.
31Ibid.
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and scope.
I n d u s t r i a l  economics has suggested t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a number of 
p o t e n t i a l  advantages to  be ob ta ined  through h o r iz o n ta l  and v e r t i c a l  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  These s t r e n g th s  a re  considered here  to  provide  a gauge 
a g a in s t  which to  t e s t  f i rms in the  case s tu d i e s .
The e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms were both v e r t i c a l l y  in t e g ra t e d  and 
c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d .  There a re  two l e v e l s  a t  which t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  
may have given th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies a compet i t ive  advantage.  F i r s t l y ,  
they  could b e n e f i t  from the  t e ch n ica l  base shared by many of  t h e i r  
p roduc ts ,  leading  to  advantages of s c a le  and scope.  Scale advantages arose  
from th e  production of common components; scope advantages from u t i l i s i n g  
f a c i l i t i e s  and s k i l l s  ob ta ined  in one area o f  e l e c t r o n i c s  in ano ther32. 
A major f a c t o r  in obta in ing  t h i s  advantage is  shar ing  t e c h n i c a l  resources  
in re sea rch  and development. Having a wide ranging  development programme, 
based on a core  technology,  could lead to  economies in the  use of 
re so u rce s ;  engineers  with s im i l a r  s k i l l s  could be moved around severa l  
p r o j e c t s .  There i s  a lso  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of techno log ica l  c ro s s -o v e r  between 
the  va r ious  developments; p r o j e c t s  can feed o f f  each o th e r .  A development 
made f o r  an advanced m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s  a p p l i c a t i o n  could  be 'va lue  
eng inee red733, which then means i t  can be used in a commercial computer 
a p p l i c a t i o n .  This shar ing of  s k i l l s  can a lso  advance th e  f i rm  along the 
l ea rn ing  curve f a s t e r  than i f  i t  was j u s t  developing a s i n g l e  product.  Once 
a f i rm  has developed a process  f o r  one of i t s  product l i n e s  i t  w i l l  be 
cheaper to  e x p l o i t  the  same process  in ano ther ;  l e a rn in g  by doing, 
accomplished in one product l i n e ,  can be t r a n s f e r r e d  to  a no the r .  Sutton 
cons ide rs  t h i s  to be one of the  advantages of  ' s p e c i a l i s e d  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ' 3*.  He a l so  sugges ts  t h a t  the  lea rn in g  e f f e c t  can go 
beyond th e  phys ica l  production l e v e l :  f irms can lea rn  o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  
le ssons ,  as well  as manufacturing le ssons .  This t h e s i s  co n s id e r s  which 
firms had the  b e s t  base to  lea rn  from. The e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  had the  scope 
to  share  i n t e r n a l  learn ing-by-doing  in e l e c t r o n i c  equipment; th e  bus iness  
machines f irms could le arn  from t h e i r  pas t  exper ience  in s e l l i n g  punched
32The genera l  concepts of the  economies of scope a re  d iscussed  in E.E. 
Bai ley  and A.F. F r ied laen d e r ,  "Market s t r u c t u r e  and m ul t i -p roduc t  
i n d u s t r i e s " ,  Journal of Economic L i t e r a t u r e . 1982, 20, ppl024-48; W.J. 
Baumol, J .C .  Panzer,  R.D. W il l ig  Contestable  Markets and th e  theory  of 
i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e . New York, 1982.
33Reduced in complexity and p r i c e .
3*C.J .  Su t ton ,  Economics and corpora te  s t r a t e g y . Cambridge, 1980, 
pp66-7.
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card  machines.
Secondly, h o r i z o n ta l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  firms could a l so  be s t rengthened 
by not  being r e l i a n t  on a s in g l e  market:  having a number o f  products  gave 
them some s e c u r i t y  of income. In o th e r  words, t h e r e  was a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
the se  f irms could  have achieved th e  advantages of th e  d i v e r s i f i e d  
conglomerate,  while  r e t a i n i n g  the  o p e ra t iona l  advantages o f  working with in  
one technology, e l e c t r o n i c s .  A core  question  i s  whether t h i s  balance was 
achieved, or whether t h e re  were some o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  which negated 
the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  having both the  advantages of  th e  conglomerate and those 
of a core  t e chno log ica l  base .
A t h i r d  advantage which these  f irms should have been able  to  br ing  
to  bear  in t h e i r  a s s a u l t  on the  computer market was the  success  t h a t  they 
were having in o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  markets .  During th e  per iod  covered by the  
case  s t u d i e s ,  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  ind u s t ry  as a whole was booming. Te lev is io n ,  
c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  and a whole gamut of  m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s  were in very 
heavy demand, which b e n e f i t ed  the  l a rge  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. This t h e s i s  
cons ide rs  whether these  fi rms managed to  use the  re sources  thus  generated  
to  e n t e r  the  computer market,  a new s e c to r  which they had i d e n t i f i e d  as a 
p o t e n t i a l l y  l a rg e  o u t l e t  f o r  e l e c t r o n i c s .
Taking the  Schumpeter35 and G a lb ra i th 36 t h e s i s  o f  s c a l e ,  scope 
and s i z e  g iv ing  f i rms market power, through having g r e a t e r  funds a v a i l a b le  
fo r  r e sea rch  and development,  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms might have been expected 
to  perform well  in the  computer in d u s t ry .  They had the  re so u rce s  and the 
t e c h n ic a l  background. Yet the  market became dominated by s p e c i a l i s t  
computer companies. This t h e s i s  w i l l  cons ider  how th e s e  s p e c i a l i s t  
companies d i f f e r e d  from the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms,  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  
and, above a l l ,  t h e  i n t e r n a l  reasons why the  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms f a i l e d  to  
marshal l  t h e i r  r e sou rces  f o r  t h i s  indus t ry .
The core  ques t ion  which i s  addressed in t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  whether the  
d i v e r s i f i e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms were capable  of support ing  a l l  t h e i r  a reas  
of a c t i v i t y .  I t  addresses  the  ques t ion  of whether f i rm s  s u f f e r  from 
' c a p i t a l - r a t i o n i n g ' 37 and, i f  t h i s  e x i s t e d ,  did  i t  lead to  op e ra t io n a l  
weaknesses and abandonment of new a c t i v i t i e s ?  All the  f a c t o r s  mentioned 
above a f f e c t e d  how the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms d e a l t  with th e  process  of
35J.A. Schumpeter, Cap i ta l i sm .  Socia li sm,  and Democracy. 1961.
36J.K. G a lb ra i th ,  American Capi ta li sm: The concept of  c o u n te rv a i l in g  
power. Boston, 1952.
37C. Tomkins, Corporate  Resource A l loca t ion :  f i n a n c i a l ,  s t r a t e g i c  and 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s . Oxford, 1991, ppl79-180.
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' i n t e r n a l  v e n t u r i n g ' ,  how they  weighed new o p p o r tu n i t i e s  and which ones 
they  opted to  back the  most.  Given t h i s  p o in t ,  no o v e ra l l  framework is  used 
f o r  each case  s tudy,  as the  p rocesses  could be d i f f e r e n t  in each, but the  
r e s u l t s  a re  th e  same. The conclus ion examines whether the  many lessons  from 
each ch ap te r  add up to  a c r i t i c i s m  of the  a b i l i t y  of c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  
d i v e r s i f i e d  f i rm s  to  expand in commercial and compet it ive  markets .
This i s  a comparison of one s e t  of f i rms t h a t  en te red  the  computer 
in d u s t ry  as a new oppor tun i ty  f o r  e x p lo i t i n g  te ch n ica l  knowledge with to  
a s e t  of  companies which b u i l t  computers when they  s t a r t e d  to  take  the  
p lace  of  t h e i r  o ld  p roduc ts .  I t  a s s e s s e s  t e ch n ica l  g i a n t s  versus  market 
knowledgable s p e c i a l i s t s .
The development o f  the  B r i t i s h  and American computer i n d u s t r i e s .
Earlv  computers.
I t  i s  common a t  t h i s  s tage  in a t h e s i s  or book about the  computer 
in d u s t ry  to  have an o u t l i n e  of  how technology has developed and of the  
s c i e n t i s t s  t h a t  brought the  concepts t o  f r u i t i o n .  However, here  t h e re  w i l l  
only be th e  b r i e f e s t  of  o u t l i n e s .  There are  a number of  comprehensive works 
on e a r l y  developments in computing,  both in B r i t a i n 38 and th e  USA39. 
They show t h a t  B r i t a i n  was on a par  with  the  United S ta t e s  in what could 
be termed th e  p re -com pe t i t ive  phase of  the  indus t ry :  t h e  pe r iod  when 
computer technology was confined to  small  groups of p ioneer ing  s c i e n t i s t s  
and e n t r e p r e n e u r s .  Developments a t  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  of Manchester and 
Cambridge and a t  the  Nat ional Physical  Labora to r ies  were extremely 
important to  th e  progress  of  e a r l y  computer technology. This pe r iod  la s t e d  
from about the  end of the  war to  the  e a r l y  1950s. Ins tead  t h i s  s ec t io n  w i l l  
concen t ra te  on th e  development o f  th e  market f o r  computers.
Only a few l a b o r a to r i e s  had the  f i n a n c i a l  resources  o r  the  s k i l l s  to  
develop th e se  complex and i n t r i c a t e  machines f o r  t h e i r  own use.  Yet many 
o the r  l a b o r a t o r i e s  had a requirement fo r  increased c a l c u l a t i n g  speed,
3SS.H. Lavington, Earlv  B r i t i s h  Computers. Manchester, 1980. This is  
the  most comprehensive B r i t i s h  s tudy.  See a l so :  N. M etropol is ,  J .  Hewlett ,
and G-C Rota,  e d s . ,  A His to ry  of  Computing in the  Twentieth Century . New 
York, 1980; A. Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma. 1983; M.V. Wilkes Memoirs
of a Computer P io n e e r . Cambridge, Mass. ,  1985; and F.C. Will iams "Early 
computers a t  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty " ,  The Radio and E l e c t r i c a l  Engineer 45
1975, pp327-31.
39N. Metropolis  e t  a l ,  A h i s t o r y  of Computing in the  Twentieth 
Centurv: P.E. Ceruzzi,  Reckoners: The P r e - h i s to r v  of the  D ig i t a l  Computer 
from Relays t o  the  Stored Program. Westport , Conn., 1983; K. Flamm, 
Creat ing the  Computer: Government. Indus t ry  and High Technology. Washington 
1988. There a re  many o th e r  h i s t o r i e s  of the  development of  computer 
technology in th e  USA, many of  which w i l l  be mentioned in case  s tu d i e s .
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c re a te d  by the  growing complexity of  science  and technology, e s p e c i a l l y  in 
th e  nuc lea r  and ae ro n au t ic a l  f i e l d s .  I t  was t h i s  sc ience  community which 
produced the  f i r s t  demand f o r  computers.
By 1950, t h e  F e r r an t i  company claimed to  be the  f i r s t  f i rm  to  o f f e r  
f u l l y  fu n c t io n a l  computers f o r  commercial s a l e 40. Engl ish E l e c t r i c ,  using 
technology from th e  National Physical  L ab ora to r ie s ,  was a b le  to  fo l low s u i t  
sometime l a t e r 4 1 , as did th e  f i rm  E l l i o t t  B ro thers .
In th e  USA the  i n i t i a l  t e c h n i c a l  i n t e r e s t  in computers r e s id ed  in 
s i m i l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and government l a b o r a t o r i e s .  However, 
the  o rg a n i s a t i o n s  which f u l f i l l e d  e a r l y  s c i e n t i f i c  demand f o r  computers 
were s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  UK. The two most important  e a r ly  
producers  were small e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  Eckert  and Mauchly with 
the  UNIVAC machines42 and Engineering Research A ssoc ia tes  with the  ERA 
110143 . Both of  these  fi rms were to  become p a r t  of the  UNIVAC Division 
of  the  bus iness  machines f i rm  Remington Rand, which in t u r n  became a p a r t  
of Sperry-Rand. The t h i r d  s i g n i f i c a n t  commercial computer development,  
though lagging behind Remington Rand 's s t a b l e ,  was in IBM44. A handful 
of  o th e r  small e n t r e p re n e u r i a l  f i rms  developed computers.  Many w i l l  be 
mentioned in t h i s  t h e s i s ,  inc lud ing  Elec troData  which was taken  over by the 
bus iness  machines fi rm Burroughs, and the  Computer Research Corp. which was 
absorbed in to  National Cash R e g i s t e r s 45 . The r o l e  of t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies a t  t h i s  e a r ly  s tage  in th e  US indus t ry  was on t h e  whole l im i ted  
to  components and t e ch n ica l  a s s i s t a n c e ;  t h e i r  major push in to  th e  market 
came somewhat l a t e r .
This very b r i e f  o u t l i n e  of  the  genes is  of the  computer ind u s t ry  shows 
t h a t ,  in B r i t a i n ,  m u l t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  were involved from the 
very e a r l i e s t  s t a g e .  In the  USA small e n t e r p r i s e s  and bus iness  machines 
fi rms showed a s t rong  e a r l y  i n t e r e s t ;  a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between the 
i n d u s t r i e s .
4°See below, chap ter  2 on F e r r a n t i ' s  Mark 1 computer, pp50-57.
41See below, chap ter  4 on English  E l e c t r i c ,  ppl38-140.
42N. S te rn ,  From ENIAC to  UNIVAC: An Appraisal  of th e  Eckert-Mauchlv 
Computers. Bedford,  Mass. ,  1981. See a l so  Sperry Rand s e c t i o n  in chapte r  
8, pp350-358.
43A.A. Cohen and E. Tomash, "The B ir th  of an ERA: Engineering Research 
Assoc ia tes  I n c . " ,  Annals o f  th e  H is to ry  of Computing. 1, 1979, p p .83-100.
44C .J .  Bashe e t  a l ,  IBM's Earlv  Computers. Cambridge, Mass. ,  1986. 
This book g ives  a good d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  IBM's e a r l y  computer developments.
45See below, chap te r  8,  pp330-350.
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Development of  th e  mass market.
The w o r ld ' s  stock of  computers grew r a p i d l y  from the  mid-1950s 
onwards. From production of  a handful o f  computers f o r  s c i e n t i s t s ,  machines 
t h a t  were viewed almost as sc ience  f i c t i o n  m ys te r ies  and which looked 
somewhat Heath-Robinson due to  t h e i r  complexity,  the  mainframe computer 
became commonplace and the  micro computer l a t e r  became a l l - p e r v a s i v e .  
Figure 1 .3 ,  shows how the  number of  computers m u l t i p l i e d :
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Figure 1.3
Worldwide Computer Shipments.
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p247. Compiled from IDC, EDP Industry Review.
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The h i s t o r y  of t h i s  growth i s  u sua l ly  d iv ided  in to  genera t ions  of 
computers.  Each new genera t ion  added func t ions  and a b i l i t i e s  which enhanced 
t h e i r  appeal to  u se r s .  These gene ra t ions  a re  framed in terms of the  type 
of component used to  bu i ld  th e  computer. This i s  a simple d iv id in g  l ine  
between machines,  but one which masks the evo lu t iona ry  and conceptual 
changes which led to  the  new f u n c t io n a l  a b i l i t i e s .
F i r s t  g e n e ra t io n  computing: e a r l y  1950s - la te  1950s.
The e a r l y  computer in d u s t ry  used the  vacuum tube as the  underlying 
technology: tubes  were used f o r  a l l  log ica l  f u n c t io n s .  This made the 
machines l a r g e ,  power hungry and i n i t i a l l y  very u n r e l i a b l e .  Memory was 
simple,  based on cathode ray  tubes  o r  delay l i n e s ,  systems capable  of 
s to r in g  only l im i ted  amounts o f  d a t a ,  or on slow magnetic drums, akin to 
the  modern d isk  d r iv e ,  but with t i n y  capac i ty .
The f i r s t  genera t ion  can be d ivided in to  two pe r iods .  The previous 
sec t ion  d iscussed  the  f i r s t  of th e s e  when computers were a s c i e n t i f i c  
c u r i o s i t y  with only a small community o f  developers  and u se r s .  A number of 
incremental  improvements gave some o f  the  l a t e r  f i r s t  genera t ion  machines 
widespread acceptance ,  with reasonab ly  large production runs .  Innovations 
included the  more r e l i a b l e ,  lower power, min i-valve; magnetic core  memory 
ins tead  of  drum and cathode ray  s to ra g e ;  and the  in t ro d u c t io n  of  magnetic 
tape and magnetic d isk  s to ra g e .  Magnetic cores  became the  most important 
computer memory u n t i l  the  1970s and were f i r s t  found in la rge  s c a le  IBM and 
UNIVAC computers*6 . As th e se  improvements were incorpora ted ,  and as 
p r ices  were reduced through b e t t e r  manufacturing techn iques ,  new func t ions  
fo r  computers were developed, leading  to  computers becoming more than j u s t  
s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t o r s .  IBM's small 650 computer was used f o r  t a s k s  t h a t  
had p re v io u s ly  been c a r r i e d  out by t a b u l a t i n g  and punched card 
equipment*7 ; over one thousand of th e se  were produced. IBM's 305, which 
incorpora ted  e a r l y  d isk  d r iv e  technology, a l so  approached one thousand 
s a le s .  These machines were p r im a r i l y  used fo r  commercial da ta  p rocess ing ,  
a source of  demand t h a t  r a p i d l y  o u t s t r ip p e d  the  s c i e n t i f i c  market.
In the  UK, f i r s t  genera t ion  computers were not b u i l t  on such a la rge 
sca le :  only a few systems so ld  more than 20.
*6See below, chap te r  8,  pp312-314.
*7Ib id .
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Second g e n e r a t io n ,  l a t e  1950s-mid 1960s.
Following the  d issemina t ion  of  th e  new t r a n s i s t o r  technology w i th in  
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  world,  a number of s o l i d - s t a t e  computers s t a r t e d  to  emerge 
in the  l a t e  1950s. Such machines o f f e red  g re a t  advantages over t h e i r  
p redecesso rs .  T r a n s i s to r s  g r e a t l y  reduced s ize  and power consumption, were 
r e l i a b l e  and easy to  package,  and made much g r e a t e r  c a l c u l a t i o n  speeds 
p o s s ib le .
Second genera t ion  computers a l so  had b e t t e r  p e r i p h e r a l s ,  incremental  
improvements which g r e a t l y  enhanced th e  throughput of the  computer.  Tape 
dr ives  improved, as did p r i n t e r s ,  al lowing g r e a t e r  speeds a t  both ends of 
the  computational p rocess .  However, i t  was in the  area  o f  random access  
s to rage  t h a t  second genera t ion  machines were much b e t t e r  than the  f i r s t  
machines. Disk d r iv e  technology was g r e a t ly  enhanced, with IBM producing 
ever f a s t e r  and l a rg e r  d isk  s to rage  systems48. Secondly,  the  magnetic 
core main memory came down in p r i c e .  This made la rge  c ap a c i ty  memory on 
computers p o s s ib l e ,  g r e a t l y  in c reas in g  the complexity of the  t a sk s  t h a t  
they could handle .
Improved technology and the  f a l l i n g  p r ic e  meant t h a t  computers could 
be app l ied  to  many new t a s k s .  Computer languages such as F o r t ra n ,  w r i t t e n  
by IBM f o r  eng ineer ing  and COBOL a common language f o r  bus iness  
a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  g r e a t l y  improved programming p r o d u c t iv i t y .  Computers were 
given th e  a b i l i t y  to  perform m u l t ip l e  t a sk s ,  such as p r i n t i n g  out the  
r e s u l t s  from one program while  c a l c u l a t i n g  another .  This a b i l i t y ,  t o g e th e r  
with th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of l a rge  random access s t o r e s ,  led to  a number of new 
r e a l - t im e  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  where computers performed ta sk s  as r e q u i r e d ,  r a t h e r  
than process ing  ta sk s  in s t r i c t  batch o rder .  Above a l l ,  the  l a rge  user  base 
t h a t  was being b u i l t  up was leading  t o  new a p p l i c a t io n  ideas ,  which were 
developed f o r  one user  then a t t r a c t e d  o the rs .
At the  end o f  the  f i r s t  gen e ra t io n  of computing and during the  second 
gene ra t ion ,  t h e r e  was g re a t  momentum behind the  computer. By the  end of the  
second gen e ra t io n  of computing a l l  t h e  business  machines f irms had turned 
t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  to  bu i ld in g  small systems to  complement t h e i r  old 
t a b u la t i n g  machines.  Figures  8 .4  and 8 .5 49 show how the  computer s t a r t e d  
to become a s i g n i f i c a n t  product f o r  American bus iness  machines f i rm s ,  
r a p id ly  becoming t h e i r  main product  l i n e .  Likewise ICT in the  UK was having 
to acqu i re  computer technology50 . For these  fi rms t h e r e  was l i t t l e
48See below, chap te r  8 ,  pp314-320.
49p304 and p305.
5°See below chap te r  5, ppl70-176.
40
choice :  the  computer was r e p l a c in g  th e  old e lec t ro-mechanical  punched card 
technology.
I t  was in the  cusp between th e  f i r s t  genera t ion  of computers and the  
in t ro d u c t io n  of  the  second t h a t  many of  the e l e c t r o n i c s  companies en tered  
the new in d u s t ry .  While F e r r a n t i  and English E l e c t r i c  were a l ready  
involved, o th e r s  had wai ted .  By 1956-7 i t  was becoming c l e a r  t h a t  the  
computer market was going to  be s i g n i f i c a n t .  Three the  major case  s tu d i e s ,  
EMI, RCA and GE, en tered  a t  t h i s  t im e ,  as did the  more success fu l  Honeywell 
company, while  English E l e c t r i c  a l s o  g re a t ly  increased i t s  e f f o r t  in the  
computer in d u s t ry  a t  t h i s  t ime .  A number of o the r  e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms a lso  
made s h o r t  l iv ed  forays  in to  th e  e a r l y  second genera t ion  computer market,  
inc luding  B r i t i s h  GEC and AEI and American Philco  and Bendix. In the  case 
s tu d ie s  i t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies hoped to  use t h e i r  
knowledge of  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e i r  e a r l y  exper ience  of the  
t r a n s i s t o r ,  to  lever  t h e i r  way in to  the  forming market.  I t  was Philco  in 
the USA and EMI in Europe which managed to market the  f i r s t  l a rge  sca le  
s o l id  s t a t e  computers.  Most of t h e se  companies t a r g e t e d  the  commercial, 
r a t h e r  than the  s c i e n t i f i c ,  computer market f o r  t h e i r  fo r ay s :  t h i s  had 
become th e  l a r g e s t  p a r t  of th e  market with the  most p o t e n t i a l  f o r  growth.
Notably,  i t  was during t h i s  genera t ion  of  computing t h a t  the  most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  s t a r t - u p  computer companies were founded: Control  Data Corp. 
and D ig i t a l  Equipment Corp . ,  both o f  which became major p lay e r s  in the  
world market.
However, th e  most no tab le  second generat ion machines once again came 
from IBM. The 1401 was the  f i r s t  computer to exceed 10,000 i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  
an o rde r  of  magnitude l a r g e r  than th e  machines i t  rep laced .  The 1401 became 
the workhorse o f  the  commercial computing world. The second no tab le  s e r i e s  
of machines were the  va r ious  IBM 70** s e r i e s  computers.  These were la rge  
commercial and s c i e n t i f i c  machines.  The various  IBM 70** computers were 
again th e  workhorses of  t h e i r  f i e l d s ,  the  7070/2/4 in la rge  sca le  
commercial computing and the  7090/94 in s c i e n t i f i c  computing. Both of  these  
l in e s  so ld  many hundreds51.
Chapter e i g h t  shows t h a t  i t  was IBM's a b i l i t y  to  con t ro l  the  second 
genera t ion  of  computers t h a t  was the  key to i t s  continued dominance of  the  
market.  I t  was a t  t h i s  s tage  t h a t  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, a number of 
which were much l a rg e r  than IBM, had a p o t e n t i a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  compet i t ive  
advantage by applying t h e i r  e l e c t r o n i c  technology to  the  computer market. 
IBM's b e t t e r  market knowledge and marketing techniques  saw o f f  t h i s
s l See below, chapter  8 ,  pp315-319.
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Third g e n e r a t io n ,  a id-1960s  onwards.
This r e p re se n t s  the  pe r iod  in which computer technology became more 
fo rm al i sed .  The core change in technology was the  move from the  d i s c r e t e  
t r a n s i s t o r  as the  logic  component, to  the  in teg ra ted  c i r c u i t  which combined 
a number of  t r a n s i s t o r s ,  t o g e th e r  with other s o l i d  s t a t e  components such 
as diodes and s i l i c o n  r e s i s t o r s ,  onto a s in g l e  piece  of s i l i c o n  or 
germanium. Since t h i s  t ime much e f f o r t  has gone in to  s t r i v i n g  f o r  an ever 
g r e a t e r  d e n s i t y  of  c i r c u i t s  on the  ch ip .
However, the  t h i r d  gen e ra t io n  of  computing was hera lded by the IBM 
360 family :  a system which d id  not use IC components52. IBM ins tead  used 
a hybrid technology, s i l i c o n  with r e s i s t o r s  and o th e r  pass ive  components 
b u i l t  in ,  with  t r a n s i s t o r s  so ldered  on. Nor did the  most success fu l  B r i t i s h  
t h i r d  g e n e ra t io n  computer use ICs. The ICT 1900 family  used t r a n s i s t o r s .  
What r e a l l y  d i s t in g u i s h e d  the  t h i r d  generation  of  machines was the  adoption 
of a more advanced a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  more advanced ope ra t ing  programs, and, 
most impor tan t ,  c o m p a t ib i l i ty  between whole f a m i l i e s  of  computers.  Before 
t h i s  computers were optimised f o r  th e  sca le  of c a l c u l a t i o n  they  were meant 
to  undertake  and they va r ied  g r e a t l y  because r ap id  te ch n ica l  change meant 
t h a t  models e n te r in g  the  market a t  j u s t  one or two year  i n t e r v a l s  were very 
d i f f e r e n t .  These changes to  th e  o rgan isa t ion  of  computer ranges  were 
ad d i t io n a l  to  th e  usual cyc le  o f  us ing f a s t e r  components and lowering 
manufacturing c o s t s ,  producing b e t t e r  pr ice :performance r a t i o s  and g r e a te r  
f u n c t i o n a l i t y .
The IBM 360 was a range of  computers which o f f e red  a l l  these  
f e a t u r e s .  Users o f  the  range could op t  f o r  a small system with punched card 
in p u t -o u tp u t ,  o r  a very la rge  computer capable of the  most complex ta sks  
and c o n t r o l l i n g  banks of  d i sk  and tape d r i v e s .  These systems were 
compatible th roughout .  For a la rg e  company t h i s  meant computer and software 
s tandards  would be the  same throughout  the  company. For sm al le r  f i rm s,  
expansion to  l a r g e r  systems would not c rea te  headaches of reprogramming 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  and arranging  complex d a ta  swapping, a common problem before  
t h i s  concept.
Almost every  f irm fol lowed t h i s  example, though a number of novel 
t a c t i c s  were adopted to  take  advantage of the change to  the  new genera t ion .  
Honeywell, and to  some degree GE53, made t h e i r  new machines backward
52See below, chapter  8,  pp320-325.
53See below, chap ter  7, pp270-273.
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compatible with old IBM computers in th e  hope t h a t  users  would upgrade to  
t h e i r  systems r a t h e r  than th e  new IBM range. RCA's Spectra  70 s e r i e s 54 
was made compatible with the  new IBM 360 range,  a t a c t i c  which was aimed 
a t  making RCA th e  s tandard  second source  fo r  IBM a r c h i t e c t u r e  machines.  RCA 
also hoped t h a t  i t  would b e n e f i t  from i t s  more advanced component 
technology; i t  was the  f i r s t  major range to  e x p l o i t  IC components 
techniques .
The 360 was a worthy successor  to IBM's second genera t ion  of 
computers. Figure 1 .355 showed a s t a l l  in computer s a l e s  in 1964 
following the  announcement of  the  IBM 360. This was followed by a boom in 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  due,  in the  main, to  th e  thousands of  360 family  machines 
produced. By t h i s  t ime computer technology was becoming commonplace, 
employing hundreds of thousands in both bui ld ing  the  machines and opera t ing  
them.
This was th e  dynamic market in which the  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms were 
t ry ing  to  e s t a b l i s h  a p resence .  What follows i s  a s tudy of the  s t r a t e g i e s  
adopted by f irms wishing to  e x p l o i t  t e ch n ica l  knowledge and market power, 
derived from a broad base o f  o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  to  win a share 
of t h i s  new indus t ry .
54See below, chap ter  6, pp230-233.
55See above, p38.
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Chapter 2
The F e r ran t i  Company and th e  e a r lv  computer indus t ry .
Development of the  Company.
As a family  owned f i rm  F e r r a n t i  i s  unique among the  companies s tud ied  
in t h i s  t h e s i s .  RCA, IBM and English  E l e c t r i c  a l l  had powerful a u to c ra t s  
leading  them a t  one time who passed contro l  o f  the  f i rm  to  t h e i r  sons. 
However, the  ac t ions  of th e se  f a t h e r - s o n  d y n a s t i e s  were tempered by the 
need to  s a t i s f y  ex te rna l  sources  of c a p i t a l ,  and by the  non-family  board 
members. There were no such r e s t r i c t i o n s  in F e r r a n t i .  Because of  t h i s  
ownership s t r u c t u r e ,  F e r r a n t i  was a f irm ca r ry in g  an unusual ly  la rge 
h i s t o r i c a l  legacy. I t  is  impor tant to  understand the  h i s t o r y  o f  Fe r ran t i  
so t h a t  l a t e r  s t r a t e g i e s  can be seen in proper con tex t .
The company was formed by Sebast ian  Ziani de F e r r a n t i  and two 
backers ,  Alf red  Thompson and F ranc is  Ince,  in 18821. Sebast ian  worked a t  
the  f o r e f r o n t  of technology in the  r a p i d l y  expanding e l e c t r i c a l  indus t ry .  
His achievements included th e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t i n g  cu r re n t  power p l a n t ,  high 
vol tage  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c ab le s ,  e l e c t r i c  cu r ren t  mete rs ,  and advances in 
e l e c t r i c a l  tr ansform er  technology2 . The company su f fe red  a number of s e t ­
backs be fo re  th e  1914-18 war,  due t o  growing compet it ion from la rg e r  
e l e c t r i c a l  f i rm s ,  and to  the  c o s t s  a s so c ia ted  with S e b a s t i a n ' s  many 
innovat ions .  For a period  th e  f i rm  was placed in a d m in i s t r a t i o n 3 .
A f te r  the  war, the  f i rm  grew as the importance of  e l e c t r i c i t y  in 
s o c ie ty  grew. However, the  company s t i l l  had problems. The swi tch-gear  
department was closed down a f t e r  th e  war, because i t  req u i red  more 
investment than the  p r iv a t e  funds o f  th e  fi rm could  provide1*. F e r r a n t i  was 
unable to  r a i s e  new c a p i t a l  due to  i t s  s t a t u s  as a p r iv a t e  company, and, 
unwil l ing  to  take  on s u b s t a n t i a l  long-term d e b t ,  opted to  s e l l  t h i s  
department d e s p i t e  i t s  p o t e n t i a l l y  s t ro n g  t r a d in g  p o s i t i o n .  In l a t e r  years  
the  company disposed of  a number o f  departments f o r  th e  same reason,
1W.L. Randell ,  S.Z. de F e r r a n t i - h i s  in f luence  upon e l e c t r i c a l  
development, 2nd e d i t i o n ,  1946.
2F e r r a n t i  I n t e r n a t io n a l  S igna l ,  Fe r r an t i  down the y e a r s . March 1989, 
Pamphlet prepared fo r  F e r r a n t i ' s  p u b l ic  r e l a t i o n s .  F e r r a n t i  Archive.
3J . F .  Wilson, F e r r an t i  and the  B r i t i s h  e l e c t r i c a l  ind u s t ry  1864-1930. 
Manchester, 1988. This book i s  the  b e s t  account o f  the  e a r l y  h i s t o r y  of  the 
company.
^Vincent de F e r r a n t i ,  'The growth and development of Fe r ran t i  
L im i ted ' ,  London School of  Economics, Seminar on the  problems in i n d u s t r i a l  
a d m in s t r a t io n . 22/11/55.
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inc luding  the  computer department.
F e r r a n t i  was a company t h a t  r e l i s h e d  technology. However, many of the  
new products  t h a t  i t  became involved with  were only of  pass ing  i n t e r e s t  to  
the  company: i t  was a w i l l i n g  developer  of  new technology but  was inna te ly  
conse rva t ive  when faced with a com pet i t ive  market. One example o f  t h i s  was 
in the  consumer market. Sebas t ian  developed the domestic e l e c t r i c  f i r e  with 
r e f l e c t i v e  metal behind i t  t o  r a d i a t e  h ea t .  The f i rm  a l so  produced domestic 
e l e c t r o n i c s  such as e a r l y  r a d io  k i t s ,  and, in the  l a t e  1930s, t e l e v i s i o n  
s e t s .  Domestic e l e c t r i c a l  and e l e c t r o n i c s  goods were only a sh o r t  l ived  
a c t i v i t y ,  both abandoned by the  end of  the  1950s as compet it ion  increased .
The f i r m ' s  most important pre -war e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t y  was rad io  
components. I t  produced a range of components inc luding the  AF3 t ransformer  
which g r e a t l y  improved the  q u a l i t y  of  rad io  re c e p t io n 5 . In 1935 the  Moston 
Radio works was opened which con ta ined  a l l  the  l i g h t e r  s ide  of the  
bus iness ,  the  Radio,  Valve and Domestic Appliance Departments.  As mentioned 
above, n e i t h e r  the  Radio nor Appliances o rgan isa t ions  would l a s t  long.
The va lve and component o p e ra t io n s  led to  F e r r a n t i ' s  la rg e  e l e c t r o n i c  
components bus iness  a f t e r  th e  war. The second major element in F e r r a n t i ' s  
e l e c t r o n i c  development was the  Ins truments  Department. This was F e r r a n t i ' s  
c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  engineer ing  o p e ra t io n .  Some of i t s  f i r s t  products were 
e lec t ro -m echan ica l  a i r c r a f t  in s t rum en ts ,  which proved use fu l  in the  war:
'Out of t h i s ,  i t  [ th e  Instruments Department] even tu a l ly
became almost a development l a b o ra to ry  f o r  govrnment c o n t r a c t s . ' 6
F e r r a n t i ' s  f i r s t  w a r - r e l a t e d  c o n t r a c t  came as e a r l y  as 1934: i t  was 
fo r  mechanical  fu s e s 7 , a product i t  had a lso  made in the  F i r s t  World War. 
This was followed by c o n t r a c t s  f o r  r a d a r  and nav igat ion  equipment,  work 
i n i t i a l l y  c a r r i e d  out a t  i t s  Moston p l a n t .  To cope with inc reas ing  m i l i t a r y  
demand a new opera t ion  was s e t  up in  Edinburgh. I n i t i a l l y  i t  produced 
navigat ion  equipment, and l a t e r  r a d a r  and f i r e - c o n t r o l  systems. The 
S c o t t i sh  b us iness  kept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  these  a reas  a f t e r  the  war, with 
the  r e s t  o f  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  o pe ra t ion  concentra ted  in Manchester.
Therefore  F e r r an t i  was unique among e l e c t r i c a l  and e l e c t r o n i c  
manufacturers  in t h a t  i t  was a p r i v a t e  concern.  I t  was run by a family  t h a t  
put g r e a t  s t o r e  on technology and eng ineer ing .  However, th e  p r i v a t e  s t a t u s  
a f fe c ted  i t s  freedom of a c t io n  and i n s t i l l e d  a conservati sm on i t s
5J .F .W ilson ,  F e r r an t i  1964-1930. ppl37-8.
6 ' F e r r a n t i - t h e  family  and th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' .  The E l e c t r i c a l  
Manufac turer. J u ly  1958, pp22-25.
7Ib id .
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War work and the  post-war impetus to  bu i ld  computers.
The Second World War had a g r e a t  e f f e c t  on the  F e r r an t i  company. The 
fundamental change was the  growth of the  high technology c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  markets.  To deal with m i l i t a r y  work, F e r r an t i  b u i l t  up a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e l e c t r o n i c s  c a p a b i l i t y ,  with la rge  development and 
manufacturing f a c i l i t i e s  being ded ica ted  to  c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c  equipment.
The t rans fo rm a t ion  to  peace t ime manufacture was not an easy one f o r  
the  company to  make. F e r r a n t i  was not a recognised fo r c e  in c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  before  the  war8 , but i t  now had a very la rge  commitment to  
t h i s  market.  A f te r  the  war, i t  was faced with a c o l lap se  in i t s  order 
books. This was not unique to  F e r r a n t i ,  the  end of war meant a c o l l a p s e  in 
the  o rder  book f o r  a l l  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies: most companies expected th e re  
to  be a de lay  between the  end of  war r e l a t e d  orders  and a commensurate r i s e  
in commercial work . This i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Figure 2.1 which shows what the  
leading company in the  e l e c t r o n i c s  market,  Marconi, expected to  happen to  
i t s  s a l e s  a f t e r  the  war9 :
8Marconi Archive,  'P o s t  War Po l icy -Fac tua l  Review of  Pre-war and 
Current P o s i t i o n s ' ,  1944.
9Marconi Archive,  'Repor t  on post-war problems in r e l a t i o n  to  s a le s  
p o l i c y ' ,  p repared by R.D. Bangay, 10/5/44.
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Figure 2.1
Projected effect of war ending on 
the sales of the Marconi Company.
End of war witi^Germany
(0co
End of war wit
Effect of break clauses in contracts
1 2 3 41 0 5
Year
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This  was the  s i t u a t i o n  faced by F e r r a n t i ' s  Inst ruments Department, 
but o th e r  p a r t s  of the  company b e n e f i t t e d  from peace. Those s e c t io n s  
involved in the  e l e c t r i c a l  s id e  of  the  company gained from post-war r e ­
equipment and expansion of th e  n a t i o n a l i s e d  e l e c t r i c i t y  in d u s t ry .
On the  face  of i t ,  t h i s  temporary downturn in the  demand f o r  c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  would not seem t o  have been much of a problem. F e r r a n t i  wanted 
to  main ta in  an i n t e r e s t  in th e  new e l e c t r o n i c  te ch n o lo g ies ,  and i t  had 
p r o f i t s  from the  e l e c t r i c a l  s id e  of  the  bus iness  to  t i d e  i t  through th e  
per iod  in which c i v i l  products  were being developed. However, the  f i rm  
r e j e c t e d  the  idea of c ross  s u b s i d i s a t i o n .
The head of F e r r a n t i ' s  Inst rument Department, Eric  Grundy, became 
i n t e r e s t e d  in the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of us ing computers in i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t ro l  
systems10, as a method of us ing the  depar tment 's  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  One key 
seminar paper in t e r e s t e d  him. At the  I n s t i t u t i o n  of E l e c t r i c a l  Engineers 
in 1947, P ro fesso r  Arthur P o r t e r ,  who had worked f o r  F e r r an t i  dur ing  the  
war11, o u t l in e d  th ree  advantages e l e c t r o n i c  equipment could o f f e r  
indus t ry :
' F i r s t ,  e l e c t r o n i c  equipment i s  extremely f l e x i b l e .  The 
c o n t r o l l e d  member can be remote and the  same c o n t r o l l e r  may be used 
f o r  more than one purpose;
Second, a vas t  amount of experience in e l e c t r o n i c  techn iques  
had been developed during the  p a s t  s ix  y e a r s ;  and
Third ,  the  non- techn ica l  poin t  t h a t  in the  United S t a t e s  the  
design and a p p l i c a t io n  of  automatic c o n t r o l l e r  equipment was ahead 
of  the  U.K., but with the  coming of modern e l e c t r o n i c  techn iques  
t h e r e  was no reason why we should not achieve  p a r i t y . '
On th e  recommendation of  P o r t e r ,  Grundy employed a servo-mechanism
ex p er t ,  Dr D ie t r ich  P r in z 12. A f te r  being in te rned  as a German n a t i o n a l ,
Pr inz was re l e a s e d  and served under Por te r  on th e  M in is t ry  o f  Supply 's
Servo Panel.  Grundy planned to  use Pr inz ,  and h i s  a s s i s t a n t ,  t o  develop
e l e c t r o n i c  con t ro l  systems:
'Grundy asked S i r  Vincent de F e r r a n t i  to  sponsor a s tudy  of 
automatic  con t ro l  from general  company funds ,  but t h i s  was r e fu s e d ,  
and Pr inz was employed on a s tudy of r a d a r  d i s p la y  f o r  the  M in is t ry
10National  Archive f o r  the  H is to ry  of Computing, Bernard Swann, s a l e s  
manager of  the  F e r r an t i  Computer Department, 'The F e r r an t i  Computer 
Department ' ,  1975. This paper was prepared f o r  the  Computer Science 
Department of  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty ,  F e r r a n t i ' s  c lose  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  in 
computer design.
11lb i d .
121 b i d.
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S i r  Vincent had a number of reasons fo r  t h i s  d e c i s io n .  F i r s t l y  the  
B er l in  blockade increased  th e  urgency o f  radar  developments.  However, th e re  
was ano ther  reason f o r  V in cen t ' s  lack of i n t e r e s t .  During the  post-war 
pe r io d ,  F e r r a n t i  was adopt ing a pol icy  of  opera t ing  autonomous 
depar tments1"1. Throughout the  h i s t o r y  of the  F e r r an t i  Computer 
Department,  but e s p e c i a l l y  in th e  e a r l y  days, the  F e r r an t i  family  expressed 
the  view t h a t  i t  was unw il l ing  to  use c en t r a l  company funds to  develop the  
computer b u s in e s s .  Grundy had to  f i n d  the  f inance  to  c a r ry  out h i s  plans  
from elsewhere .  Two op t ions  e x i s t e d .  F i r s t l y ,  he could u t i l i s e  in t e rn a l  
department r e so u rce s ,  though t h i s  was not enough given the  drop in m i l i t a r y  
s a l e s .  Secondly,  he could t r y  to  f i n d  some e x te r n a l  sponsorship  f o r  t h i s  
development.
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  a family  company was opera t ing  in t h i s  
d e c e n t r a l i s e d  way. This was ahead of  th e  big th r e e  e l e c t r i c a l  manufacturers  
in the  UK - GEC, EE and AEI - who would not adopt t h i s  method u n t i l  the  
l a t e r  1950s and 1960s, in the  meantime continuing  to  use a f u n c t io n a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n 15. The o rg a n i s a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e  and S i r  V incen t ' s  level of 
con t ro l  over  the  f irm i s  d iscussed  below16.
In th e  summer of 1948 Pr inz  was again a v a i l a b l e  to  Grundy, the  r ad a r  
d i s p la y  having been completed. Grundy dispatched Pr inz to  study computer 
developments in the  USA17. With the  a id  of P o r t e r ,  Pr inz managed to  look 
a t  a number o f  th e  key developments in America18. Grundy's i n s t r u c t i o n s  
to  Pr inz  s t i l l  e x i s t  in a te legram s en t  to  him in 194819:
'Wil l  you p lease  cons ider  th e  p rep a ra t io n  of a complete r e p o r t  
on d i g i t a l  computing as you have seen i t  Stop I would l i k e  to  submit
13Ib id .
14P .D ra th ,  'The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between sc ience  and technology: 
U n ive rs i ty  re sea rch  and th e  computer indus t ry ,  1945-1962' ,  PhD Thes is ,  
Manchester U n iv e r s i ty ,  1973, p4 -12. This comes from a Drath in te rv iew with 
Grundy.
15R.Jones  and 0 . M a r r io t t ,  Anatomy of a Merger: a H is to ry  of  GEC. AEI 
and Engl ish E l e c t r i c . 1970. This i s  t h e  most comprehensive s tudy of the  
th ree  major B r i t i s h  e l e c t r i c a l  companies.
16pp58-62.
17P.L. Young, pub l ic  r e l a t i o n s  employee of F e r r an t i  Computer 
Department, 'The growth of  a computer depar tm en t ' ,  p a r t  I ,  The E l e c t r i c a l  
Manufacture r. March 1958, ppl8-20.
18Swann ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
19NAHC, F e r / b l .
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t h i s  to  H i t c h ' s  su p e r io r s  as a l ev e r  to  persuade them to  f inance  our 
developments fo r  t h e i r  use S top '
The Mark 1 Computer
I t  appears t h a t  one of P r i n z ' s  main conclus ions  from h is  t r i p ,  was 
t h a t  the  UK had as good a p o s i t i o n  in the new technology as th e  USA. One 
of B r i t a i n ' s  c en t r e s  of e x ce l len ce  was developing a t  Manchester 
U n iv e rs i ty 20 , th e  company's home town. The U n iv e r s i t y ' s  computer a c t i v i t y  
was cen t red  in the  E l e c t r i c a l  Engineering Department and was led by 
P ro fesso r  F.C. Will iams. Will iams, and h is  a s s i s t a n t  TomKilburn,  had been 
working a t  the  Telecommunications Research Establishment dur ing  the  war 
y ear s .  In 1946 they moved to  Manchester and continued t h e i r  work on 
e l e c t r o n i c  s to rag e  techn iques21 . Will iams'  most famous c o n t r ib u t io n  to  
computer hardware development was th e  Williams Tube. This was a cathode- 
ray - tube  t h a t  was used to  s to r e  d i g i t a l  information .  I t  was one of  the  few 
e a r ly  methods o f  s to r in g  da ta  f o r  use by a computer.  This dev ice  was not 
only used in e a r l y  Fe r r an t i  machines,  bu t was a l so  used by IBM in i t s  f i r s t  
e l e c t r o n i c  computers22.
In June 1948 Williams had completed the  'baby Mark 1' which was 
claimed to  be th e  w or ld ' s  f i r s t  s tored-program computer23. Most of the  
funding f o r  the  e a r ly  Manchester work came from the  Royal Soc ie ty ,  but t h i s  
was a f i n i t e  source.  Grundy saw t h i s  e a r ly  machine,  but the  Instrument 
Department d id  not have the  f i n a n c i a l  resources  to  develop the  t e s t  bed 
in to  a f u l l  s c a l e  computer. In any case ,  the  whole f i e l d  was completely  
unknown to  the  company, and t h e r e  was l i t t l e  idea of who would be the  
customers f o r  such machines.  In f a c t ,  i t  was the  F e r r an t i  Radio Department 
t h a t  was f i r s t  involved with Will iams '  work. Williams was an ad v iso r  to  the  
Radio Department and in r e t u r n  i t  provided some hardware to  the  U n iv e r s i ty  
p r o j e c t 24. L a te r  t h e re  was a c e r t a i n  amount of  c o n f l i c t  between the  Radio 
and Ins truments  departments  as to  which should have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r
2°P.L. Young, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Dept. Pt  I ' .
21S.H. Lavington, 'Computer development a t  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty '  in:  
A h i s t o r y  of  computing in the  tw e n t ie th  centu rv-a  c o l l e c t i o n  of  e ssav s .  ed.  
N. Metropol is ,  J .  Howlett and Gian-Carlo Rota, New York, 1980. The National  
Archive f o r  th e  His to ry  of Computing has a l a rge  c o l l e c t i o n  cover ing the  
computers developed in Manchester U n ivers i ty .
22C.J .  Bashe e t  a l ,  IBM's Ear lv  Computers. Cambridge, Mass. ,  1986.
23Lavington 'Computer Development a t  Manchester U n i v e r s i t y ' .
24John Hendry, Innovating f o r  f a i l u r e :  Government po l icy  and the  e a r l v  
B r i t i s h  computer indus t ry .  Cambridge, Massachuset ts ,  1989, p42.
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developing Will iams '  des ign .  The Instruments  Department won the  b a t t l e  but 
the  team t h a t  worked on computers was drawn from both o p e ra t io n s 2®. The 
Radio Department developed the  c i r c u i t s ,  while th e  Instruments Department 
provided the  p re c i s io n  eng ineer ing  s i d e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the  magnetic drum which 
acted  as a l a rge  backing s t o r e  to  th e  f a s t e r  Will iams Tubes26.
While the  Instruments  Department had no resources  to  develop 
Will iams '  computer, t h e re  had been some movement in government c i r c l e s  
r egard ing  f u r t h e r  development of a domestic computer c a p a b i l i t y .  P ro fesso r  
P.M.S. B la c k e t t ,  o f  Manchester U n i v e r s i t y ' s  Physics  Department, d i scussed  
the  s i t u a t i o n  with the  government 's  Chief S c i e n t i s t  a t  the  M in is t ry  of 
Supply, S i r  Ben Lockspeiser27 . A f te r  he had seen the  p ro to type  he 
immediately s en t  F e r r an t i  a l e t t e r  o f  i n t e n t  to  purchase a Mark 1 computer 
to  be i n s t a l l e d  in the  U n iv e r s i ty 28, a machine known as MADAM. The 
c o n t r a c t  was not placed through the  ap p ro p r ia te  c o n t r a c t s  department of the  
MoS, and was not open to  t e n d e r .  This seems a p p ro p r ia te  as F e r r an t i  had 
a l ready  c o n t r ib u te d  to  the  p r o j e c t  and was c lo se  to  the  development team. 
However, Hendry r e l a t e s  t h a t  Williams himself  would have p r e f e r r e d  to  work 
with EMI which he saw as the  premier  e l e c t r o n i c s  company in the  
country29 . As w i l l  be seen below, EMI was f u l l y  occupied with t e l e v i s i o n  
a t  t h i s  t ime.
L o c k sp e i s e r ' s  d e c i s io n  j u s t  to  ge t  on with th e  job and to  a u th o r i s e  
the  b u i ld in g  of  a system was d r iven  by the need f o r  computers in defence 
work. As in th e  USA, the  concern of th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  was not so much with 
computers themselves ,  but with prov id ing  computational f a c i l i t i e s  powerful 
enough to  ensure  t h a t  the  UK could keep up in areas  such as nuc lear  
engineer ing  and a i r c r a f t  and m i s s i l e  dynamics; the  main new techno log ies  
of i n t e r e s t  to  th e  US and B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s .  The M inis t ry  o f  Supply 
was r e f l e c t i n g  a demand de r ived  from m i l i t a r y  t echno log ica l  advance.
25Ib id .
26Young, 'F e r r a n t i  Computer Dept p t  I ' .
27Drath 'R e la t io n s h ip  between sc ience  and technology '  4-12.
28Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
29Hendry, Innovat ing f o r  f a i l u r e . pp55-6.
51
Producing and s e l l i n g  Mark 1 computers: the  r o l e  o f  the  National  Research 
and Development Corpora tion.
i )  The MADAM and FERUT computers.
From 1949 to  Ju ly  1951 th e  Instruments  Department was c o n s t r u c t in g  
MADAM. To do t h i s  the  M in is t ry  of  Supply had given i t  a budget o f  £120,000 
to  develop and produce one machine.  The question  t h a t  occupied the  minds 
of a number of i n t e r e s t e d  bodies  was what would happen nex t .  Lockspeiser 
t r i e d  t o  keep the  momentum going.  He i n i t i a t e d  th e  Brunt Committee which 
was ch a i r ed  by the eminent m e teo ro log is t  S i r  David Brunt30 . This 
committee brought to g e th e r  lead ing  academics and the  r e l e v a n t  government 
depar tments and was intended to  advise  government on computers. He a lso  
t r i e d  to  persuade S i r  Henry Tizard  of the  Advisory Council on S c i e n t i f i c  
Po l icy  to  a u th o r i s e  th e  purchase  of th ree  Mark 1 machines31. This was 
re fused  with Tizard  sugges t ing  t h a t  the  a pp rop r ia te  sponsoring body was the  
Department of  S c i e n t i f i c  and I n d u s t r i a l  Research. Late in 1951 Lockspeiser 
took charge of  the  DSIR.
By 1951 th e  MADAM was being d e l iv e red .  A meeting was held in January 
1951 between Lockspeiser,  Brunt,  Williams and the  head of the  M in is t ry  of 
Supply, B r ig a d ie r  G.H. Hinds, i t  was agreed t h a t  the  MoS c o n t r a c t  needed 
to  be renewed t o  keep the  Manchester and F e r r a n t i  team t o g e t h e r 32. This 
was only  f o r  continued re sea rch  and was a DSIR c o n t r a c t  adminis tered  
through MoS33. Of a more s u b s t a n t i a l  na tu re ,  B r igad ie r  Hinds l e t  i t  be 
known t h a t  MoS wanted a Mark 1 computer fo r  atomic weapons re sea rch  a t  the  
Fort  Hals tead  re sea rch  e s t a b l i sh m e n t34. However, t h i s  would exceed h is  
expendi ture  a u th o r i z a t io n  and a l so  be out of s tep  with com pet i t ive  tender  
p o l i c i e s .  He t h e r e f o r e  had to  wai t  to  place  a formal c o n t r a c t .
At t h i s  t ime a new body, the  National Research and Development 
Corpora tion ,  s tepped in .  I t  was not mandated to  employ inven t ions  f o r  
m i l i t a r y  work but to  ensure  t h a t  they  were e x p lo i te d  f o r  the  b e n e f i t  of the  
B r i t i s h  economy3 5 . The NRDC's main a s s e t s  were the  pa ten t  r i g h t s  i t  took
3°Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
31 lb i d .
32NRDC 86 /7 /5  Concluding minutes of  a meeting held 22/1 /51 .
33NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 .  Halsbury,  Managing D irec to r  of the  NRDC, to  W.G. Bass,  
F e r r an t i  D i r e c to r  with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  computer o p e ra t io n .  21/6 /51 .
34Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer depar tment ' .
35Hendry, Innovating f o r  F a i l u r e . pp7-22.
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over from o the r  government depar tments .  I t  was t h e se  p a ten t s  i t  was meant 
t o  e x p l o i t :  the se  included th e  r i g h t s  t o  the  Wil l iams '  computer inven t ions .  
N ego t ia t ions  between the  NRDC and F e r r an t i  s t a r t e d  in 1950/1.
However, the  next machine to  be sold was not supported by the  UK 
government.  F e r r an t i  managed to  s e l l  a Mark 1 to  the  U n iv e rs i ty  of 
Toronto3®, and was known as the  FERUT. This s a l e  owed much to  the  
personal c o n tac t s  of P ro fesso r  P o r te r  and the  e f f o r t s  of F e r r a n t i ' s  f i r s t  
computer s a le s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  Vivian ( l a t e r  Lord) Bowden. The FERUT and 
MADAM c o n t r a c t s  seem to  have formed F e r r a n t i ' s  con ten t ion  t h a t  i t  had 
produced the  f i r s t  commercially a v a i l a b l e  computer,  and i t  was c e r t a i n l y  
f i r s t  t o  export  a computer.
FERUT was purchased to  help in the  co n s t ru c t io n  of the  j o i n t  
US/Canadian St Lawrence Seaway. Canada wanted to  ensure  t h a t  i t  matched the  
c o n t r ib u t io n  of the  USA in the  co n s t ru c t io n  of t h i s  cana l .  One way i t  did  
t h i s  was to  provide the  design  c a l c u l a t i o n s :  t h i s  was where th e  computer 
came in 37.
F e r r a n t i  found t h a t  FERUT was an ambitious p r o j e c t .  Problems were 
caused by a number of f a c t o r s .  F i r s t l y  i t  was one of th e  w o r ld ' s  f i r s t  
computers,  and the  f i r s t  to  be exported  th ree  thousand m iles .  Another cause 
of the  problems was the  f a c t  t h a t  F e r r an t i  was not w i l l i n g  t o  bear the  
t o t a l  c o s t  of bu i ld ing  the  machine, n e i th e r  was the  Canadian government 
w i l l i n g  to  pay f o r  i t  ahead of  d e l iv e r y .  The r e s u l t  was t h a t  as each sub- 
assembly of  the  machine was manufactured i t  was exported to  Toronto and 
paid f o r  by the  Canadian government. The computer was not f i r s t  assembled 
and t e s t e d  in Manchester38. Another problem was the  inexper ience  of  the  
Canadian o p e r a to r s .  F e r r a n t i ,  g r e a t l y  helped by the  c h ie f  FERUT maintenance 
eng ineer ,  and the  NRDC programming e x p e r t  Chris topher  S t rachey ,  managed to  
ge t  the  machine working f o r  the  1952 Toronto Computer Conference.  The 
Seaway c a l c u l a t i o n s  were a l so  f i n i s h e d  in record  t ime. However, Swann 
be l ieved  t h a t  th e  machine's  renowned r e l i a b i l i t y  problems c r ip p l e d  the  
firms chances of  making ano ther  s a l e  in North America3®. F e r r a n t i  was 
c o n t in u a l ly  handicapped by a r e p u ta t i o n  fo r  u n r e l i a b i l i t y .  On the  o the r  
hand, FERUT did  launch F e r r a n t i ' s  Canadian company, F e r r an t i  Packard,  in to  
a sh o r t  but i n f l u e n t i a l  computer fo r ay ,  as i t  was F e r r an t i -P ack a rd  which
3®Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
37Ib id .
3SIb i d .
39Ib id .
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main ta ined the  machine once th e  B r i t i s h  engineers  went home. A f te r  t h i s  
exper ience ,  the  NRDC's C hr is topher  Strachey prepared plans  f o r  d e t a i l e d  
t e s t i n g  of  f u tu r e  machines40 . I t  a l so  led to  an upgrading of  fu tu r e  
machines to  the  Mark 1* s tan d a rd .
i i )  The NRDC's a ttempt t o  merge th e  computer and t a b u l a t o r  i n d u s t r i e s .
Discussions  between F e r r a n t i  and the NRDC can be d iv ided  in to  two 
c a t e g o r i e s .  One s e t  of p lans  concerned the d i r e c t  support  o f  th e  computer 
o p e ra t io n s  a t  F e r r a n t i .  Another,  l e s s  success fu l  and l e s s  fo rm al ,  s e t  of 
t a l k s  r e l a t e d  to  the  e f f o r t s  of  the  NRDC to br ing  the  UK in d u s t ry  to g e th e r .
The l a t t e r  t a l k s  revolved  around Halsbury 's  d e s i r e  to  ensure  t h a t  the  
UK had a compet itor to  IBM41 . In 1950 IBM was not making computers,  but 
had a l re ad y  taken out a l i c e n s e  from the  NRDC f o r  the  Williams Tube, indeed 
t h i s  proved to  be a good source o f  funds fo r  the  Corpora tion .  Halsbury saw 
a major t h r e a t  in the  form of  IBM bu i ld in g  computers as an ex tens ion  to  i t s  
t a b u l a t o r  b us iness .  He b e l ieved  t h e r e  was a major t h r e a t  of IBM corner ing  
the  world market fo r  computers.  His i n i t i a l  e f f o r t s  in a r rang ing  round 
t a b l e  t a l k s  between the  e l e c t r o n i c s  and the bus iness  machine companies,  to  
develop a s t r a t e g y  f o r  computer production ,  came to  nought. Halsbury 's  
second e f f o r t  to  produce a B r i t i s h  compet itor to  the  perceived t h r e a t  from 
IBM, was t r y i n g  to  form a l in k  between B r i t i s h  Tabula to r  Machines ' s42 
bus iness  machines knowledge, and F e r r a n t i ' s  e l e c t r o n i c  technology 
c a p a b i l i t y .  However, BTM was f u l l y  occupied t r y i n g  to  compete with  IBM in 
the f i e l d  of  t a b u l a t o r s 43 and had l i t t l e  time f o r  an unproven technology. 
BTM was a l s o  concerned t h a t  IBM might ge t  hold of  any technology t h a t  i t  
might develop under c o n t r a c t  with the  NRDC. IBM was a l ready  an e s t a b l i s h e d  
l ic ensee  o f  t h e  NRDC, and BTM was concerned t h a t  the  v e s t i n g  o f  p a ten t  
r i g h t s  t o  th e  NRDC could b e n e f i t  i t s  r i v a l .  Some plans  were made f o r  
Fe r r an t i  and BTM t o  work to g e th e r  but they  came to  noth ing . A l a t e r  a t tempt 
to develop a l in k  between F e r r a n t i  and the  o the r  B r i t i s h  bus iness  machines 
f irm,  Powers-Samas, a l so  came to  l i t t l e ,  as i s  expla ined  l a t e r .
4°NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  In t e r n a l  Memo from C. Strachey to  J .  Crawley then the  
NRDC's s e c r e t a r y .
41Hendry, Innovating f o r  f a i l u r e . pp60-73.
42Up to  t h i s  time BTM had been IBM's B r i t i s h  l i c e n se e ,  see  below, 
chapte r 5, pp l61-163.
43lb i d .
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i i i )  Build ing  and s e l l i n g  th e  Mark 1*.
Having f a i l e d  to  in f luence  the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  embryonic in dus t ry ,  
th e  NRDC was l e f t  with l i t t l e  choice  but to  support  and encourage F e r r an t i  
in the  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of th e  Mark 1 computer. This proved d i f f i c u l t  to  
a r range ,  and a t  l e a s t  ten  months were wasted in pursuing a plan t h a t  would 
be unacceptable  to  the  s e n io r  F e r r a n t i  management. In February 1951, 
W.G.Bass, d i r e c t o r  in charge of  F e r r a n t i ' s  computer o p e ra t io n s ,  wrote to  
Halsbury with a plan of  ac t io n * 4 . I t  cons is ted  of  four  p o in t s :
a] Fundamental r e s ea rc h .
b] Commercial s a l e  of f u l l y  engineered Mark 1 computers.
c] Production of s p e c i a l i s t  bus iness  vers ions  of the  Mark 1, to  be produced 
in con junct ion  with u se r s .
d] Development o f  a b u s i n e s s - o r i e n t a t e d  computer to  r e p lace  the  e x i s t i n g  
types  of  bus iness  machines.
Bass wanted the NRDC to  support  sec t ions  c] and d] of t h i s  scheme. 
F e r r an t i  e s t im ated  t h a t  expend i tu re  on these  a reas  would amount to  
£100,000, spent over th r e e  y e a r s .  Bass suggested t h a t  the  NRDC c o n t r ib u t e  
f i f t y  pe rcen t  o f  t h i s .  This was not th e  bas is  t h a t  the  NRDC wanted to  s t a r t  
from. F e r r a n t i  wanted the  NRDC to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the  longer term aspec ts  
of the  programme. The NRDC, however, was more i n t e r e s t e d  in Mark 1 s a l e s ;  
i t  was th e se  p a ten t s  t h a t  th e  NRDC was adm in is te r ing45.
The NRDC suggested making a loan aga ins t  some form of development and 
production agreement f o r  th e  Mark 1. Bass and Grundy made a counter  
p roposa l ,  sugges t ing  the  NRDC make a d i r e c t  investment in F e r r a n t i ' s  
computer o p e ra t io n 46. The NRDC chairman, S i r  Percy M il l s ,  was cool to  the  
idea,  as he be l ieved  t h a t  i t  would show too much b ia s  in favour  of 
F e r r a n t i 47Also,  given Vincent de F e r r a n t i ' s  l a t e r  a t t i t u d e ,  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  b e l iev e  t h a t  he would have agreed to  t h i s  p lan .
N ego t ia t ions  were long and labor ious ,  bu t ,  u n t i l  the  second h a l f  of 
1951, MADAM and FERUT kept F e r r a n t i  busy.  One problem was in demarcating 
the  r o l e s  o f  the  NRDC and the  M in is t ry  of Supply. The FERUT p r i c e  included 
r o y a l t i e s  f o r  both o rg a n i s a t i o n s .  I t  was not u n t i l  l a t e  1951 t h a t  the  NRDC
44NRDC 86 /7 /5 ,  20/2 /51.
45NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  Hennessey, NRDC Patent  Manager, comments on F e r r an t i
p roposa ls ,  21/2 /51 .
4SNRDC 86 /7 /5 ,  minutes of meeting between NRDC and F e r r a n t i  25/4 /51.
47Ibid.
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seems to  have taken f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  There was a l so  some disagreement 
over p a t e n t  arrangements,  as  th e  NRDC wanted to  a c t  as a p a t e n t s  pool to  
enable  B r i t i s h  firms to  ge t  access  to  a l l  p o s s ib le  technology.
On the  9th November 1951, Halsbury wrote to  Bass with a f i rm  proposal 
based on B ass 's  e a r l i e r  idea48. The NRDC was prepared to  loan th e  company 
£50,000 a t  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of  5%. I t  was to  be re p a id  by a simple  5% levy 
on s a l e s  o f  a l l  computer equipment made by F e r r a n t i .  The exac t  l icence  
s i t u a t i o n  was s t i l l  t o  be n e g o t ia ted .  I t  was going t o  be based on th e  NRDC 
re c e iv in g  the  r i g h t s  to  any F e r r an t i  invention made under the  arrangement 
u n t i l  50% of the  loan had been r e p a id ,  and t h e r e a f t e r ,  F e r r a n t i  would 
r e t a i n  UK r i g h t s  and the  NRDC overseas  r i g h t s ,  o r  v ice  ve rsa .
I t  seems t h a t  up t o  t h i s  s tage  th e  Instruments Department management 
had been n e g o t i a t in g  on i t s  own b e h a l f ,  without much input from the  r e s t  
of the  f i rm ,  as these  p lans  flew in the  face  o f  the  f i r m ' s  a t t i t u d e  to  
o u ts id e  funding. Bass '  r e p ly  to  the  NRDC proposal showed t h a t  Vincent 
F e r r an t i  was not well disposed to  such schemes:
'My chairman has given some thought to  your kind l e t t e r  of 
November 9, but has come to  the  conclusion t h a t  he does not want to  
borrow money from anyone except the  bank, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as t h e r e  are  
no cond i t ions  with regard  to  l icences  a t t a ch e d  to  money l e n t  us by 
th e  bank, and they  have no charge on our b u s i n e s s . ' 49
However, Vincent had a counter  proposal which Bass quotes a t  leng th :
' I  understand t h a t  the  func t ion  of  th e  NRDC i s  t o  encourage 
th e  r ap id  a p p l i c a t i o n  of inventions  to  in dus t ry .
The only way I can see t h a t  the  NRDC could help us t o  do t h i s
in the  case of computers,  would be to  o rde r  computers from us which 
we would keep in s tock  f o r  s a le  aga in s t  f i rm  o rd e rs .  As a s a l e  took 
p la ce ,  we would pay them [ the  NRDC] the  c o s t  o f  the  machine,  p lus  an 
agreed p r o f i t ,  say 10%, and get what p r i c e  we could f o r  i t .  Th is ,  in 
f a c t ,  would be s i m i l a r  in i t s  a c t io n  to  a rocke t  launching appara tus  
- once in th e  a i r  we can f l y  - and I suggest  i s  the  most a p p ro p r i a t e  
use o f  t h e i r  ventu re  c a p i t a l . ' 50
Halsbury,  con tac ted  th e  Brunt Committee and S.A. Dakin of  the  Board 
of Trade51 , to  see i f  they  would be in agreement with t h i s  p lan .  At the  
27th NRDC board meeting i t  was rep o r ted  t h a t  th e  BoT would approve of NRDC
funds being spent  in such an arrangement52. However, the  NRDC wanted to
tu rn  th e  plan around so t h a t  i t  was F e r r an t i  t h a t  r e ce ived  a f ixed
48NRDC 86 /7 /5 .
49NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  Bass to  Halsbury,  22/11/51.
5° I b i d .
S1NRDC 86 /7 /5 ,  dated 26/11/51.
52NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  Minutes of the  27th board meeting 27/11/51.
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percentage  p r o f i t  and the  NRDC any p r o f i t  above t h i s .  I t  was proposed t h a t  
th e  NRDC should buy four  machines and then a c t  as the  so le  s t o c k i s t  of 
F e r r a n t i  computers.  F e r r an t i  would then be appointed as s e l l i n g  agen ts ,  and 
would r e c e iv e  a f ix e d  percentage  reward fo r  each s a l e  t h a t  i t  made.
Despi te  V incen t ' s  r e t i c e n c e  towards the  NRDC having some r i g h t s  over 
F e r r a n t i ' s  developments,  th e  Corpora tion i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i t  have l icence  
r i g h t s  during the  period of  th e  suppor t .  I t  argued t h a t  th e  NRDC had spent 
£40,000 in p a ten t in g  Wil l iams '  work, and t h a t  o the r  NRDC sponsored 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  were j u s t  as l i k e l y  t o  generate  computer inven t ions  as 
F e r r a n t i 53 , and th e re fo re  F e r r a n t i  was j u s t  as l i k e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  from 
NRDC l ic e n ce  r i g h t s .  The Corpora tion a l so  had to  ensure t h a t  over t ime i t  
would break even, and l ic ences  were seen as e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h i s  goa l .  With 
the  new s t r u c t u r e  of  suppor t ,  i t  appears  t h a t  the  company r e l e n t e d  on t h i s .
A f te r  the  drawn out n e g o t i a t i o n s  on a loan,  the  t a l k s  on th e  purchase 
agreement seem t o  have gone very smoothly. This was probably  due to  a 
combination of  f a c t o r s .  F e r r a n t i  was g e t t in g  to  the  s tage  where more 
c o n t r a c t s  were needed, while  th e  NRDC was su f f e r in g  from th e  f r u s t r a t i o n  
of  not being ab le  to  c r e a t e  the  combined computer indus t ry  t h a t  i t  d e s i r ed .
Halsbury met Vincent de F e r r a n t i  on the  18th December, and repo r ted  
to  the  next board meeting t h a t  th e  proposed arrangement was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
agreed on5A. F e r r an t i  was to  r e c e iv e  cost  +7.5% to  b u i ld  machines and 
another  5% f o r  a s a l e .  The machines were to  be c a l l e d  th e  Mark 1*, 
fo llowing improvements suggested a f t e r  experience with th e  MADAM and FERUT 
Mark 1 computers.  The no t iona l  c o s t  o f  stocking fo u r  machines was £220,000 
based on manufacturing c o s t s  of £55,000:
Table 2.1 Cost and p r i c e  break-down of the  Mark 1*
£
manufacturing c o s t  50,550
F e r r a n t i  7.5% p r o f i t  3.787
54,337
Computer ex works c o s t  roughly  55,000
i n s t a l l a t i o n  a t  s i t e  10,000
6% r o y a l t y  on NRDC p a te n t s  4,925
n o t iona l  20% NRDC p r o f i t  11,000
s e l l i n g  commission to  F e r r a n t i  2.075
Customer p r i c e  83,000
Source: NRDC 86/10 /2 ,  Managing D i rec to r s  r e p o r t  to  the  33rd NRDC board 
meeting, 28/5 /52 .
53NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  Halsbury to  Bass 4/12/51.
5*NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  Minutes of the  28th NRDC board meeting 19/12/51.
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This p r i c e  was to  in c rease  to  £103,000 abroad,  to  cover th e  e x t ra  
c o s t  o f  ex p o r t .  I f  the  customer wanted the  p rov is ion  of  h igh-speed  input-  
output dev ice s ,  then the  home p r i c e  would be £100,000 and £115,000 abroad.
Even tua l ly  7 Mark l * ' s  were produced, 6 were stocked by th e  NRDC plus  
one f o r  th e  MoS, i t  i s  u n c e r ta in  whether t h i s  machine was s tocked by the  
NRDC or  bought d i r e c t l y  by MoS. The customers and sponsors f o r  a l l  the  
Markl and l * ' s  fo llows:
Table 2,2 Mark 1 S a le s .
Code No. Type Sponsor Customer/User Installed
DC1 Marti MoS/DSIR Manchester University and MoS 1951
DC2 Markl National Development 
Council of Canada
University of Toronto 1952
DC3 Markl* MoS or NRDC MoS 1953
DC4 Markl* NRDC Shell Labs. Holland 1954
DCS Markl* NRDC National Inst, for the Applicarai 
of Mathematics, Rome.
1955
DCS Markl* NRDC M E ,  Aldermaston 1954
Da Markl* NRDC MoS 1955
DC8 Markl* NRDC A.V. Roe I Co. 1954
DC9 Markl* NRDC Armstrong Siddley Motors 1957
Source: B.B . Swann, 'The F e r r a n t i  Computer Department
The f i n a l  machines were commissioned d e sp i t e  some r e s i s t a n c e  from the  
Board of  Trade,  who were worried  t h a t  the  on-going c o n t r a c t  was u l t r a  
v i r e s .  However, by t h i s  s tage  the  machine was becoming in c r e a s in g ly  
ou tda ted55 and was re c e iv in g  l i t t l e  new i n t e r e s t .
Vincent de F e r r a n t i ' s  a t t i t u d e  to  th e se  e a r lv  computer developments.
E a r l i e r  i t  was seen t h a t  the  company re fused  to  c ross  s u b s id i s e  the  
Instrument Department so t h a t  i t  could s t a r t  developing computers56. This 
implies t h a t  F e r r an t i  was o p e ra t in g  a s t r i c t  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  s t r u c t u r e ,  which 
was undoubtedly  th e  i n t e n t i o n .  However, i t  was a family  bus iness  of  l im i ted  
s i z e ,  and i t  seems t h a t  Vincent would have been involved in a number of  the  
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n s  t h a t  ope ra t in g  d iv i s io n s  made.
N ev er th e le s s ,  i t  seems t h a t  the  Instruments  Department d id  have a 
large measure o f  freedom. The Department went ahead with d e t a i l e d  t a l k s  
with th e  NRDC without f e e l i n g  i t  necessary  to  d i scu ss  p o s s ib le  arrangements 
with th e  company management. This was t e s t i f i e d  to  by the  way Vincent ru led  
out the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of the  Instrument Department accept ing  a loan from the
55NRDC 86 /9 /1 ,  Minutes of th e  NRDC's E lec t ro n ic  Computer Sub­
committee, 1 /12/53 .
56See above pp48-50.
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NRDC, a f t e r  the  Department had spent  some time on th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Bass '  
idea o f  th e  NRDC tak ing  a s tak e  in th e  Department would undoubtedly  have 
been abhor ren t  to  Vincent.  I t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  t h i s  degree o f  autonomy led
to  major co n t ro l  and co s t  problems in the  Computer Department during the
mid-1950s.
V in c en t ' s  ov e ra l l  a t t i t u d e  to  the  computer ven ture  seems to  have been 
negat ive  from i t s  incep t ion .  This i s  seen not only  by the  i n i t i a l  r e t i c e n c e  
to  fund th e  expansion in to  computing,  but a l so  by continued d i sp la y s  of 
doubts about the  a d v i s a b i l i t y  of  being in t h i s  market.  The NRDC made t h i s  
c l e a r  t o  th e  Board of Trade when i t  reques ted  permission  t o  fund the  Mark 
1* p r o j e c t :
' I  would be g r a t e f u l  f o r  your e a r l i e s t  in d i c a t io n  t h a t  the  BoT 
w i l l  approve t h i s  t r a n s a c t i o n  in p r i n c i p l e .  You a re  s u f f i c i e n t l y
acquain ted  with the  h i s t o r y  of t h i s  m at te r  to  be aware t h a t  we have
gone to  endless  t r o u b l e  to  persuade F e r r an t i  t o  show some i n i t i a t i v e  
in th e  development of computers.  They a r e ,  however, extremely 
r e l u c t a n t  to  in v es t  any f i n a n c i a l  s take  in t h e i r  development 
no twi ths tand ing  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  p r o je c t  has been, so f a r ,  f inanced  
from the  pub l ic  purse .  In the se  c ircumstances  i t  seems to  me t h a t  we 
a re  f u l l y  j u s t i f i e d  in t r a d in g  in th e se  machines as a means of 
s ecur ing  t h e i r  development and e x p l o i t a t i o n  a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  than 
w i l l  take  place  i f  th e  m a t te r  i s  l e f t  in F e r r a n t i ' s  hands.  I f  the  
l a t t e r  were the  case then in my opinion our computer inven t ions  
would be c u r r e n t ly  " i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  developed and e x p lo i t e d "  with in  
th e  meaning of  s e c t io n  1 o f  the  Development o f  Inventions  
A c t  /5 7 .
Of th e  next two computer systems developed by F e r r a n t i ,  the  NRDC 
would sponsor one and was in a c t i v e  d iscuss ion  about suppor t ing  th e  second. 
Despite th e  success  of the  Mark 1* and the  f a c t  t h a t  the  next machines were 
expected t o  s e l l  in g r e a t e r  numbers, the  company cont inued  to  show 
r e t i c e n c e  about tak ing  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  and the  p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t ,  
i t s e l f .  Though i t  must be s a id  t h a t  f inanc ing  both p r o j e c t s  might have 
proved d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  f i rm .
In March 1953, Halsbury d iscussed  with S i r  Vincent how th e  NRDC could 
speed up th e  development of  th e  UK computer in d u s t ry 58 . Halsbury 
suggested t h a t  the  NRDC take  over th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  market ing the  
machines t h a t  i t  was sponsor ing .  Vincent was a g a in s t  t h i s  idea as he 
expected t h a t  t h i s  would lead  to  d u p l ic a t io n  of e f f o r t ,  and t h a t ,  in any 
case ,  marketing was the  n a tu ra l  f o r t e  o f  the  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  He argued 
th a t  F e r r a n t i  was p rogress ing  a t  a su s ta in a b le  r a t e ,  and t h a t  the  slow 
expansion o f  th e  computer op e ra t io n  was the  prudent course .  Contrary  to  
t h i s  s ta tem ent  i t  w i l l ,  in f a c t ,  be seen th a t  Vincent had l i t t l e  f a i t h  in
57NRDC 8 6 /7 /5 ,  Unsigned l e t t e r  to  S.A. Dakin, 27/12/51.
58NRDC 8 6 /9 /1 ,  i n t e r n a l  NRDC f i l e  note on the  meeting,  11/3 /53.
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the  a b i l i t i e s  of h is  company to  s e l l  in to  a ha rsh ly  compet it ive  market59. 
N ever the le ss ,  he did not want to  become t i e d  to  a long-term commitment to  
the  NRDC. The e f f o r t s  of th e  f i rm  to  overcome i t s  pe rceived lack of  s e l l i n g  
s k i l l s  w i l l  be considered l a t e r  when looking i t s  a b o r t iv e  a ttempt to  work 
with the  Powers-Samas company.
Halsbury be l ieved  t h a t  much of F e r r a n t i ' s  conservatism was due t o  a 
longer than average company memory, not su rp r i s in g  given i t s  family  na tu re :
'A c o n t r ib u to r y  f a c t o r  towards t h i s  s t a t e  of  a f f a i r s  may be 
t h a t  h is  [ S i r  V in c en t ' s ]  f a t h e r  p r e t t y  well broke the  f i rm  through 
indebtedness  to  the  banks in the  ear ly  days,  and S i r  V incen t ' s  one 
de te rm ina t ion  i s  never again  t o  get  in to  a mess. As h is  out look is  
dominated by the  twin f a c t o r s  of  a de s i r e  f o r  complete independence 
and a super -cau t ious  a t t i t u d e  to  r i s k  t a k in g ,  he has avoided the  
worst  forms of  hubr is  and the  f irm is  merely overdrawn £4 
m i l l i o n . /6°
Given t h i s  conservati sm,  S i r  Vincent was a g a in s t  F e r ran t i  bear ing  the  
r i s k  of  assuming the  r o l e  of  a computer manufacturer:
' I f  S i r  Vincent were looking fo r  a new e n te r p r i s e  to  inves t  
F e r r a n t i  money in ,  he would not himself  pick computers.  He has,  
however, no ob jec t ion  to  a Government agency picking computers f o r  
him provided t h a t  he i s  f u l l y  compensated f o r  the  use o f  F e r r an t i  
f a c i l i t i e s .  He expects  100% compensation in the  f i r s t  in s tance  and 
th e  r i g h t  to  be the  so le  u l t im a te ly  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r ty  in whatever 
comes of th e  p r o j e c t .  ' 61
S i r  Vincent o f f e red  a g raph ica l  r e p re se n ta t io n  of how he expected 
co s t s  and p r o f i t  to  develop as the  Computer Department matured. He only 
expected p r o f i t s  a f t e r  an i n i t i a l l y  la rge  ou t lay  of  money fo r  R&D. I f  the  
government was w i l l i n g  to  pay f o r  him to  reach the  break even p o in t  (E) he 
was w i l l i n g  to  bu i ld  computers, o therwise  not:
59Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Depar tment ' .
®°NRDC 86/30 /2 ,  Lord Halsbury 'Some thoughts on F e r r a n t i '  15 /2/57.  
This appears  to  have been a paper w r i t t e n  fo r  the  b e n e f i t  of th e  new NRDC 
Chairman S i r  William Black.
S1NRDC 86/29 /7 ,  H a lsbury 's  note on a meeting with F e r r an t i  16/3 /54.
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Figure 2.2
Vincent Ferranti’s  plan for subsidizing 
the Computer Department. Revenue.
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Vincent proposed t h a t  whoever sponsored the  Computer Department would 
re c e iv e  a l l  the  p r o f i t  up to  t ime F, covering repayment and some p r o f i t .  
From t h i s  poin t  the  whole ope ra t ion  would be F e r r a n t i ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  He 
desc r ibed  t h i s  as the  ' l au n c h in g '  p o in t  fo r  the  new depar tment.
This plan was o u t l in e d  during nego t ia t io n s  over the  Mark I I  Mercury 
computer,  the  Mark 1* successor62 . I t  i s  worth noting t h a t  even when S i r  
Vincent decided t h a t  F e r r an t i  should develop the  Mercury w i thou t  NRDC 
support ,  i t  was made c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  decis ion  was made with cons iderab le  
unease.  One of F e r r a n t i ' s  s t a f f  put V incen t ' s  agreement to  t h i s  in terms 
of h is  own sky rocke t  analogy:
' S i r  Vincent has accepted our view t h a t  you [ the  NRDC] have in 
f a c t  launched us and t h a t  we can now f l y .  He did not come round to  
t h i s  without a l o t  of h e a r t - s e a rc h in g ,  as he seems to  th in k  you are  
a b e t t e r  bus iness  man than we a r e .  His view i s  t h a t  so long as the  
con t ro l  of s e l l i n g  po l icy  is  in your hands you w i l l  see to  i t  t h a t  
every th ing  i s  so ld  a t  a p r o f i t  because you have nothing e l s e  out of 
which to  recover  your expenses.  We on our s ide  are  under the  
suspic ion  of wanting to  run the  computer bus iness  a t  no p r o f i t  or a 
loss  by s u b s id i s in g  i t  out of the  r e s t  of  the  Fe r r an t i  
e n t e r p r i s e s . ,63
I f  the  Computer Department had a degree of ope ra t iona l  independence, 
and l a t e r  seems to  have been r iven  with  d iscord ,  i t  may have been because 
the s en io r  management were not committed to  i t .
Formation of the  Computer Department.
At the  same meeting of  March 1953 in which Vincent had r e j e c t e d  the  
idea of  the  NRDC tak ing  over the  marketing of computers,  the  ques t ion  of 
o rgan isa t ion  was r a i s e d .  Halsbury was concerned t h a t  the  b u i ld in g  of 
computers was a marginal a c t i v i t y  f o r  the  company. He sugges ted  t h a t  
F e r r a n t i ' s  managerial  commitment drew unfavourable comparison to  the  
s i t u a t i o n  a t  IBM, where computers were rece iv ing  th e  h ighes t  a t t e n t i o n 64. 
Halsbury accepted t h a t  S i r  Vincent himself  had a wide range o f  company 
a f f a i r s  to  deal wi th ,  cover ing the  world-wide dea l ings  of  th e  company. S i r  
Vincent s t a t e d  t h a t  he be l ieved  h is  ope ra t iona l  managers were completely 
capable.  He s t a t e d  t h a t  the  top  team in the  Instruments  Department, Grundy, 
Tooth i l l  and C ar te r ,  were q u i t e  capable  of running wholly independent 
companies and were, t h e r e f o r e ,  capable  of running a s in g l e  depar tment .  
However, Halsbury poin ted out t h a t  th e se  th ree  men were a l l  involved in the  
running of  the  whole of the  ins truments  opera t ion .  In f a c t  the  f i r s t  people
62See below, p53.
63NRDC 86/29/7 ,  Halsbury 's  notes  on Fe r r an t i  meeting.
64Ibid.
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who were s o l e l y  involved in computers were Bowden and Swann in s a l e s  and 
market ing and Po l l a rd  in design and manufacturing.  They did  not r e p o r t  to  
a s in g l e  person with complete r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  computers, bu t  to  the  
p rev ious ly  mentioned sen io r  s t a f f .
Quite c l e a r l y  Halsbury had h i t  on a sore p o in t .  In a Ju ly  v i s i t  to  
the  company, Halsbury l e a r n t  of  a major shake up in the  o rg a n i s a t i o n 65 . 
According to  the  Fe r r an t i  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  the  meeting, the  shake up had 
been p r e c i p i t a t e d  by a r e v o l t  by P o l l a rd .  He was apparen t ly  t i r e d  of 
'government by committee '66, and had demanded a b e t t e r  s t r u c t u r e .  The 
company th e r e f o r e  made the  computer opera t ion  in to  a f u l l  department :  i t  
was given the  same o rg a n is a t io n  and s t a t u s  as the  o the r  departments  in the  
company. P o l l a r d  became the  o v e ra l l  manager67, though Grundy remained the  
d i r e c t o r  in charge .  At the  t ime t h i s  s a t i s f i e d  Halsbury.  However, i t  soon 
became c l e a r  t h a t  t h e re  were huge r i f t s  w i th in  the depar tment,  which 
even tua l ly  proved c o s t l y  f o r  the  NRDC.
As was implied e a r l i e r ,  the  F e r r an t i  company was l e s s  than vigorous 
in i t s  s t r i c t  adherence to  nominal managerial  s t r u c t u r e s .  Lord Halsbury 
exper ienced a number of problems a r i s i n g  from S i r  V incen t ' s  a t t i t u d e :
[ S i r  Vincent] i s  in the  French sense of the  word Me pa t ro n '  
and, whatever managerial  s t r u c t u r e  may be adopted on a paper c h a r t ,  
everybody in the  o rg a n is a t i o n  i s  in r e a l i t y  working f o r  S i r  Vincent.  
One of  h i s  concerns of  course  is  to  know what i s  going on 
everywhere, and from t h i s  po in t  of view I do not th ink  he has any 
g r e a t  o b jec t io n  to  members of h i s  team being a t  s ixes  and sevens 
among themselves .  I t  means t h a t  in the  end they come to  him with 
t h e i r  s t o r i e s  and t h i s  enables  him to  keep h is  e a r  to  th e  ground. 
The e l d e r  members of the  F e r r an t i  family  f r eq u e n t ly  qua r re l  among 
themselves ,  and one of  S i r  V incen t ' s  main preoccupations  seems to  be 
to  keep anyone e l s e  out of h i s  personal family  enc losu re ,  now 
re se rv ed  f o r  h imself  and h is  sons Sebast ian  and B a s i l . ' 68
Peaasus and Mercury, the  ranges  f o r  the  l a t e  1950 's .
The Markl* made F e r r a n t i  the  leading European computer company. I t  
was adopt ing a new o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  format and i t  had the  backing of the  
B r i t i s h  government, in the  form of  the  NRDC. F e r r an t i  had a s o l i d  t e ch n ica l  
base,  and the  market was s t a r t i n g  to  develop r a p id ly  in the  US and was
65NRDC 8 6 /9 /1 ,  f i l e  note  on meeting between Halsbury and Messers. 
Grundy, Bowden, Swann and Welchman. 24/7/53.
66Ib i d .
67P.L. Young, 'The F e r r a n t i  Computer Department,  p t  I ' . E l e c t r i c a l  
Manufacturer.  March 1958.
68NRDC 86/30 /2 ,  Lord Halsbury,  'Some thoughts on F e r r a n t i ' .
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l i k e l y  to  do the  same in Europe. The fi rm in troduced two new, f i r s t  
g e n e r a t io n ,  machines in the  mid 1950s, the  medium s c a l e ,  genera l  purpose,  
Pegasus and the  la rge  s ca le  s c i e n t i f i c  Mercury. This was th e  most advanced 
range in Europe, ye t  i t  f a i l e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a s t rong  enough base to  secure 
i t s  f u t u r e .
F e r r a n t i  Package Computer 1. Pegasus.
Development and NRDC sponsorship .
As e a r l y  as 1952 some NRDC board members were e n t h u s i a s t i c  to  see 
F e r r a n t i  working on a smal ler  and cheaper system, which they  hoped would 
f in d  a l a r g e r  user  base than the  complex Markl*69. P ro f .  B lack e t t ,  
suggested t h a t  such a computer would be useful both to  sm al le r  s c i e n t i f i c  
users  and in some commercial r o l e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in PAYE c a l c u l a t i o n s .  Two 
sm al le r  systems were a l ready  being developed in the  UK7° .  F i r s t l y ,  th e re  
was the  Engl ish E l e c t r i c  ve rs ion  of the  National Physical  Labora to r ies  
P i l o t  ACE machine. The NRDC had l i t t l e  knowledge of  the  P i l o t  Ace p r o j e c t ,  
and was not p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d  in a machine geared to  s c i e n t i f i c  
r e s ea rc h .  The second system was a c t u a l l y  being supported by th e  NRDC. I t  
was a design p r o j e c t  w i th in  the  m i l i t a r y  and ins truments  f i rm ,  E l l i o t t  
Bro the rs71 . Halsbury commented to  B lacke t t  t h a t  the  NRDC would not be 
able  s im ul taneous ly  to  launch a p r o j e c t  fo r  a smal ler  F e r r a n t i  machine, 
while a l so  suppor ting  a replacement fo r  the  Markl* and E l l i o t t ' s  
development work. However, t h i s  tu rned  out not to  be a dilemma.
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  NRDC and E l l i o t t  Bro thers  was not a 
g rea t  success ,  a t  l e a s t  on th e  p a r t  of the  NRDC, though i t  d id  b e n e f i t  
F e r r a n t i .  Two NRDC r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  John Crawley and Dennis Hennessey, 
v i s i t e d  E l l i o t t  Brothers  in 1950 to  look a t  i t s  computer developments.  They 
saw a computer system which had been developed f o r  a Royal Navy f i r e  
con t ro l  system72 . The NRDC was impressed by the  packaging of th e  machine, 
which used in te rchangeab le  p r in t e d  c i r c u i t  boards ,  g r e a t l y  eas ing  the  
maintenance problem a sso c ia te d  with e a r l i e r  machines. I t  was a l so  impressed
69NRDC 8 6 /9 /1 ,  notes  on a meeting between th e  NRDC and F e r r a n t i ,  P rof .  
P.M.S. B la ck e t t  asked the  F e r r a n t i  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  whether th ey  had any 
plans f o r  such a system, 16/6 /52.
7° I b i d ,  comment by the  NRDC's Hennessey.
71lb i d .
72NRDC 86/13 /1 ,  NRDC Board meeting 23/8/50.
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by th e  computer development group, e s p e c i a l l y  i t s  head W.S. E l l i o t t 73, 
who was an ex-employee of MoS and an important f ig u r e  in wartime rada r  
developments.  F in a l ly  the  head of  E l l i o t t s ,  S i r  Leon B ag r i t ,  had a general  
plan t h a t  appealed to  Lord Halsbury.  He ta lked  about b u i ld in g  a small 
machine a t  a c o s t  of £20-25,000, f o r  s a le  in the  v a s t  US market7*. He 
a l so  spoke of  l ink ing  the computer t o  a small French accounting machine 
f i rm ,  Logabax75 , in which B ag r i t  had a holding. Halsbury had always 
wanted a l in k  between an e l e c t r o n i c s  opera tion  and a bus iness  machine 
company.
However, the  NRDC sponsored machine,  the  E l l i o t t  401, was not a g re a t  
success .  The pro to type  was completed by ea r ly  195376, and was e v en tu a l ly  
i n s t a l l e d  a t  Cambridge U n iv e r s i ty 77. Cambridge was given use of the  
machine, in r e t u r n  fo r  f i n e  tun ing  i t .  However, they  discovered  t h a t  i t  was 
a f lawed system t h a t  needed a good deal of work done on i t 78 . In the  
mean-time the  main members of  E l l i o t t s '  computer team, inc luding  W.S. 
E l l i o t t  and H.G. Carpenter,  handed in t h e i r  n o t ice  to  E l l i o t t  B ro the rs79. 
I t  took a number of months f o r  th e  problems to  be so r ted  ou t ,  and r a t h e r  
than go to  E l l i o t t ' s  f o r  th e  r edes ign  work, the  NRDC employed the  ex- 
E l l i o t t  team to  work with the  U n iv e r s i ty .  E l l i o t t ' s  only suppl ied  hardware 
to  the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of t h i s  team. W.S. E l l i o t t  then l e f t  NRDC employment 
and s t a r t e d  work a t  F e r r a n t i 80.
Grundy had a l ready  put in a b id  to  rep lace  E l l i o t t  Bro thers  as the  
main c o n t r a c t o r  f o r  the  401 p r o j e c t 8 1 . I n i t i a l l y  the  NRDC could see no
73Not r e l a t e d  to  the  company name which dated back to  the  previous  
cen tury .
7*NRDC 86/13 /1 ,  d i scuss ion  between Halsbury and B ag r i t  in Chicago, 
r epo r ted  by the  NRDC's W.E.P Johnson in a l e t t e r  to  the  NRDC Chairman S i r  
Percy M i l l s ,  24/11/50.
75NRDC box 86/13, Halsbury to  B ag r i t  10/4/53.
76NRDC 86/13 , In te rn a l  memo by Hennessey, summarizing the  s t a t e  of the  
401 c o n t r a c t .  31/3 /53 .
77NRDC 86/13, Crawley to  E l l i o t t  Brothers 17/7/53.
78NRDC box 86/13, Halsbury to  B agr i t  16/10/53.
79Ib id .
soNRDC 86/13, minutes of the  13th meeting of the  e l e c t r o n i c  computer 
sub-committee of  the  NRDC. 24/11/53.
81NRDC 86 /30 /1 ,  L e t t e r  rep ly in g  to  F e r r a n t i ' s  Grundy from Halsbury.  
29/9/53.
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reason f o r  t h i s  change of a l l e g i a n c e 82 . A mere two months l a t e r ,  the  NRDC 
and F e r r a n t i  were a c t i v e l y  n e g o t i a t i n g  around t h i s  p roposa l83.
There seems to  have been a number of reasons f o r  t h i s .  F i r s t l y  th e re  
was th e  perceived  need f o r  a medium sca le  computer with more advanced 
components than the  Markl*. While the  t e ch n ica l  problems of  th e  401 had 
d i s i l l u s i o n e d  th e  NRDC as to  E l l i o t t  B ro the rs '  c a p a b i l i t y  to  produce useful 
commercial computers,  the  f a i t h  in the  e x - E l l i o t t  design team s t i l l  
e x i s t e d .  F e r r a n t i  won more patronage from the  NRDC now t h a t  i t  employed 
W.S. E l l i o t t  to  head a new design department.  The NRDC t o l d  F e r r a n t i  t h a t  
i t  d id  not want a 'Chinese copy of  th e  401 ' .  The Corpora tion wanted a 
machine based on the  des ign ,  but d i f f e r i n g  in a number of  i t s  weak
8 4areas  .
Swann, the  Fe r r an t i  s a l e s  manager, wrote to  the  NRDC req u es t in g  not 
only the  r i g h t  to  use a l l  the  '401 tech n iq u es '  and a d r a f t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
fo r  the  machine, but a l so  gave them the  r e s u l t s  of a market a p p ra i s a l  fo r  
such a computer8 5 . The i n i t i a l  markets t a rg e te d  f o r  t h i s  medium sca le  
p rocessor  were i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  r e q u i re d  advanced s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  
of the se  the  aerospace  indus t ry  was the  l a r g e s t .  I t  was planned l a t e r  to 
add magnetic t ape  d r ives  to  the  system, which would make th e  machine 
s u i t a b l e  f o r  more inpu t -ou tpu t  in t e n s iv e  t a s k s ,  l i k e  commercial and 
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  d u t i e s .  He concluded t h a t  commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s  would 
prove to  be a much l a rg e r  market.  The computer was expected to  s e l l  f o r  
£16,000-22,000, p u t t in g  i t  w i th in  reach of a few commercial u s e r s .
In e a r l y  1954 Halsbury wrote to  Fe r r an t i  o rder ing  10 F e r r an t i  
Packaged Computer 1 computers, in a s im i la r  arrangement t o  th e  Markl* 
c o n t r a c t86 . The Corporation expected t h i s  to  co s t  £220,000. Of t h i s  the  
development c o s t s  were to  amount to  £70,000, to  be recovered a t  a r a t e  of 
£7000 on each machine. However, i t  should be noted t h a t  the  c o n t r a c t  was 
cos t  p lu s :  F e r r a n t i  was to  r e c e iv e  a f ix e d  percentage  p r o f i t  f o r  producing 
the  machines and then a commission f o r  s e l l i n g  them. For the  NRDC t h i s  was 
a major e r r o r .
Most of the  problems surrounding the  FPC 1, l a t e r  marketed as the
82Ib id .
83NRDC 86/30 /1 ,  NRDC's Manager Computer P ro je c t ,  presumably Hennessey, 
to Grundy. 26/11/53.
8*Ib id .
85NRDC 86 /30 /1 ,  F e r r a n t i ' s  Swann to  the NRDC 17/12/53.
S6NRDC 86 /30 /1 ,  Halsbury to  F e r r an t i  2/2 /54.
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Pegasus,  were c rea ted  by the  d e c i s io n  to  s p l i t  development and production .  
Pegasus was designed by W.S. E l l i o t t  in a new c e n t r e  in London. The new 
ope ra t io n  in Por t land  P lace,  c o n s i s t e d  of  the  London Computer Laboratory ,  
a number of  personnel from th e  Computing Research Group plus  the  Computer 
Sales  Department87 . However, product ion  was to  be a t  the  Moston p la n t  in 
Manchester,  under the  con t ro l  of  P o l l a rd .  Simultaneously th e  Moston 
o pe ra t ion  was developing a new s c i e n t i f i c  computer, the  Mercury, while  the  
London c e n t r e  marketed a l l  the  computers made by F e r r a n t i 88 .
This arrangement c rea ted  much in f i g h t in g  w i th in  the  company, with the 
Moston and London ope ra t ions  in competi t ion f o r  supremacy. In e a r ly  
1953s ®, Swann had suggested to  Grundy t h a t  a 401 type machine would be 
a very s a l e a b l e  item, and i t  was the  sa le s  s t a f f  t h a t  drove th e  Pegasus 
p ro j e c t  on. Grundy h ired  E l l i o t t  to  design the type of system wanted by the  
sa le s  people .  This i s  where th e  f i r s t  problem a rose .  According to  both 
Swann90 and Halsbury91 , E l l i o t t  had once turned Po l la rd  down f o r  a job 
and now found himself  P o l l a r d ' s  subord ina te .  P o l l a rd  was not p leased  t h a t  
Grundy had h i re d  E l l i o t t ,  nor t h a t  he was being given h is  own ope ra t ion  in 
London92 . Swann, and presumably the  whole of h i s  s a l e s  team in London, 
saw th e  Pegasus as a machine t h a t  they  could s e l l ,  but saw th e  large  
Mercury computer being developed in Manchester as o f f e r i n g  l imi ted  
p o t e n t i a l .  Therefore ,  Swann seems to  have sided with W.S. E l l i o t t  in t h i s  
c o n f l i c t ,  and h i s  r e c o l l e c t i o n s  tend  to  support  the  views held  by the  
London h a l f  o f  th e  Computer Department.  He sugges ts  t h a t  the  compet it ion  
between th e  two men led to  empire b u i ld in g .  E l l i o t t  wanted to  b u i ld  the  
f i r s t  two or  t h r e e  Pegasus computers in London: i t  was argued t h a t  bu i ld ing  
the f i r s t  machines near the  development team would be b e n e f i c i a l .  Once a l l  
the problems had been ironed out f u l l  product ion could be moved t o  Moston. 
Swann, however, claims t h a t  P o l l a rd  decided to  rush  in to  the  production of 
Pegasus, in o rde r  to  secure  th e  pre-eminent  p o s i t io n  in the  p r o j e c t .  Swann 
claimed t h a t  t h i s  was one of  a number of ways in which Po l l a rd  t r i e d  to  
f r u s t r a t e  th e  London o p e ra t io n .  The outcome was huge c o s t  over- runs  and
87P.L. Young, 'The growth of a computer depar tment ,  p a r t  I I ' ,  
E l e c t r i c a l  Manufactu rer . April  1958, pp30-33.
s s Ib id .
89Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
9° I b i d .
91NRDC 86 /30 /2 ,  Halsbury,  'Some thought on F e r r a n t i '  15 /2/57.
92Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
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delays  in d e l i v e r i e s ,  caused by going in to  production to  qu ick ly .
The NRDC seemed have to  appor t ioned  blame more widely ,  but  l e s s  on 
P o l l a rd  and more on E l l i o t t .  I t  a l so  l e v e l led  blame a t  the  Sales  Department 
and the  lax accounting procedures  of  F e r r a n t i ' s  Costing Department,  which 
f a i l e d  to  inform Pol lard  t h a t  c o s t s  were g e t t in g  out of hand.
The c o s t  c a l c u l a t i o n s  used f o r  planning the  p r o j e c t ,  were based on 
d i r e c t  labour and m a te r ia l s  c o s t i n g  20% of the  t o t a l  production c o s t s ,  
overheads were t o  be 60%, and a 20% margin was allowed. Overheads were, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  charged a t  300% on th e  d i r e c t  c o s t s 93. Presumably the  
overheads were i n d i r e c t  labour ,  d ep rec ia t io n  of p l a n t ,  indeed the  whole 
gamut of  c o s t s  t h a t  a re  incurred  i n d i r e c t l y .
On top  of the  manufacturing c o s t s  the re  was the  cos t  of development. 
This was budgeted a t  £70,000. This seemed more than f a i r  as the  machine was 
to  be an improved vers ion of th e  401, to  which F e r r an t i  had access  to  the  
design personnel  and p a t e n t s .  The c o s t  of the  401, design and p ro to type ,  
had been £60,0009A.
However, cos ts  were a l r e ad y  out of con t ro l  when the  c o n t r a c t  was 
agreed. The NRDC l a t e r  e s t im ated  t h a t  the overhead c o s t s  were 750% on 
d i r e c t  c o s t s  in 1954 and e v e n tu a l ly  rose  to  900%95. By autumn 1956 the  
NRDC had b i l l s  amounting to  £444,500 with the  l ik e l ih o o d  of  the  t o t a l  being 
over £500,000, over twice th e  o r i g i n a l  e s t im a te96 . I t  i s  c e r t a i n  t h a t  the  
management of  th e  opera tion  d id  not know t h i s  was the  case ,  indeed, Po l la rd  
was o r i g i n a l l y  th ink ing  in terms o f  a f ixed  p r i c e  c o n t r a c t 97. P o l la rd  
bel ieved  t h a t  Fe r r an t i  would make a t  l e a s t  as much p r o f i t  from a f ixed  
p r ice  c o n t r a c t ,  with the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of coming in well  under c o s t .  
Evidently  he d id  not know t h a t  c o s t s  were a l ready  out of c o n t r o l .
The NRDC be l ieved  t h a t  some o f  the  blame came from the  s p l i t t i n g  of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  and the  geographica l  sep a ra t io n  of design and 
manufacture.  This was compounded by the  dec is ion  to  go s t r a i g h t  in to  
product ion wi thou t  a p ro to type98 . This conclusion was s im i l a r  to  Swann's
93NRDC 86/30 /2 ,  Halsbury,  'Some thoughts on F e r r a n t i ' .
9* Ib id .
95NRDC 86/30 /1 ,  Meeting between the  NRDC's Hennessey and Crawley and 
F e r r a n t i ' s  Grundy and P o l l a r d .  Hennessey's  notes 12/9/56.
96Ib id .
97NRDC 86/30 /1 ,  t h i s  d e t a i l  comes in an in te r n a l  NRDC r e p o r t ,  which
u n fo r tu n a te ly  i s  not da ted ,  but appears  to  have been in the  autumn 1956 
period.
9SIb id .
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argument t h a t  p ro to types  should have been produced in London. The lack of 
p ro to types  led t o  long delays  in d e l iv e r y ,  and continued m odif ica t ion  of 
machines as they were being produced. There was no s tandard  to  copy. This 
was made worse by arguments about who should design the  drum memory t h a t  
was used as back-up memory f o r  th e  f a s t e r  nickel  de lay  l i n e  memory. They 
squabbled about t h i s  e n d le s s ly ,  but ended up with n e i t h e r  the  Moston nor 
the  London opera t ions  having a drum ready to  incorpora te  in to  th e  system 
when i t  was f i n i s h e d ,  leading  to  f u r t h e r  de lay and c o s t " .
However, in the  eyes of  the  NRDC, i t  was the  London c en t r e  where 
cos ts  were running r i o t .  In February 1956, Po l l a rd  assured the  NRDC t h a t  
he had £9000 in hand on the  development account100. The t r u t h  was t h a t  
he was a l r e ad y  well over budget and l a t e r  had to  apologise  to  the  NRDC f o r  
t h i s ,  t e l l i n g  them t h a t  he had been misinformed by the  accounts department .  
One problem was th a t  the  P o r t land  P lace  opera tion had decided to  s e t  up an 
extremely expensive s a l e s  promotion c en t r e ,  and to  inc rease  i t s  s a l e s  
a c t i v i t i e s .  This was on top  of th e  in c reas in g ly  ove r-spen t  design 
o p e ra t ion .  They were not keeping any account of  work in progress  in London, 
and r a t h e r  than rou te  b i l l s  v ia  Moston they sent them d i r e c t l y  to  the  NRDC, 
as Moston were doing on t h e i r  own b e h a l f .  The NRDC seem to  have agreed t h a t  
Po l lard  was, in f a c t ,  being mis led .  Eventually  the  design co s t  of the  
machine was £170,000 and a l l  o th e r  c o s t s  had a l so  rocke ted101.
I f  th e  doubling in the  c o s t  of th e  machines was not bad enough, the  
lack of informat ion  was worse f o r  th e  NRDC. F e r r a n t i  cont inued t o  search 
fo r  o rders  f o r  the  ten  machines t h a t  the  NRDC had ordered.  I t  had no 
in te rn a l  informat ion t h a t  th e  c o s t s  had r i s e n ,  though t h i s  d id  not mat te r  
to  F e r r an t i  as i t  was a c o s t  p lus  c o n t r a c t .  Por t land  Place  cont inued to  
s e l l  machines a t  the  o r i g i n a l  ask ing p r i c e  of £35,000, d e sp i t e  c o s t s  having 
doubled.  F e r r a n t i  stuck to  t h i s  p r i c e  to  the  b i t t e r  end102: the  NRDC was 
l e f t  with a massive loss  on the  machines.
E ven tua l ly ,  a f t e r  a good deal  of  a rm-tw is t ing  by Halsbury and the  new 
NRDC chairman W.R. Black, th e  company agreed to  pay back £75,0001Q3, but 
not u n t i l  e a r l y  1958. The Corpora tion e v en tu a l ly  su f fe red  a loss  of
"NRDC 86/30 /2 ,  Halsbury,  'Some thought on F e r r a n t i ' .
100NRDC 86/30 /1 ,  undated in t e r n a l  memo.
101Ib id .
l o z ib id .
103NRDC 86/30 /3 ,  correspondent from Sebastian  de F e r r an t i  to  Black, 
20/2/58.
£140 ,14510\
This was not the  end of the  Pegasus. Indeed, F e r r an t i  must have 
b e n e f i t e d  g r e a t l y  from the  NRDC's mis for tune .  P o l l a rd  l a t e r  t o l d  Halsbury 
t h a t  the  o r i g i n a l  cos t  p ro je c t io n s  were c a lc u la te d  a t  the  r a t e  Fe r r an t i  
expected them to  be once production  had progressed s u f f i c i e n t l y 105. I t  
was planning to  s e l l  the  machines a t  t h e  pr ice  i t  expected to  ach ieve a f t e r  
i t  had progressed  some way down th e  learning curve .  Late r  machines were 
t h e r e f o r e  expected to  be cheaper,  bu t  t h i s  was too  l a t e  f o r  the  NRDC, 
which, in e f f e c t ,  paid fo r  the  lo ss  leader  s tage  of  the  p r o j e c t .
A f te r  the  f i r s t  ten  machines had been produced, S i r  Vincent f i n a l l y  
decided t h a t  the  Computer Department was now ' l a u n c h e d ' ,  and i t  continued 
to  b u i ld  and s e l l  the  Pegasus. The company i n s t a l l e d  26 Pegasus I s  between 
1956 and 1960, and 12 updated Pegasus 2s between 1959 and 1962l o s . 
F e r r an t i  had not paid anything f o r  the  development of the  o r i g i n a l  s e r i e s ,  
nor f o r  i t s  i n i t i a l  production or  even fo r  e s t a b l i s h in g  a s a l e s  o p e ra t io n .  
The l a t t e r ,  though c r i t i c i s e d  as an unexpected cos t  by the  NRDC, was 
e s s e n t i a l  t o  s e l l i n g  a sm al le r ,  more general  a p p l i c a t i o n  system. The s a le  
of e a r l y  s c i e n t i f i c  systems was very  much an e x e rc i s e  in s e l l i n g  to  a 
c losed community of  advanced s c i e n t i s t s ,  but the  Pegasus was aimed a t  a 
much broader  audience.  The only co s t  Fe r ran t i  had on i t s  f i r s t  t en  sa le s  
was th e  £75,000 se t t lem en t  with the  NRDC, a f a i r l y  small development c o s t .
S e l l in g  the  Pegasus: the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with Power-Samas.
Vincent de F e r r an t i  was unconvinced, f i r s t l y  about the  prudence of 
the  computer manufacturing scheme, and secondly about the  a b i l i t y  of 
F e r r an t i  t o  s e l l  computers. I t  was becoming obvious t h a t  computers were 
going to  be in c re a s in g ly  used in commercial environments.  P o te n t i a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  inc luded:  c a l c u l a t i n g  pay ro l l ,  p repar ing  accoun ts ,  and 
c a l c u l a t i n g  s t a t i s t i c a l  d a ta .  According to Swann, the  F e r r an t i  company had 
a d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e  to  t h i s  market compared to  the  bus iness  machine 
f i r m s 107. F e r r a n t i  was i n t e r e s t e d  in doing c a l c u l a t i o n s  t h a t ,  in the  
p a s t ,  had been too la rge  to  t a c k l e .  Business machines companies looked on 
o f f i c e  equipment s im ultaneously  to  improve the o f f i c e ' s  fu n c t io n ,  and to  
cut s t a f f ;  bus iness  machines were e f f i c i e n c y  t o o l s .  The t a b u l a t i n g  machines
10*NRDC 86/30/3 ,  'E s t im a tes  of Final P os i t ion  on F.P.C. C o n t r a c t ' ,  
97th NRDC board meeting,  26/2 /58.
l o s NRDC 86/30/2 ,  Halsbury,  'Some thoughts on F e r r a n t i ' .
l o s Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
107Ib id.
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fi rms had exper ience of s e l l i n g  machines in t h i s  commercial market.
F e r r a n t i  t a lk e d  to  both th e  major B r i t i s h  t a b u l a t o r  producers  about 
t h i s  problem. Encouraged by the  NRDC, Fe r r an t i  f i r s t  t a lk e d  to  th e  B r i t i s h  
Tabula ting  Machine company. All t h a t  came from t h i s  arrangement was BTM's 
help in a t t a c h in g  i t s  punched card  equipment to  F e r r a n t i  machines. The main 
s t i c k in g  p o in t  was the  f a c t  t h a t  BTM wanted the  so le  r i g h t  to  market any 
machines to  come out of  a j o i n t  v e n tu re 108. However, Swann saw another  
reason f o r  the  f a i l u r e  of the  BTM n e g o t i a t io n s :  P o l l a rd  favoured a l ink  up 
with i t s  r i v a l  Powers-Samas.
There were a number of  p re s su re s  on F e r r an t i  to  come to  some 
arrangement with a bus iness  machines f i r m .  F i r s t l y ,  th e re  was p ressu re  from 
Blacke t t  and the  NRDC to  get  involved in commercial machines, leading in 
pa r t  t o  Pegasus.  I f  t h i s  was going to  be sold  in the  commercial da ta  
process ing f i e l d  th e re  were a number o f  problems t h a t  had to  be ta ck led .  
To s e l l  t o  t h i s  group of use r s  b e t t e r  p e r ip h e ra l s  were needed; BTM punched 
cards were the  most common da ta  s to ra g e  medium a t  t h a t  t ime,  but a long 
term arrangement with t h i s  f i rm  seemed u n l ik e ly .  Even more im por tan t ly ,  the  
s e l l i n g  of small machines to  the  commercial market needed a na t iona l  s a le s  
fo rce ,  and a l a rge  se rv ice  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  This would be very  expensive to  
build  up:
' . . . s e l l i n g  of small computers would [ r e q u i r e ]  many customers 
t o  g e t  a reasonable  tu rnove r  and these  would be widely  s c a t t e r e d .  
This would mean a l a rge  s a l e s  and se rv ice  o rg a n i s a t i o n ,  which we 
were sure  the  Chairman would not  agree t o ' 109.
F e r r a n t i  had no na t iona l  s a l e s  network: a l l  s e l l i n g  was done a t  i t s
London o f f i c e .  While t h i s  was adequate fo r  s e l l i n g  to  eng ineers  (advanced
users were more w i l l in g  to  t r a v e l  to  f i n d  the  b e s t  equipment),  i t  was not
a good enough method f o r  s e l l i n g  to  commercial u se r s .
Discuss ions  with Powers-Samas s t a r t e d  in Ju ly  1952110, and cen tred
on two a re a s :
1) The two companies were j o i n t l y  to  design a small commercial computer.
2) Power-Samas was to  take  over th e  s e l l i n g  of F e r r an t i  computers in the  
commercial market.
However, n e i th e r  the  manufactur ing nor the  s a l e s  o p e ra t io n s  of the  
companies worked well t o g e th e r .  The manufacturing ope ra t ion  of Powers and 
F e r ran t i  formed a b r i e f  l i a i s o n  to  design  a computer. However, they  f a i l e d  
to come up with a machine: both design  teams had t h e i r  own p r o j e c t s  which
l o s Ib i d .
109Ib id .
110Ib id.
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took p r i o r i t y  over the  j o i n t  ven tu re .  Likewise th e  Powers s a le s  opera t ion  
and the  F e r r a n t i  Computer Sales  Department proved comple te ly  incompatib le .
In March 1954 the  s a le s  s t a f f s  o f  the  two companies p resen ted  a j o i n t  
paper ,  proposing  c lose  c o l l a b o r a t io n  leading t o  an ' i n t e g r a t e d  da ta  
p rocess ing  sy s te m '111. Despite  th e se  t a l k s ,  the  f i r s t  10 Pegasuses were 
going to  use BTM, r a t h e r  than Powers, punched card  p e r i p h e r a l s .  The reason 
f o r  t h i s  was s t r a ig h t fo rw a rd .  The IBM/BTM standard  punched card was the  one 
u su a l ly  used by engineering customers112. This was because they used an 
e l e c t r o n i c  device  to read the  cards  r a t h e r  than th e  pin mechanism used by 
the  Remington/Powers s tandard  ca rds .  The IBM/BTM machines a lso  had a plug 
board ' reprogramming'  system, which made them more f l e x i b l e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
useful in s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n s  where parameters  change f r e q u e n t ly .  
Therefore ,  a sp ec ia l  vers ion  of  the  Pegasus, P lu to ,  was t o  be made using 
the  Powers card ,  which Powers s t a f f  were to  s e l l .
The outcome was t h a t  F e r r a n t i  was t r y i n g  to  s e l l  the  Pegasus 
p r im ar i ly  to  t e ch n ica l  u se r s ,  while the  Powers s t a f f  were meant to  s e l l  
Pluto  to  commercial customers.  However, the  Powers s t a f f  were no t ,  in 
r e a l i t y ,  s e l l i n g  i t .  By 1955, Powers was s e l l i n g  i t s  own smal le r  PCC 
c a l c u l a t i n g  dev ice ,  which, while  not a f u l l y  f u n c t io n a l  computer, got 
p r e f e r e n t i a l  t rea tm en t  from the  Powers'  s t a f f .  A f u r t h e r  problem was t h a t  
F e r r an t i  would only o f f e r  a 15% d iscoun t  on the  p r i c e  of  the  machines i t  
sold to  Powers; Powers wanted 25%. This f u r t h e r  d iscouraged Powers from 
a c t i v e l y  s e l l i n g  the system.
By th e  t ime BTM and Power-Samas merged to  form ICT113, Powers had 
not c re a te d  a s in g le  o rder  f o r  F e r r a n t i .  All the  arrangement achieved was 
to  reduce th e  market to  which F e r r a n t i  could s e l l  systems on i t s  own 
beh a l f .  The Pegasus sold  well enough to  te chn ica l  u s e r s ,  but many of  th e se  
machines were used in a secondary a d m in i s t r a t io n  r o l e ,  proving t h a t  i t  
could well  have sold in the  commercial market.
In th e  e a r l y  1960s F e r r an t i  produced the  updated Pegasus 2. Free from 
the Powers arrangement,  many were so ld  into  the  commercial market. But by 
t h i s  s tage  i t  was too l a t e ;  t h i s  f i r s t  genera t ion  computer was ou tda ted .  
Figures 2.3  and 2.4 show a breakdown of  the  u se r s  of  Pegasus computers:
121Ib id .
112See below, chap te r  8 on IBM, pp302-310.
113See below, chap te r  5 on ICT.
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Figure 2.3
Pegasus 1 customers,
by industry group.
Other Govt, research est.
\ f /
Other manufacturing industry
3 of the systems used in “other manufacturing industry "and 2 of the Ferranti machines were used for designing heavy 
electrical plant. Another 3 were used in the steel industry.
B.Swann “The Ferranti Computer Department" 1975.
Ferranti internal use
(3)
Education inc. NRDC Northampton 
Poly installation ^5^
(3) Govt. Aviation Research est.
Aircraft manufacturers
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Figure 2.4
Pegasus 2 customers,
by industry group.
Banks and
Insurance
Aircraft Manufacturers
(1) Government research 
(1) Ferranti service work
Other manufacturers
B.Swann "The Ferranti Computer Department" 1975.
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Perseus .
In a d d i t io n  to  the  Pegasus,  F e r r an t i  produced one pure ly  commercial 
system, the  Perseus ,  designed f o r  the  insurance in d u s t ry .  This was a scheme 
devised by the  f i r s t  F e r r an t i  s a l e s  manager, Bowden, a f t e r  he had v i s i t e d  
the  USA to  s tudy advances in commercial computing. A f te r  t h i s  t r i p  he had 
d iscussed  user  needs with th e  Royal Insurance Company114. The p r o j e c t  
c o n s i s te d  of  a small number of F e r r an t i  engineers and an ac tu a ry  from Royal 
Insurance .  Unfor tunate ly  f o r  t h i s  p r o j e c t ,  i t  too  became a v ic t im  o f  the  
agreement with Powers.
Perseus  was a la rge  machine cons t ruc ted  out of the  same packages t h a t  
made up the  Pegasus.  However, i t s  development was held up f o r  a number of 
years  because th e re  was some concern t h a t  i t  over lapped with Powers'
i n t e r e s t s  too  much. Powers was the  leading s u p p l i e r  o f  punched card
equipment to  the  insurance in d u s t ry ,  and i t  was concerned t h a t  Perseus 
could damage t h i s  market. Perseus used magnetic tape  memory and Powers'  
punched ca rds .  Magnetic tapes  were p a r t i c u l a r l y  usefu l  to  the  insurance  
companies as they  had huge da ta  bases to  access .  Two models were f i n a l l y  
b u i l t  a t  F e r r a n t i ' s  Bracknell  L ab ora to r ie s ,  showing th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  of  the  
Pegasus package system115. The f i r s t  was produced f o r  South Afr ican 
Mutual L i f e ,  and the  second f o r  a Swedish insurance company. Both were 
completed in the  second h a l f  of 1959, way too l a t e  f o r  a f i r s t  genera t ion  
machine to  become popular.
Mark II  Mercury.
With the  s a l e s  department pursuing the  f u tu r e  of the  Pegasus ,  the
Moston o p e ra t io n  was busying i t s e l f  wi th  the  l a r g e r  Mercury computer. The 
Mercury was based on the  Meg computer developed by Dr Tom Kilburn  a t  
Manchester U n iv e r s i ty 116. I t  was a machine designed to  take  up the
mantle o f  th e  Mark 1 as a f a s t  computer fo r  s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n .
Kilburn had the  ba s ic  machine working from October 1952 and in i t s  
f i n a l  f l o a t i n g  po in t  v e r s io n 117 by May 1954118. The f i r s t  p roduction
114Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Development' .
115Ib id .
l l e S.H. Lavington A h i s t o r y  of Manchester computers. Manchester,  1975
p25.
117F lo a t in g  poin t a r i t h m e t i c  eases the  programming t a s k  fo r  
mathematical c a l c u l a t i o n s .  In the  Meg i t  was a hardware f e a t u r e ,  whereas
prev ious ly  i t  had to  be done slowly with software .
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machine was not i n s t a l l e d  u n t i l  August 1957. Kilburn was c r i t i c a l  of t h i s  
de lay  in g e t t i n g  the  system in to  the  market, and blamed i t  on th e  lengthy 
n e g o t i a t io n s  tak in g  place  between the  NRDC, the  DSIR and F e r r an t i  on the  
f u t u r e  o f  the  system.
Swann s t a t e s  t h a t  F e r r a n t i  reques ted  a sum of £25,000 from the DSIR 
to  develop a s a l e a b le  ve rs ion  of  Meg119. However, minutes of a meeting 
held in 1954 show t h a t ,  in f a c t ,  F e r r a n t i  had reques ted  £400,000 from the  
DSIR to  fund general  computer developments not a s so c ia te d  with a s in g le  
p r o j e c t 120. S i r  Vincent proposed th e  scheme to  ' l a u n c h '  the  F e r r an t i  
Computer Department,  and the  graph he used to  exp la in  t h i s  has been shown 
above121. The DSIR turned t h i s  plan down on the  advice of the  Brunt 
committee,  which did  not see i n d u s t r i a l  support  as a DSIR 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 122. On the  o th e r  hand, Halsbury was i n t e r e s t e d  in 
supporting  th e  f l o a t i n g  po in t  technology. However, to  make another  cash 
advance of t h i s  na ture  the  NRDC needed c e r t a in  concess ions .  The NRDC wanted 
the  pe r iod  f o r  recover ing  th e  loan to  l a s t  ten y e a r s ,  and be lev ied  as a 
f l a t  r a t e  on a l l  F e r r a n t i ' s  computer and computer sub-system s a l e s 123. 
Secondly i t  wanted the r i g h t  to  ve t  any sub-con t rac ts  t h a t  F e r r an t i  wanted 
to  make. This was apparen t ly  a re fe ren ce  to  th e  n e g o t i a t io n s  going on 
between F e r r a n t i  and Powers.
Such long term arrangements were onerous to  the  company. However, 
t h i s  was not th e  only reason th e  company r e j e c t e d  the  scheme. P o l l a rd  was 
t ry in g  to  persuade S i r  Vincent t h a t  the  system would be comparat ively  cheap 
to  produce,  having been p a r t i a l l y  developed by th e  U n iv e r s i ty .  He a lso  
t r i e d  to  persuade him t h a t  i t  would be a p r o f i t a b l e  o f f e r i n g 12*. 
There fore ,  F e r r a n t i  decided to  produce the  system with i t s  own re so u rce s ,  
and hoped to  keep the  f u l l  p r o f i t  t o  i t s e l f .
11SNRDC 86/29 /4 ,  note of a conversa tion  with Tom Kilburn in the
minutes of  th e  27th computer sub-committee meeting 15/3/55.
119Swann, 'F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
12°NRDC 86 /29 /7 ,  H a lsbury 's  notes  on a meeting between h imself ,  the
NRDC Chairman, Lockwood, and F e r r a n t i ' s  S i r  Vincent ,  Grundy, P o l l a rd ,
Robson, S ions ,  Swann and Welchman, 23/3/54.
121Figure 2 .2 ,  p68.
122NRDC 86 /29 /7 ,  H a lsbury 's  no tes  on a meeting with F e r r a n t i  23 /3/54.
1Z3Ib id .
12*Swann, 'F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
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S e l l i n g  th e  Mercury.
Swann, as manager of s a l e s ,  d id  not share  P o l l a r d ' s  view of the  
machine:
'A f t e r  a meeting in the  o f f i c e  of [ th e ]  NRDC I wrote t h a t  I 
could  not see s a l e s  o f  more than four  of th e  p ro jec ted  big  computers 
- though t h i s  was of course  e a r l y  d a y s . ' 125
In f a c t  19 were i n s t a l l e d  between 1957 and 1961. In a way Swann d ismisses
most o f  t h e se  s a l e s  as chance:
'Some years  l a t e r  one of my programmers, John Davidson, t o ld  
me he had come across  t h i s  memorandum [see  above];  we had by then 
so ld  about a dozen Mercurys. I sa id  i t  only showed how d i f f i c u l t  
market prophecies  could be,  but John sa id  t h a t  a p a r t  from the  s a l e s  
to  nuc lea r  e s tab l ishm ents  we had in f a c t  sold  f o u r . ' 126
Swann b e l ieved  t h a t  th e re  was an a n t i - s a l e s  atmosphere in Manchester,  with
the  eng ineers  more i n t e r e s t e d  in th e  f in e s se  of t h e i r  technology. They
l iked  th e  powerful ,  academically  in sp i re d  Mercury, but did  not l i k e  the
popular ,  E l l i o t t - d e s i g n e d ,  Pegasus.  Equally,  i t  appears t h a t  t h e re  was
l i t t l e  enthusiasm in London f o r  s e l l i n g  the big machines, which so ld  a t  an
average p r i c e  o f  £120,000127.
N ever the le s s ,  the  Mercury was a l a rg e r  s e l l e r  than th e  s a le s
department p re d ic t e d .  I f  the  Pegasus had become the  work horse  of the
B r i t i s h  aerospace  in dus t ry ,  then th e  Mercury did  the  same f o r  the  atomic
resea rch  e s ta b l i sh m e n ts ,  not j u s t  in B r i t a in  but across  Europe. This i s  not
s u r p r i s i n g ;  i t  was descr ibed  as the  f i r s t  computer designed e s p e c i a l l y  f o r
la rge  s c a l e  s c i e n t i f i c  work, o u t s id e  o f  the  USA123. Of the  19 so ld ,  10
were used f o r  atomic energy and power re sea rch ,  6 of these  abroad, 5 in
Europe and 1 in B ra z i l .  The o th e r  9 went t o  a wide number of  o the r
s c i e n t i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s .
This pe r iod  must be counted as the peak of F e r r a n t i ' s  computer
o p e ra t io n s .  The Pegasus was s e l l i n g  well f o r  medium sca le  t e ch n ica l
a p p l i c a t i o n s  and the Mercury as one of  the  s tandard  systems used f o r
nuc lear  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  While i t s  l in k  with Powers had proved f r u i t l e s s  in
producing commercial s a l e s ,  i t  was with  t h i s  very s o r t  of  product range
t h a t  th e  US s c i e n t i f i c  computer manufacturer CDC based i t s  sp e c ta c u la r
growth. Notably CDC's 6600 super-computer drew on developments made in
F e r r a n t i ' s  l a s t  s tand-a lone  computer,  the  ATLAS.
1Z5Ib id .
126Ib id .
127Hendry, Innovating f o r  f a i l u r e . pl83,  a t  1963 p r i c e s .  
123Datamation . Nov/Dec 1958, p l7 .
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According to  Swann the  company did cons ide r  s p e c i a l i s i n g  in the 
s c i e n t i f i c  market,  a po l icy  which would have preempted CDC. One problem 
with t h i s  idea was F e r r a n t i ' s  f a i l u r e  to  secure  any orders  in th e  US, by 
f a r  the  l a r g e s t  market of  s c i e n t i f i c  computers.  In some r e s p e c t s  t h i s  is  
not s u r p r i s i n g .  There were a number o f  US f i rms supplying such systems, 
inc lud ing  IBM. There was a l so  a s t rong  tendency f o r  buyers of such machines 
to  look f o r  domestic supply.  This was due to  the  f a c t  t h a t  many of the  
s c i e n t i f i c  computers i n s t a l l e d  in th e  US were e i t h e r  owned by the  
government,  or  used by c i v i l  c o n t r a c t o r s  on government c o n t r a c t s .  This led 
to  th e  c i v i l  buyers wanting the  same systems as th e  government, and t h i s  
meant domestic producers.
One e x t ra  d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  p o t e n t i a l  compet itors  was IBM's p o l icy  of 
o f f e r i n g  la rg e  d iscounts  to  s c i e n t i f i c  u se r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  u n i v e r s i t i e s .  IBM 
o f fe red  d i scoun ts  of up to  60% to  educa t iona l  buyers ,  and a l e s s e r  amount 
to  some o th e r  purchase rs .  This was o f f e red  as a combination of  t ax  w r i t e ­
o f f ,  as th e  US government encouraged such use,  and IBM's own enthusiasm to 
t i e  up t h i s  market,  so f u t u r e  users  would be t r a i n e d  on IBM systems. 
F e r r an t i  found i t  completely impossible  to compete on these  te rms.
In any case ,  i f  F e r r an t i  had t r i e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  in the  US 
market, i t  would have been faced with  very la rge  c o s t s .  E s ta b l i sh in g  
comprehensive s a l e s  and s e r v ic e  f a c i l i t i e s  throughout  the  USA would have 
been expensive .  I t  has a l r e ad y  been seen t h a t  the  company was averse  to  
such r i s k s .
On the  o th e r  hand, F e r r a n t i  was s e l l i n g  machines to  th e  European 
community of  s c i e n t i s t s .  In Europe, and e s p e c i a l l y  in the  UK, F e r r a n t i  was 
able to  compete a g a in s t  IBM's 650 computer with the  Pegasus;  and the  
Mercury could compete with some of  IBM's 700 s e r i e s  machines.
The Orion and the  S i r i u s :  The f a i l u r e  to  produce ap p ro p r ia te  replacements  
fo r  the  o ld  range.
By 1957 the  Pegasus and Mercury systems were being d e l iv e re d  to  
customers.  However, the  s a l e s  department was concerned t h a t ,  come the 
November 1958 Computer E x h ib i t io n ,  F e r r an t i  would have no new system to 
t a lk  abou t129. I t  was c l e a r  t h a t  the  company needed to  s t a r t  work on 
s o l id  s t a t e  computers; f irms such as EMI had a l read y  progressed a long way 
with t h i s  kind of  work. A second f a c t o r  taxing the  mind of the  company was 
t h a t  i t  was becoming apparent t h a t  commercial and s c i e n t i f i c  computing were 
s t a r t i n g  to  merge. In the  f i r s t  genera t ion  of computers i t  was assumed th a t
129Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Depar tment ' .
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s c i e n t i f i c  machines needed a f a s t  p rocesso r ,  but t h a t  p e r ip h e ra l s  were l e s s  
impor tant .  In commercial machines,  processors  were cheap and slow, but 
in p u t -o u tp u t  p e r ip h e ra l s  were given high p r i o r i t y .  However, such s c i e n t i f i c  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  as s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  and meteorology requ i red  high speed 
in p u t -o u tp u t .  Equally ,  with the  in t roduc t ion  of random access d i sk  d r iv e s ,  
throughput o f  commercial da ta  could b e n e f i t  from f a s t e r  c e n t r a l  p rocesso r  
u n i t s .  I t  was a l so  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  most o f  a machine's  t ime, in both c la s s e s  
of  work, was spent moving da ta  around the  system130. I t  became 
in c re a s in g ly  apparent t h a t  the  same machine should be a p p l i c ab le  to  both 
t a s k s ,  i t  was e q u a l ly  apparent t h a t  th e  Powers c o l l a b o ra t io n  was not going 
to  produce such a computer.
I t  was decided to  b u i ld  a machine c a l l ed  the  Orion to  f u l f i l  these  
needs.  Orion was based on a lo g ic a l  u n i t  conta ined on a s in g l e  c i r c u i t  
board,  which made use of t r a n s i s t o r s ,  magnetic cores  and t rans fo rm ers ;  i t  
was c a l l e d  the  Neuron c i r c u i t 131. The concept f o r  t h i s  type o f  c i r c u i t  
s t a r t e d  in 1953. By 1955 F e r r a n t i ' s  Manchester o p e ra t io n 132 had s t a r t e d  
Neuron development133. In May 1958 th e  small ,  t e s t - b e d ,  NEWT machine was 
completed134.
At t h i s  s tage  the  F e r r an t i  s a l e s  team in London, and the  West Gorton 
design and manufacturing o p e ra t io n ,  once again s t a r t e d  arguing  about the  
d i r e c t i o n  the  company should go. The Neuron c i r c u i t  was designed a t  a time 
when the  c o s t  o f  t r a n s i s t o r s  was very high. The Neuron design was aimed a t  
g e t t i n g  the  maximum out of each c i r c u i t .  This was done a t  the  expense of 
making t iming extremely c r i t i c a l ,  r e q u i r in g  the  c i r c u i t s  to  achieve  very 
t i g h t  t o l e r a n c e s .  Pegasus eng ineers  t o l d  Swann t h a t  the  Pegasus c i r c u i t  
packages had had a good margin of  s a f e t y  b u i l t  in to  them. Orion d id  not:  
the  Neuron c i r c u i t  was h igh ly  r e l i a n t  on near p e r f e c t  o p e r a t i o n 135. The 
sa le s  o p e ra t io n  then argued t h a t  a small device ,  l i k e  the  t r a n s i s t o r ,  would 
e i t h e r  always be d i f f i c u l t  to  make, and t h e r e f o r e  would have of  only 
l im i ted  market p o t e n t i a l ,  or  t h a t  i t  would f a l l  in p r i c e .  I t  has a l ready  
been seen t h a t  th e  co s t  of the  Pegasus had been expected to  f a l l  as the
13° I b i d .
131NAHC, F e r r a n t i  brochure 'O r ion '  1960.
132Now moved to  a sp ec ia l  p l a n t  a t  West Gorton.
133F e r r a n t i  Archive,  A.R. Wilde, 'The S i r i u s  Compute r ' .F e r r an t i  
Jou rna l ,  vol 18, no. 1, sp r ing  1960.
134Ib id .
135Swann, 'F e r r a n t i  computer Depar tment ' .
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company progressed along the  manufacturing learn ing  curve .  Swann expected 
th e  same f o r  th e  t r a n s i s t o r  o r  i t  would hardly  be worth us ing ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
f o r  commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s .
While the  Newt a l l ay ed  some of  the  f e a r s  t h a t  the  system would not 
work, t h e r e  was a l so  some concern as to  the  app rop r ia tenes s  o f  th e  machine 
f o r  th e  market.  Po l la rd  was th in k in g  in terms of  an expandable machine. I t  
was expected to  s t a r t  a t  £120,000 and be configured to  a system cos t ing  
hundreds of  thousands.  I t  f u l f i l l e d  th e  need f o r  a machine t h a t  could be 
so ld  f o r  commercial da ta  p rocess ing :  i t  had very advanced in pu t -ou tpu t  
handling r o u t i n e s ,  as w i l l  be d i scussed  l a t e r .  However, i t  was not a g re a t  
advance in speed; i t  was only 3-4 t imes f a s t e r  than the  Mercury, which was 
le s s  than the  t e n - f o l d  inc rease  t h a t  the  sa les  department would have l ik e d .
The s a l e s  department argued t h a t  a t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  Pegasus would be 
the  b e t t e r  ro u te  to  go down f o r  r e p la c in g  the Pegasus.  Never theless  Orion 
was advanced and more s u i t a b l e  f o r  commercial use than the  Pegasus had 
been. In any case  Po l la rd  argued t h a t  a t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  Pegasus would have 
been too  expensive to  produce.  As f o r  a replacement f o r  the  Mercury, he 
argued t h a t  a l a rge  Orion c o n f ig u ra t io n  would be use fu l  f o r  such work. The 
Orion was expected to  be s u i t a b l e  f o r  both commercial and s c i e n t i f i c  
computing.
The f i r s t  s a l e a b le  machine to  come out o f  the  Neuron work was the  
small S i r i u s  computer,  based on the  o r ig in a l  NEWT136. This was very much 
a str ipped-down system, designed f o r  the  very small end of the  eng ineer ing  
market.  I t  was easy to  program, smal l ,  had a f a s t  paper tape  in pu t -ou tpu t  
device and o f f e re d  some punched card  p e r i p h e r a l s 137. One e x t r a  f e a tu r e  
was a simple d i g i t a l  d i s p la y  which showed a r e p r e s e n ta t i o n  of  the  program 
as i t  ran ;  a s s o c ia t e d  wi th  i t  was a keyboard f o r  d i r e c t  inpu t .  
Unfor tunate ly  the  market f o r  small engineering computers had been cornered 
by E l l i o t t ' s  with  the  803 system, and the S i r i u s  o f f e re d  no s i g n i f i c a n t  
advantages over i t ;  l a t e r  DEC would dominate t h i s  market.  However, the  
d i sp lay  f e a t u r e  made i t  s i n g u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  fo r  t e a c h in g .  Between 1960 and 
1963 16 were i n s t a l l e d .  Of t h e se  4 were used f o r  F e r r a n t i ' s  own computer 
s e r v ic e ,  whi le  8 went to  manufactur ing companies, 2 were used f o r  t each ing  
a t  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  1 was used by the  Admiralty and another  was exported  to  
Czechoslovakia f o r  unspec i f ied  uses .  However, accord ing to  Swann most of 
these  systems ended up being so ld  on to  co l leges  f o r  teaching  use.
136Wilde, op c i t ,  F e r r a n t i  J o u r n a l . 1960.
137F e r r a n t i  Archive,  'Advantage of the  F e r r a n t i  S i r i u s  Computer ' ,  
s a le s  brochure ,  January 1961.
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There fore ,  by the  l a t e  1950s F e r r an t i  was s e l l i n g  a number of 
d i f f e r e n t  machines. In o rde r  of  s i z e  they  were: S i r i u s ,  Pegasus,  Mercury 
and P e rseu s138. However, th e  l a t t e r  machines were a l l  f i r s t  g en e ra t io n ,  
valve systems. F e r r an t i  needed the  new so l id  s t a t e  Orion system t o  r ep lace  
them.
F e r r a n t i  provided a number of f e a tu r e s  on the  Orion which were very 
advanced. To increase  th roughput of  da ta  th e  Orion adopted a technique 
r e f e r r e d  t o ,  by Swann, as t im e - s h a r in g ,  though i t  was of a more l im i ted  
na ture  than  the  l a t e r  concept o f  t im e-shared  computers.  The design team 
r e a l i s e d  t h a t  th e re  was a l o t  of  wasted t ime when using a computer. For 
example, even the  f a s t e s t  contemporary paper tape  system could only  input  
1000 c h a r a c t e r s  per  second. The machine was running much f a s t e r  than t h i s ,  
so was always wai t ing  f o r  inpu t  and outpu t  devices  to  catch up. There fore ,  
they devised  the  computer so i t  could perform a number o f  t a sk s  
s imul taneous ly ,  and t h i s  was supported  by one of  the  f i r s t  comprehensive 
con tro l  programs [opera t ing  sys tem],  the  OMP. The Orion could co n t ro l  a 
number of  p e r ip h e r a l s  s imul taneous ly  and could handle a number of  programs 
a t  the  same time. There fore ,  i f  the  machine was working on a la rge  and t ime 
consuming problem using da ta  from the  magnetic tape  d r iv e ,  i t  could  input  
smal le r programs and data  from th e  o th e r  devices  and process the  smal ler  
program during the  in pu t -ou tpu t  cy c le s  of the  la rge  job.  This b e t t e r  
u t i l i s e d  th e  expensive p e r i p h e r a l s ,  and increased th roughput139.
The second g re a t  advantage o f f e r e d  by the  Orion was the Nebula high 
level  programming language. This was a method by which the  machine could 
be programmed using p la in  Engl ish ,  which was then t r a n s l a t e d  in to  machine 
code140, l i k e  th e  computer languages used today.  This reduced the  need 
to  employ mathematica lly  t r a i n e d  programmers and allowed more use rs  to  
design programs f o r  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  needs.
However problems with th e  Orion mounted. One of  the  problems t h a t  the  
machine had was t iming, as p r e d ic t e d  by the people in London. The problem 
was caused by the  increased s i z e  of  th e  Orion over the  s impler  S i r i u s .  
Engineers found t h a t  the  wave form of  an e l e c t r i c a l  pulse  a t  one end of a 
wire was d i f f e r e n t  a t  the  o th e r  end: t h i s  was known as the  F e r r a n t i  E f fec t  
a f t e r  i t s  d i s c o v e r e r 141. This d i f f i c u l t y  was l e s s  obvious in th e  smal ler
138Wilde, op c i t ,  F e r r a n t i  J o u r n a l . 1960.
139NAHC,'Ferranti System-Orion'  s a le s  brochure  1960.
14°Swann, 'F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
141lb i d .
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Newt and S i r i u s .  The problems were so g rea t  t h a t  F e r r an t i  even tua l ly  
rep laced  the  Neuron c i r c u i t s  with an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  the  Gripple  technique,  
and re - launched  the  system as the  Orion 2. I t  i s  u n ce r ta in  how many of the  
machines so ld  used the  G r ipp le .  Swann only r e f e r s  to  one in h i s  s a l e s  
f i g u r e s ,  the  r e s t  being the  o r i g i n a l  Orion 1 des ign .
The way in which F e r r a n t i  overcame the  problems of the  Orion 1 and 
the Neuron c i r c u i t  i t s e l f  led to  problems. I t  had been intended t h a t  the  
machine be expandable,  a l lowing e x t r a  process ing equipment to  be added to  
handle more programs a t  once,  and e x t r a  p e r ip h e r a l s  to  increase  input-  
output c ap a c i ty .  However, t o  overcome th e  t iming problem each computer was 
con s t ru c ted  to  meet the  exac t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  ordered ,  making fu tu r e  
expansion of  the  machines very  d i f f i c u l t .  According to  Swann n e i t h e r  the  
management nor the  s a le s  s t a f f  were informed of  t h i s  important change.
The Orion had a l so  grown to  be a l a r g e r  system than o r i g i n a l l y  
intended and was by no means a Pegasus replacement.  In 1963 p r i c e s ,  the  
average Orion so ld  f o r  £300,000142. 12 systems were i n s t a l l e d .  2 were 
used f o r  F e r r a n t i ' s  own computer s e r v i c e ,  and 2 were used by government 
r esea rch  e s tab l i sh m en ts ;  the  o th e r  8 were a l l  used f o r  commercial da ta  
p rocess ing  in indus t ry  and commerce.
Attempts to  r e c t i f y  the  problems.
The S i r i u s  was small and cheap, the  Orion was la rge  but had c o s t l y  
t e ch n ica l  problems and was being seve re ly  delayed.  The s a le s  department 
t h e r e f o r e  r e s u r r e c t e d  the  t r a n s i s t o r  Pegasus idea.  A s e t  o f  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
was c re a te d  by a study group led  by Harry Johnson. The scheme was, however, 
dropped by the  Computer Department.  A f te r  Swann re tu rn e d  from a holiday in 
the Autumn of  1961, he found t h a t  engineer ing  manager, Pe te r  H a l l ,  had 
cance l led  the  idea in favour  of  the  Orion 2 scheme.
However, F e r r a n t i ' s  Canadian o rg a n i s a t i o n ,  Fe r r an t i -Pack a rd ,  took up 
the p roposa l ,  to g e th e r  with some techniques  l e a r n t  from the  Orion and the  
r e a l - t im e  computers F e r r an t i -P ack a rd  had developed f o r  o n - l in e  t i c k e t  
ope ra t ions  and o the r  work, and c re a te d  the  FP 6000. This machine was 
developed as a medium-size computer t h a t  Fer ran t i -Packa rd  was going to  use 
fo r  i t s  s p e c i a l i s t  o n - l in e  computer a c t i v i t i e s .  However, when ICT took over 
F e r r a n t i ' s  Computer Department,  t h i s  design was a l so  included. I t  became 
the base of the  ICT 1900 computers which have been developed a l l  the  way 
through to  the  c u r r e n t  ICL machines143.
142Hendry, Innovat ing f o r  F a i l u r e . pl83, in 1963 p r i c e s .
143See below, chapter 5, on ICT, ppl99-204.
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N ever the le ss ,  in the  e a r l y  1960s F e r r an t i  had only two second 
g e n e ra t io n  machines on o f f e r  in the  UK, the  S i r i u s  and th e  Orion, a dead 
end technology.
ATLAS, th e  f i n a l  chance.
In the  same period t h a t  the  Orion and S i r i u s  were being marketed,  
F e r r a n t i  had been working on a government c o n t r a c t  f o r  a super s ca le  
computer.  John Hendry has f u l l y  desc r ibed  the  n a t io n a l  p r o j e c t  of  the  l a t e  
1950s and e a r l y  1960s to  produce a B r i t i s h  super computer1**.
As with so many government i n i t i a t i v e s  to  improve the  c o u n t ry ' s  
tech n o lo g ica l  base ,  the  ATLAS p r o j e c t  s t a r t e d  a f t e r  a group of  ex p e r t s  from 
Cambridge U n ive rs i ty ,  Harwell and th e  National Physical  L a b o ra to r i e s 1*5 
v i s i t e d  the  USA in the  summer o f  1956. Their r e p o r t  concen tra ted  on the  
p o t e n t i a l  of  the  IBM STRETCH p r o j e c t .  STRETCH was being c o n s t ru c ted  by IBM 
to  f u l f i l  the  mathematical needs of the  l a rg e s t  US s c i e n t i f i c  l a b o r a t o r i e s .  
I t  was backing t h i s  p r o je c t  wi th a team of 300 graduate  level  s t a f f ,  and 
o v e r a l l ,  i t  was repor ted  to  be spending $28 m i l l i o n  a year  on computer 
r e s e a r c h 1*6 . This was probably an underest imate .
The French had a l ready  s t a r t e d  a to  develop t h e i r  own super computer 
p r o j e c t ,  in the  form of the  f a i l e d  Bull 60. Supercomputers were becoming 
items of  n a t io n a l  p r ide  in Europe, based on th e  assumption t h a t  i t  was 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y  important to  be ab le  to  produce the  computers needed to  c a r ry  
out advanced nuc lea r  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  I t  was a lso  thought t h a t  such a p r o j e c t  
was important in ensuring the  tech n o lo g ica l  compet it iveness  of any domestic 
computer in d u s t ry ,  a view supported  by the Royal Radar Establ ishment :
'RRE adhered to  the  opin ion expressed by NRDC t h a t  i t  was 
broad ly  in the  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  to  engage in a h igh-speed computer 
p r o j e c t  and th a t  the  f in a n c in g  of  such a p r o j e c t  would have to  be 
regarded a s ,  in l a rg e  p a r t ,  support  f o r  th e  computer 
i n d u s t r y  7l*7
Hendry de sc r ibe s  the  complicated n e g o t ia t io n s  t h a t  went on th roughout 
the  l a t e  1950s to  s t a r t  such a programme. The s i t u a t i o n  was confused by the  
d i f f e r e n t  v i s io n s  held by th e  NRDC and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Author i ty ,  who were expected to  be th e  l a r g e s t  customer f o r  such machines.
1**John Hendry, 'Prolonged n e g o t ia t io n :  The B r i t i s h  f a s t  computer 
p r o j e c t  and the  e a r ly  h i s t o r y  of  the  B r i t i s h  computer i n d u s t r y ' .  Business 
His to ry  26 1984, pp280-306; and Innovat ing fo r  f a i l u r e , chap te r  10.
1*5Ib id .
1*6Swann, 'F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
1*7NRDC 86/40 /6 ,  John Crawley's  f i l e  note  on a meeting with RRE
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  30/8/57.
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Within th e  l a t t e r  th e re  was some enthusiasm fo r  becoming d i r e c t l y  involved 
in t h e  development of the  computer, o r  f o r  using th e  re sources  o f  the  RRE 
in th e  design  of  the  machine. On the  NRDC s ide ,  £lm was made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
a f a s t  computer p r o j e c t 1*8 . The Corporation wanted to  s e t  up a 
s u b s id ia ry  department which would p lace  orders f o r  th e  o v e ra l l  system with 
o u ts id e  c o n t r a c t o r s .  I t  did  not b e l i e v e  t h a t  such a development was with in  
the  a b i l i t i e s  a s in g le  f i rm .
Even tua l ly  i t  was decided to  s p l i t  the  r o l e s  of the  i n t e r e s t e d  
p a r t i e s .  The NRDC was to  commence a p ro je c t  to  produce a super computer 
wi th in  a r e l a t i v e l y  sh o r t  p e r io d 149. This sh o r t  term under tak ing  was to  
be based on a machine being developed by the  Kilburn  team a t  Manchester 
U n iv e r s i ty ,  c a l l e d  the  MUSE. I t  was reckoned t h a t  such a machine would be 
two to  t h r e e  t imes slower than S t r e t c h ,  but s t i l l  f a s t  (about 50 t imes 
f a s t e r  than the  Mercury150) .  The second p r o j e c t  was to  be a long term 
development programme based a t  th e  RRE, which was to  le ap - f ro g  c u r r e n t  
technology. Nothing came of the  l a t t e r  idea.
Another f a c t o r  which was becoming apparent  was t h a t  F e r r an t i  had a 
growing i n t e r e s t  in the  MUSE p r o j e c t .  F e r ran t i  was concerned t h a t  the  
Atomic Weapons Research Establi shment had bought an IBM 704 in p re fe rence  
to  th e  Mercury. I t  was becoming in c reas in g ly  obvious t h a t  F e r r an t i  needed 
to  do something t o  safeguard  i t s  p lace  in the  u n i v e r s i t y  and s c i e n t i f i c  
market. The coincidence  of F e r r a n t i  and NRDC i n t e r e s t s  in the  MUSE p r o j e c t  
brought th e  two p a r t i e s  in to  n e g o t i a t io n .  However, t h e re  was some 
re lu c tan c e  on th e  s ide  of the  NRDC to  commit i t s e l f  to  support ing F e r r a n t i ,  
who, in th e  p a s t ,  had c re a te d  some problems. A second cause f o r  r e t i c e n c e  
on the  NRDC's p a r t ,  was i t s  f e e l i n g  t h a t  F e r r an t i  was too small to  c a r ry  
out such a l a rg e  p r o j e c t .  I t  was th e  NRDC's o r i g i n a l  con ten t ion  t h a t  the  
na t iona l  f a s t  computer p r o j e c t  was so large t h a t  no s in g le  o rg an is a t io n  
could take  i t  on151, but e v e n tu a l ly  i t  had to  accep t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .
In l a t e  1958, th e  NRDC and Fe r ran t i  could  not agree  a form of 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  t h a t  was a c c e p ta b l e 152. As an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  the  NRDC 
s t a r t e d  t a l k i n g  to  EMI and Engl ish E l e c t r i c  about  whether they  could
148Ib id .
149NRDC 86 /40 /6 ,  S i r  Owen Wansbrough-Jones, d r a f t  r e p o r t  of the  
Harwell Working P a r ty ,  p resen ted  to  the  100th NRDC board meeting,  28/5 /58.
15°Swann, 'F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .
151NRDC 86 /40 /6 ,  i n t e r n a l  memo from Halsbury to  NRDC chairman W.R. 
Black, 17/7 /58 .
152Hendry, 'Pro longed N e g o t i a t i o n s ' ,  Business H i s to ry . 1984.
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produce a f a s t  computer. In 1959 th e  s i t u a t i o n  became e a s i e r  when the  
atomic energy people a t  Harwell decided t h a t  they  no longer wanted to  
d i v e r s i f y  in to  computer des ign .  The RRE p r o j e c t ,  supported by the  NPL, was 
taken over by th e  DSIR. This c l ea re d  th e  decks f o r  th e  NRDC, who no longer 
had to  co n s id e r  developments w i th in  o ther  p a r t s  of government. The 
Corpora tion asked f o r  simple p roposa ls  from th e  t h r e e  companies f o r  
p r o j e c t s  to  b u i ld  a f a s t  computer. EMI and F e r r a n t i  both app l ied  f o r  
support .  F e r r a n t i  had f i n a l l y  decided to  accept the  same c o n t r a c t  
cond i t ions  as EMI ( t h i s  had been the  s t i c k in g  po in t  in 1958). EMI had been 
working on a la rg e  commercial da ta  process ing system, th e  2400, with the  
backing of  the  NRDC153. The proposed loan was to  be paid  back based on 
a f l a t  levy on a l l  EMI's computer s a l e s ,  not j u s t  2400 s a l e s .  Halsbury 
be l ieved  t h a t  F e r r an t i  accepted t h i s  form of c o n t r a c t  because i t  
d e s p e ra te ly  needed a l a rge  c o n t r a c t  t o  keep i t s  design team busy154.
The NRDC board meeting o f  22nd April  1959155 had two p o t e n t i a l  
p r o j e c t s  to  support ,  the  f i r s t  - support ing the  F e r r an t i  ATLAS p r o j e c t  - 
was expected to  cos t  £850,000. F e r r a n t i  wanted the  NRDC to  fund 60% of 
t h i s ,  £510,000. EMI's plan was to  c o s t  £375,000. EMI was ask ing f o r  75% of 
t h i s  sum, £280,000156. Halsbury and the  E lec t ro n ic  Computer Sub- 
Committee recommended the  EMI p ro p o sa l157. EMI planned to  produce a 
s c i e n t i f i c  v e rs ion  of the  2400, c a l l e d  the 3400158. Though t h i s  was not 
expected to  be as powerful as th e  ATLAS, i t  would be a v a i l a b l e  qu icker ,  
and, up t o  t h i s  s tage ,  i t  was thought t h a t  EMI had worked well  with the  
NRDC.
Hennessey, the  deputy managing d i r e c t o r  of the  NRDC, made a counter 
p roposa l .  He suggested t h a t  both p r o j e c t s  be supported,  but  to  a l e s s e r  
degree than was being asked f o r .  He won approval f o r  t h i s  p lan ,  a l lowing 
£240,000 f o r  th e  3400 and £300,000 f o r  th e  ATLAS. The 3400 pe te red  ou t ,  but 
a t  l e a s t  ATLAS got  going, though with a reduced NRDC commitment. Hendry 
sugges ts  t h a t  th e  3400 p r o j e c t  may have been a barga in ing  counter  c rea ted  
by Halsbury to  ge t  a b e t t e r  deal  from F e r r a n t i .
153See below, chap ter  3 on EMI, ppl34-140
154NRDC 86/40 /6 ,  Halsbury to  Black, 17/7/58.
155NRDC 86/40 /6 ,  minutes of  the  110th NRDC board meeting,  22/4 /59.
156NRDC 86/42 /5 ,  Halsbury,  'Swan Song' .  Halsbury wrote t h i s  i n t e rn a l  
rep o r t  on h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  summing up th e  NRDC's r o l e  to  d a te .
157NRDC 86/40 /6 ,  110th board meeting 22/4/59.
158See below, chapter 3, ppl41-142.
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Build ing and S e l l in g  ATLAS 1.
N ei ther  making nor s e l l i n g  the  ATLAS was to  prove easy,  though i t  was 
no l e s s  su ccess fu l  than some o th e r  super-computer p r o j e c t s .
I t  was a t  about t h i s  t ime t h a t  P o l l a r d ,  the  F e r r an t i  Computer 
Department manager, l e f t  F e r r a n t i  t o  jo in  the  American bus iness  machines 
company, Burroughs. J u s t  a f t e r  he jo in e d  Burroughs he wrote an a r t i c l e  in 
the  lead ing  US computer indus t ry  jo u rn a l  Datamation, c o n t r a s t i n g  the  UK and 
US i n d u s t r i e s 159. This gives  us some in s ig h t  in to  the problems Fe r r an t i  
had a t  t h i s  t ime ,  and the  weaknesses i t  had when developing such a system.
He saw computers as being a s id e  l ine  f o r  companies in the  UK: UK 
fi rms were more in t e r e s t e d  in o th e r  bus inesses .  This was d i f f e r e n t  in the  
US bus iness  machines firms where the  commitment to  computers was whole­
hea r ted .  In ch ap te r  e ig h t  of t h i s  t h e s i s  i t  i s  seen t h a t  the  computer was 
a much more important product to  the  US business  machines fi rms than i t  was 
to th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. Despite  t h i s  lower commitment to  computers, 
P o l la rd  noted t h a t  B r i t i s h  f i rms s t i l l  wanted to  produce the  whole system; 
American f i r m s ,  such as Burroughs, were much more w i l l i n g  to  su b -c o n t ra c t  
to s p e c i a l i s t s .  F in a l ly  he noted a massive s k i l l s  shor tage .  UK computer 
systems were o f t e n  being developed by teams of as few as twelve,  in the  USA 
the R&D and eng ineer ing  o pe ra t ions  were an o rd e r  of magnitude l a r g e r .  
Notably,  however, these  la rg e  development teams were no more success fu l  in 
developing super-computers  than the  Fe r r an t i  team. Po l la rd  saw lack of 
commitment and an unwil l ingness  to  s u b -c o n t r a c t ,  as fundamental B r i t i s h  
weaknesses.
Some of  t h e se  weaknesses su r faced  in the  ATLAS. Despite  the  sheer  
s ca le  of  the  p r o j e c t ,  most of  the  machine was c o n s t ru c ted  by F e r r a n t i .  Only 
some sub-systems were bought in ,  such as magnetic core  s to re s  bought from 
Plessey and Mullard ,  and the  magnetic tape u n i t s  bought from Ampex160. 
F e r r an t i  t h e r e f o r e  had the  c o s t  of developing almost the  whole system.
The ATLAS was a very advanced machine. I f  i t  d id  not q u i t e  match the  
break-neck speed of the  STRETCH (which in any case  never came up to  
e x p e c ta t io n ) ,  i t  made up f o r  t h i s  by having very  advanced o p e ra t io n a l  
concepts b u i l t  in to  i t .  Like the  Orion, ATLAS allowed f o r  the  running of 
m ul t ip le  programs, and could handle a la rge  number of very f a s t  inpu t -  
output  dev ice s ,  making up f o r  one o f  Mercury's  shortcomings161. ATLAS
159Brian P o l l a r d  'A comparison of  computer i n d u s t r i e s  in th e  U.S. and 
the U .K . ' ,  Datamation. May/June 1960 p51-52.
l s o NRDC 86 /32 /2 ,  At las  p rogress  r e p o r t ,  30 /9 /60 .
l s l Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer D epar tment ' .
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a l so  in troduced the  concept of  v i r t u a l  memory. This i s  a technique  where 
a c t i v e  d a ta  can be t r a n s f e r r e d  in to  a secondary s t o r e .  The u se r  does not 
know t h a t  t h i s  has occurred and the  system a c t s  as i f  i t  has an unl imited  
f a s t  s t o r e ,  though access i s  slower when i t  has to  access  th e  v i r t u a l  
memory.
These advanced f e a t u r e s  were th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  10 programmers 
w r i t i n g  the  ope ra t ing  system, 15 programmers working on use r  languages ,  and 
a s i m i l a r  number of  eng ineers  working on the  hardware162. As has been 
noted,  STRETCH had a team of  300 developing i t ,  and Bull was using 200 
programmers a lone  on the  Bull  60. This was symptomatic of  th e  lack of 
funds.  The o r i g i n a l  U n ive rs i ty  MUSE p r o j e c t  had been p a r t l y  paid  fo r  from 
the  small  amount of money accru ing  to  the  Department of E l e c t r i c a l  
Engineering from Mark 1 s a l e s 163; the  NRDC had only put up £300,000; and 
by mid 1960, F e r r a n t i  had spent  Elm of  i t s  own money on the  p r o j e c t 164. 
By comparison to  the  e f f o r t  in o th e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h i s  was a l l  very  modest.
While F e r r an t i  developed a very advanced computer, i t  was j u s t  too 
much work f o r  such a small group. Swann h igh l igh ted  a four  year  lag between 
the  i n s t a l l a t i o n  of  the  f i r s t  computer and the  software  to  run i t  being 
a v a i l a b l e .  Delays to  the  ATLAS became very long, leading to  l o s t  s a l e s  and 
inc reas ing  the  c o s t  to  F e r r a n t i .  While the  company could i n s t a l l  ATLASes 
by 1963, the  r e a l i t y  was t h a t  a f u l l  system could not be working f o r  some 
time a f t e r  t h a t .
Another,  more immediate, problem was t h a t  F e r r an t i  had a g re a t  deal  
of d i f f i c u l t y  g e t t i n g  o rd e r s .  During th e  1950s, the  Mercury was the  only 
la rge  s c i e n t i f i c  machine being made in Europe. In the  e a r l y  1960s, ATLAS 
was the  only ' g i a n t - s c a l e  computer '  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  commercial s a l e  in the  
whole world165. The reason f o r  t h i s  was t h a t  the  STRETCH had gone awry: 
i t  had c o s t  much more than in tended t o  develop and had not proved as f a s t .  
IBM had o f f e re d  them f o r  s a l e  a t  $10m each, but t h i s  was a t  a huge lo s s ,  
so i t  had withdrawn the  machine from th e  market. Likewise the  Bull 60 was 
a f a i l u r e  and t h a t  company was buckl ing  under g re a t  f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i n 166.
P e rv e r se ly  t h i s  a c t u a l l y  damaged F e r r a n t i .  Many p o t e n t i a l  ATLAS 
use r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in the  US, became s c e p t i c a l  t h a t  F e r r an t i  could  a c t u a l l y
162 ib id .
163Lavington A His to ry  of Manchester Computers p32.
164Hendry, 'Prolonged n e g o t i a t i o n s ' .
165Datamation. April  1962, p l9 .
166See below, chapter 7 on General E lectric, pp315-317.
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d e l i v e r .  Sebas t ian  F e r r a n t i ,  V in c en t ' s  successor,  became d i r e c t l y  involved 
in the  UK s a l e s  e f f o r t  as th e  lack of s a l e s  s t a r t e d  to  become a c r i s i s .  For 
a f i rm  l i k e  F e r r a n t i ,  a l o t  of  money was a t  r i s k ,  and y e t  by 1961 th e re  
were no f i rm  o rd e r s .  The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Author i ty  had ordered 
a STRETCH in 1960 fo r  the  Atomic Weapons Research Establ ishment .  The AWRE 
opted f o r  the  STRETCH because i t  would be d e l iv e red  e a r l i e r  than ATLAS. 
STRETCH was a l so  expected to  be f a s t e r  than ATLAS, and could use software  
developed f o r  nuc lear  s c i e n t i s t s  in America. However, as i t  became c l e a r  
t h a t  STRETCH was not l i v in g  up to  expec ta t ions ,  i t  became ev iden t  t h a t  the  
c i v i l  s id e  of  the  UKAEA would need a g i a n t  computer f o r  i t s e l f ,  STRETCH not 
being f a s t  enough to  handle both work loads167. Harwell ,  t h e  UKAEA's 
c i v i l  e s tab l i shm en t ,  was sympathetic  to  F e r r a n t i ' s  p l i g h t  and the  AEA 
bought a system in 1961 f o r  d e l iv e r y  in 1964. In Hendry's  eyes t h i s  o rder  
was too l a t e  to  encourage o th e r  p o t e n t i a l  users  in the  f i e l d  of  nuc lea r  
research  to  fo llow s u i t .  Sebas t ian  wanted a p r e s t i g io u s  order  l i k e  t h i s  to  
give o th e r  users  f a i t h  in th e  system, but t h i s  o rder  was too l a t e :  by t h i s  
time o th e r  developments were on the  horizon . Other p o t e n t i a l  u se r s  were 
w i l l in g  to  wait  and see i f  the  system could do the  job.  By the  t ime i t  
could prove i t s e l f ,  th e  CDC 6600 was near production in the  USA. As the  
ATLAS was d e l iv e re d ,  CDC was mopping up with i t s  machine168.
The l a r g e s t  s in g le  market f o r  t h i s  type of computer was in the  USA. 
However F e r r a n t i  did not s e l l  any ATLAS machines in the  USA. I t  seems t h a t  
F e r ran t i  was in informal d i s cu s s io n s  about the  s a l e  of  something l i k e  6-12 
computers in the  USA, d e s p i t e  American preference  f o r  domestic machines. 
Of th e se ,  the  c l o s e s t  to  a f i rm  order  was from Westinghouse,  a f i rm  with 
large nuc lea r  i n t e r e s t s 169. However, each o rder  ran in to  m i l l i o n s  of 
pounds, and each c o n t r a c t  would have had to  have la rge  p e n a l ty  c lauses  
w r i t t en  in to  them in case of l a t e  i n s t a l l a t i o n .  F e r r a n t i  decided t h a t  t h i s  
was too g r e a t  a r i s k  t o  t a k e .  With h a l f  a dozen o rde rs  taken in the  USA, 
any hold-up in d e l iv e ry  would have put very la rge  sums a t  r i s k ,  l a r g e r  sums 
than F e r r a n t i  was w i l l i n g  to  lose  on computers.
The ATLAS was a commercial f a i l u r e :  by 1963 the  machine was a l ready  
looking o b s o le t e .  In 1964 IBM announced i t s  t h i r d  genera t ion  systems and 
CDC was winning the  s c i e n t i f i c  market with the  CDC 6600170, designed by
167Hendry, Innovat ing f o r  F a i l u r e , chapte r 10.
168See below, chap te r  8,  pp397-400, on CDC.
169Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Department ' .  
17°See below, chap te r  8,  pp397-400.
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Seymor Cray who, i t  i s  c laimed, used the academic papers on the  ATLAS 
system t o  help design the  6600.
ATLAS 2.
This p r o j e c t  s t a r t e d  when F e r r an t i  o f f e re d  Pro fesso r  Wilkes of 
Cambridge U n ive rs i ty  some of  the  ATLAS s u b -u n i t s .  This was in exchange f o r  
Wilkes working on an updated and cheaper machine. By 1963 t h i s  work was 
well in hand. In 1963 F e r r a n t i  was n e g o t ia t in g  the  s a l e  of  th e  Computer 
Department to  ICT, and i t  seems t h a t  i t  t a lked  up the  p rospec ts  f o r  the  
Atlas  2, so as t o  be in a s t ro n g e r  n e g o t ia t in g  p o s i t i o n .  In t h i s  r e s p ec t  
F e r r an t i  b e n e f i t ed  from the  f a i l u r e  of STRETCH; the  AWRE was concerned t h a t  
i t  would be l e f t  with the  only  one in Europe, making i t  very expensive to  
get  suppor t .  F e r r an t i  o f f e red  to  s e l l  i t  a replacement ATLAS 2, a t  an 
extremely low p r ic e  with severe  pen a l ty  c l a u s e s ,  an o f f e r  t h a t  was 
accepted.
Once ICT had acquired the  F e r r a n t i  Computer Department,  i t  was l e f t  
with an o rd e r ,  a t  an uneconomical p r i c e ,  f o r  a one -o f f  machine. Despite  the  
help of  AEA computer e x p e r t s ,  the  ATLAS 2 was d e l iv e red  in 1966, 14 months 
l a t e .
The fo l lowing t a b l e  shows the  few ATLAS u se r s :
Table 2.3  ATLAS s a l e s :
ATLAS 1:
Customer Del ivery  Uses
Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  1963 R esearch /se rv ice
U n ive rs i ty  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
London U n iv e r s i ty  1963 Computer s e r v ic e
UKAEA 1964 Nuclear energy
Research
ATLAS 2
AWRE 1966 Nuclear Weapons
Research.
F e r r a n t i ' s  o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s .
Before cons ider ing  the  reasons  why Fe r r an t i  abandoned i t s  computer 
opera t ions  i t  i s  worthwhile o u t l i n i n g  the o the r  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  the  f i rm  
was developing a t  t h i s  t ime. The p r i o r i t y  which the  company accorded each 
a c t i v i t y  sheds a good deal o f  l i g h t  on F e r r a n t i ' s  s t r e n g th s  and weaknesses.
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Bloodhound m issiles and m ilitary and industrial control computers.
So f a r ,  only  one s id e  o f  F e r r a n t i ' s  computer bus iness  has been 
d i scu ssed :  commercial and s c i e n t i f i c  data process ing  systems. However, 
F e r r a n t i  was producing a number of o th e r  computer systems, both m i l i t a r y  
and c i v i l i a n .  By the e a r ly  1960s th e r e  were two o th e r  departments producing 
computer equipment.  The f i r s t  o f  these  was the  I n d u s t r i a l  Control  Systems 
Department171, l a t e r  known as the  Wythenshawe Div is ion .
I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  F e r r a n t i ' s  Ins truments  Department had a 
g rea t  deal  of  d i f f i c u l t y  f in d in g  work a f t e r  the  Second World War. One 
s o lu t io n  f o r  t h i s  was to  b u i ld  th e  government sponsored Mark 1 computer. 
A second impor tant p r o je c t  was the  development c o n t r a c t  f o r  the  Bloodhound 
a n t i - a i r c r a f t  m i s s i l e ,  a c o n t r a c t  awarded in th e  same year  as t h e  Mark 1
work s t a r t e d ,  1948172. F e r r a n t i  was re spons ib le  f o r  the  e l e c t r o n i c
systems o f  the  m i s s i l e .  B r i s t o l  Siddeley produced the  engines and the
B r i s to l  A i r c r a f t  Company made the  fu se lage .  The whole system was c o n t r o l l e d  
by a F e r r a n t i  d i g i t a l  computer,  th e  Argus173, developed under the
c o n t r a c t .
By 1961 F e r r an t i  had s t a r t e d  to  i n s t a l l  t h i s  computer f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  
con t ro l  purposes .  An Argus was used to  contro l  chemical production a t  IC I ' s  
Fleetwood p l a n t ,  and a second was used by Babcock and Wilcox to  c on t ro l  the  
s t a r t - u p  and shut-down of b o i l e r s  in a power s t a t i o n 17**. This kind of 
work was c l o s e r  to  Grundy's o r i g i n a l  plans  fo r  computers,  as the  b ra in s  of 
i n d u s t r i a l  processes .
Since the  1950s, the  Argus has been through many g en e ra t io n s ,  and by 
1979, 1263 had been so ld ,  excluding th e  many used in weapons systems:
171F e r r a n t i  Archive,  F e r r a n t i  Computer World. No.17 Sep t /O c t '  63.
172J . f .  Wilson and C l i f f  Wimpennev. F e r r an t i  down the  y e a r s . 
Manchester,  1989, Fe r r an t i  p u b l i c i t y  brochure.
173 F e r r a n t i  a rch ive ,  F e r r a n t i  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  the  Bloodhound guided 
weapon system, pu b l i c i t y  a r t i c l e ,  1963.
17* F e r r a n t i  a rch ive ,  Sebas t ian  F e r r a n t i ' s  managing d i r e c t o r ' s  'Review 
of A c t i v i t i e s ' ,  1961.
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Table 2.4 Combined s a l e s  of Araus computers.  
TotalIndus t ry
Chemical
Oil
Process i n d u s t r i e s  
Manufacturing in d u s t r i e s  
Metal
Public  u t i l i t i e s
E x t rac t iv e
Paper p r i n t i n g
D i s t r i b u t i o n
Commerce
Transport
Communication
Publ ic  s e r v ic e s
U n ive rs i ty  re sea rch
Software houses and OEM175
P r in t in g  and pub l ish ing
30
43
12
216
96
142
60
145
61
73
85
28
16
4
5 
7
1023
M i l i t a ry
F e r r an t i  i n t e r n a l  use 
Serv ice
141
93
6 on loan
1263
Source: National Archive f o r  th e  H is to ry  of Computing F e r /c /3 1 ,  ' L i s t  of 
p r in c ip a l  Argus computer i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,  excluding m i l i t a r y  s a l e s ' , F e r r an t i  
Ltd, 1979.
Apart from the  s p i n - o f f  Argus computers,  Bloodhound a lso  provided 
cash. In f a c t  i t  provided too much cash. O r ig in a l ly  th e  development 
c o n t r a c t  f o r  th e  system was t o  be £ 1 - 1 . 5m176. I t  turned out to  be £32m, 
of which £8m was fo r  the  F e r r a n t i  c o n t ro l  system. The production c o n t r a c t  
f o r  the  m i s s i l e  was worth £ 4 4 .5m. Of t h i s  £13.5m was a f ix ed  p r i c e  c o n t r a c t  
f o r  F e r r a n t i ' s  c o n t r ib u t io n .  However, i t  seems t h a t  F e r r an t i  managed to  
produce th e  system much cheaper than  expected.  The House of  Commons 
e s t a b l i s h e d  a committee to  examine a l l e g a t i o n s  of excess p r o f i t .  The 
outcome of  t h i s  was the  Lang Report  which es t imated  t h a t  F e r r a n t i  made a 
p r o f i t  of  £ 5 . 77m from Bloodhound, a 82% margin on c o s t s 177. Eventua lly  
the  f i rm  was fo rced  to  pay back £ 4 . 25m178.
1750 r i g i n a l  Equipment Manufacture is  the  term to  de sc r ibe  a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  s e l f - c o n ta in e d  product t h a t  is  used in the  make up of another 
product.
176Times. 30/4764 p6, 7 and 14, s ta tement by Mr Amery, M in is te r  of 
Avia t ion ,  in r e a c t io n  to  the  2nd r e p o r t  on the  Bloodhound m is s i l e  from the  
Committee of Public  Accounts.
177Times 24/7 /64 ,  p l2 .
178Times. 29/7 /64, plO.
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Naval and sp ec ia list computers.
The t h i r d  computer o p e ra t ion  was a s p i n - o f f  from , th e  Computer 
Department i t s e l f .  When th e  London ope ra t ion ,  which had designed the  
Pegasus,  moved to  Bracknel l ,  work commenced on m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l  command 
and c o n t ro l  systems. O r ig in a l ly  t h i s  was done in th e  M i l i t a r y  A pp l ica t ions  
Group, but j u s t  before  the  Computer Department was sold  to  ICT, t h i s  group 
was spun out as the  D ig i t a l  Systems Department179 and was kept by the  
f i rm .  I t  produced a number of  s p e c i a l i s t  m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l  systems. C iv i l  
computers inc luded machines f o r  o n - l i n e  sea t  r e s e r v a t i o n s  f o r  a i r l i n e s  and 
a i r  t r a f f i c  con t ro l  systems.
However, DSD's two core  products  were the  F1600 m i l i t a r y  computer and 
the Action Data Automation (ADA) systems, t h a t  used the  F1600 computer.  The 
f i r s t  ADA was i n s t a l l e d  on the  a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r  HMS Eagle which led to  the  
h ighly  automated con t ro l  rooms of the  modern navy. F e r r an t i  became one of 
the  l a r g e s t  su p p l i e r s  of computer systems to  western  navies .
Automatic machine too ls.
Another a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  d i g i t a l  technology was numerical ly  c o n t r o l l e d  
machine t o o l s ;  again t h i s  was p r im a r i ly  driven by m i l i t a r y  needs.  The 
S c o t t i s h  Group, which was formed a f t e r  the second war, developed these  
systems in support  of i t s  r a d a r  work180.
The USA was leading the  way in t h i s  type of  technology. During the  
Korean War, the  US Air Force encouraged the  development of numerical 
con tro l  systems fo r  machine t o o l s  to  produce the  h ighly  i n t r i c a t e  
engineer ing  work t h a t  was becoming e s s e n t i a l  t o  modern a i r c r a f t 181. 
However, F e r r a n t i  was ahead of a l l  competi t ion in one s p e c i f i c  a rea :  
systems to  make rada r  wave guides .  The company had s t a r t e d  work on these  
systems in 1951. By 1954 i t  had secured a c o n t r a c t  t h a t  would demand the  
use of numeric c on t ro l  systems, indeed th e re  seems to  have been a symbiosis 
between t h i s  c o n t r a c t  and the  i n t e r e s t  in machine to o l  numeric c o n t r o l .  The 
c o n t r a c t  was f o r  the  Airpass  Radar t h a t  was used in the  Engl ish E l e c t r i c  
PI Lightning f i g h t e r .  Radars have a la rge  block of  aluminium in them, 
within  t h i s  block grooves have to  be carved: th e s e  a re  the  wave guides 
which shape th e  rada r  p u ls e s .  Achieving t h i s  needs extremely accura te
179F e r r a n t i  Archive,  Sebas t ian  F e r r a n t i ' s  Review of A c t i v i t i e s . 1963.
18°Wilson and Wimpenney, F e r r a n t i  down the  y e a r s .
181C. Leyton e t  a l ,  Ten Innovations:  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  study on 
te chno log ica l  development and the  use of  Qual i f ied  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers  
in ten  i n d u s t r i e s . 1972, chap te r  12.
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carv ing ,  and the  automatic machine to o l  was the  b e s t  way t o  do t h i s .  
F e r r a n t i  made a number of  co n t ro l  systems, but i t  was in t h i s  f i e l d  t h a t  
i t  led the  market.
However, F e r r an t i  did not manage to  make the  production of  machine 
too l  co n t ro l  systems in to  a commercial success .  F e r r an t i  needed to  s e l l  a 
number of  systems to  spread the  high co s t  of developing them, j u s t  using 
them t o  make i t s  own rada r  systems was too expens ive .  In th e  l a t e  1950s, 
the  machine too l  con tro l  market was becoming l a rg e .  By 1960 F e r r a n t i  had 
spent £ 2 . 4m on numeric con t ro l  systems, but by 1963 i t  had so ld  only 150 
u n i t s ,  a t  a value of £3m182. In 1969, under the  guidance of the  
I n d u s t r i a l  Reorganisa tion C orpora t ion ,  P le ssey ,  which was much more 
success fu l  in the  commercial market,  bought the  F e r r a n t i  o p e ra t ion  fo r  
£ 2 .5m. This was y e t  another  m i l i t a r y  s p in - o f f  t h a t  F e r r a n t i  f a i l e d  to  
develop in to  a major bus iness .
Radar and Guided Weapons.
As the  above sec t ions  show, F e r r an t i  was very a c t i v e  in the  a reas  of 
radar  and m i s s i l e s .  The Bloodhound was a r e l a t i v e l y  success fu l  weapon and 
was so ld  to  B r i t a i n ,  Sweden, S w i tze r land ,  Singapore and A u s t r a l i a ;  indeed 
i t  i s  s t i l l  in l im i ted  use.  By the  l a t e  1950s, to g e th e r  with  th e  B r i s to l  
company, F e r r an t i  claimed to  have th e  l a r g e s t  guided weapons team in 
Europe183. In r a d a r ,  F e r r a n t i  was competing a g a in s t  GEC/EE's amalgam of 
Marconi and E l l i o t t  and the  sm al le r  EMI o pe ra t ion ,  and was probably  number 
two in the  market.
Consumer Products.
F e r r an t i  l e f t  the  consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  and e l e c t r i c a l  market a f t e r  
the  war. The f i n a l  s ec t io n  d isposed of was th e  T e lev is io n  and Radio 
department to  E.K. Cole Ltd18*. At th e  time the  company expla ined  t h a t  
t h i s  would f r e e  working c a p i t a l  f o r  o th e r  commitments.
Electrical equipment.
Likewise the  company abandoned t h i s  most t r a d i t i o n a l  of i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s  in th e  face  o f  heavy compet it ion from l a r g e r  e l e c t r i c a l  
producers.
182Ib id .
183Times 26/7/57 p l6 ,  r e p o r t  of  Vincent de F e r r a n t i ' s  chairman 's
s ta tement.
18*Ib id .
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Semiconductors.
F e r r a n t i ' s  h i s t o r y  in the  e l e c t r o n i c  components bus iness  i s  a long 
s to r y  which w i l l  only be summarised he re135. The company seems to  have 
d isp layed  a s im i l a r  a t t i t u d e  to  t h i s  business as i t  did to  i t s  computer 
ven tu re s ,  abandoning harsh commercial markets f o r  a more s p e c i a l i s e d  
approach.
In 1953 the  Valve Department s e t  up a team of  th r e e  r e sea rc h e r s  to  
work on semiconductors .  The wise dec i s ion  was made to  i n v e s t ig a t e  the  use 
of s i l i c o n  dev ices ,  r a t h e r  than the  more expensive germanium devices 
(germanium resea rch  was more common a t  t h i s  s t a g e 135) .  F e r r an t i  produced 
a number of advanced dev ices ,  mostly f o r  the m i l i t a r y .  In 1962 i t s  advanced 
techniques  led i t  to  be th e  f i r s t  source  of commercial in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t s  
ou ts ide  of  the  USA137. I n i t i a l l y  i t  developed i t s  own a r c h i t e c t u r e  using 
D iode-Trans is to r  Logic.  I t s  f i r s t  devices  were m u l t i - ch ip  packages c a l l e d  
Micro l in ,  then i t  produced th e  Micronor chip and then  the  Micronor I I ,  the  
l a t t e r  being developed from RCA technology.  The l a s t  two f a m i l i e s  of chips 
were l ic en sed  to  Marconi, which used them in the  m i l i t a r y  Myriad and Priam 
computers and in the  English  E l e c t r i c  System 4 computers133. However, 
F e r r an t i  did  not have the  f i n a n c i a l  resources  t o  develop a broad enough 
range o f  Micronor c h ip s 139. ICs have to be made a v a i l a b le  in la rge 
compatible f a m i l i e s  so t h a t  they  can be used f o r  a l l  p o s s ib le  purposes.  
F e r r an t i  had d i f f i c u l t y  f u l f i l l i n g  t h i s  c r i t e r i a .  This meant t h a t  the  
Micronor f a i l e d  to  become widely used. A major blow was the  f a i l u r e  of ICT 
to  adopt F e r r a n t i  chips  in the  1900 s e r i e s ,  d e s p i t e  a la rge  F e r r an t i  
r e p re s e n ta t i o n  on the  ICT board a f t e r  i t  had taken over th e  Computer 
Department.
F e r r a n t i  switched from i t s  own designs to  producing s tandard  
T r a n s i s t o r - T r a n s i s t o r  Logic (TTL) dev ices ;  Texas Instruments  had made t h i s  
the  s tandard  technology worldwide.  ICT/L bought l a rge  q u a n t i t i e s  of TTL 
chips from F e r r a n t i ,  which cushioned th e  blow from the  commercial f a i l u r e
135E. S c ib e r ra s  M u l t ina t iona l  e l e c t r o n i c  companies and na t iona l  
economic p o l i c y .  Greenwich, Conn., 1977, gives a good o u t l i n e  of  F e r r a n t i ' s  
h i s to r y  in t h i s  market
135Leyton, Ten In n o v a t io n s , chap te r  7.
137S c ib e r r a s ,  M ul t ina t iona l  E lec t ron ic  Companies. pl75.
133See below, chap te r  4,  ppl67-171.
189A. Golding, 'The semiconductor industry  in B r i t a in  and the  United 
S ta t e s :  a case  s tudy in innovat ion ,  growth and th e  d i f f u s io n  of technology. 
PhD. U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Sussex 1971.
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of  Engl ish E l e c t r i c ' s  System 4 and th e  f a i l u r e  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  Micronor 
e lsewhere .  Texas Instruments  was, ap paren t ly ,  too  busy supplying the  
burgeoning US market to  compete f o r  t h e se  o r d e r s 190. This changed in the  
e a r l y  1970s when a general  downturn in the  world economy, and the  f i r s t  
ever slowdown in computer s a l e s ,  led to  th e  'TTL w a r ' 191. Texas 
Instruments  s lashed  i t s  p r i c e s  in an e f f o r t  to  inc rease  volume on the se  
commodity dev ice s ,  and F e r r a n t i ,  not w i l l in g  t o  do the  same, l o s t  the  ICL 
deal and became margina l ised  in the  market.
S c ib e r ra s  c h a r a c te r i s e d  F e r r a n t i ' s  s t r a t e g y  as fo llowing  the  same 
p a t t e r n  as o th e r  ' l i t t l e  league '  f i rm s:  t h a t  i s ,  i t  s p e c i a l i s e d  in 
con t inuous ly  developing new, high value  devices ,  o f ten  f o r  the  m i l i t a r y .  
As demand f o r  the  new device picked up and la rge  mass production companies 
s t a r t e d  to  produce i t ,  F e r r a n t i  would leave t h a t  market be fore  th e  p r i c e  
came down. This culminated in F e r r a n t i  leading the  world in the  production 
of semi-custom devices ,  where i t  could  produce sp ec ia l  devices  to  o rde r ,  
but with a very f a s t  turnaround.
F e r r a n t i  so ld  t h i s  su c c e s s fu l ,  t e c h n o lo g ic a l ly  advanced, bus iness  to  
P lessey  in the  l a t e  1980s, as a p a r t  of i t s  scheme to  pay f o r  the  
d i s a s t r o u s  a c q u i s i t i o n  of the  s p e c i a l i s t  U.S. defence b us iness ,  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  S igna l .
F e r r a n t i ' s  d ec i s io n  to  leave the  computer indus t ry  and some conc lus ions .
The conclus ion t h a t  can be drawn from th e  l a s t  s e c t io n  i s  t h a t  
Fe r r an t i  was, from the  l a t e  1950s, concen t ra t ing  more and more on i t s  
advanced m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s  and computer techno log ies  and r e l a t e d  
c i v i l i a n  s p i n - o f f  bus inesses .  I f  one of  these  a reas  became too compet i t ive  
the  company would abandon i t ,  as i t  had with a l l  i t s  pu re ly  commercial 
op e ra t io n s .  This s tage  o f ten  seems t o  have been reached when i t  became 
necessary  to  produce c i v i l i a n  s p i n - o f f  products to  remain com pet i t ive .
Given t h i s  p a t t e r n ,  i t  i s  not s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  the  Computer Department 
was d isposed o f .  However, th e  company was not d ispos ing  of  a c t i v i t i e s  
unless  t h e re  was an underlying economic reason. There were p le n ty  of  the se  
reasons surrounding t h i s  depar tment.
The Computer Department ' s  a b i l i t y  to  compete was hampered by the  
l im i ted  re sou rce s  of F e r r a n t i .  The company was family  owned, was unwil l ing  
to  make long term coopera t ive  arrangements,  was worr ied about p a s t
19°F. Malerba The Semiconductor Industry:  the  economics of rap id
growth and d e c l i n e . Madison, Wisconsin,  1985, p i 16.
191Ibid.
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indeb tedness ,  and ye t  i t  s t i l l  had a pol icy  of  continued high technology 
expansion.  Such a combination was always going to  make cash flow a problem. 
Producing computers i s  a cash-hungry bus iness .  The high demands of  R&D mean 
a continued d ra in  on c a p i t a l  r e s o u rce s ,  and y e t  F e r r a n t i  was not s e l l i n g  
enough machines to  cover t h i s  o u t lay  without government subs idy.
F e r r a n t i  took a number of s teps  which were designed to  r e s t r i c t  the  
c a p i t a l  d ra in  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  i t s  computer e n t e r p r i s e .  However, these  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  ensured t h a t  i t  would not achieve a l a rg e  enough market share 
to  j u s t i f y  even the  l im i ted  expend i tu re .  The f i r s t  way in which the  f irm 
m i t ig a te d  the  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  of  en te r in g  the  computer ind u s t ry  was by 
drawing on government sponsorship .  I t  a lso  made ex tens ive  use of systems 
developed o u ts id e  the  f i rm ,  mainly from the U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Manchester.
Secondly i t  t r i e d  to  come to  an agreement with Powers-Samas to  reduce 
the  high co s t  of s e l l i n g  mass-produced commercial computers.  There were two 
f a c t o r s  behind t h i s  a t tempted j o i n t  venture .  Vincent de F e r r an t i  always 
be l ieved  t h a t  th e  Department 's  g r e a t  weakness (and t h i s  was probably h is  
view of the  whole company) was t h a t  i t  did not have the  a b i l i t y  to  s e l l  in 
the  commercial environment192. The second advantage was t h a t  F e r r an t i  
would not have to  bu i ld  up a la rg e  na t iona l  s a l e s  and support  s t a f f .  The 
company could co ncen t ra te  on i t s  engineer ing  market,  while Powers could 
market commercial systems.
However, t h i s  s a le s  p o l ic y  was not given p r a c t i c a l  support  w ith in  
e i t h e r  F e r r a n t i  o r  Powers-Samas. All i t  did was to  prec lude  F e r r an t i  from 
f in d in g  orders  from pure ly  commercial customers.  Even though much of the  
cos t  of  th e  Pegasus was borne by the  NRDC, the  f a i l u r e  to  s e l l  more systems 
meant t h a t  F e r r a n t i  l o s t  the  o p por tun i ty  of b u i ld in g  a s u b s t a n t i a l  non- 
s c i e n t i f i c  use r  base.
A f u r t h e r  problem was t h a t  th e  Ferranti -Powers  s t r a t e g y  was not 
backed with the  development of  a p p ro p r ia te  machines. The eng ineer ing  teams 
of the  two companies did not produce the  general  purpose computer t h a t  was 
c a l l e d  f o r .  Because of t h i s  f a i l u r e ,  Fe r ran t i  had no medium-scale computer 
fo r  the  mid-1960s to  o f f e r  the  merging s c i e n t i f i c  and commercial markets.
Another cash-sav ing  d e c i s io n  was to  have a p o l icy  of only s e l l i n g  
computers,  r a t h e r  than r e n t in g  systems. As i s  seen e lsewhere,  IBM had a 
po l icy  of  l e a s in g  i t s  punched card and computer systems: i t  wanted to  be 
the  p rov ide r  of  complete packages o f  hardware, software  and s e r v i c e 193. 
This p o l i c y  meant t h a t  computer su p p l ie r s  had to  fund th e  production of
192Swann, ' F e r r a n t i  Computer Depar tment ' .
193See below, chapter 8.
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computers,  while having to  wait  a number of years  to  recoup t h i s  ou t lay .  
Without o f f e r i n g  t h i s  s e rv ice  i t  would be impossible  f o r  F e r r a n t i  to  
e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  in the  commercial market,  as l e as in g  was over 60% of the  
market a t  the  t ime. Swann seems to  have r e g r e t t e d  t h i s :  he p o in t s  out t h a t  
a la rge  number of  the  Pegasus, Mercury and S i r iu s  computers were used fo r  
a number o f  y e a r s ,  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  would have genera ted  a good r e n t a l  
income. However, i t  i s  worth no t ing  th a t  f i rms s p e c i a l i s i n g  in the  
s c i e n t i f i c  market,  such as CDC, b e n e f i t t e d  g r e a t l y  by s e l l i n g  r a t h e r  than 
l e as in g ;  they  avoided higher than necessary  s t a r t  up c o s t s ,  and could use 
t h e i r  cash f o r  f u r t h e r  R&D.
Another way in which the  f i rm  t r i e d  to  keep s e l l i n g  c o s t s  under 
con t ro l  was to  avoid s e t t i n g  up a s a l e s  opera tion in the  USA. Again while 
t h i s  c o n t r o l l e d  cos ts  and cu t  the  Computer Department 's  c a p i t a l  
requ irements ,  i t  l im i ted  F e r r a n t i ' s  chances of  achieving a l a rge  enough 
user base to  cover the  development o f  new computer systems.
When i t  came to r e p la c in g  Mercury and Pegasus,  West Gorton engineers  
produced the  Orion. While the  f i rm  may have r e j e c t e d  the  idea of 
concen t ra t ing  on the  sc ience  market,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the  Orion was not r e a l l y  
s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h a t  market must have wasted F e r r a n t i ' s  p o s i t i o n .  F e r r an t i  did 
not have the  s a le s  network nor th e  e x p e r t i s e  t o  s e l l  Orion in the 
commercial market.  Things were made worse by i t s  t e ch n ica l  f a i l u r e s .  These 
f a i l u r e s  not only c rea ted  e x t r a  c o s t ,  but meant t h a t  engineers  were t i e d  
up d ea l ing  with these  shortcomings.
ATLAS did  bu i ld  on the  f i r m ' s  p a s t  exper ience .  I t  was in many ways 
a successor  t o  Mercury, appea l ing  as i t  did to  atomic re sea rch  agenc ies .  
However, again i t  t i e d  down eng ineers  fo r  longer than expected,  and cos t  
s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts of company money. I t  was e v en tu a l ly  a machine t h a t  
would c o s t  a t  l e a s t  £2m per system. This implied a small market p lace ,  and 
very qu ick ly  any hopes of  secur ing  much of t h i s  market evaporated .
By 1963 F e r r an t i  was perceived  as having the  most advanced computer 
team in Europe, y e t  i t  had no product t h a t  was l i k e l y  to  be success fu l  in 
b r inging  in a sh o r t  term p r o f i t .  The S i r iu s  and Orion had not matched the  
sa le s  o f  Mercury and Pegasus:  t h i s  was desp i te  o f  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  t o t a l  
market had grown t e n - f o l d .  The ATLAS machine had been m arg ina l ised .  
Engineers who could have worked on successor machines had been pinned down 
s o r t in g  out problems on the  old  systems. All t h i s  was a t  a time when i t  was 
becoming obvious t h a t  IBM would be d e l iv e r in g  t h i r d  genera t ion  equipment 
by 1964. This meant F e r r a n t i  had to  s t a r t  planning to  cope with another  
leap forward in technology.
There fo re ,  i t  i s  not s u r p r i s i n g  th a t  F e r r an t i  decided to  n e g o t i a t e
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th e  s a l e  of the  department to  ICT. In f a c t  the  NRDC had been sugges ting 
t h a t  t h i s  should happen f o r  a number of y e a r s 194, though i t  was not 
involved in the  n e g o t i a t io n s .  In p rep a ra t io n  f o r  t h e  s a l e  to  ICT, F e r r an t i  
rep a id  the  £300,000 ATLAS loan to  th e  NRDC in Apri l  1963195, and the  
s a l e  was announced on the  7th of  August 1963196.
ICT was doubtful  about the  s a l e a b i l i t y  of F e r r an t i  machines, 
e s p e c i a l l y  ATLAS, but the  F e r r a n t i  Packard 6000 was j u s t  the  computer i t  
needed on which to  base i t s  next genera t ion  o f  systems. The f i rm  a lso  
needed to  improve i t s  i n t e r n a l  design  a b i l i t y ,  something F e r r a n t i ' s  
Computer Department could o f f e r .  The department was paid  f o r  in cash and 
shares  which valued i t  a t  £ 5 .3m197. Grundy became F e r r a n t i ' s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on the ICT board,  Bas i l  de F e r r a n t i  became deputy managing 
d i r e c t o r  f o r  R&D (though h i s  only  p r io r  exper ience  had been as a 
Conservative M.P.) and by the  end of  1964 he was th e  managing d i r e c t o r  of 
the  whole company. F in a l ly  the  l a s t  manager o f  the  F e r r an t i  Computer 
Department,  P e te r  Hal l ,  became a deputy d i r e c t o r  a t  ICT. The FP6000 and ICT 
s to ry  i s  taken up in chap te r  s i x .
Computers were a complex and ever  changing technology: t h e r e  was a 
con t inua l  b a t t l e  to  keep up. This leads  to con t inu ing  R&D expenses,  which 
have to  be w r i t t e n  o f f  r a p i d l y .  F e r r a n t i  su f fe re d  from t h i s  problem. I t  
a lso  faced  the  prospect of e v e n tu a l ly  build ing  up an expensive s a l e s  and 
se rv ice  network, both dom es t ica l ly  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  All the se  i n i t i a l  
and on-going c o s t s  had to  be pa id  f o r  out of th e  company's r e so u rce s ;  but 
Fe r r an t i  only had a l im i ted  c a p i t a l  base .
F e r r a n t i  never made a complete corpora te  commitment to  computers:  th e  
company never made them c e n t r a l  to  i t s  s u rv iv a l .  While t h i s  p ro te c ted  the  
firm from the  r ig o u r s  of  a tough market, i t  a l s o  meant i t  f a i l e d  to  
c a p i t a l i s e  on i t s  p o s i t io n  as a lead ing  firm in th e  f a s t e s t  growing market 
in th e  world.  This s tudy a l s o  shows t h a t  t h e r e  were a number of  
d isadvantages  to  the  c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  s t r u c t u r e .  F e r r a n t i  was put 
under p re s su re  from having to  support  so many d i f f e r e n t  t e ch n o lo g ie s .  The 
fo llowing case s tu d ie s  a l so  r ev ea l  the  same th in g s  about the  o the r
194NRDC 86/42 /1 ,  138th NRDC Board meeting 22/11/61,  Duckworth, the  new 
MD of th e  NRDC, suggested t h a t  i t  would be wise f o r  EMI, ICT and F e r r an t i  
to cons ide r  a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of  the  indus try .
195NRDC 86/42 /2 ,  151st Board meeting.
196F e r r a n t i  Computer World. Is sue  7 September/October 1963.
197Martin Campbell-Kelly,  ICL: a bus iness  and t e c h n ic a l  h i s t o r y . 1989,
p223.
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e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  While F e r r a n t i  i s  an unusual case ,  due to  i t s  ownership,  
i t  s t i l l  seems to  have s u f f e re d  from th e  same problems faced by th e  o th e r  
e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms t h a t  t r i e d  to  e n t e r  the  computer indus t ry .  Supporting 
m u l t ip l e  high technology d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s  led to  c a p i t a l  r a t i o n i n g ,  leading 
in t u r n  to  the  f i rm  l im i t in g  i t s  commitment to  a number of i t s  o p e ra t io n s ,  
even where those  commitments were in s t rong markets in which i t  had some 
techno log ica l  leade rsh ip .
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Chapter 3.
Electrical and Musical Industries.
EMI was a more conventional  f i rm  than F e r r a n t i ,  in t h a t  i t  was a 
p u b l i c ly  quoted company. Despi te  t h i s  major d i f f e r e n c e ,  i t  succumbed to  
e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same p re s su re s  t h a t  forced  F e r r a n t i  out of the  indus t ry .  
The main themes are  the  same, r evo lv ing  around the  a b i l i t y  t o  e x p lo i t  
technology in a new bus iness  oppor tun i ty ,  th e  success  or f a i l u r e  of 
d e c e n t r a l i s e d  con t ro l  in a c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  f i rm ,  and the  
problems of  support ing m u l t ip le  growth paths.
EMI's formation.
EMI was formed in the  l a t e  1920s and e a r l y  1930s by th e  American 
company RCA1. I t  was modeled from the  merger of  a number of the  companies 
t h a t  RCA had acqu ired ,  as i t  developed in to  th e  w o r ld ' s  lead ing  s u p p l ie r  
of consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  and en te r ta inm en t  so f tw are2 . The major RCA a s s e t  
t h a t  formed EMI was the  l a rge  record  company, Columbia, which was merged 
with ano ther  l a rg e  record f i rm ,  the  Gramophone Company. To t h i s  was added 
the  RCA-owned Marconiphone consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n ,  and i t s  holding 
in the  e l e c t r o n i c  components company M.O. Valve3 . RCA, i t s e l f ,  was formed 
from American Marconi Company, and had purchased Marconiphone and Marconi 's  
holding in M.O. RCA i n i t i a l l y  had a 29% stake  in EMI, but d isposed  of t h i s  
four  years  l a t e r * .  At t h i s  t ime RCA was d isposing  of a l l  i t s  overseas  
a s s e t s  to  f r e e  funds fo r  i t s  domestic o p e ra t io n s5 .
The four  ope ra t ions  made EMI th e  wor ld ' s  l a r g e s t  record  and music 
p u b l i sh e r  and gave i t  the  r i g h t s  t o  RCA's HMV la b e l ,  and th e  names 
Marconiphone and G. Marconi6 . The l a r g e s t  opera t ion  was th e  record  
bus iness ;  records  would always remain EMI's l a r g e s t  d i v i s i o n .  However, i t  
a l so  produced th e  phonograms and r a d io  s e t s  on which the  music was heard,
1J .E .  Wall, 'The development and o rg an isa t io n  of  EMI L t d ' ,  in the  
Edwards and Townsend seminar s e r i e s ,  'Seminar on the  problems in i n d u s t r i a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' ,  19/5/64, Wall was th e  managing d i r e c t o r  of  EMI.
2See below, chapter  6 on RCA.
3The o th e r  p a r tn e r  was GEC.
*Robert Sobel,  RCA, New York, 1986.
5See below, chapter  6, p200.
6Wall, 'Development of EMI'.
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and made some of  the  components t h a t  were used in the se  s e t s .
Development o f  t e l e v i s i o n  and m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s .
EMI's most important pre-war  e l e c t r o n i c s  development was i t s  leading 
r o l e  in the  commerc iali sa tion of  t e l e v i s i o n .  This led to  EMI being 
perceived  as the  most capable  e l e c t r o n i c s  firm in the  UK. In the  mid-I930s 
a team of  t h i r t y  EMI eng inee rs ,  led by Isaac  Shoenberg, produced the  worlds 
f i r s t  a l l  e l e c t r o n i c  t e l e v i s i o n  system7 . This was a development on the  
work of  RCA's Dr Zworykin, whose Iconoscope was the  f i r s t  p r a c t i c a l  camera 
tube .  EMI improved on t h i s  and produced the  EMITRON tube®, on which i t  
based i t s  TV system. The Marconi company provided t r a n s m i t t e r  technology, 
and th e  two companies formed a j o i n t  company to  market t e l e v i s i o n  
equipment, Marconi-EMI T e lev is ion  Co9 . The BBC encouraged t h i s  development 
by opening the  w or ld ' s  f i r s t  f u l l  t e l e v i s i o n  s t a t i o n  a t  the  Alexandra 
Palace in 193610. Following a pe r iod  of dual b roadcas t ing ,  EMI's system 
was s e le c te d  to  be the  BBC s tan d a rd ,  beating  the  i n f e r i o r  Baird system. 
However, the  e x i s t en c e  of the  BBC meant t h a t  EMI could not copy RCA and 
e x p lo i t  t h i s  invention by s e t t i n g  up i t s  own t e l e v i s i o n  network. The 
National Broadcasting Company would be an important cash g en e ra to r  fo r  RCA.
EMI's knowledge of b u i ld in g  complex e l e c t r o n i c  systems meant i t  had 
a leading r o l e  in developing e l e c t r o n i c  systems f o r  the  war e f f o r t .  One of  
the  most important products was the  high powered Klystron tube which was 
v i t a l  to  r a d a r .  EMI would s t a y  a l e ad e r  in t h i s  technology a f t e r  the  war. 
I t s  l i s t  of m i l i t a r y  products  was very  long, and defence e l e c t r o n i c s  stayed 
a core  a c t i v i t y  even a f t e r  1945. By 1965 defence s a l e s  r e p re se n te d  52% of 
e l e c t r o n i c s  s a l e s 11.
However, Layton argues t h a t  B r i t i s h  f i rm s ,  such as EMI, did not 
b e n e f i t  from th e  Second World War as much as US companies such as RCA12.
7B a i r d ' s  system was mechanical .
8P .L egga t t ,  'The evo lu t ion  of  t e l e v i s i o n  technology '  E lec t ron ic  
Engineer Vol .60,  No.735, March 1988, pl4-24.
9W.J. Baker A h i s t o r y  of the  Marconi Company. 1970, p324; S.G. 
Sturmey, The economics development o f  t e l e v i s i o n . 1958, p203.
1QC. Layton e t  a l ,  Ten Innovations :  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  study on 
techno log ica l  development and the  use o f  q u a l i f i e d  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers
in ten  i n d u s t r i e s . 1972, Chapter 8.
“ P.N. Kemp-Gee and Co. 'EMI Ltd '  January 1971, p r i v a t e  investment 
c i r c u l a r  on EMI, held in the  London Business School l i b r a r y .
12Layton, Ten Innovations., chapter 8.
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He argues  t h a t  in the  UK a company's s e l f  i n t e r e s t  was secondary to  the  
n a t io n a l  e f f o r t .  In th e  USA most o f  the  development a s s o c i a t e d  with 
e l e c t r o n i c  equipment was the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  p r i v a t e  c o rp o ra t io n s .  In the  
UK a c lo se  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between companies, government and u n i v e r s i t i e s  was 
formed. This led to  much of the  m i l i t a r y  development work being undertaken 
ou ts id e  the  company. A f te r  th e  war the d iv i s io n s  between government 
l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and in d u s t ry  reappeared and broke up t h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Companies had to  r e c o n s t r u c t  t h e i r  R&D e f f o r t  t o  catch  up 
with t e chno log ica l  growth a f t e r  the  war.  I t  has been seen t h a t  main ta in ing  
t h i s  l in k  between in d u s t ry ,  government and academia was c r i t i c a l  to  
F e r r a n t i ' s  computer i n t e r e s t s ,  a l ink  o ther  companies d id  not main ta in .  
Layton notes  t h a t  in the  1930s, EMI's £2-3m resea rch  expendi tu re  on 
t e l e v i s i o n  was a match f o r  RCA's $9m spend. However, a f t e r  the  war the  RCA 
Sarnoff Laboratory had become a huge and powerful c en t r e  of t e ch n ica l  
innovation,  an order of magnitude l a r g e r  than EMI's R&D o p e ra t io n .  EMI 
would become dominated by music and f i lm  i n t e r e s t s :  c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  
counted f o r  only 20-25% of EMI's post-war a c t i v i t i e s ;  a t  RCA e l e c t r o n i c s  
was the  main a c t i v i t y .
The immediate pos t  war years :  re . i e c t in a  an oppor tun i ty  to  become a computer 
p ioneer .
A f te r  the  war EMI s t a r t e d  a p o l i c y  of e l e c t r o n i c  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  to  
reduce r e l i a n c e  on r e c o rd s 13. Marconi,  the  leading B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm ,  expected EMI to  be one of  i t s  main c o m p e t i to r s1*. I t  
expected EMI to  broaden i t s  b roadcas t ing  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  concern 
fo r  Marconi as t h i s  rep resen ted  25% of  i t s  pre-war bus iness .  The Marconi- 
EMI T e lev is ion  agreement was to  end in 1949. With the  exper ience  EMI had 
picked up in th e  areas  o f  r a d a r ,  t e lem e t ry  and spec ia l  v a lv e s ,  Marconi 
fea red  t h a t  EMI would s t a r t  competing with i t s  t r a n s m i t t e r  b u s in e s s 15.
Before t h i s  happened, EMI made an attempt to  take  Marconi over.  This 
bid was made p o s s ib le  by th e  Labour Government's dec is ion  to  fo l low  the  
recommendation of  the  1945 Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference and
13Times. 19/12/50, p9, r e p o r t  of S i r  Alexander Aikeman's 1950 
chairman 's  s ta tem en t .
14Marconi Archive, Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. Ltd. 'Post-War
P o l i c y ' ,  i n t e r n a l  planning document, 1944.
15Ibid.
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n a t i o n a l i s e  Cable and W ire les s16. However, the  manufacturing arm, 
Marconi, was not wanted. EMI was one of the  companies t h a t  b id  f o r  i t .  
There c e r t a i n l y  seems to  have been a good case  f o r  arguing t h a t  the  two 
fi rms were complementary: Marconi-EMI Te lev is ion  had a l read y  shown the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  However, Engl ish E l e c t r i c  was th e  winner;  th e se  companies 
were a l so  reasonably  compatible.  EE wanted Marconi to  s t a r t  producing 
t e l e v i s i o n  s tu d io  equipment as q u ick ly  as p o s s ib l e ,  p u t t in g  i t  in d i r e c t  
compet it ion with EMI. This lead to  EMI and Marconi agreeing to  th e  end of 
Marconi-EMI T e lev is ion  in 194817 as they  both wanted to  move on to  each 
o t h e r s '  pa tch ; th e  two companies were now in open compet i t ion .  I n i t i a l l y  
EMI tu rned  to  STC and AEI f o r  t ransm iss ion  equipment before  producing i t s  
own t r a n s m i t t e r s .  Likewise,  Marconi s t a r t e d  to  produce RCA cameras and 
o ther  RCA s tu d io  equipment.
However, th e  p o t e n t i a l  of t e l e v i s i o n  equipment was slower to  be 
r e a l i s e d  than had been expected.  Layton sees the  BBC as slow t o  expand i t s  
t e l e v i s i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  due to  post-war a u s t e r i t y .  The second TV broadcas t ing  
s t a t i o n ,  Sutton C o ld f i e ld 18, was not i n s t a l l e d  u n t i l  1949, and o the rs  
only fol lowed slowly.  In the  meantime EMI had invested  la rg e  amounts of 
c a p i t a l  to  become a t u rn - k e y 19 s u p p l i e r  of t e l e v i s i o n  equipment. This 
c rea ted  a dual problem f o r  the  company. F i r s t l y  i t  was con t inuous ly  
inc reas ing  i t s  b roadcas t  equipment f a c i l i t i e s ,  y e t  home o rde rs  were slow. 
Secondly, th e  company had decided t o  increase  i t s  c ap a c i ty  t o  produce 
domestic t e l e v i s i o n  s e t s ,  in p rep a ra t io n  f o r  th e  opening of  th e  Sutton 
C o ld f ie ld  t r a n s m i t t e r .  However, in the  year  of  i t s  opening, the  
C h ance l lo r ' s  budget increased  purchase tax on t e l e v i s i o n  s e t s  from 66 2/3% 
to  100%. The company decided to  keep to  i t s  p roduction t a r g e t s ,  though t h i s  
led to  a s i g n i f i c a n t  squeeze on margins as i t  had to  cu t  i t s  f a c t o r y  p r i c e s  
to keep s a l e s  going.
In 1949/50 t r a d in g  p r o f i t s  f e l l  s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  a l l  o f  which was due 
to poor r e s u l t s  from the  UK e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n s .  Until  t h e  mid-1950s the  
company f a i l e d  t o  come up to  e x p e c ta t io n s ,  mainly because o f  a lower r e tu r n  
from t e l e v i s i o n ,  with the  consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  ope ra t ion  remaining a
16Baker,  Marconi. p233.
17Marconi Archive,  A.E. P h i l l i p s  'The Grove as Research and 
Development L a b o ra to r i e s '  1981. P h i l l i p s  was an ex-employee o f  Marconi 
Space and Defence; t h i s  was a d r a f t  chap ter  f o r  a book.
18Sturmey, The Economic Development of Radio . p208. Sutton C o ld f ie ld  
was an EMI-AEI s t a t i o n .
19A p rov ide r  of complete s tud io  and t r a n s m i t t e r  s t a t i o n s .
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con t inu ing  problem.
La te r  managements blamed t h i s  per iod  of f a i l u r e  on the  l eade rsh ip  of  
chairman S i r  Alexander Aikeman, and managing d i r e c t o r  S i r  Ernes t  F isk .  
Aikeman and Fisk int roduced a new managerial  s t r u c t u r e ,  a s t r i c t  fu n c t io n a l  
s t r u c t u r e 20, th e  exact oppos i te  of the  'M' form s t r u c t u r e  adopted by 
F e r r a n t i .  The fu n c t io n a l  o pe ra t ions  cons is ted  o f :
EMI ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT LTD
EMI FACTORIES LTD
EMI INSTITUTES LTD
EMI RESEARCH LABS LTD
EMI SALES AND SERVICE LTD
EMI SUPPLIES LTD
EMI STUDIOS LTD
EMI RELAYS (Hayes) LTD
EMI RELAYS (Uxbridge) LTD
EMITRON TELEVISION LTD
ELECTRONIC TUBES LTD
ALPHA ACCESSORIES LTD
Source: EMI Annual Reports.
A device  would be invented in th e  resea rch  labs ,  developed by the  
eng ineer ing  o p e ra t io n ,  made in the  f a c t o r i e s  and sold by the  s a l e s  and
se rv ice  d i v i s i o n .  Wall, when he became managing d i r e c t o r  of EMI, commented
t h a t  t h i s  system had been be ing i n e f f i c i e n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in th e  consumer 
products f i e l d ,  as i t  adverse ly  a f f e c t e d  the p o l i c y  making process :
'The fragmenta tion of  th e  process o f  making and s e l l i n g  a 
product r e ac ted  a g a in s t  the  fo rmula t ion  of  an e f f e c t i v e  and coherent 
p o l i c y  t o  th e  market p o s i t i o n . ' 21
EMI exper ienced poor r e tu r n s  from a number o f  i t s  overseas  o p e ra t io n s ,  
r e f l e c t i n g  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  some co u n t r ie s  had a f t e r  th e  war22. This
f u r t h e r  reduced t r a d in g  p r o f i t s ,  as EMI's overseas  bus inesses  (mostly 
record  and TV manufacture) and expor t  bus iness  (mostly e l e c t r o n i c s ) ,
accounted f o r  over h a l f  o f  a l l  s a l e s .  Fisk ,  the  a r c h i t e c t  of t h i s  
s t r u c t u r e ,  was l a t e r  unceremoniously sacked.
In the  l a t e  1940s, EMI was approached fo r  the  f i r s t  t ime about the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  producing computers.  When the  NRDC was f i r s t  looking f o r  an
2°J .E .W al l ,  'Development of  EMI'.
21lb i d .
22Times, 14/12/53,  p l3 ,  r e p o r t  of  the Chairman's annual s ta tem ent .
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e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm  to  jo in  a p a r tn e r s h ip  to  produce computers with  a bus iness  
machine f i rm ,  th e  f i r s t  e l e c t r o n i c s  company i t  approached was EMI23. The 
reason f o r  t h i s  was t h a t  F.C. Will iams, designer of  the  Mark 1, recommended 
EMI as the  t e c h n i c a l l y  most competent e l e c t r o n i c s  company. EMI a t tended  the  
NRDC's one and only  meeting of  the  Advisory Panel on D ig i t a l  Computers in 
19492*. Like th e  o the r  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms,  EMI r e j e c t e d  th e  idea of 
jo in in g  a p a r tn e r s h ip .  In any case ,  EMI's c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n ,  
EMI Engineering Development, a l r e ad y  had i t s  hands f u l l  with o th e r  c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  p r o j e c t s .  At t h i s  e a r l y  s tag e  the only a c t i v e  connection i t  had 
with computers was an agreement to  provide eng ineer ing  suppor t  to  the  
Telecommunications Research Es tabl ishment  in some of  i t s  i n t e r n a l  computer 
developments.
1955 onwards, new management s t r u c t u r e ,  and the  background f o r  the  computer 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .
In the  e a r l y  1950s EMI was in an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  p o s i t i o n .  The 
fo llowing graphs show how p r o f i t s  had f a l l e n ,  and t h a t  the  r a t i o s  of p r o f i t  
to  c a p i t a l  employed and to  tu rnove r  were a t  a low p o in t .  Another th in g  to  
note in the se  graphs ,  which i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  l a t e r  in t h i s  s t o r y ,  i s  the  f a l l  
in p r o f i t s  and th e  p r o f i t  r a t i o s  in th e  period 1957-61, the  pe r iod  in which 
EMI was a c t i v e l y  involved with  th e  marketing of  computers:
23John Hendry, Innovat ing f o r  f a i l u r e :  Government p o l ic y  and the  e a r l v  
B r i t i s h  computer indus t ry .  Cambridge, Massachusetts ,  1989, p55.
24NAHC, o u t l i n e  minutes o f  Advisory Panel meeting,  14/12/49.
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Figure 3.1
EMI Annual Turnover, 1954-1970.
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Figure 3.2
EMI Pre-Tax Profit, 1954-1970.
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Figure 3.3
EMI Financial Ratios, 1954-1970.
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I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  r e f l e c t  t h a t  Layton claimed t h a t  be fore  the  war 
EMI was ab le  to  inves t  as much in t e l e v i s i o n  as RCA. However, a f t e r  the  war 
RCA was an o rder  o f  magnitude l a r g e r  than EMI: by 1955 RCA's tu rnover  was 
$1055m25. RCA's rap id  expansion was based on i t s  e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t i e s :  
NBC t e l e v i s i o n  and record  s a l e s  were secondary.  EMI was s t i l l  dominated by 
i t s  music pub l i sh ing  and record  b u s in e s s .  Though i t  was the  w o r ld ' s  l a r g e s t  
record  producer,  t h i s  indus t ry  had not expanded as r a p i d l y  as the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  market.
The company got back on t r a c k  in the mid-1950s.  A number of  s teps  
were taken to  s u s t a in  t h i s  improvement. A new managing d i r e c t o r  was 
appointed in 1952, L .J .  Brown, and a new chairman, J . F .  Lockwood, in 
195526 . They s e t  about r e s t r u c t u r i n g  the  company. This t ime i t  was based 
on product d i v i s i o n s 27 . This allowed c l e a r e r  l i n e s  of communication and 
b e t t e r  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  and c o n t r o l .  The E lec t ron ic s  a c t i v i t i e s  were combined 
in to  EMI E lec t r o n ic s .  The s t r u c t u r e  o f  the board gives  an o u t l i n e  of how 
a c t i v i t i e s  were d iv ided:
Table 3.1 Board s t r u c t u r e  of  EMI E le c t ro n ic s .
Managing D i r e c t o r - c o n t r o l l e d  th e  M i l i t a ry  D iv is ion .
Deputy Managing D i r e c t o r - c o n t r o l l e d  the  Commercial D iv is ion .  
D i re c to r  A—Sales o f  M i l i t a r y  Product.
B—Valve Divis ion .
C—Technical .
D—F i n a n c i a l .
E--Works.
Source: J .E .  Wall 'The development and o rgan isa t ion  of  EMI L t d ' .
Wall s a id  t h a t  th e  new s t r u c t u r e  was arranged so t h a t :
' o p e r a t i n g  su b s id ia ry  companies have a u t h o r i t y ,  as well as 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  to  an ex ten t  t h a t  enables them to  run t h e i r  own day- 
to -day  a f f a i r s . ' 28
The amount of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t h a t  each d iv i s io n  had was c o n t in u a l ly  
assessed  and a l t e r e d .  However, i t  appears t h a t  the  company's c e n t r a l  
o rg an is a t io n  remained la rg e .  In 1964 EMI employed 30,000 worldwide, 18,500 
in the  UK. The head o f f i c e  s t a f f ,  employed in the  c e n t r a l  fu n c t io n a l
25See below, chap ter  6, f i g  6 .1 ,  p202.
26Times. 12/12/55, p l5 ,  r e p o r t  o f  the Chairman's annual s ta tem en t .
27J .E .  Wall , 'Development o f  EMI'.
2SIb i d .
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d i v i s i o n s ,  numbered 1,500, of  which as many as 1,000 were employed in 
c o n t r o l l i n g  th e  UK company and only  500 th e  l a rge  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
op e ra t io n 29. The only fu n c t io n s  t h a t  seem to  have been under th e  con tro l  
of the  d iv i s i o n s  were s e l l i n g  and producing. Even purchasing,  which should 
opera te  as a c lo se  p a r tn e r  to  p roduc t ion ,  was under head o f f i c e  c o n t ro l .
The new management decided t h a t  the  company should c o n cen t ra te  on the  
manufacture of :  r e co rds ,  m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  c i v i l  c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  
magnetic t a p e ,  and domestic a p p l i a n c e s .  This allowed the  company t o  dispose 
of the  troublesome consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n .  In 1950/51 EMI was 
producing 2000 t e l e v i s i o n  s e t s  per week30. In 1951 and 1952, t o t a l  s a le s  
of s e t s  in the  UK was 500,000 per y e a r .  Therefore ,  EMI had a 20% stake of 
the  B r i t i s h  market.  However, i t  had not managed to  tu rn  t h i s  st rong 
p o s i t io n  in to  a p r o f i t a b l e  o p e ra t io n .  In 1953, d e s p i t e  a rock e t in g  TV s e t  
market,  EMI s a l e s  a c t u a l l y  f e l l 31 . EMI's HMV and Marconiphone s e t s  were 
h ig h -p r iced ,  up-market i tems. Firms th a t  had much sm al le r  t e l e v i s i o n  
production f a c i l i t i e s  in the  e a r l y  1950s, and which lacked the  
in t e r n a t i o n a l  t e l e v i s i o n  manufactur ing opera t ions  of EMI (f i rm s  l i k e  Thorn 
E l e c t r i c a l  I n d u s t r i e s ) ,  had managed to  produce s e t s  more in tune with the  
growing market f o r  mass-produced, cheap TVs.
In 1957 EMI and Thorn announced t h a t  they  were to  merge t h e i r  
consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n s 32 . The s t a t e d  o b je c t iv e  was to  
concen t ra te  both companies ' p roduct ion  of  t e l e v i s i o n  and audio products  a t  
Thorn 's  two ' f l o w - l i n e '  p roduction  p l a n t s .  I t  was, in r e a l i t y ,  a take over 
of the  t r a d e  names by Thorn. EMI d id  continue to  produce t e l e v i s i o n s  
overseas ,  but th e se  a s s e t s  were d isposed  of l a t e r  in the  decade.
Another s t e p  taken to  improve EMI's p r o f i t  r a t i o s  was f u r t h e r  
c o n so l id a t io n  o f  i t s  leading  p o s i t i o n  in the reco rd  bus iness .  In the  1950s 
i t  e s t a b l i s h e d  EMI (US), which d i s t r i b u t e d  c l a s s i c a l  records  in the  USA, 
and l a t e r  i t  purchased the  US company Capitol  Records33. This increased 
record s a l e s  to  over 50% of  group s a l e s 34, and f u r t h e r  under l ined  i t s  
p o s i t io n  as th e  in d u s t ry  l e ad e r .  EMI a lso  s tr eng thened  i t s  e l e c t r i c a l
29Ib id .
3° Times. 19/12/50, p9, r e p o r t  of the  Chairman's annual s ta tement  1950.
31TJmes, 14/12/53, p l3 ,  r e p o r t  o f  the Chairman's annual s ta tement .
32Times. 29 /3 /57 ,  p l7 .
33Times, 12/12/55, p l5 ,  r e p o r t  o f  the Chairman's annual s ta tement .
34I b id .
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app l iances  o p e ra t io n s  with the  purchase of Morphy-Richards35. Within a 
few years  EMI would have g r e a t  problems with t h i s  low technology,  high o u t ­
put b u s in e s s ,  and would have to  e n t e r  in to  va r ious  j o i n t  ven tures  with 
o th e r  e l e c t r i c a l  companies to  r a t i o n a l i s e  the  B r i t i s h  indus t ry .
Another purchase was the  Ardente company36 . This f i rm  made hear ing 
a i d s ,  and a s s o c ia te d  micro components, a technology EMI a l so  wanted to  use 
in o th e r  a reas  o f  e l e c t r o n i c s .  I t  a l s o  foreshadowed EMI's major expansion 
in the  a rea  of medical e l e c t r o n i c s ,  which caused i t  such g r e a t  problems in 
the  1970s.
In the  1960 annual r e p o r t ,  Lockwood re p o r t e d  t h a t  the  f i rm  was 
concerned t h a t  a l l  the se  changes had adverse ly  a f f e c t e d  the  company's 
product mix. The r e l i a n c e  on the  reco rd  market was not seen as i d e a l .  EMI 
saw i t s e l f  as being too  r e l i a n t  on consumer's  en te r ta inm en t  expend i tu re .  
One s o lu t i o n  was to  make purchases  such as Morphy Richards and Ardente.  The 
o the r  s o lu t io n  was to  inc rease  production in o th e r  markets;  f o r  EMI t h i s  
meant c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s .  In the  l a t e  1950s and e a r l y  
1960s EMI s t a r t e d  a major programme of extending i t s  e l e c t r o n i c s  
a c t i v i t i e s .  In c i v i l i a n  e l e c t r o n i c s  i t  had growing i n t e r e s t s  in e l e c t r o n i c  
in s t rum en ts ,  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t ro l  systems ( e s p e c i a l l y  th e  Robotug, an 
automatic  wheeled v eh ic le  used in warehouses and f a c t o r i e s ) ,  medical 
e l e c t r o n i c s ,  and c losed  c i r c u i t  t e l e v i s i o n .  M i l i t a r y  equipment included 
sub-systems f o r  m i s s i l e  systems and s p e c i a l i s t  r a d a r ,  such as mortar and 
sea search r a d a r s .  A Canadian e l e c t r o n i c s  company was purchased to  form the  
su b s id ia ry  EMI-Cossor which became a world le ade r  in sonar ,  and EMI's 
A u s t ra l i an  o p e ra t io n  produced a number o f  m i s s i l e  sub-systems.  In general  
EMI was not succe ss fu l  in many of  th e  most compet i t ive  a reas  of c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s .  L a te r  i t  abandoned many o f  the  commercial e l e c t r o n i c s  markets .
35EMI annual r e p o r t  1960.
36Ib id .
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EMI and Data Processing.
One of  th e  major planks in the  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  of the  company towards 
non-consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t i e s  was the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in to  commercial 
da ta  p ro cess in g .  I t  appeared t h a t  EMI E lec t ron ic s  was making a bid to  
become a major fo rce  in the  r a p i d l y  expanding computer market.  However, the  
l i t t l e  t h a t  i s  known about th e  i n t e r n a l  workings of  the  computer opera t ion  
po in t  to  a somewhat confused s i t u a t i o n ,  and a l im i t ed  commitment by the  
co rp o ra te  c e n t r e  to  t h i s  new o p p o r tu n i ty ,  a common s i t u a t i o n  in e l e c t r o n i c s  
f i rm s .
EMI a l r e a d y  had an i n t e r e s t  in the f i e l d  of analogue computing, 
indeed i t  was the  UK's l a r g e s t  producer o f  the se  h igh ly  s p e c i a l i s t  
machines. I t s  main product was the  modular EMIAC I and I I .  Analogue 
computing took a d i f f e r e n t  approach from d i g i t a l  computing: i t  was a common 
method of s tudy ing  the  phys ica l  a t t r i b u t e s  of engineer ing  problems. 
Analogue computers were an e l e c t r i c a l  model o f  the  s u b jec t  o f  s tudy. 
Analogue s o l u t i o n s  to  t e ch n ica l  problems became l e s s  economic as the  power 
of d i g i t a l  machines inc reased ,  and pr ices  came down. However, the  
commercial d i g i t a l  computer o p e ra t io n  had l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  t h i s  
analogue a c t i v i t y .
EMI a l r e a d y  had connections  with ind iv idua ls  t h a t  were involved in 
developing th e  computer market,  c h i e f  among th e se  l inks  being th e  one to  
the  NRDC. S i r  Edward de S te in  was on th e  board of  both EMI and th e  NRDC in 
the  e a r l y  1950s. Lockwood was a l r e ad y  on the  NRDC board before  he jo ined  
EMI as chairman, and chaired  the  NRDC's Computer Sub-Committee during the  
1950s. F i n a l l y ,  S i r  Percy M i l l s ,  who had been the  NRDC chairman, 1949-1955, 
jo ined  the  EMI board when he r e t i r e d  from th e  Corpora tion .  Few o the r  
companies had connections  l i k e  t h i s .
I t  has a l r e ad y  been seen t h a t  in the  l a t e  1940s EMI had r e j e c t e d  the  
o r ig i n a l  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  jo in  an NRDC-sponsored, f i r s t  g e n e ra t io n ,  computer 
p r o j e c t .  EMI had l i t t l e  enthusiasm f o r  removing i t s  t e ch n ica l  s t a f f  from 
p r o j e c t s  which were d i r e c t e d  a t  l e s s  u n c e r ta in  markets .  I t  i s  not 
s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  EMI decided i t  had b e t t e r ,  and more immediate, 
o p p o r tu n i t i e s  t o  e x p lo i t :  a f t e r  a l l  in the  l a t e  1940s th e re  was no computer 
market.
However, by the mid-1950s t h e r e  were i n i t i a t i v e s  w i th in  EMI to  s t a r t  
developing a commercial computer. Two independent p r o j e c t s  got under way, 
one was a comple te ly  in t e r n a l  e f f o r t  to  d i v e r s i f y  in to  a growing p a r t  of 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  market,  the  second was a j o i n t  p r o j e c t  with the  NRDC to  do 
much the  same th in g .  Both developments s t a r t e d  in d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of EMI 
Engineering Development Ltd,  j u s t  be fore  the r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of  th e  company
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along p r o f i t  c en t r e  l i n e s .
In the  m id - to - l a t e  1950s, EMI developed two major computer systems, 
the  medium s c a l e  1100 and la rg e  s c a le  2400, both o f  which were marketed in 
the  l a t e  1950s and e a r ly  1960s. They were Europe's  f i r s t  s o l i d  s t a t e ,  
second g enera t ion  computers.  Both were t a rg e ted  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t  t h e  o f f i c e  
da ta  p rocess ing  r o l e 37. EMI chose th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from the  f i r s t  to  the  
second gene ra t ion  of computing to  e n t e r  the  market,  j u s t  as many o th e r  
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies d id ,  most no tab ly  RCA and GE. At t h i s  s tage  the  
computer market was becoming more developed, a t t r a c t i n g  th e  a t t e n t i o n  of 
la rge  f i rms  t h a t  wanted to  develop a major new product l i n e .  The s h i f t  to  
s o l id  s t a t e  e l e c t r o n i c s  gave th e  m ul t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies a 
window of  oppor tun i ty  to  e n t e r  the  market.  They could gain compet i t ive
advantage by applying t h e i r  knowledge of l a rge  s o l id  s t a t e  e l e c t r o n i c
systems to  t h i s  f i e l d .  This knowledge came from t h e i r  r o l e  as major 
s u p p l i e r s  o f  m i l i t a r y  systems. This was the model t h a t  EMI fo llowed.
The BMC and EMIDEC 1100 computers.
Much of th e  i n i t i a t i v e  f o r  t h i s  p ro je c t  - which became the  main 
t h r u s t  o f  EMI's computer d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  - came from C l i f f o r d  Metcalfe .  
Metcalfe took over from C.S. Agate as managing d i r e c t o r  of EMI Engineer ing 
Development, and became the  f i r s t  managing d i r e c t o r  of EMI E le c t ro n ic s  when 
the  'm' form s t r u c t u r e  was adopted.  One of M e tc a l fe ' s  f i r s t  a c t s  was to  
commission a r e p o r t  from EMI employee R.E.Spencer on the  f u t u r e  of  
e l e c t r o n i c  bus iness  machines3®. In t h i s  r e p o r t  Spencer foresaw a system 
which would c o n s i s t  of many small  computers and w o rk s ta t io n s ,  l inked  to  a 
la rge  c e n t r a l  computer s to rage  u n i t .  Spencer 's  v i s io n  was years  ahead of
i t s  t ime. EMI was not about to  make t h i s  scheme a r e a l i t y ;  i t  would be
another ten  yea r s  before  r e l a t i v e l y  cheap minicomputers were produced, l e t  
alone microcomputers.  N ever the le s s ,  i t  did confirm M e tc a l fe ' s  b e l i e f  t h a t  
th e re  was a growing market f o r  computers in the  commercial o f f i c e  
environment.  Spencer was de sc r ibed  as  the  t e c h n ic a l  guru t o  Metcalfe  and
37Most of  th e  following d e t a i l  on the two p r o je c t s  comes from notes  
made by John Hendry on in te rv iews  conducted with some of th e  key EMI 
computer s t a f f ,  and some b r i e f  papers w r i t t e n  f o r  him by ex-EMI s t a f f ,  both 
during th e  1980s. He has k ind ly  al lowed me to  use th e se ,  as y e t  unused, 
sources .
38R . J .F r o g g a t t ,  one of the  managers on the  1100 p r o j e c t ,  'Some notes 
on the  EMI computers ' ,  13/1 /87 , paper  w r i t t en  f o r  John Hendry.
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Houndsf ie ld  (who l a t e r  led th e  1100 p r o j e c t ) 39.
At a more p r a c t i c a l  l e v e l ,  Metcalfe had a p o t e n t i a l  customer f o r  a 
machine.  ICI F e r t i l i z e r s  was i n t e r e s t e d  in acqu i r ing  a computer f o r  
in vo ic ing  customers.  Metcalfe seems to  have had a c lose  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
ICI: they  sen t  him a bag of  f e r t i l i z e r  each Christmas*0 . A p r o j e c t  was 
s t a r t e d  to  develop a machine t h a t  could f u l f i l  t h i s  requirement .  To lead 
t h i s  group R.T.Clayden was r e c r u i t e d  from Engl ish E l e c t r i c * 1 . He had 
p re v io u s ly  worked on English E l e c t r i c ' s  P i l o t  ACE and DEUCE computers, and 
before  t h i s  had worked f o r  EMI Cent ra l  Research L abora to r ie s .  Clayden 's  
group produced a P i l o t  Machine which was a ske le ton  of a l a r g e r  system 
which could  perform the  t a sk  ICI wanted. According to  F ro g g a t t ,  i t  was 
decided t h a t  t h i s  machine would be too expensive to  produce as a s t a n d ­
alone computer,  and would need a number of a d d i t io n s  to  i t  to  make i t  a 
worthwhile system.
The d ec i s io n  not to  produce a system based on the  P i l o t  Machine was 
not the  end. Metcalfe p e r so n a l ly  won a co n t rac t  to  bu i ld  a computer f o r  the  
B r i t i s h  Motor Corporation.  In the  mid-1950s Metcalfe had i n i t i a t e d  a 
p ro j e c t  to  ' lo o k  a t  Roo tes '*2 . Kramskoy, as head of the  Spec ia l  Products 
Uni t ,  jo in ed  in t h i s  ' l o o k ' .  Kramskoy l o s t  i n t e r e s t  in th e  idea:  he 
be l ieved  t h a t  the  problems t h a t  needed to be addressed a t  the  Longbridge 
p la n t  were th e  province of ded ica ted  machine con t ro l  systems r a t h e r  than 
computers.  La te r  Kramskoy developed th e  EMIDEC 2400 computer. Kramskoy's 
view of  th e  BMC p r o je c t  shows j u s t  how separa te  h i s  group was from the  r e s t  
of EMI's computer developments, a f a c t o r  t h a t  l a t e r  became very impor tant.
In f a c t ,  Metcalfe had persuaded BMC's S i r  Leonard Lord t h a t  a 
computerised pay ro l l  system was needed f o r  the  Longbridge f a c t o r y * 3 . 
According to  F roggat t ,  M e tc a l f e ' s  e f f o r t s  were so success fu l  t h a t  BMC was 
t e l l i n g  EMI why i t  was the  b e s t  f i rm  f o r  the  job .  F roggat t  b e l iev ed  t h a t  
BMC was in f luenced  by the  f a c t  t h a t  EMI was la rge  enough to  absorb a loss  
on a f i x e d  p r ic e d  c o n t r a c t .
I t  was hoped t h a t  the  machine developed f o r  BMC could be so ld  to
39Charles  Kramskoy, leade r  of EMI's 2400 computer team, paper w r i t t e n  
f o r  John Hendry 18/11/85, Kramskoy was a c r i t i c  of  the  1100 p r o j e c t .
*°Froggat t  'Some notes on the  EMI computers ' .
41 lb i d .
*2Kramskoy paper.
*3F ro g g a t t ,  'Some notes on the  EMI computers ' .
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o th e r  customers44 . Clayden and h i s  team s e t  to  work on producing the  
c e n t r a l  p rocesso r  u n i t ,  which followed s im i la r  l i n e s  to  the  P i l o t  Machine, 
and was a f i r s t  genera t ion  valve  computer. The p e r ip h e ra l s  were sub­
c o n t r a c te d  to  EMI's Scophony Baird f a c to ry  a t  Wells, which EMI had 
purchased as a p re-p roduc t ion  f a c t o r y ,  mostly f o r  government c o n t r a c t s .  
Over th e  years  much of  EMI's magnetic tape and s p e c i a l i s t  reco rd ing  work 
was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  t h i s  s i t e 45 . Wells provided th e  magnetic drum f a s t  
s t o r e  and the  magnetic tape  system f o r  the  BMC machine. I t  was decided t h a t  
the  tape  d r ive  should be t a i l o r e d  to  the BMC machine and no more; i t  
t h e r e f o r e  produced a modified domestic tape deck, which was a u s e le s s  item 
f o r  any o th e r  a p p l i c a t i o n .  This g r e a t l y  reduced the  l ik e l ih o o d  of s e l l i n g  
the  computer f o r  more general  a p p l i c a t i o n .
There was a t h i r d  sub-assembly t h a t  Clayden wanted to  su b -c o n t ra c t  
w i th in  th e  company. This was the  pe r iphe ra l  co n t ro l  equipment, the  means 
by which the  CPU communicated with the o u ts id e  world.  According to  
F rogga t t ,  two groups were i n i t i a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d :  Kramskoy's and a small 
engineer ing  group led by Godfrey Houndsfield.  Kramskoy l o s t  i n t e r e s t  in 
t h i s  work, in f a c t  Kramskoy makes no mention of  t h i s  system in h i s  paper 
fo r  Hendry. Kramskoy claimed t h a t  he was s u rp r i s e d  when he d iscovered  the  
e x i s t en ce  of  th e  1100 development team. This i s  s u r p r i s in g  as one of  h is  
sen io r  en g in ee r s ,  Norman Brown, was seconded to  the  BMC development team 
f o r  s ix  months4 6 . Brown was the  only member of  Kramskoy's team to  have 
any exper ience  o f  computers before  they  s t a r t e d  to  bu i ld  th e  2400.
Kramskoy's lack of i n t e r e s t  in producing the  p e r ip h e ra l  con t ro l  s id e  
of the  BMC machine l e f t  Houndsfield t o  develop t h i s  equipment. He took a 
d i f f e r e n t  approach to  Clayden and designed a s o l i d  s t a t e  c o n t r o l l e r .  
T r a n s i s to r s  were s t i l l  expensive in 1955/6, and production in Europe was 
very l im i t e d .  Houndsfield t h e r e f o r e  used magnetic core lo g ic .  Magnetic 
cores  a re  t i n y  f e r r i t e  loops which a re  threaded to g e th e r  on wire m a tr ices  
and can a c t  as on-o f f  swi tches ,  and could t h e r e f o r e  be used as computer 
logic  and memory. Magnetic cores  were j u s t  becoming the  favoured type of 
computer memory. They were smal l ,  r e l i a b l e  and could provide la rge  amounts 
of f a s t  memory. A few companies, such as EMI, a l s o  s t a r t e d  to  use them as 
logic  dev ices .
Fu r the r  help was r e c r u i t e d  by employing Derek Hemy from LEO 
Computers, who took charge of programming the BMC machine. LEO was the  most
44Ib id .
45 lb i d .
46Norman Brown, in te rv iewed by John Hendry.
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exper ienced company in the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  computers to  commercial problems: 
i t  had a l read y  been doing F o rd 's  p ay ro l l  on i t s  LEO I s e r v i c e .  Hemy and 
another  LEO programmer, John Grover, would become the  core  of EMI's s a le s  
team*7 . The BMC computer was d e l iv e re d  in e a r l y  1956. F in a n c ia l ly  i t  was 
not a success :  18 months of debugging was needed a t  Longbridge before  i t  
was accep tab le  f o r  customer use.
As the  engineer ing  teams worked on the BMC machine in 1956, the  logic  
des igners  (F ro g g a t t ,  David Robinson and t h e i r  subord ina tes )  s t a r t e d  to  work 
on a machine t h a t  could be so ld  on a commercial b a s i s 48. Rather  than 
bu i ld ing  on Clayden 's  work, they  s t a r t e d  to develop an a r c h i t e c t u r e  based 
on H oundsf ie ld 's  magnetic core  technology. Kramskoy says t h a t  when he found 
out about the  1100 computer in 19584®, he was su rp r i sed  t h a t  t h i s  
technology had been implemented. Magnetic core  log ic  i s  in h e re n t ly  slow, 
e s p e c i a l l y  compared to  t r a n s i s t o r s .  Froggatt  admits t h a t ,  i f  they  had 
foreseen  the  massive f a l l  in t r a n s i s t o r  p r ices  from 1957-1959, they would 
not have used co re s .  However, the  t a r g e t  market was the  commercial s e c to r ,  
where speed was only one c o n s id e ra t i o n ,  though i t  ru led  the  machine out of 
p laying any u se fu l  secondary r o l e  as a s c i e n t i f i c  machine.
The code name fo r  the  system was the 0X0 4 (no-one knows why). In 
October 1956 Metcalfe  expressed suppor t  fo r  the  system, and in e a r l y  1957 
EMI s e t  up a formal Computer Divis ion  within EMI E lec t ro n ic s  Ltd. Norman 
Hi l l  was appoin ted  as i t s  head. He immediately ' f i rmed up'  th e  0X0 4 ' s  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n 50 and appointed Houndsfield as the  p r o j e c t  leade r .  
Houndsfield rece ived  the  f u l l  support  of the  E lec t ro n ic s  Group sen io r  
management, the  Managing D i re c to r  Metcalfe ,  h i s  Deputy (head of  the  
commercial s id e )  Alloway and Spencer5 1 . The computer was given a 1,000- 
word magnetic co re  f a s t  memory, and had a magnetic drum backing t h i s ,  an 
ex tens ion  of th e  p e r iphe ra l  developed in Wells.  However, they decided to  
buy Ampex magnetic tape decks from th e  USA. They r e j e c t e d  the  idea of going 
back to  EMI's Wells opera t ion  f o r  t a p e s ,  even though i t  was developing the  
tape d r iv e s  f o r  the  o th e r  EMI computer, the  2400. When the  1100 was 
upgraded to  the  1101 in the  e a r l y  1960s, they again  went to  the  USA, t h i s
47William Talbot interv iewed by Hendry.
48Fro g g a t t ,  'Some notes on the  EMI compute rs ' .
49Kramskoy paper.
5°F ro g g a t t  'some notes  on the  EMI computers ' .
51Norman Brown and William Talbot interviewed by John Hendry.
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time buying the  P o t t e r  906 I I  d r i v e 52. Other p e r ip h e ra l s  inc luded the  
Samastronic p r i n t e r  from Power-Samas ( l a t e r  ICT). While t h i s . w a s  the  
f a s t e s t  p r i n t e r  in the  UK, i t s  r e l i a n c e  on b ic y c l e  chains was a source of 
some concern to  th e  EMI e n g in ee r s53. This p r i n t e r  was never as success fu l  
as the  e x ce l le n t  machines made by IBM. One of th e  advantages of IBM systems 
was th e  good r a t e  of ou tpu t  t h a t  they  had. When deal ing  with commercial 
problems i t  is  the  o v e ra l l  a b i l i t y  of the  machine t h a t  i s  important ,  not 
j u s t  the  te chn ica l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  c e n t r a l  p rocesso r  i t s e l f .  
E lec t ron ic s  f irms seem to  have had d i f f i c u l t y  in a p p re c ia t in g  t h a t  
computers were not j u s t  an e x e r c i s e  in c i r c u i t  board des ign .  Business 
machines firms took a much broader view of what was needed.
The 1100 's  market performance.
The 1100 was configured as a medium sca le  computer: i t s  average p r ice  
was £180,00054. I t  was the  f i r s t  of th e  second genera t ion  computers b u i l t  
in Europe, and a p a r t  from some small BTM/ICT models,  the  F e r r a n t i  Perseus ,  
and the  LEO I I ,  i t  was the  f i r s t  machine to be t a rg e t e d  a t  the  commercial 
user .  In 1960, the  a n a ly s t s  Computer Consultan ts  saw the  UK computer market 
as in a 'w a i t  and see '  mode55. Users were looking a t ,  and s i z in g  up, the  
new genera t ion  of  machines. However, two f i rms  were tak in g  s u b s t a n t i a l  
orders  in 1960, EMI and IBM. The IBM orders  were fo r  th e  1401, a t  an 
average p r ic e  of  £120,000: i t  was in th e  same medium sca le  ca tegory  as EMI. 
However, ou ts ide  of  the  USA the  1401 was not d e l iv e red  in q u a n t i ty  u n t i l  
1962. EMI was i n s t a l l i n g  the  1100 from 1959:
Table 3.2
Annual i n s t a l l a t i o n s  of  1100 and 1101 computers:
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
1 5 7 6 2 3
Average system p r ic e  £180,000
Source: Computer Consul tan ts  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer Digest  1965. 
This rep resen ted  le ss  than 10% of machines i n s t a l l e d  in th e  UK in any one
52William Talbot ,  no tes  w r i t t e n  f o r  John Hendry.
53Froggat t ,  'Some notes  on the  EMI compute rs ' .
54 Computer Consultant Ltd,  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer Diges t .  1963, 
1963 p r i c e s .
55CBI Archive,  Computer Consultants  Ltd, Commentary 1 /6/60.
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y e a r ,  but i t  rep re sen ted  12% of  the  value of new UK i n s t a l l a t i o n s  in 1960, 
and in 1961, with  EMI a l so  i n s t a l l i n g  2 2400s, EMI had a 27% s h a re 56.
Table 3 .3  shows some of  the  end users of the  systems:
Table 3 .3  End use r s  of  1100 and 1101 computers57.
1100 Users:
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
EMI
Air  M in is t ry  Central Pay and Record Off ice  
Aust in  Motor Company 
Boots Pure Drug Co.
Glaxo
ICI
M in is t ry  of  Labour
Barclays  Bank, London 
B.E.A.
EMI Computer Centre,  London 
Royal Navy, s to re s .
Sainsbury Ltd.
Barclays  Bank 
Kodak
EMI, Hayes
Known use r s  of 1101 computers:
1962
1963
No d a te s  a v a i l a b l e :
EMI Computer Centre, London
S.Smith & Son Ltd.
Domestic E l e c t r i c  Rentals  
National Coal Board 
London Transpor t  Executive
Source: Computer Consultants  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t . 1963 and 
1965.
While in 1960-61 the  1100 computer seemed f a i r l y  success fu l  ( a t  l e a s t  
in B r i t i s h  t e r m s ) ,  when th e  IBM 1401 s t a r t e d  t o  be d e l iv e re d  i t  soon 
overtook EMI. IBM i n s t a l l e d  almost 300 1401's in the  UK a lone ,  and around
56P. Drath ,  'The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between science  and technology:  
u n i v e r s i t y  r e s e a rc h  and the  computer indus t ry ,  1945-1962' ,  Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  
Manchester U n iv e r s i ty ,  1973, pp22-24, f i g u r e s  derived from Computer 
C onsu l tan ts ,  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t .
57These f i g u r e s  do not e x a c t ly  concur with the  l a s t  f i g u r e s  f o r  the  
annual i n s t a l l a t i o n s  of EMI computers. I t  seems t h a t  Computer Consu l tan ts  
had incomplete knowledge of  who was buying the  machines.
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10,000 worldwide53. EMI's s a l e s  pa le  compared to  t h i s  performance.  Nor 
did  i t  manage to  keep up with  i t s  major B r i t i s h  compet i to r .  The GEC- 
designed ICT 1301 medium s c a l e  computer, s e l l i n g  a t  an average of £120,000, 
sold  over  150, g r e a t l y  o u t s t r i p p i n g  1100 sa les  d e s p i t e  the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  was 
not d e l iv e r e d  in q u an t i ty  u n t i l  1962, qui te  l a t e  f o r  t h i s  genera t ion  of 
machine. The momentum behind th e  1100 seems to  have ceased once th e  second 
gene ra t ion  machines from the  bus iness  machine f i rms  became a v a i l a b l e .  I t  
w i l l  be shown t h a t  EMI had l e s s  comprehensive customer support  than many 
com pet i to rs  and only had a l im i t ed  enthusiasm f o r  marketing th e se  machines.
EMIDEC 2400.
The a d d i t io n  of the  la rge  s c a l e  EMIDEC 2400 machine to  the  medium 
s ized  1100 gave EMI the  s o r t  o f  comprehensive range some o th e r  f i rms  would 
not be ab le  to  o f f e r  u n t i l  the  mid-1960s.  However, the  2400 did not enjoy 
the  conf idence  o f  the  d i v i s i o n a l  or  group managements and proved to  be an 
unsuccessfu l  o f f e r i n g .
The d e c i s io n  to bu i ld  t h i s  machine was the  r e s u l t  of two f a c t o r s :  one 
emanated from th e  Special  Products  Unit  of EMI, and the  o th e r  came from the  
NRDC. Char les  Kramskoy jo ined  EMI in 1949 and headed the  team designing  the  
Blue Boar t e l e v i s i o n  guided ' s m a r t '  bomb59. In 1952 he was put in charge 
of a small  eng ineer ing  group, th e  Spec ia l  Products Unit .  This group had an 
a c ro s s - th e -b o a rd  engineer ing  c a p a b i l i t y ,  design ing  la rge  m i l i t a r y  
e l e c t r o n i c s  systems. I t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  RCA had a s im i l a r  ( though much 
la rg e r )  team, c a l l e d  the  Advanced Development Group. I t  seems t h a t  Kramskoy 
decided in 1954/5 t h a t  h i s  team had to  broaden i t s  scope and to  take  on 
some la rg e  c i v i l i a n  p r o j e c t s  in o rde r  to  secure  i t s  p o s i t i o n 60.
At the  same time, the  NRDC was going through one o f  i t s  s tages  of 
anx ie ty  about th e  slow development of  the  computer in dus t ry .  Halsbury had 
v i s i t e d  th e  USA in the  autumn o f  1954s 1 . He r e tu rn e d  concerned t h a t  the  
UK was behind on magnetic tape  s to ra g e  techniques ,  magnetic core  s to ra g e ,  
and in p lanning  f o r  the  use of  t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  c i r c u i t s .  What worr ied  him 
most was th e  p o t e n t i a l  e n t ry  of  IBM in to  the  UK market.
Halsbury wanted to  see  th e  UK indus t ry  respond.  However, most of  the  
companies which were a l r e ad y  producing computers were f u l l y  occupied.
5aSee below, chapter  8,  pp314-315.
59Kramskoy's paper f o r  Hendry.
soNorman Brown, in te rv iewed by John Hendry.
61Hendry, Innovating f o r  F a i l u r e . pl05-110.
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F e r r a n t i  was a l ready  f u l l y  absorbed with  i t s  own developments, BTM and GEC 
had j u s t  agreed to  bu i ld  a machine of  the  na tu re  Halsbury wanted,  but the  
p r o j e c t  was a very  long term one with no machine l i k e l y  u n t i l  th e  e a r ly  
1960s6 2 . No o th e r  company had the  a b i l i t y ,  or w i l l ,  to  br ing a commercial 
computer t o  the  market q u icke r .  On th e  o ther  hand, the  NRDC and EMI were 
becoming in c re a s in g ly  c lo s e ,  Lockwood now being th e  EMI chairman. Halsbury 
agreed t h a t  EMI E lec t ro n ic s  Ltd should put forward a proposal to  produce 
a f u l l y  t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  computer.
Two groups in EMI were i n t e r e s t e d  in t h i s  c o n t r a c t :  the
Clayden/Houndsfield team and Kramskoy. The f i r s t  group was f u l l y  occupied 
on th e  BMC computer and decided a g a in s t  making a bid f o r  the  c o n t r a c t .  
Kramskoy's team, however, was f r e e ,  and t h i s  o f fe red  Kramskoy the  
oppor tun i ty  to  break out of th e  m i l i t a r y  work he had been doing.
There were two i n i t i a l  phases to  the  p r o j e c t .  Kramskoy's group needed 
to  ge t  some computer exper ience .  He th e re fo re  packed one of h is  eng inee rs ,  
Norman Brown, o f f  to  the  BMC team to  ge t  some exper ience63 . Brown worked 
in t h i s  group f o r  a per iod  of  5-6 months in 1954/5. However, the  Specia l  
Products  Unit decided the  b e s t  approach was to  fo l low  the  design philosophy 
of Chr is topher  Strachey, the  NRDC's own logic  e x p e r t .
The second phase in p repa r ing  the  ground f o r  the  2400, was to  
e s t a b l i s h  what users  wanted.  To t h i s  end, EMI and Strachey s tu d ied  the  
needs of  the  mail  order company Freeman's,  which was cons ider ing  how to  
automate i t s  l a rg e  c l e r i c a l  o p e r a t io n s 64. Though i t  was decided t h a t  t h i s  
was not a s u i t a b l e  bus iness  in which to  u t i l i s e  the  type of  computer EMI 
was p lanning65 , i t  did lead to  the  not iona l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  2400.
I t  was decided to  c o n s t r u c t  a l a rge  system, u t i l i s i n g  t r a n s i s t o r s ,  
magnetic cores  and magnetic t a p e .  I t  was to f u l f i l  the  needs of the  l a r g e s t  
commercial o f f i c e .  Kramskoy put forward a proposal f o r  a th r e e - y e a r  
p r o j e c t ,  d iv ided  in to  two eighteen-month s t a g e s 66. Phase A was f o r  the  
design and p ro to type  p roduct ion  of  components. Phase B was to  produce a 
machine and perform commercial demonstrat ions on i t .  Total  c o s t  was 
es t imated  a t  £320,000. One unknown f a c t o r  was the  l i k e l y  progress  t h a t  the  
Mullard company would make in b r ing ing  i t s  new t r a n s i s t o r s  and diodes  to
62 I b i d .
63Brown, in te rv iew .
64I b id .
65Ib id .
66NRDC 86 /37 /8 ,  C. Kramskoy, proposal f o r  th e  2400 p r o j e c t ,  1 /12/55.
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the  market.  Milliard was the  leading component s u p p l ie r  in the  UK and EMI 
was expec t ing  t o  purchase new s o l i d  s t a t e  components from i t 67 .
Kramskoy was very impressed with  the way Metcalfe won s u b s t a n t i a l  
NRDC backing a t  such reasonab le  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s 68. Even before  Kramskoy 
had s o r t e d  out the  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  NRDC had agreed to  f inance  th r e e  
q u a r t e r s  of  an EMI p r o je c t  c o s t in g  £300,00069 . In October 1956 t h i s  was 
extended to  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  of  Kramskoy's £320,000 plan.  EMI accepted the  
NRDC's view t h a t  the  b e s t  way to  r e cover  t h i s  f inance  was a small levy on 
a l l  EMI's computer ou tpu t .  This safeguarded the  NRDC from the  r i s k  t h a t  the  
machine i t  supported would not make i t  to the  market,  and t h a t  EMI would 
in s tead  u t i l i s e  the  developments made under the  NRDC c o n t ra c t  in another  
computer.  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  t h i s  f o m  of arrangement was unacceptable  
to  F e r r a n t i  u n t i l  the  At las  super  computer c o n t r a c t 70.
In 1959 th e  c o n t r a c t  was re n e g o t ia t ed  to  take in to  account an 
ex tens ion  to  th e  p ro je c t  to  cover the  3400 computer - which w i l l  be 
d e t a i l e d  l a t e r .  Together the se  two c o n t ra c t s  would reach over £600,000, 
with a repayment r a t e  of  2% on a l l  EMI's computer equipment s a l e s  and a 
simple i n t e r e s t  r a t e  of 5% on the  loan71. Theffec t  of var ious  tu rnover  
l ev e l s  f o r  EMI's computer o pe ra t ions  were c a lc u la t e d :
Table 3.4
P r o f i t  t o  the  
NRDC
I f  tu rnove r  s t a b i l i s e d  a t  £2m a f t e r  3 years -£550,000
£3m " -£245,000
£4m 4 £ 60,000
£5m 5 £190,000*
*The account would be c lea re d  a f t e r  12 years .
Source: NRDC 8 6 /7 /8 ,  118th NRDC Board Meeting.
The c o n t r a c t  o f f e re d  EMI la rg e  amounts of cheap cash flow with which to  
e s t a b l i s h  th e  2400 computer.
67Ib id .
6SKramskoy paper f o r  Hendry.
69NRDC 86/37 /8 ,  32nd meeting of  the  E lec t ron ics  Computer Sub­
committee,  20 /9 /55 .
7°See above, chap ter  2.
71NRDC 8 6 /7 /8 ,  Notes on a December 1959 meeting between EMI and the  
NRDC, appear ing  in the  minutes of  th e  118th NRDC Board Meeting.
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Organisation of  EMI's computer ope ra t ions  and the  outcome of  the  2400 
P ro je c t .
The 2400 was a completely s e p a ra te  opera t ion  from th e  1100 team. In 
1957 Metcalfe  appointed Norman H i l l  from E l l i o t t  Bro thers  to  b r ing  i t s  
computer ope ra t ions  to g e th e r .  He backed the 1100 as the  r i g h t - s i z e d  machine 
f o r  th e  market.  The 2400 was t r e a t e d  as a simple c o s t - p lu s  c o n t r a c t 72. 
Although EMI formed a Computer Div is ion  in 195873, th e  2400 and 1100 
p r o je c t s  were not in te g ra te d  in any p r a c t i c a l  way. The machines used 
d i f f e r e n t  te chnolog ies  and th e  two teams had a d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e  to  the  
procurement of  p e r ip h e ra l s :  the  2400 group p r e f e r r in g  in t e r n a l  sources ,  and 
the  1100 team buying e x t e r n a l l y .
The 2400 p r o j e c t  was m arg ina l i s ed  in a world of i t s  own. I t  was a 
fo rg o t ten  p r o j e c t 7*. I t  was t r e a t e d  very much l i k e  any o th e r  government 
c o n t r a c t ,  with EMI seemingly unw i l l ing  to  back i t  beyond what was necessa ry  
to f u l f i l  the  c o n t r a c t .  EMI made l i t t l e  e f f o r t  a c t i v e l y  to  market such a 
large machine without some proof t h a t  i t  would be s u c c e s s f u l .  This 
i s o l a t i o n  a lso  led to  a lack o f  c o s t  c o n t r o l ,  and a l a c k l u s t r e  a t t i t u d e  to  
providing any customer programming support  f o r  th e  system.
Costs on the  p r o je c t  rose  r a p i d l y .  By 1962 the  NRDC had inves ted  
£593,528 in EMI computer p r o j e c t s ,  o f  which £500,000 was f o r  th e  240075, 
which had thus  proved more expensive t o  develop and took longer t o  produce 
than had been o r i g i n a l l y  planned.  The p e r ip h e ra l s  a l so  p re sen ted  a major 
problem. I n i t i a l l y  Kramskoy asked th e  Domestic E l e c t r o n i c s ,D i v i s i o n  to  
consider developing a magnetic tape  s to rage  system76. However, i t  was 
even tua l ly  decided to  c o n t r a c t  EMI's Wells f a c to r y  to  produce a fo l low on 
to  the  systems i t  had developed f o r  the  P i l o t  Machine77. Froggat t  
c r i t i c i s e d  t h i s  ' b a t t l e s h i p '  type  c o n s t ru c t io n  as being comple te ly
72Hendry, Innovating f o r  F a i l u r e , p i 16.
73Brown in te rv iew .
7*Talbot in te rv iew.
75NRDC 86/37 /8 ,  progress  r e p o r t  on the 2400 programme, 14/5 /62.
76F rogga t t ,  'Some notes on the  EMI computers ' .
77Paper w r i t t e n  fo r  John Hendry by Talbot,  16/12/86.
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uneconomic to  produce78. When Talbot  was t r a n s f e r r e d  from the  2400 to  
head th e  development o f  the  1100 fo l low  up (ICT e v en tu a l ly  marketed i t  as 
the  1101) he saw a P o t t e r  tape  d r iv e  a d v e r t i s ed  in a US j o u r n a l 79. He 
ordered one having read t h a t  i t  was o n e - th i rd  of the  cos t  o f  the  machines 
used on th e  2400, with only a 20% performance s h o r t f a l l .  When i t  a r r i v e d  
i t  worked s t r a i g h t  away a f t e r  unpacking: t h i s  g r e a t l y  impressed him. The 
P o t t e r  t ape  deck was adopted,  and EMI stopped making tape  d r i v e s .  At one 
time EMI had considered  using Decca tape d r iv e s  on th e  2400ao , but 
dropped t h i s  when the Decca p r o j e c t  d id  not go ahead.
The i s o l a t i o n  of the  2400 p r o j e c t ,  and th e  d i v i s i o n a l  management's 
lack of  i n t e r e s t  in i t ,  i s  not only revea led  in r e t r o s p e c t i v e  commentaries.  
In 1960 th e  NRDC commissioned r e p o r t s  from two computer expe r t s  to  examine 
the  2400 development,  with emphasis placed on the  programming, customer 
s e rv ice  and s a l e s  a c t i v i t i e s 81 . Both seemed to  have concurred t h a t  the  
computer i t s e l f  was well designed. However, both had r e s e r v a t io n s  about the  
software  work t h a t  was going on, th e  morale in the  o p e ra t io n ,  and an 
apparent lack o f  s a le s  a c t i v i t y .
One of th e  c o n su l t a n t s ,  J .G .F .  F ranc is ,  noted in an e a r l i e r  r e p o r t  
t h a t  t h e r e  was a lack of  programmers employed. By the  t ime of h i s  second 
r e p o r t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  had improved82 . However, he found t h a t  the  m a jo r i ty  
of the  s t a f f  were very j u n io r ;  he was to ld  t h a t  exper ienced programmers 
were too expens ive  to  employ. With orders  imminent a t  t h i s  t ime,  both 
exper ts  found t h a t  a number of su b - ro u t in e s 83 had not been w r i t t e n .  
Fu r the r ,  EMI had not considered the  need fo r  some form of language compiler 
f o r  the  machine and seemed to  be expecting the  use r  to  r e l y  on labor ious  
machine code. There was a lack of d i s c i p l i n e  in programming. S t a f f  were 
allowed to  work on anything t h a t  i n t e r e s t e d  them. They d id  not c a r r y  out  
any formal w r i t i n g  up of  t h e i r  sof tware  p r o j e c t s .  The r e s u l t  was t h a t  some 
items were l o s t  and o th e r s  were d u p l ic a ted ,  r e s u l t i n g  in  de lays  and 
inc reas ing  c o s t s .
78F ro g g a t t ,  'Some notes  on the  EMI computers ' .
79Talbot  paper .
8°NRDC 86/26/6S7; 'D r a f t  proposal fo r  support  fo r  a computer type 
magnetic tape  equipment'  submitted by Decca Radar to  the  NRDC l a t e  1960.
81NRDC 86 /37 /8 ,  J .G .F .F r a n c i s ,  30/11/60; and C.R.Morton, 25/11/60.
82 lb i d .
83Sub programs were w r i t t e n  to  a llow programmers to  r a p i d l y  c o n s t r u c t  
t h e i r  own programs.
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At th e  t ime of the se  r e p o r t s ,  t h e r e  were two orders  f o r  the  2400, one 
from the  Royal Army Ordnance Corps and one from th e  M in is t ry  o f  Pensions 
and National  Insurance84 . The o th e r  c o n su l t a n t ,  Merton, noted t h a t  th e re  
was a completely  u n r e a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  to  the  amount of  work t h a t  was 
involved in programming the se  huge a p p l i c a t i o n s .  One of EMI's programming 
l e c t u r e r s  t o l d  Merton t h a t  he and one colleague could program th e  whole of 
the RAOC system in fou r  months, and t h a t  the  team working on i t  was ove r­
la rge .  Merton had the  oppos i te  p o in t  of view, and be l ieved  t h a t  the  
programming opera t ion  was not l a rge  enough. Franc is  summed up the  problems:
' [ t h e r e  was] l i t t l e  s a l e s  e f f o r t  and some f e e l i n g  of  management 
n e g l e c t . . .There seems to  be l i t t l e  d i r e c t i o n  and I f e e l  a l o t  of 
t ime i s  w a s t e d . ' 85
The system was put on the  market in 1959/60 a t  a p r i c e  of £ .5  m i l l io n  
per system. Three were so ld  in th e  UK and one to  the  USSR. All  the  UK 
co n t rac t s  were with th e  government,  one fo r  pens ions ,  two f o r  t h e  RAOC86. 
However, i t  appears t h a t  EMI had not even wanted to  bid f o r  th e  f i r s t  
co n t rac t  with the  M in is t ry  of  Pensions87: the  NRDC had to  fo r c e  EMI to  
tender  f o r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t .  EMI had no wish to  t i e  down working c a p i t a l  and 
cash-flow on s e l l i n g  an expensive computer i t  had no i n t e r e s t  in .  EMI seems 
to have only been in t e r e s t e d  in th e  NRDC money provided f o r  th e  p r o j e c t .  
I t  is  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note t h a t  th e  few systems t h a t  were so ld  were to  
government depar tments ,  who may have been sympathetic to  th e  NRDC's p l i g h t .  
Both the  RAOC and the  M in is t ry  of  Pensions computers f a i l e d  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  
acceptance t e s t s  when i n s t a l l e d  and took a long t ime to  debug8 8 .
The one b r ig h t  spot was the  s a l e  of  a system to  the  USSR, where the  
business o r i e n t a t i o n  of  the  machine meant t h a t  i t  could g e t  around expor t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s 89 . The importance of  t h i s  c o n t r a c t  was t h a t  th e  p r i c e  
included £100,000 f o r  a s e r v i c e  contingency. However, t h e  Russian 
a u t h o r i t i e s  did  not r e q u i r e  EMI s e r v i c i n g .  This £100,000 w ind fa l l  paid fo r  
much of EMI's p ro j e c t  c o s t s 90 . This was the only export  o rde r  f o r  an EMI
84NRDC 86/37/8 ,  C.R.Merton, 25/11/60.
85NRDC, 86/37/8 ,  J .G .F .F r a n c i s ,  30/11/60.
86Computer c o n su l t a n t s ,  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t . 1965.
87Hendry, Innovating f o r  F a i l u r e , p i 16.
88NRDC 86/37/8 ,  progress  r e p o r t  14/5/62.
89F rogga t t ,  'Some notes on th e  EMI computers ' ;  and Brown in te rv iew .
9°Brown in te rv iew.
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computer, r e f l e c t i n g  the  unw i l l ingness  to  back the  Computer Department with 
adequate marketing re sou rce s .
EMIDEC 3400.
This r ep resen ted  EMI's b id  to  win the NRDC's c o n t r a c t  f o r  a B r i t i s h  
super-computer.  The mot iva t ion  behind t h i s  p r o j e c t  has been desc r ibed  in 
the s e c t io n  on the  development o f  the  Fe r ran t i  A t las  computer.
The 3400 was an ex tens ion  of  th e  2400 p r o j e c t  and was looked on 
favourab ly  by th e  NRDC because of  t h i s .  The NRDC was a c t i v e l y  exp lor ing  the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  such a computer from the  mid-1950s, with l i t t l e  success .  
By 1958/59 only two companies were proposing p r o j e c t s  f o r  a s u p e r - sc a le  
s c i e n t i f i c  computer. One of  th e se  was the Manchester U n iv e r s i t y /F e r r a n t i  
MUSE/ATLAS machine, the  o th e r  was EMI's 3400. Kramskoy and Metcalfe 
proposed a p r o j e c t  cos t in g  £374,000 of  which th e  NRDC was expected to  
c o n t r ib u te  75% - £280,00091 . I t  would bu i ld  on the  exper ience gained with 
the  2400, and would cont inue  to  be guided by the  S trachey  team of 
l o g i s t i c i a n s .  Halsbury supported t h i s  p ro je c t  wholehear tedly .  He took 
c r e d i t  f o r  th e  commencement o f  th e  2400 p r o j e c t  and be l iev ed  t h i s  
ex tens ion ,  which again he i n i t i a t e d ,  would e x p lo i t  the  c lo se  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between th e  2400 team and the  NRDC9 2 . He a lso  be l ieved  t h a t  EMI's g r e a t e r  
exper ience  with  t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  computers would be of b e n e f i t  in producing 
such a la rg e  computer system. This was before  EMI's ev iden t  lack of  
i n t e r e s t  in th e  2400 had shown th rough.
Given th e se  f a c t o r s ,  Halsbury and the  Computer Sub-Committee 
recommended the  3400 p roposa l93 . However, a counter -proposa l  by the  
NRDC's deputy  managing d i r e c t o r ,  Hennessey, suggested backing both 
p r o j e c t s ,  bu t  to  a l e s s e r  degree than  e i t h e r  had asked f o r .  The Board 
agreed t o  t h i s  idea,  spreading the  r i s k  a s so c ia te d  with b u i ld in g  such 
complex systems. I n i t i a l l y  £240,000 was provided f o r  the  3400.
According to  Kramskoy, Metcalfe  got cold f e e t  over the  p r o j e c t 94. 
This i s  not s u r p r i s in g  given the  dec is ion  to  s i d e - l i n e  th e  2400. EMI 
E lec t ro n ic s  proposed t h a t  th e  c o n t r a c t  be a l t e r e d  to  a j o i n t  2400/340095
91NRDC 86/42 /5 ,  Lord Halsbury,  'Swan Song' a f i n a l  paper  he wrote on 
his r e t i r e m e n t  f o r  the  NRDC in 1959.
92Ib id ,  up to  t h i s  p o in t  no s ign  of EMI's lack of enthusiasm f o r  
s e l l i n g  th e  2400 had shown through.
93NRDC 86 /37 /8 ,  110th NRDC Board meeting 22/4 /59.
94Kramskoy in te rv iew.
95NRDC 86 /37 /8 ,  118th NRDC Board Meeting December 1959.
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one. The new plan was to  inc rease  the  2400 funding by £63,000 to  allow f o r  
the  e x t r a  c o s t s  t h a t  were being incu r red .  In r e t u r n  the  3400 funding was 
to  be decreased :  to  £190,000 with  a req u es t  f o r  £142,500 of  NRDC funds96. 
I t  was a l s o  proposed t h a t  the  p r o j e c t  be downgraded to  a general  s tudy of 
new computer techniques  f o r  a f u t u r e  computer system. Ins tead  o f  being a 
shor t  term p r o j e c t  leading to  a s c i e n t i f i c  f a s t  computer, i t  became a long 
term one, and th e  3400 development was d r a s t i c a l l y  slowed97.
However, the  3400 team did  remain in e x i s t e n c e ,  slowly c a r ry in g  out 
the  NRDC sponsored development work. When ICT took over EMI's computer 
development opera t ion  in 1961, the  3400 team and the  r e s t  of EMI's design 
engineers  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  ICT's Stevenage c e n t r e 98. The development 
cont inued as P r o jec t  PF172. I t  was thought t h a t  i t  could provide ICT with 
a to p - o f - th e - r a n g e ,  s c i e n t i f i c  system. However, the  dec is ion  by ICT to  drop 
a l l  i t s  previous  computer p r o j e c t s  in favour  of  the  FP6000/ICT1900 
a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  t o  counter the  IBM 360 family ,  meant the  end of th e  PF172. 
ICT needed every  engineer  to  work on the new l i n e .  Brown's 3400/PF172 
engineers  were redeployed to  develop the  small s ca le  members o f  the  ICT 
1900 range99.
Exit from th e  computer in d u s t ry .
In 1961, EMI sold i t s  computer opera t ion  to  ICT. The NRDC was pleased 
to  see f u r t h e r  concen t ra t ion  of  th e  in d u s t ry 100. However, t h e r e  were a 
number o f  c o n t r a c tu a l  problems to  be so r ted  out between EMI, ICT and the  
NRDC. The new head of EMI E l e c t r o n i c s ,  P.A. Alloway, wrote to  th e  NRDC's 
managing d i r e c t o r ,  Duckworth, to  inform him of  the  d e t a i l s  of the  
merger101. ICT had purchased EMI's development and sa le s  o p e ra t io n s .  ICT 
were to  con t inue  to  s e l l  the  EMIDEC range of computers and to  t h i s  ex ten t  
EMI E le c t ro n ic s  had reserved  product ion  cap ac i ty  f o r  20x1100 and 4x2400 
computers per  annum. The deal was paid  fo r  by th e  t r a n s f e r  of 275,000 ICT 
shares t o  EMI102, worth £1 ,250 ,000103.
" i b i d .
"Norman Brown interv iewed by Hendry. Brown headed th e  3400 
development team.
" T a l b o t  paper .
"Brown in te rv iew.
100NRDC 86/37/8 ,  146th Board meeting 25/7 /61.
101NRDC 86/37 /8 ,  Alloway to  Duckworth, 16/8/61.
lo zEMI, 'Annual R ep o r t ' ,  1962.
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This deal gave ICT a l a r g e r  market share ,  and the r i g h t  to  s e l l  the  
f a i r l y  su ccess fu l  1100, as well  as th e  2400. More impor tantly  i t  gave ICT 
the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  cap tu re  some o f  the engineer ing  s k i l l s  t h a t  i t  
d e s p e r a t e ly  needed i f  i t  was going to  develop f u t u r e  machines in -house .  Up 
to  t h i s  p o in t ,  most of ICT's design  work had been done by RCA and 
GEC10\
EMI had more defensive  reasons  f o r  t h i s  p a r t i a l  d i s p o sa l .  Overall  the  
company's p r o f i t  r a t i o s  had become s tag n an t ,  in terms of p r o f i t  both as a 
percentage  of  tu rnover  and of  c a p i t a l  employed105. In 1961 th e  company 
was r e p o r t i n g  lower l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s  because of increased working c a p i t a l  
and th e  purchase  of Morphy-Richards. Faced with a l a c k l u s t r e  performance,  
EMI s e t  about c u t t i n g  some c o s t s .  Chief among th e se  moves was th e  s a le  of 
the  computer op e ra t io n .  While i t  would continue to  make a l re ad y  designed 
machines in the  sh o r t - r u n ,  i t  was f r e e d  from the  burden of developing and 
s e l l i n g  th e se  computers.
Apart  from these  sh o r t  term c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  t h e re  were a l so  some long 
term problems to  be faced i f  i t  was t o  s tay  in th e  computer b u s in e s s .  With 
the  in c reas in g  s ca le  of  the  computer market and f a l l i n g  c o s t s ,  EMI had to  
achieve s i g n i f i c a n t  s a l e s  to  w r i t e - o f f  the s p i r a l l i n g  development co s t s  
a s so c ia t e d  with computers.  However, EMI was t r y i n g  to  minimise i t s  
commitment to  th e  market. I t  l im i t ed  i t s  marketing e f f o r t  to  cu t  c o s t s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  on th e  2400. This meant t h a t  i t  could not reach the  s c a le  t h a t  
was necessa ry  t o  achieve a long term, s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  s i z e .  One example of 
minimising c o s t s  was i t s  lack of  overseas  marketing.  I t  a l so  seems l i k e l y  
t h a t  EMI computers were being so ld  r a t h e r  than leased to  u s e r s .  This i s  
d e f i n i t e l y  t r u e  o f  the  2400 computer,  which would have been so ld  o u t r i g h t  
to  government u se r s .  This was not a good approach to  s ecur ing  a la rge  
market share  f o r  the  2400. Many commercial users  were used to  l e a s in g  da ta  
p rocess ing  equipment,  such as t a b u l a t o r s ,  from the  bus iness  machines f i rm s .  
This was p a r t i c u l a r l y  good f o r  computer u se r s ,  as the  r a p i d l y  advancing 
technology made o u t r i g h t  purchase  a r i s k y  dec i s io n  to  make. However, i t  
meant the  manufacturer  was faced  with the i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  of the  
leased computers.  I t  would not be ab le  to f u l l y  recoup th e  c o s t  o f  these  
machines f o r  a number of  y e a r s .  ICT was more used to  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  having 
had a long h i s t o r y  in the  bus iness  machines indus t ry .  EMI was t r y i n g  to
103NRDC 86/37 /8 ,  legal opin ion prepared f o r  th e  NRDC by b a r r i s t e r  J .E .  
Donaldson, 22/11/62.
10*See below, chap te r  5, ppl71-174.
l o s See above f ig u r e  3 .3 ,  pl08
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minimise such c o s t s ,  even a t  the  expense of not producing enough machines 
to  recoup development exp en d i tu res .
Another problem was t h a t  th e  inc reas ing  s c a le  of the  in d u s t ry  meant 
t h a t  marketing c o s t s  were r i s i n g .  I t  has a l r e ad y  been seen t h a t ,  in a t  
l e a s t  th e  2400 p r o j e c t ,  customer suppor t ,  in terms of software p re p a ra t io n  
and s a l e s  e f f o r t ,  was not comprehensive. EMI was t r y i n g  to  l im i t  the  amount 
spent on the  non-NRDC f inanced  a sp ec t s  of t h i s  p r o j e c t .
These e f f o r t s  to  minimise c o s t s  s a t  u n e as i ly  with the  f a c t  t h a t  EMI's 
range of  computers was t a r g e t e d  a t  th e  most compet i t ive  s e c to r s  of the  
ind u s t ry :  medium to  la rge  s c a le  commercial da ta  p rocess ing .  The dominant 
companies in th e  UK, ICT and IBM, were committing t h e i r  f u l l  co rpo ra te  
weight t o  th e se  types  of machine,  while  EMI had many o the r  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  
demanded company cash.  The 1100 was p itched  d i r e c t l y  a t  IBM's and ICT's 
main d a ta  p rocess ing  machines. The 2400 was l a r g e r  than anything t h a t  ICT 
had to  o f f e r  and l a rg e r  than anyth ing t h a t  IBM was then o f f e r in g  in the  UK. 
However, because of the  g r e a t  r i s k  a s so c ia te d  with producing such la rge  
machines, and because of th e  la rg e  support  commitment t h a t  they  would 
r e q u i r e ,  EMI f a i l e d  to  market th e  system a c t i v e l y .  Therefore th e  1100 was 
seen as the  main product,  d e s p i t e  the  f a c t  i t  was up ag a in s t  the  s t i f f e s t  
compet i t ion .
I t  should be noted t h a t  the  s a l e  to  ICT was not the  f i r s t  t ime t h a t  
a merger had been considered .  In 1958 Kramskoy suggested to  Metcalfe  t h a t  
he should co n s id e r  a merger with  F e r r a n t i ' s  Computer Department106. This 
would have been reasonably  lo g ic a l  as work on the  two super-computer 
p r o j e c t s  could have been r a t i o n a l i s e d .  On top of  t h i s ,  F e r r an t i  could have 
added a range o f  s c i e n t i f i c  computers t o  EMI's bus iness  o r i e n t a t e d  systems. 
At t h i s  t ime th e  problems with  th e  d iv i s io n  had not shown through and the  
idea was not taken  up. Metcalfe  had a l so  r e j e c t e d  an oppor tun i ty  to  s e t  up 
a j o i n t  company with a computer consultancy company107. Kramskoy a l so  
remarks on the  good r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  EMI had had with Honeywell and 
O l i v e t t i ,  which again led t o  noth ing .
The u l t im a te  problem was t h a t ,  by 1963-4, f i rms such as IBM and ICT 
were working on t h e i r  t h i r d  gen e ra t io n  machines. These would be la rge  
f a m i l ie s  of  mass produced machines,  r e q u i r in g  very large  teams o f  eng ineers  
to  design them, and s i g n i f i c a n t  marketing commitments to  s e l l  t h e  va r ious  
members of the  range across  th e  whole scope of  the  computer market.  This 
was not th e  k ind of commitment EMI was looking f o r .
106Kramskoy's paper f o r  Hendry.
ltJ7Ib id .
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When the  s a l e  to  ICT occur red ,  a long per iod  of d i s cu s s io n  s t a r t e d  
with the  NRDC about how the  Corporation could continue to  recoup i t s  
investment .  ICT had re fused  to  accep t  the  NRDC debt in th e  d e a l 108. EMI 
t r i e d  to  persuade the  NRDC t h a t  the  s a le s  of th e  1100 and 2400 computers 
t h a t  i t  was to  make f o r  ICT would cover  the  pay back. However, th e  NRDC 
be l ieved  t h a t ,  as EMI was u n l ik e ly  t o  produce f u r t h e r  machines a f t e r  the  
1100 and 2400, th e  l i k e l y  money genera ted  would not cover t h e  loan.  In any 
case ,  a l though i t  was p leased by the  merger, the  loan had been made to  
e s t a b l i s h  EMI in the  computer market,  and in the  b e l i e f  t h a t  EMI had an on­
going commitment to  the  market.  A number of so lu t io n s  were cons idered .  The 
f i n a l  agreement led to  EMI repaying the  NRDC money over  15 years  and 
s igning  over 10% of the  div idend earned on i t s  ICT shares  t o  the  NRDC, in 
l i eu  of  i n t e r e s t  payments.
EMI's a c t i v i t i e s  in the  1960s
EMI was more i n t e r e s t e d  in pursu ing  o ther  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  in the  1960s. 
According to  F rogga t t ,  Metcalfe  was th e  main fo rce  behind the  company's 
e f f o r t s  to  e s t a b l i s h  a l a r g e r  commercial e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t y 109. 
Froggatt  be l ieved  t h a t  Lockwood, the  chairman, p re fe r r e d  investment in the  
record  b u s in e s s ,  though t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  Lockwood's s ta tement  in 1960 t h a t  
the  group was o v e r - r e l i a n t  on r e c o r d s 110. F roggat t  a l so  b e l ieved  t h a t  
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  group was too  caught  up in the  m i l i t a r y  c o s t - p lu s  
m en ta l i ty .  I t  p r e f e r r e d  t h i s  s a f e  haven to more compet i t ive  scena r io s .
The l a t t e r  s ta tement may well have been c lo se  to  the  t r u t h .  In many 
h ighly  com pet i t ive  e l e c t r o n i c  markets ,  EMI slowly d isposed  of i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s  or opera ted  j o i n t  companies so as to  m i t ig a te  th e  r i s k .  I t  has 
been seen t h a t  by 1965 t h i s  culminated in 52% of  e l e c t r o n i c s  s a l e s  being 
in defence p ro d u c ts111. However, i t  should be noted t h a t  e l e c t r o n i c s  
only counted f o r  about 20% of  company s a le s ,  worth £36m in 1967/8112.
Outside  th e  c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  arena,  EMI took a number of  
i n i t i a t i v e s .  In th e  e a r l y  1960s EMI reduced i t s  exposure in the  magnetic 
tape market by merging i t s  tape  manufacturing opera t ion  with P h i l i p s .  EMI
loaNRDC 86 /37 /8 ,  note by the  NRDC's Duckworth on a meeting with EMI's 
Lockwood, 22 /6 /62 .
109Froggat t  'Some notes  on the  EMI p a p e r s ' .
110EMI, Annual Report ,  1960.
111Kemp-Gee, 'EMI' c i r c u l a r .
112Ib id ;  EMI r e p o r t s  do not break down the  percentage  of s a le s  
accruing from th e  d i v i s i o n s .
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held 51% of the  opera t ion  and P h i l i p s  49%; to g e th e r  they invested  in a new 
manufacturing p l a n t .  To f u r t h e r  reduce i t s  exposure to  the  commercial 
market,  EMI merged i t s  French TV manufacturing opera t ion  in to  a j o i n t  
company with Thomson-Houston113. La te r  EMI so ld  i t s  s take  to  th e  French 
p a r t n e r .  EMI a l so  merged Morphy-Richards in to  a j o i n t  company with  AEI to  
r a t i o n a l i s e  the  B r i t i s h  app l iance  market and reduce compet it ion .
More p o s i t i v e l y ,  EMI d i v e r s i f i e d  in to  o th e r  a reas  of i n d u s t r i a l  
con t ro l  and e l e c t r o n i c s .  One method was to  purchase l i c en ces  from 
C inc innat i  M il l ing  Machines, Canadian General E l e c t r i c ,  Fairbanks  Whitney, 
Saab, and o t h e r s 114; most of th e se  l icences  were f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  con t ro l  
systems. EMI a l so  p a r t i a l l y  en te red  the  market fo r  semiconductors by 
purchasing a 49% s take  in the  Hughes C orpo ra t ion ' s  S c o t t i s h  
o p e ra t io n 115. However, in 1974/5 EMI sold i t s  s take in t h i s  h ighly  
compet i t ive  s e c t o r  back to  Hughes.
EMI a l so  bought a number of f i rms in the  USA to  add to  i t s  s p e c i a l i s t  
US t e l e v i s i o n  broadcas t  equipment and e lec t ro n  tube o p e ra t io n s .  In the  UK 
an important purchase ,  in 1966, was th e  medical e l e c t r o n i c s  company, S.E. 
Labs, which would prove a major source of problems to  EMI in th e  l a t e  
1970s, when i t  f a i l e d  to  secure  a la rge  market f o r  i t s  very expensive 
medical s canners .  EMI had earmarked t h i s  as a r a p i d l y  growing market,  but 
saw th e  investment going id le  as demand grew slowly.
C ap i ta l  equipment f o r  t e l e v i s i o n  continued t o  be an important source 
of revenue throughout the  1960s. In 1961 EMI was ab le  to  r e p o r t  t h a t  i t  was 
supplying la rge  amounts of equipment to  a number of  the  new ITV companies, 
and had suppl ied  the BBC with 30 FM radio  t r a n s m i t t e r s  and 5 s a t e l l i t e  
s t a t i o n s 116, as well as winning a number of overseas  c o n t r a c t s .  Late r 
i t  w as . to  become the  UK cus tod ian  o f  the  Telefunken PAL l i c e n c e ,  f u r t h e r  
boos ting i t s  p r o f i t  from t h i s  a r e a 117. PAL was the  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  
s tandard  chosen f o r  use in B r i t a i n .  Kemp-Gee es t imated  t h a t  EMI rece ived  
£1 f o r  every PAL colour s e t  so ld  in B r i t a in  - £650,000 per  annum in the  
e a r ly  1970s118.
113EMI, Annual Report ,  1960.
114Various annual r e p o r t s .
115E. S c ib e r r a s ,  M ul t ina t iona l  e l e c t r o n i c  companies and na t io n a l  
economic p o l i c y .  Greenwich, Conn, 1977.
116EMI, Annual Repor t . 1961.
117Layton, Ten Inno v a t io n s , chap te r  8.
l l s Kemp-Gee 'EMI' .
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O v e ra l l ,  EMI E lec t ro n ic s  was ab le  to  decrease  i t s  r e l i a n c e  on MOD 
c o n t r a c t s ,  but i t  was showing a degree  of conservati sm in choosing a reas  
t h a t  were l e s s  compet i t ive  and in which i t  a l ready  had exper ience .
However, o u t s id e  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  EMI was more dynamic. The success  of 
the  45 and 33 1/3 r .p .m .  r e c o rd s ,  combined with th e  worldwide clamour f o r  
B ea t les  r e c o rd s ,  saw the  record  o p e ra t io n  becoming h ighly  p r o f i t a b l e .  Much 
of th e  la rge  p r o f i t s  of  the  1960s went in to  d iv e r s i f y i n g  the  company's 
a c t i v i t i e s .  Apart  from the  new e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n s ,  much of the  
company's expansion was in a new d i v i s i o n :  Leisure  and Enter ta inment .  For 
t h i s  d i v i s i o n  i t  purchased th e  Blackpool Tower Company, th e  Grade 
Organ isa t ion  and var ious  t h e a t r e s .  The main purchase was Warner B r o th e r ' s  
25% s tak e  in the  t e l e v i s i o n  and f i lm  company ABPC, which i t  f u l l y  acquired 
in 1969113. This gave EMI a chain  of cinemas, a f i lm  s tu d io ,  a 
production company and a c o n t r o l l i n g  s take  in Thames T e le v is io n .
Conclusion.
Overal l  t h e r e  seems to  have been a dual problem f o r  the  EMI Computer 
D iv i s io n .  F i r s t l y  th e re  was a lack o f  corpora te  commitment to  developing 
a l a rge  s take  in t h i s  growing market.  Secondly, given the  conse rva t ive  
a t t i t u d e  EMI was tak ing  to  th e  o p e ra t io n ,  i t  was a mistake to  t r y  to  take  
the  market head on in th e  m edium-to- large-sca le  commercial a rena ,  IBM's and 
ICT's favoured t e r r i t o r y .
Taking on t h i s  s e c to r  of  the  market needed the  f u l l  support  o f  a long 
term programme. As w i l l  be seen in th e  chapte rs  on ICT and th e  US bus iness  
machines f i r m s ,  the se  companies were t o t a l l y  o r i e n t a t e d  to  achieving  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  market share ,  so as to  cover the  high development c o s t s  of 
computers.  EMI wanted to  make the  ope ra t ion  s e l f  f inanc ing  a t  a very  e a r ly  
s t a g e 120. Operat ing in the  small UK market, with a l a rge  number of 
com pet i to rs ,  such a p o l ic y  was impossible .  I t  would take  more than one 
genera t ion  of  machines to  e s t a b l i s h  a la rge enough base t o  cover f u tu r e  
development c o s t s .  I f  EMI was not w i l l i n g  to  s ink funds in to  developing a 
big market presence  with the  1100 and 2400, and a t  the  same time inves t  
heav i ly  in th e  next genera t ion  of  machines, i t  could not hope to  mainta in  
i t s  p lace  in th e  h e a r t  of  the  computer market.
The company was not committed to any such long-term market 
development p r o j e c t .  I t  was not only d i v e r s i f i e d  a t  the  co rp o ra te  level 
(with la rg e  r e c o rd ,  domestic app l iance  and en ter ta inment  a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  but
119Ib id .
12°F ro g g a t t  'Some notes  on the  EMI computers ' .
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i t  was a l so  d i v e r s i f i e d  a t  group l e v e l .  EMI E lec t ro n ic s  had, i t s e l f ,  a wide 
p o r t f o l i o  of a c t i v i t i e s .  A f te r  i t s  development of b lack and white  
t e l e v i s i o n ,  EMI would never produce a s im i la r  b u r s t  of e f f o r t  to  e s t a b l i s h  
a long- term, market-founding , technology.
EMI's main s t r a t e g y  seems to  have been one of  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  The 
purpose was to  give i t  p r o t e c t io n  from the  vagar ies  of  the  market:  i t  
sought p r o t e c t io n  from f a i l u r e  by ensur ing  i t  was not over exposed in any 
s in g l e  market p lace .  I t  seems to  have been one o f  a number of  f i rm s  t h a t  
adopted d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  as an in h e r e n t ly  defensive  s t r a t e g y  and could not 
t o l e r a t e  any d iv i s io n  needing a l a rg e  f i n a n c i a l  commitment f o r  an extended 
period of  t ime.
In many ways i t s  weaknesses were s im i la r  to  F e r r a n t i ' s :  lack of 
co rpo ra te  commitment, combined with a p re ference  f o r  l e s s  r i s k y  and s h o r t e r  
term d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s  than computers.  To add to  t h i s ,  both companies seemed 
o v e r - r e l i a n t  on the  d i v i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  They used i t  t o  p r o t e c t  the  
paren t  company from f a i l u r e  of  any s in g l e  product ,  as much as a method of 
improving day t o  day running of  th e  company.
Given t h i s  negative  view o f  th e  company, the  adoption of the  most 
ambitious product p lan ,  b u i ld in g  medium sc a le  bus iness  machines,  was 
completely inap p ro p r ia te  to  th e  level  o f  corpora te  commitment. I t  i s  seen 
l a t e r  t h a t  f i rm s  l ik e  Burroughs, NCR, CDC and DEC had niche  market 
s t r a t e g i e s  to  c on t ro l  c o s t s ,  p lus  f u l l  commitment to  computer technology.  
EMI had n e i t h e r  o f  these :  an i n h e r e n t ly  bad s t r a t e g y  f o r  a d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
in to  computers.
This ch ap te r  unve i ls  a s t o r y  of poor o rg a n is a t i o n  and poor d e c i s io n  
making, seemingly caused by an i n a b i l i t y  to  coord ina te  o p e ra t io n a l  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  with th e  d iv id e  between the  1100 and 2400 teams, a 
mismatch between t a c t i c a l  and s t r a t e g i c  planning. At the  h igher  lev e l  the  
problem was the  low corpora te  commitment to computers, and th e  product plan 
chosen. I t  a l s o  shows t h a t  EMI was being forced  to  choose between i t s  
various  expansion pa ths ,  which in i t s e l f  is  not a s u r p r i s i n g  p o s i t i o n  f o r  
a f irm to  be in .  Even when p r o f i t s  were good, in the  l a t e  1950s, the  
E lec t ro n ic s  Div is ion  had to  make th e  choice between whole hea r ted  support  
f o r  the  1100 or  th e  2400. When p r o f i t s  s tagnated  in the  e a r l y  1960s, and 
i t s  c a p i t a l  re sou rces  came under more p ressu re ,  i t  was forced  to  abandon 
p r o j e c t s .  I t  opted to  leave one of  the  f a s t e s t  growing i n d u s t r i e s  in the  
world, computers.  The reasons f o r  t h i s  choice goes back to  the  huge amounts 
of investment needed to  make a success  o f  t h i s  market,  e s p e c i a l l y  as i t  was 
concen t ra t ing  on the  commercial s e c t o r ,  and on the  f a c t  t h a t  the  f i rm
132
tended to  see d i v e r s i t y  as a form o f  r i s k  l i m i t a t i o n  r a t h e r  than as a 
method f o r  changing the  c o rp o ra te  d i r e c t i o n .
The most rev ea l in g  informat ion  uncovered in the  US case  s tu d i e s  on 
RCA and GE, i s  th e  d e t a i l  on how c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  f i rm s  made the  
dec i s ion  to  abandon computers when faced  with c a p i t a l  r a t i o n i n g .  Reading 
th ese  ch ap te r s  can throw l i g h t  on what was probably  happening w i th in  EMI, 
thanks t o  the  abundant a rch ive  informat ion on RCA and GE.
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Chapter 4.
Engl ish  E l e c t r i c .
With the  e x i t s  of  EMI and F e r r a n t i ,  English  E l e c t r i c  was l e f t  as 
B r i t a i n ' s  second major, dom es t ica l ly  owned, commercial computer 
manufacturer .  I n i t i a l l y  EE s p e c i a l i s e d  in machines f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  
c a l c u l a t i o n ,  then added a number of  i n d u s t r i a l  computer con t ro l  systems to  
i t s  range and then made a major b id  to  become a leading computer maker by 
o f f e r i n g  a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  range of  commercial computers. EE was th e  B r i t i s h  
company t h a t  came c l o s e s t  to  matching RCA and GE. Indeed the  o p e ra t io n s  of 
EE and the  s t r a t e g i e s  i t  adopted seemed to m i r ro r  these  American g i a n t s .
However, t h i s  chap te r  only r e p re se n t s  a p a r t i a l  s tudy of  th e  company. 
Unlike the  s tu d i e s  of RCA and GE the  dec is ion  making process  t h a t  went on 
w i th in  English E l e c t r i c  i s  not known. Therefore  t h i s  p a r t i a l  case  study 
only shows t h a t  EE was t r y i n g  to  emulate ,  consc ious ly  or unconsc ious ly ,  the  
a c t i v i t i e s  of th e se  US f i rm s .  The s ec t io n s  on EE's computer a c t i v i t i e s ,  and 
on i t s  d e c i s io n  to  leave the  computer indus t ry ,  draw heav i ly  on th e  process  
revea led  in the  US case  s t u d i e s .  The s to ry  s t a r t s  with the  f i rm  being 
analogous to  F e r r an t i  in th e  market,  but then becoming in c re a s in g ly  
involved in commercial da ta  p rocess ing ,  emulating th e  ' b ig  push'  s t r a t e g i e s  
of US f i r m s .  F in a l ly  i t  opted out of  the  market f o r  e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same 
reasons  as the  American f i r m s .  This study shows th a t  th e  p re s su re s  on 
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  to  leave th e  computer indus t ry  were g e n e r a l ly  c o n s i s t e n t  
across  both B r i t a i n  and America. EE may have o u t l a s t e d  F e r r a n t i  and EMI, 
but th e  p re s su re  of  suppor t ing  m u l t ip l e  high technology a c t i v i t i e s  s t i l l  
forced  i t  out of  t h i s  r a p i d l y  growing, ye t  very com pet i t ive ,  market.
There a re  two major reasons  why informat ion on t h i s  f i rm  i s  lacking .  
F i r s t l y ,  as in o the r  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, the  computer a c t i v i t y  was 
performed down the  chain o f  command, in one o f  the  sm al le r  o pe ra t ing  
d i v i s i o n s .  Information from s u b -d iv i s io n s  i s  even r a r e r  than the  a rch ives  
of c o rpo ra te  headquar te rs .  Secondly English E l e c t r i c  i s  now a p a r t  of  the  
General E l e c t r i c  Company, which i s  not a good source  f o r  a rc h iv a l  m a te r i a l .
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The Company.
Engl ish E l e c t r i c  was formed in 1918 with the  merger of f i v e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  e l e c t r i c a l  companies1 . A f te r  a per iod  of  f i n a n c i a l  p re ssu re  
in th e  1920s, th e  F i r s t  Lord Nelson became chairman of  the  company and in 
the 1930s the  American f i rm  Westinghouse became the  major shareho lde r ,  
though con t ro l  s tayed in th e  UK. Lord Nelson was a powerful f i g u r e  and 
ta ck l ed  the  company's problems with a h ighly  c e n t r a l i s e d  decision-making 
process .  I t  c o n s i s te d  of fu n c t io n a l  depar tments ,  such as accounts ,  
development, home s a le s  and e x p o r t s ,  coupled to  a geog raph ica l ly  based 
manufacturing o rg a n i s a t i o n ,  based on the o r i g i n a l  pre-EE companies. 
However, the  most important a spec t  of  the  company's o rg a n i s a t i o n  was the  
rou t in g  of decision-making up to  Lord Nelson. He was the  only execu t ive  
board member u n t i l  19482 , when an executive  committee was formed and h is  
son was appoin ted  to  the  pos t  of  deputy managing d i r e c t o r ,  which made h is  
son the  only n a tu ra l  successor .
The o rg a n i s a t i o n  of the  company only s t a r t e d  to  change during the  
Second World War, by which t ime i t  was independent of  Westinghouse. However 
the  s t r u c t u r e  was only f u l l y  reformed in the  1960s with the  formation of 
a complete product group system. Before t h i s  only new a c q u i s i t i o n s  and new 
product d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s  had p r o f i t  c en t r e  s t a t u s 3 . In 1965, fo llowing the  
advice of management c o n su l t a n t s  McKinsey and Company4 , the  second Lord 
Nelson adopted a product l i n e  o rg a n is a t i o n  across  the  whole company. He 
introduced t h i s  r e o rg a n i s a t io n  to  s e n io r  management very p r o f e s s i o n a l ly  
with l e c t u r e s  and pamphlets5 . The remaining fu n c t io n a l  and c e n t r a l  s t a f f s  
were meant to  take  on a consu l tancy  and planning r o l e ,  a c t i n g  as an
1Marconi Archive,  Second Lord Nelson of S t a f f o r d ,  Chairman and Chief 
Executive of  EE, 'Address to  the  meeting of execu t ives  and managers of  the  
English E l e c t r i c  Company', 2 /11/65 . This address  summed up the  p a s t  
performance o f  th e  company and o u t l i n e d  a major s h i f t  in the  company's 
o rg a n i s a t i o n .  This paper w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  to  as the  ' r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  
p r e s e n t a t i o n ' .  The Second Lord Nelson succeeded h i s  f a t h e r  in 1956.
2R.Jones and 0 . M a r r io t t ,  The Anatomy of  a Merger: a H is to ry  of GEC. 
AEI and English  E l e c t r i c . 1970, p l75: Dic t ionary  o f  Business Biography: a 
b iograph ica l  d i c t i o n a r y  of bus iness  leaders  a c t i v e  in B r i t a i n  in the  per iod  
1860-1980. ed D .J .  Jeremy, 1984, pp417-426, b iograph ies  of the  1s t  and 2nd 
Lord Nelsons of  S ta f fo rd .
3Marconi a rc h iv e ,  Lord Nelson, r e o rg a n i s a t io n  p r e s e n ta t i o n ,  1965.
4D.F.Channon, The S t r a t eg y  and S t ru c tu re  of B r i t i s h  E n t e r p r i s e . 197.3,
ppl35-6.
sIb id .
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i n t e r n a l  management consul tancy  s e r v i c e 6 . This i s  s im i l a r  to  the  GE system 
of  c o n t ro l  which w i l l  be s tu d ied  l a t e r .
Immediately a f t e r  th e  war,  EE underwent a per iod  of  growth and 
p r o f i t ,  f u e l l e d  by high demand f o r  i t s  core heavy e l e c t r i c a l  p roduc ts .  I t  
extended th e se  heavy e l e c t r i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  by s t a r t i n g  to  produce d i e s e l -  
e l e c t r i c  locomotive engines and jo ined  in the development of  nuc lea r  power. 
I t  a l s o  expanded in to  th r e e  major new markets:  aerospace ,  e l e c t r o n i c s  ( led  
by Marconi) and computers.  However of th e  th ree  major e l e c t r i c a l  companies, 
EE remained the  most roo ted  in the  heavy s ide  o f  the  indus t ry .
In the  n o n - t r a d i t i o n a l  end of  i t s  ope ra t ions  one of i t s  most 
impor tant new commitments was to  a i r c r a f t  and aero  engines .  During the  
Second World War EE acquired  the  a i r c r a f t  engine maker Napiers7 . I t  a l so  
opera ted  a shadow fa c to ry  producing bombers under l i c e n ce .  A f te r  the  war 
Lord Nelson decided EE should e x p l o i t  these  a s s e t s  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  f i rm  
as a major a i r c r a f t  company. EE developed a number o f  c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  
a i r c r a f t  and m i s s i l e  systems. The most successfu l  o f  these  was th e  Canberra 
bomber which was produced in l a rge  numbers and used worldwide; indeed, many 
hundreds were produced in th e  USA under l icence  f o r  th e  US f o r c e s .  This was 
the  product t h a t  enabled the  company to  s tay  in t h i s  i n t e r n a t io n a l  indus t ry  
in to  the  1960s.
However, in the e a r l y  1960s EE was faced with  a number of f i n a n c i a l  
problems and was fo rced to  reshape i t s e l f  and r e a s s e s s  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
h e a l th .  At t h i s  time a number of i t s  new o pe ra t ions  were d isposed o f .  
Napiers was so ld  to  Rolls-Royce following a f a i l e d  a ttempt  to  develop a 
market f o r  a new turbo-prop  engine8 . The a i r c r a f t  ope ra t ion  was merged 
with B r i s t o l  t o  form the  B r i t i s h  A i r c r a f t  Company in th e  mid-1960s9 . 
Eventua lly  EE disposed of  i t s  EDP d iv i s io n .  The reason fo r  i t s  poor 
performance was in p a r t  caused by the  co s t  of suppor t ing  so many high c o s t  
t e ch n o lo g ie s .
The second major d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  a f t e r  the  war was in to  e l e c t r o n i c s .  
EE acquired  Marconi fo l lowing the  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of  Cable & Wire less  in
6Marconi a rch ive ,  Lord Nelson, r e o rg a n i s a t io n  p r e s e n ta t i o n ,  1965.
7LSE a rc h iv a l  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Lord Nelson, 'The development and 
o rg a n i s a t i o n  of  the  Engl ish E l e c t r i c  Company L t d . ' ,  paper given a t  the  
London School o f  Economics in the  s e r i e s ,  'Seminars on the  problems in 
i n d u s t r i a l  a d m i n s t r a t i o n ' , 5 /5 /6 4 ,  h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as 'Development 
and o r g a n i s a t i o n  of EE'; see a l s o ,  C. Wilson & W. Reader, Men and Machines: 
a h i s t o r y  of  D.Napier & Son Engineers L t d . . 1958.
8 Ib id .
9Jones and M ar r io t t ,  Anatomy of a merger. p!90.
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194610. I t  won the  bid fo r  Marconi in the face  of  compet it ion from EMI. 
Both put forward arguments t h a t  they  would d o v e ta i l  well with Marconi ' s  
product mix11. For EE, i t  meant acqu ir ing  th e  most advanced c a p i t a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  o rg an isa t io n  in th e  coun try .  EE absorbed an o rg a n i s a t i o n  st rong 
in m i l i t a r y  systems, communication equipment and broadcas t  t r a n s m i t t e r s .  
EE a l so  expanded i t s  scope by ending Marconi 's  c o l l a b o ra t io n  with  EMI on 
t e l e v i s i o n ,  and moved Marconi in to  the  production of a f u l l  l i n e  of 
t e l e v i s i o n  s tu d io  equipment as well  as t r a n s m i t t e r s ,  in compet i t ion  with 
EMI. This was done by u t i l i s i n g  Marconi ' s  t e ch n ica l  l inks  with i t s  one time 
s u b s id ia ry ,  RCA12, though t h i s  was a t  the  expense of EE f a l l i n g  out with 
i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  US p a r tn e r ,  Westinghouse13. That is  not to  say t h a t  EE 
was r e l i a n t  on US technology. By 1951 i t  had a resea rch  and development 
work fo rce  of  6000, spending £ 6 .25m per annum, most employed a t  th e  Nelson 
and Marconi Labora to r ie s .  For a B r i t i s h  f i rm  t h i s  was a very la rge  
commitment. Jones and M ar r io t t  argued th a t  t h i s  f i g u r e ,  and the  f a c t  t h a t  
the company had 2000 t r a i n e e s  a t  any one t ime,  was due to  the  f i r s t  Lord 
Nelson 's  w i l l in g n e s s  to  th in k  in the  long te rm1**. He was prepared to  
forego sh o r t - t e rm  p r o f i t s  f o r  long-term p r o j e c t s .
EE seems t o  have picked up Marconi a t  a very good p r i c e .  I t  paid 
£ 3 .75m, but £1.6m of government s tock  owned by Marconi was disposed o f ,  
making the  ne t  p r ic e  £2.1m15. EE added to  th e se  Marconi a s s e t s .  Chief 
among th e se  a d d i t io n s  was th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  in th e  mid 1960s of  E l l i o t t  
Automation. This added to  the  m i l i t a r y  command, c on t ro l  and communication 
a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  Marconi a l r e ad y  opera ted ,  as well  as in c reas in g  market 
share in e l e c t r o n i c  ins truments  and adding to  the  EE's i n d u s t r i a l  
automation b us iness .  I t  was th e  a d d i t io n  of the  i n d u s t r i a l  automation and 
small computer a c t i v i t i e s  of E l l i o t t s  t h a t  mostly  a f f e c t e d  the  computer 
ope ra t ion .
A f te r  the  war, EE a lso  en te red  the  product ion of domestic app l iances  
and consumer e l e c t r o n i c s .  However, l ik e  the  a i r c r a f t  o p e ra t ion  these  
products were s id e l in e d  or  dropped as the  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  f a i l e d  to
10W.J.Baker,  A h i s t o r y  of  th e  Marconi Company. 1970.
“ See a l so  above, chap te r  3, where the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of Marconi and EMI 
is  d i scussed ,  pplOl-118.
12Lord Nelson, 'Development and o rg an is a t io n  of  EE', 1964.
13Jones and M ar r io t t ,  Anatomy of a merger. pl83.
1AIb id ,  pl86.
15Ibid pl80.
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improve. EE d id  not want to  bear  the  cost  of  developing the marketing 
network t h a t  goes with such p ro d u c ts ,  and was up a g a in s t  s t i f f  compet it ion  
from J u le s  Thorn and Arnold Weinstock.
Engl ish  E l e c t r i c  and computers.
The t h i r d  major non-heavy e l e c t r i c a l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  was in computers 
and automation.  EE was one o f  the  f i r s t  B r i t i s h  companies t o  become 
involved in computer technology and, a f t e r  an incubat ion  period  which was 
longer than F e r r a n t i ,  i t  o f f e r e d  an e a r ly  marketable  computer to  the  
s c i e n t i f i c  market.  The company's computer scope increased  s t e a d i l y  u n t i l  
the  mid-1960s,  when i t  a t tempted  to  o f f e r  a s i g n i f i c a n t  new range of 
machines to  compete head on with  both ICT and IBM.
DEUCE Computer
EE f i r s t  became involved in computing when the  National Phys ical  
L abora to r ie s  a t  Teddington s t a r t e d  a p ro je c t  to  b u i ld  a computer.  In 1944 
the  Treasury  had given permission to  the NPL to  s e t  up a c e n t r a l i s e d  
Mathematical D iv i s ion16, to  provide  c a l c u l a t i o n  s e rv ice s  both w i th in  the  
NPL and to  o th e r  research  l a b o r a t o r i e s .  One of i t s  s t a f f  was th e  leading 
mathematic ian and computer t h e o r i s t ,  Alan M. Tur ing17, who designed the  
Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) f o r  high-speed mathematical  c a l c u l a t i o n .  
However, none o f  Tu r ing 's  D iv is ion  had an e l e c t r o n i c s  background, so 
o u ts id e  support  was needed to  c o n s t r u c t  the system.
In 1949 T u r in g ' s  development was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the  new E le c t ro n ic s  
Section o f  th e  NPL's Radio D iv is io n ,  a s ec t io n  with more a p p ro p r ia t e  
s k i l l s 18. The E lec t ro n ic s  Sec t ion  decided not to  continue  with T u r in g ' s  
e f f o r t s  to  b u i ld  the  very la rg e  and complex ACE and in s tead  to  c o n cen t ra te  
e f f o r t s  on a cut-down model, t h e  P i l o t  ACE, to  prove the  technology. The 
ACE would be cons t ruc ted  once th e  P i l o t  had been made to  work. This  was not 
to  T u r in g ' s  l i k i n g :  d i s i l l u s i o n e d  with the  NPL's lack of commitment to  h i s  
o r i g i n a l  idea to  bu i ld  a machine f o r  immense mathematical  exper im enta t ion ,  
Turing l e f t  th e  NPL and pursued h i s  own developments, f i r s t  a t  King 's
16M.G. Croarken, "The c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  of  s c i e n t i f i c  computation in 
B r i t a i n  1925-1955",  PhD U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Warwick, 1985. p p l2 9 -131.
17J.H.  Wilkinson, 'T u r i n g ' s  work a t  the  National  Physical  Laboratory  
and c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  the  P i l o t  ACE, DEUCE, and ACE', A h i s t o r y  of computing
in the  tw e n t i e th  centurv: A c o l l e c t i o n  of e s s a v s . ed N. Metropoli s  e t  a l ,  
New York, 1980, pp 101-114. Wilkinson was one o f  the  ACE p r o j e c t  l e ad e r s .
18Ib id.
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College and then a t  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty 19.
N ever the less ,  in 1948 English E l e c t r i c  s t a r t e d  working with the-NPL 
E le c t ro n ic s  Section to  develop a f u l l y  engineered vers ion  of th e  P i l o t  
ACE20. This was to  be known as th e  DEUCE. The P i l o t  Ace was f u l l y  
o p e ra t io n a l  in 1952, roughly two years  behind th e  f i r s t  M anches te r /Fer ran t i  
Mark I computer.
The f i r s t  DEUCE was d e l iv e red  to  the NPL in 1955. EE then i n s t a l l e d  
two f o r  i t s  own use.  EE had a l a rg e  demand f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n  as 
i t  had a big i n t e r e s t  in s c ience  based i n d u s t r i e s ,  such as aerospace ,  
conventional  power g enera t ion ,  and, l a t e r ,  nuc lea r  power. The average p r i c e  
of the  DEUCE was £50,000. Product ion ended in 1961, with 30 being 
d e l iv e re d 21. This seems impressive  compared to  the  f i r s t  F e r r an t i  
systems, the  Mark I and I * ' s ,  of  which e igh t  were i n s t a l l e d .  However, t h i s  
success was to  some degree a symptom of the DEUCE being l a t e r  and longer 
in the  market.  By 1955 production of  the  Hark 1* was ending, DEUCE was only 
j u s t  being d e l iv e re d .  By 1961 F e r r a n t i  had produced the  Mercury, Pegasus,  
Perseus and the  second genera t ion  S i r i u s  machines, with Orion and At las  
machines near ing  product ion ,  a l l  of which, added to g e th e r ,  g r e a t l y  
o u t s t r ip p e d  EE's performance with th e  DEUCE.
The major users  of  the  DEUCE were the a i r c r a f t  indus t ry ,  and atomic 
resea rch  l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  a c t i v i t i e s  c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  EE's own bus inesses :
19Wilkinson, 'T u r in g ' s  work a t  the  NPL', A h i s t o r y  of computing in the  
tw ent ie th  c e n t u r v . ed Metropolis  e t  a l .
2°Croarken, 'The c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  of s c i e n t i f i c  com p u ta t io n ' , pp. 160-161.
“ Computer Consultan ts  Ltd,  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t . 1965, 
in 1963 p r i c e s .
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Table 4.1 Sales of DEUCE computers.
DEUCE I
Customers
AWRE
B r i t i s h  A i r c r a f t  Corp.
Other A i r c r a f t  Designers
inc.  Royal A i r c r a f t  Es tabli shment
Other Govt. Research
U niv e rs i ty
Other commercial
EE i n t e r n a l
Number of systems
1
6
4
2
3
2
2
DEUCE II
EE Atomic Power Div 1
EE Nelson Laboratory  1
Marconi 1
RAE 1
United Kingdom Atomic 1
Energy A uthor i ty
DEUCE IIA
EE in t e r n a l  2
Minis t ry  of A g r icu l tu re  3
Source: Computer Consultants  Ltd,  B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t .  1965.
Second Generation Machines.
During the  second g enera t ion  of  computing, English E l e c t r i c  extended 
the scope of  i t s  computer range ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  i t  acqu ired  LEO 
computers.  EE s t a r t e d  to  become a major fo rce  in the  UK computer market.  
The NRDC es t im ated  t h a t  j o i n t  EE and LEO computer tu rnover  a t  t h e  tu rn  of  
the decade was £.5m-£lm per annum; by the  mid-1960s t h i s  had reached £12m, 
though t h i s  was only one q u a r t e r  of  ICT's t u rn o v e r22.
Of the  second genera t ion  machines produced, the  KDF9 was th e  na tu ra l  
successor  to  the  DEUCE. This machine was o r i e n t a t e d  towards the  s c i e n t i f i c  
market, and was o f  an advanced a r c h i t e c t u r e .  I t  was marketed in the  e a r ly  
1960s and f i r s t  i n s t a l l e d  in 1963. I t  was more expensive than th e  DEUCE, 
a t  an average p r i c e  of £120,000. However, the  re sea rch  users  had a growing 
demand f o r  l a r g e r  s ca le  computing.  The US Off ice  o f  Naval Research (ONR) 
noted t h a t  the  machine became a v a i l a b l e  a t  the  same time t h a t  B r i t i s h  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  were about to  purchase  a la rge number of  computer systems23. 
The major UK u n i v e r s i t i e s  were in t h e  process  of  rep lac ing  th e  f i r s t  
genera t ion  F e r r a n t i  machines, t h a t  were then common, with new second
22NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  'Commercial p rospects  f o r  E n g l i sh -E lec t r ic -M arco n i ' ,  
undated i n t e r n a l  NRDC re p o r t  prepared in 1965.
23CBI Archive ,  United S t a t e s  O ff ice  of Naval Research,  London, 'The 
B r i t i s h  Computer Scene; P a r t  I I ,  The B r i t i s h  Computer I n d u s t r y ' ,  1967.
140
g enera t ion  systems.
However, the  u n i v e r s i t y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  tended to  be f a i r l y  bare .  
Limited funds meant t h a t  they purchased the  c e n t r a l  p rocessor  u n i t  but with 
only l im i ted  memory and p e r ip h e ra l  op t ions .  The u n i v e r s i t i e s  were hoping 
to  add e x t r a  f a c i l i t i e s  as funds became a v a i l a b l e 24. With such a chunk 
of the  KDF9's users  only wanting l im i ted  op t ions ,  EE seems to  have given 
a low p r i o r i t y  t o  p e r ip h e ra l s  f o r  the  machine. Eventua lly  EE d id  provide 
CDC d i s c  packs f o r  the  system to  add t o  i t s  own tape  d r iv e s ,  manufactured 
under l i c ence  from RCA25. Despite  t h i s  the  ONR c h a r a c t e r i s e d  EE as being 
weak in p e r i p h e r a l s .  EE a lso  only o f f e r e d  l im i ted  software  suppor t ,  hoping 
th a t  the  advanced users  t h a t  bought the machine could do t h e i r  own 
programming, a t a c t i c  a l so  adopted by DEC and CDC26. The only language 
provided by EE, ALGOL, was very i n e f f i c i e n t 27.
The NRDC saw the  KDF9 as a flawed machine when i t  was f i r s t  
in troduced28, though i t  d id  see i t  as a useful a d d i t io n  to  the  UK's s tock 
of s c i e n t i f i c  systems, with the  p o t e n t i a l  of being improved on over t ime. 
I t  so ld  about 30 u n i t s  in the  5 yea r s  of  product ion .  Aerospace proved to  
be a second good source of s a l e s :
Table 4 .2  KDF9 Sales :
User Number
U n iv e r s i t i e s  7
Aerospace 5
Govt Lab. 3
In te rn a l  use 2
ICI 1
Other customers unknown.
Source: Computer Consultants  Ltd, B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t .  1965.
EE was a l so  producing small computers to  r i v a l  E l l i o t t s  and F e r r an t i  
in the  a rea  o f  process  con t ro l  computer systems. The KDN2/KDF7 sold  f o r  
about £20,00029. However, most of  the  value of such a system was in the
24Ib id .
25NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  'Commercial prospects  f o r  EELM'.
26See below, chap te r  8,  pp350-353.
27CBI Archive ,  ONR, 'The B r i t i s h  computer scene; p a r t  IV, the  
u n i v e r s i t i e s ' ,  1967.
28NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  'Commercial p rospects  fo r  EELM'.
29ib id .
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area of  system in t e g r a t io n  and p l a n t  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  so how much EE earned 
from such a computer i s  not r e a l l y  known. By 1965 12 had been i n s t a l l e d :
Table 4 .3  KDN2/KDF7 S a le s .
S tee l  producers  8
E l e c t r i c a l  u t i l i t i e s  4
Source: Computer Consultan ts  Ltd, B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t .  1965.
The s t e e l  producers us ing th e  KDF7 ( the  l a t e r  name f o r  the  machine) 
included the  Czechoslovakian s t a t e  producer,  which purchased a la rge  
package of  computers from EE in the  mid-1960s,  inc luding  two la rge  EE/LEO 
machines30 .
The expansion into the commercial market.
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  second genera t ion  computer produced by EE was 
the  KDP10/KDF8. This machine showed th e  te ch n ica l  and commercial d i r e c t i o n  
t h a t  EE planned to  go. The crux of  Engl ish E l e c t r i c ' s  plan to  develop i t s  
s take  in the  computer market was to  u t i l i s e  Marconi ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i c e n s in g  
and t e ch n o lo g ica l  l inks  with RCA. EE made the  dec is ion  to  broaden i t s  
coverage of the  computer market by adopting th e  RCA 501 data  process ing  
computer and s e l l i n g  i t  t o  th e  o f f i c e  based commercial da ta  process ing  
market. I t  took t h i s  design and 'A n g l i c i s e d '  i t 31 . The 501 computer was 
one of  th e  e a r l i e s t  US second gene ra t ion  da ta  process ing  machines32 and 
was so ld  from th e  l a t e  1950s to  th e  e a r ly  1960s; in t o t a l  about 99 were 
i n s t a l l e d .  The EE KDP10/KDF8 was a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n s t a l l a t i o n  from 1961 to  
1965 but only 13 were so ld  a t  an average p r i c e  of  £400,00033. I t  was 
t h e r e f o r e  somewhat behind th e  s a l e s  period of  th e  RCA 501, not only a 
func t ion  o f  i t  f i r s t  being designed by RCA and then t r a n s f e r r e d  to  EE, but 
a lso  because of th e  redes ign  work done by EE, a mistake the  company would 
make aga in .
The customers f o r  the  KDP10/KDF8 are  not completely known, the  
following r e p re se n t s  9 of th e  13:
3°CBI Archive ,  ONR, 'The B r i t i s h  computer scenes;  p a r t  I I ,  The B r i t i s h  
computer i n d u s t r y ' .
31NRDC 86/35 /5 ,  'Commercial p rospec ts  f o r  EELM'.
32See below, chapter  6, pp210-213.
33Computer Consultan ts  Ltd,  B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t . 1965.
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Table 4.4 KDP1Q/KDF8 Sales.
Customer Type Number
Banks and o th e r  f in a n c i a l  i n s t .  6
Other commercial 2
In te rn a l  use 1
Source: Computer Consultants  Ltd,  B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t .  1965.
At t h i s  t ime EE was a l so  s e l l i n g  the sm al le r  KDF6. This so ld  f o r  
£60,000, and appears  to  have been so ld  to both commercial and i n d u s t r i a l  
u se r s ,  12 being so ld .  Unfor tunate ly  l i t t l e  i s  known of t h i s  machine, though 
i t  may have been r e l a t e d  to  th e  KDP10/KDF8.
EE a l so  used i t s  t e ch n ica l  l in k s  with RCA to  get  hold of pe r ip h e ra l  
equipment,  b u i ld in g  such th in g s  as RCA tape d r i v e s .  However, l i k e  RCA i t  
had to  look elsewhere fo r  c e r t a i n  o th e r  dev ices ,  f o r  example buying d i s c s  
d r ives  from CDC34, though EE probably would have bought d i s c s  from RCA 
i f  they had been a v a i l a b le .  The re fo re ,  to some degree,  EE did not s u f f e r  
from a common weakness of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies by shunning equipment 
not b u i l t  by i t s e l f ,  a weakness po in ted  out by the  manager of F e r r a n t i ' s  
Computer Department when he jo ined  Burroughs35. This was a l so  noted by 
the NRDC36. However, i t  a l so  noted th a t  EE planned to  produce more 
equipment in-house as the  computer opera t ion  grew37.
Acquiring more commercial sk i l l s  and real-time computer techniques.
An i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with RCA was t h a t  no le s s  
than one year  a f t e r  the  KDP10/KDF8 was f i r s t  i n s t a l l e d ,  ICT was i n s t a l l i n g  
a l a t e r  RCA machine, the  ICT1500/RCA301. During t h i s  per iod  th e re  were some 
vague d i s cu s s io n s  about the  t h r e e  f i rms  working to g e th e r  on a new system, 
but nothing came of i t 38 . EE was not taking up opt ions  on the  newer RCA 
machines because i t  was a l r ead y  f u l l y  occupied with  the  var ious  KDF ranges .  
A second f a c t o r  was t h a t  EE had secured a second rou te  in to  commercial 
computing by acqu i r ing  LEO Computers.
34NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  'Commercial p rospects  f o r  EELM'.
35Brian P o l l a r d ,  'A comparison of  computer i n d u s t r i e s  in the  U.S. and 
the  U .K . ' ,  Datamation. May/June 1960, pp51-52.
36NRDC 86/35 /5 ,  'Commercial prospects  f o r  EELM'.
37Ib id .
3aCBI o ra l  h i s to r y  c o l l e c t i o n ,  in te rv iew with Colonel A.T. Maxwell, 
ICT chairman, c a r r i e d  out by A.L.C. Humphreys, former managing d i r e c t o r  and 
deputy chairman of  ICL, 9 /1 /80 .
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By 1963 EE was having to  cope with some of  the  problems t h a t  fo rced 
i t  to  r e - o r i e n t a t e  i t s  s t r u c t u r e .  Compared to  a number of  i t s  i n t e r n a t io n a l  
com pet i to rs ,  i t s  performance looked d i s t i n c t l y  weak. Lord Nelson noted t h a t  
t h e  very high R&D and c a p i t a l  o u t lay s  involved in th e  computer indus t ry  
made c o n so l id a t io n  a n a tu ra l  course  o f  a c t i o n 39. This was very much in 
l i n e  with what was happening in the  r e s t  of the  UK in d u s t ry ,  with ICT 
acqu i r ing  EMI and F e r r a n t i ,  and abroad, with Ph i lco  leaving  the  in d u s t ry ,  
Bendix 's  computer opera t ion  being so ld  to CDC, and GE absorbing Bull of 
France.  However, while ICT was a c t i v e l y  looking to  acqu ire  t e ch n ica l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  s k i l l s  from the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, EE was going in the  
oppos i te  d i r e c t i o n .  EE had a sound base in e l e c t r o n i c  technology, what i t  
wanted was g r e a t e r  access to  the  s k i l l s  needed to  market computer systems 
in the  commercial environment.
Unfor tuna te ly  the  t r a i n  of dec is ion  making w i th in  EE is  not known, 
but from what i s  seen in o th e r  case  s tud ies  i t  seems reasonable  to  
specu la te  about the  reasons f o r  i t s  expansion in to  the  commercial 
environment. The separa te  a r t s  of s c i e n t i f i c  and bus iness  computing had 
r a p id ly  merged during the  second genera t ion  of computing. S c i e n t i f i c  t a sk s  
requ i red  b e t t e r  inpu t -ou tpu t  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  such th ings  as s t a t i s t i c a l  
work, while improved p e r ip h e r a l s  meant t h a t  th e  commercial user  could 
b e n e f i t  from g r e a t e r  p rocessor  speed. With the  s c i e n t i f i c  and commercial 
markets f o r  mainframe computers r a p i d l y  coming to g e th e r ,  EE needed g r e a t e r  
exposure to  s e l l  f u tu r e  machines in to  both markets .  I t  needed to  do t h i s  
so i t  could ge t  th e  l a r g e s t  p o s s ib le  r e tu rn  from i t s  R&D investment,  and 
ensure t h a t  i t  could achieve high enough sca le  economies t o  compete with 
o ther  general  purpose computer producers .
EE t r i e d  to  achieve t h i s  g r e a t e r  coverage by forming a j o i n t  computer 
opera t ion  with th e  LEO s u b s id ia ry  of J.Lyons Ltd. In 1963 EE and Lyons 
formed Engl ish Electric-LEO Computer Ltd40. A year  l a t e r  Lyons so ld  i t s  
shares in the  bus iness  to  EE and EE thus acquired one o f  the  UK's most 
p rog ress ive ,  and commercially o r i e n t a t e d ,  computer o p e ra t io n s .
An e x c e l l e n t  shor t  h i s t o r y  o f  Leo a lready  e x i s t s 41, so only  a b r i e f  
o u t l in e  of i t  w i l l  be given here .  Lyons had prided i t s e l f  on having one of 
the  most advanced o f f i c e  systems, organised by mathematic ians from
39Lord Nelson, 'The o rg a n i s a t i o n  and development of EE'.
4° I b id .
41J . 'H e n d ry ,  "The tea-room computer manufacturer:  J .  Lyons, LEO and 
the p o t e n t i a l  and l im i t s  of  h igh - tech  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n " ,  Business  His to ry  
29 (1987) pp 73-102.
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Cambridge who worked on e a r ly  o p e ra t io n a l  re sea rch  techniques .  In the  l a t e  
1940s and e a r l y  1950s i t  was decided t o  f u r t h e r  improve i t s  systems by 
developing th e  LEO I computer,  based on Maurice Wilkes '  Cambridge EDSAC 
p r o j e c t .  The LEO I was used f o r  a number of r o l e s  in Lyons, but was a l so  
used to  o f f e r  s e rv ice s  to  o th e r  f i r m s ,  doing such th ings  as F o rd 's  Dagenham 
p a y r o l l .  In 1954 Lyons s t a r t e d  to  market the LEO II  and s e t  up a s u b s id ia ry  
to  produce i t .  From 1957 to  1961, 11 of  these  f i r s t  genera t ion  systems were 
d e l iv e r e d ,  a t  an average p r i c e  o f  £95,00042.
In the  e a r l y  1960s, the  LEO I I I  was announced, LEO's second 
genera t ion  system. However, computer systems were becoming in c re a s in g ly  
expensive to  develop, and were being produced in ever l a r g e r  numbers. I t  
appears t h a t  Lyons decided t h a t  i t s  small o pe ra t ion  was not la rg e  enough 
to  j u s t i f y  the  expense of developing a t h i r d  genera t ion  family .  In 1965 the  
NRDC b e l ie v ed  t h a t  EE's computer d i v i s i o n  and LEO had each been ope ra t ing  
on a f i n a n c i a l  s h o e - s t r in g :  development cos ts  were very high compared to  
tu rnover  in both companies'*3 . I t  was hoped t h a t  combining the  computer 
i n t e r e s t s  of  th e  two fi rms in to  one range of  machines fo r  the  t h i r d  
genera t ion  of  computers would reduce t h i s  problem.
The LEO I I I  and i t s  upgrades,  t h e  326 and the  360, sold  reasonab ly  
well f o r  EE. from 1962 to  1967 43 of  the  systems were so ld  a t  an average 
p r ice  o f  £200,000.
A f te r  th e  takeover  of LEO, i t  was decided t h a t  Marconi 's  r e a l - t im e  
computer a c t i v i t i e s  should be merged in to  the  EEL opera t ion  to  form English 
Electric-Leo-Marconi Computers. The main Marconi computer product was the  
Myriad computer. Marconi ' s  computer a c t i v i t i e s  s t a r t e d  with a c o n t r a c t  to  
design and produce an a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l / a i r  defence environment f o r  
Sweden, c a l l e d  Fur Hat41*. Marconi had developed the  T r a n s i s to r i s e d  
Automatic Computer, TAC (meaning ' thank  you'  in Swedish),  to  c o n t ro l  the  
system. This was followed by the  Myriad computer, which Marconi claimed was 
the w o r ld ' s  f i r s t  t h i r d  g enera t ion  system. Myriad was so ld  widely f o r  
process ing r a d a r  in format ion and communication swi tch ing45.
Marconi ' s  i n t e g ra te d  c i r c u i t  c a p a b i l i t y  was based on a l ic ence  to
42Computer Consultan ts  Ltd, B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t . 1965.
43NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  'Commercial p rospects  f o r  EELM'. This r e p o r t  was 
compiled as a p a r t  of an NRDC survey of  the  UK computer in d u s t ry .
44Marconi Archive ,  S i r  Robert T raf fo rd ,  'From Wireless to  Chips-All
in a L i f e t i m e ' ,  The Third Mountbatten Lecture 16/10/80. T ra f fo rd  was in 
charge of Marconi ' s  computer a c t i v i t i e s ,  and subsequently  GEC Computers 
Ltd.
4Slb id
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produce the  F e r r an t i  Micro!in and Micronor c h ip s 46. The a b i l i t y  to  
produce t h i r d  genera t ion  components proved an impor tant f e a tu r e  of  EELM's 
b id  to  become a major p layer  in the  r a p id ly  growing indus t ry .  The Myriad 
used F e r r a n t i ' s  Microlin ch ip s ,  a kind of  m u l t i - ch ip  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  which was 
l a t e r  superseded by higher d e n s i t y  F e r r an t i  c h ip s ,  the  Micronor I and I I  
c i r c u i t s ,  the  l a t t e r  i t s e l f  based on RCA technology47.
The f i n a l  add i t ion  to  EE's computer o pe ra t ions  was the  computer 
a c t i v i t i e s  of  E l l i o t t  Automation,  a f i r m  taken-over  by EE in 1967. A f te r  
t h i s  the  d iv i s io n  became known as English E l e c t r i c  Computers (EEC). 
E l l i o t t s  had p a r t i c u l a r  s t r e n g th s  in m i l i t a r y ,  con t ro l  and small s ca le  
s c i e n t i f i c  computers.  However, with th e  o ther developments wi th in  EEC, and 
l a t e r  ICL, in th e  area  of genera l  purpose machines, E l l i o t t s '  main machine, 
the  4100, was not f u r t h e r  developed and production ended in 19704S.
The purchase of E l l i o t t s  gave EE a much s t ro n g e r  presence in the  
f i e l d  of  process  and m i l i t a r y  con t ro l  computers, expanding the  share  given 
i t  by the  KDN2. E l l i o t t s  had over 200 i n s t a l l a t i o n s  in process c o n t r o l ,  
with i t s  leading  product being th e  ARCH system49. This gave EE an 
es timated  50% share  of  the  UK market.  A dd i t iona l ly  E l l i o t t  and Marconi 
systems gave EE an e s t im ated  80% of  the  UK ded ica ted  m i l i t a r y  computer 
market60 . In both markets F e r r a n t i  was the main r i v a l ,  and indeed i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  see t h a t  EE could have had 80% of th e  m i l i t a r y  market f o r  long 
in the  face  of  the  range of m i l i t a r y  computers made by F e r r an t i  and o th e r  
producers .
These con t ro l  and m i l i t a r y  a s s e t s  of EE, Marconi and E l l i o t t s ,  
remained with  EE a f t e r  i t  merged th e  computer d iv i s io n  with ICT, and 
e v en tu a l ly  became GEC Computers.
46E. Sc ibberas ,  M ul t ina t iona l  e l e c t r o n i c  companies and n a t io n a l  
economic p o l i c y . Greenwich, Conn., 1977; and E. Leyton, Ten Innovations  
Chapter 7.
47Ib id .
4aM. Campbell-Kelly,  ICL: a bus iness  and t e ch n ica l  h i s t o r y . Oxford,  
1989, p269.
49I n t e r n a t io n a l  Data Corpora tion EDP Europa Report 21/11/69,  p3.
s o Ib i d .
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Attempt to become a major systems supplier: the third generation System 4.
In 1965 EELM informed th e  Treasury  Support Unit t h a t  i t  in tended to  
compete head on with IBM and ICT51. EELM was given a high s t a t u s  with in  
th e  company. I t  became one of  th e  e leven t r a d in g  groups w i th in  the  new 
company s t r u c t u r e 52. With t h i s  h ighe r  s t a t i o n  in the  company, EELM was 
expected to  grow to  become a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  the  company, and la rge  
enough to  su rv ive  in the  compet i t ive  computer in d u s t ry .  To do t h i s  i t  took 
r a d i c a l  s t e p s  t o  produce a range of  machines which could e x p l o i t  LEO's 
commercial connec t ions ,  EE's s c i e n t i f i c  market,  Marconi 's  i n t e g ra te d  
c i r c u i t  technology, and the  l in k  to  RCA.
In the  mid-1960s i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  the second genera t ion  of computers 
needed to  be rep laced .  IBM was making g rea t  s t r i d e s  with th e  announcement 
of the  360 family  of compatible computers,  o f f e r in g  a completely  in t e g ra te d  
range of  machines with massive support  and marketing o rg a n i s a t i o n s  and the  
b e s t  p e r ip h e ra l  c o l l e c t i o n  on the  market.
EELM took advantage of th e  f a c t  t h a t  ICT was not i n t e r e s t e d  in making 
use of RCA's 360 r i v a l ,  the  RCA SPECTRA 70. EELM dropped p lans  t o  produce 
i t s  own system and decided to  l i c e n ce  the  RCA system. RCA had adopted a 
s t r a t e g y  of t r y i n g  to  be the  second source fo r  IBM equipment.  The Spectra  
s e r i e s  was made program-compatible with the  IBM 360, though i t  was 
a r c h i t e c t u r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t .  I n i t i a l l y  th e  Spectra  70 s e r i e s  c o n s i s te d  of 
four  machines,  p i tched  between members of the  IBM fam i ly .  One of  the  
advantages of RCA being an IBM fo l low er  was t h a t  i t  could  o f f e r  the  
com pet i t ive  advantage of us ing t h i r d  genera t ion  components, i n t e g ra te d  
c i r c u i t s  ( IC s ) .  IBM had to  use a hybr id  technology as ICs were not r e a d i l y  
a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h e  t ime th e  360 was developed53. I t  was more important 
w i th in  IBM to  have the  product r e l e a s e d  a t  the  r i g h t  t ime and t o  capture  
the  market f i r s t ;  the  f i n e s s e  of th e  component used was not  so important.  
At RCA th e  two l a r g e s t  Spec tra  machines used ICs whi le  the  two sm al le r  ones 
used t r a n s i s t o r s ,  as found in second genera t ion  machines54 .
In 1965 EELM announced i t s  t h i r d  genera t ion  machines, the  System 4
51NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  'Commercial p rospec ts  f o r  EELM'. The TSU was the  
Treasury committee in charge o f  government purchasing and genera l  computer 
m a t te rs .
52Marconi a rc h iv e ,  Lord Nelson, r e o r g a n i s a t io n  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  1965.
53See below, chap ter  8, pp320-325
54See below, chap ter  6, pp230-233.
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fam i ly 55, the  members being the  4 /10 ,  4/30,  4/50 and 4/70. The b a s ic  4/10 
c o s t  $185,000, th e  4/70 could be configured to  c o s t  over $2 ,800,00056. 
As a t  RCA, the  l a r g e s t  p a i r  of machines used monol i th ic  chips to  make them 
complete t h i r d  genera t ion  systems. However, un l ike  RCA machines,  the  
sm al le r  members of  the  family  used th e  same m u l t i - ch ip  i n t e g r a t i o n  as the  
Marconi Myriad used57. Marconi was put in charge of developing the  two 
smal ler  systems58 . There was a l so  a 4/75 which was a t im e-sha r ing  system 
sponsored by MinTech and developed a t  Edinburgh U n iv e rs i ty 59. The 4/75 
was meant to  allow up to  200 use r s  to  access the  computer a t  the  same time. 
This c a l l e d  f o r  d e l iv e ry  of  a p ro to type  4/70 to  the  U n iv e rs i ty  in Ju ly  
1968, conversion to  the  4/75 by October 1968 and acceptance f o r  use in 
December 1968. I t  was s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  EELM bea t  ICT and IBM f o r  t h i s  
c o n t r a c t ,  showing i t s  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g th  in r e a l  t ime systems.
N ei ther  ICT's 1900 nor IBM's 360 s e r i e s  would adopt such advanced 
components. They used simple r components so they could ge t  t h e i r  t h i r d  
genera t ion  f a m i l i e s  quick ly  in to  th e  market.  RCA and EELM seemed to  be 
t ry in g  to  achieve compet it ive  advantage by the  beauty of t h e i r  technology.
There were a number o f  d isadvantages  with such a p o l i c y .  EE was 
undertaking a major reworking of th e  RCA Spectra 70 system, as i t  had with 
the  RCA501-KDP10/KDF8. However, t h i s  meant EE was lagging behind not only 
IBM but a l so  RCA in the  production of  t h i r d  genera t ion  computers.  RCA's 
s t r a t e g y  meant t h a t  i t  i n e v i t a b ly  lagged behind IBM in the  in t r o d u c t io n  of 
new techno log ies  as i t  had to  wai t  t o  copy IBM pro toco ls  when they  were 
published . The dec is ion  to  use t r a n s i s t o r s  f o r  th e  logic  of  t h e  smal le r  
members of  the  Spectra  70 s e r i e s  was an at tempt to  m i t ig a te  t h i s  problem; 
using second genera t ion  components meant the  smal ler  machines could be 
produced qu ick ly ,  and a t  a lower c o s t .  EELM had opted to  fo l low RCA, 
another  s tep  removed from the  o r i g i n a t o r s  of the  concept,  IBM. Not only did 
i t  fo llow RCA, but i t  decided to  red es ig n  the system, another  ex tens ion  to  
the  t ime per iod  needed to  ge t  th e  System 4 in to  the  f i e l d .  I t  a l s o  meant 
t h a t  th e  System 4 was being re le a s e d  comparatively c lo se  to  the  
announcement of the  next fam ily  o f  IBM systems, the  370s. There fore  EELM
55CBI Archive,  ONR, 'The B r i t i s h  computer scene,  p a r t  I I ' .
56Ib id .
57Ib id .
58Marconi Archive,  The Marconi Company. January 1967. A pamphlet 
in troducing the  workings of th e  Marconi company.
59CBI Archive,  ONR, 'The B r i t i s h  computer scene,  p a r t  I I ' .
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could only  expect to  mainta in  i t s  one advantage - more advanced components 
- f o r  a very sh o r t  t ime.
Another problem with t h i s  s t r a t e g y  was t h a t  i t  was p u t t i n g  EELM in to  
d i r e c t  compet it ion  with IBM, even more d i r e c t l y  than ICT. ICT, with i t s  
1900 family  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n s t a l l a t i o n  from 1964, locked customers in to  i t s  
unique a r c h i t e c t u r e .  To change from an ICT to  an IBM system was r e l a t i v e l y  
expensive and d i s r u p t iv e  because of th e  change in sof tware  re q u i re d .  EELM's 
System 4 and IBM's 360 s e r i e s  were r e l a t i v e l y  easy f o r  customers to  swap 
between, and pr icerperformance comparisons were easy to  make. RCA intended 
to  t a c k l e  the  market by o f f e r i n g  machines s e t ,  on average,  15% above IBM's 
machines in terms of performance,  but s e t  a t  a p r i c e  of  15% below IBM. RCA 
wanted to  ach ieve t h i s  by using more in teg ra ted  components to  reduce the  
cos t  of  bu i ld ing  machines,  and presumably by foregoing  some of the  very 
high p r o f i t  margin t h a t  IBM was ope ra t ing  wi ths o . To achieve  t h i s  goa l ,  
RCA was working in the  very la rge  US indus t ry  and i t  was a l so  g e t t i n g  some 
income from l i c e n s in g  i t s  systems abroad, to  EELM, Siemens and H i tach i61 . 
EELM had a much smal ler  market in which to achieve  the  sca le  economies 
needed to  match t h i s  p lan .
A f u r t h e r  problem was t h a t  ICs were comparatively  expensive in the  
1960s, the  second reason f o r  RCA us ing  o lder  technology in i t s  smal ler  
Spectra  computers. However, EELM was t ry in g  to  use the  components t h a t  
Marconi had used to  produce th e  Myriad, a system t h a t  had only been used 
in a few government c o n t r a c t s .  Adopting the  same technology f o r  small 
commercial systems proved expensive and the  sm a l le s t  computer in th e  range,  
the  4 /10,  was never d e l iv e red  due to  i t s  im prac t ica l  c o s t s .
P o t e n t i a l l y  the  main c o s t  advantage of copying RCA's s t r a t e g y  was in 
not doing i t s  own design work. Yet EE did not e x p l o i t  t h i s  saving as i t  
redesigned the  RCA system so much. RCA never managed to  make a p r o f i t  from 
i t s  po l icy  of  bu i ld ing  IBM-compatible machines t h a t  were more powerful y e t  
cheaper than IBM's own machines. In th e  l im i ted  UK market EE had l i t t l e  
chance.
EELM announced the  System 4 some twelve months l a t e r  than ICT 
announced i t s  1900 s e r i e s .  The d e l iv e r y  times were to  be even longer:  ICT 
d e l ive red  the  1905 in January  1965, but the  f i r s t  System 4 was not
6°See below, chapter  6, pp230-239.
61US v IBM, px 2482; IBM 'World Trade Corpora tion: Competit ive 
Manufacturer New S a le s ,  Ren ta ls  I n s t a l l e d ' ,  Sept 1969. This was a summary 
paper showing th e  main compet it ion to  IBM's overseas  o pe ra t ion .
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d e l iv e re d  u n t i l  March 1967s 2 . While EELM redesigned RCA machines, ICT 
simply produced a range based on e x i s t i n g  F e r r an t i  technology63 . At EE 
d e l iv e r y  da tes  became longer and c o s t s  rose .  By 1967 only 60 systems were 
on o rd e r ,  and as the  problems inc reased  a number of  these  were l o s t .
Leaving computers: the  merger with ICT.
In 1966 only 2 KDF9's, 8 Myriads and 6 LEO machines were d e l iv e re d ,  
the  o th e r  EELM systems were o b s o le t e ,  while the  f i r s t  ten System 4 ' s  were 
not d e l iv e r e d  u n t i l  1967. I t  i s  o f  some i n t e r e s t ,  indeed s u r p r i s e ,  t h a t ,  
even as l a t e  as September 1969, IBM r a t e d  no System 4 machine in i t s  top 
10 of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  compet it ion ,  and s u r p r i s i n g l y  the  LEO 326 was the  only 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from the  English E l e c t r i c  Computers (EEC) h a l f  of  ICL to  be 
ra t e d  in the  top ten  compet it ive  machines.  This was due to  th e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  
of a la rg e  number of LEO 326 's  by th e  General Post  O ff ice .  The following 
t a b l e  l i s t s  the  computers t h a t  IBM's World Trade Corporation r a t e d  in the 
top ten  o u ts id e  the  USA:
Table 4 .5
Manufacturer and system 1st  Half  1969 rank 1968 rank
RCA 70/45 1 2
RCA 70/35 2 7
Univac 1109 3 1
ICL LEO 326 4 0
ICL 1902 5 0
GE 115 6 3
CDC 6500 7 0
Univac 9300 8 4
ICL 1901 9 8
Burroughs 3500 10 6
Source: US vs IBM. px2482, IBM World Trade Corpora tion: 'Compet it ive  
Manufacturer New S a le s ,  Rentals  I n s t a l l e d ' ,  Sept 1969.
ICL was th e  leading i n t e r n a t i o n a l  compet itor,  but th e  System 4 was 
not leading t h i s  e f f o r t .  Yet s a l e s  of  t h e  RCA 70/45 and 70/35, by Siemens, 
H i tach i ,  and RCA in Canada, had made them the  b ig g es t  in d iv id u a l  system 
compet itors  in t h i s  l i s t .  Overall  WTC ra ted  the  1900 s e r i e s  as the  most 
compet it ive  f u l l  range64 . System 4 had not met the  cha l lenge  of the  
market,  e s p e c i a l l y  compared to  o th e r  l icensees  of  RCA technology. Sales
62I n t e r n a t io n a l  Data Corpora t ion ,  EDP Europa Repor t . 21/11/69, plO.
63See below, chap te r  5, p p l7 5 -180.
64US V IBM. IBM 'Compet it ive  manufacturer s a l e s ' ,  September 1969.
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were poor compared to  the  ICT 1900. A year  a f t e r  the  merger of English 
E l e c t r i c  Computers and ICT, th e  machines from th e  EEC p a r t  of ICL 
rep re sen ted  only a small p ropor t ion  of  ICL's i n s t a l l e d  base and n e g l ig ib l e  
numbers of  new orde rs :
Table 4.6 Installation Census July 1969.
First Installations
Installed. by July 1969 On Order
ICT Systems
1900 Series 1/65 1033 1
1900A/E/F Series 9/67 116 473
EEC Systems.
System 4 3/67 111 20
Source: International Data Corporation, EDP Europa Report. 21/11/69, p8-ll.
These f i g u r e s  show j u s t  how success fu l  was ICT's p o l ic y  of  g e t t i n g  a family  
of machines t h a t  a t  l e a s t  looked l i k e  a t h i r d  genera t ion  system in to  the  
market r a p i d l y .  As time went by the  1900 s e r i e s  was upgraded. The 1900A 
S e r ie s  used IC components and the  l a t e r  S s e r i e s  used monol i th ic  c h ip s .  The 
System 4 was marg ina l ised  in to  a system sold  only to  l a rge  users  who 
e s p e c i a l l y  wanted IBM c o m p a t ib i l i t y  and good r e a l - t im e  c a p a b i l i t i e s .
ICT and EEC had a number of  f a l s e  s t a r t s  in t r y i n g  to  coopera te .  
These included t r i - l a t e r a l  d i s cu s s io n s  in the  e a r l y  1960s between RCA, ICT 
and EELM to  produce a new l i n e  of  small  systems, which came to  no th ing65, 
and a b r i e f  plan  f o r  a j o i n t  EELM-ICT-CITEC66 super-computer67. This 
l a t t e r  plan  was akin  to  the  Concorde p r o j e c t  and was aimed a t  underpinning 
B r i t i s h  and French computer technology,  bu t ,  given th e  d i f f i c u l t y  of 
developing super-computers,  the  Government did not support  i t .  However, a 
l a t e r  ICT proposal f o r  a super-computer,  c a l l e d  the  1908, d id  a t t r a c t
65CBI o ra l  h i s to r y  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Colonel A.T. Maxwell, in te rv iewed by 
A.L.C. Humphreys.
66CITEC was a s t a t e  supported French computer company.
67NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  ICT and EELM: 'Large computer p r o j e c t :  p r e s e n ta t i o n  
to  the  Government ',  September 1965.
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government suppor t ;  but i t  was never  b u i l t 68.
The f i r s t  major move towards merger was taken in 1965. At t h i s  t ime 
ICT was in the  depths of a f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  caused by the  launch of  the
1900 s e r i e s 69 . Cash flow and p r o f i t s  were in a c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  not
only due to  development and marketing c o s t s ,  bu t  a l so  because of the
success  of the  1900 s e r i e s .  The c o s t  o f  p lacing la rge  numbers o f  systems 
in to  l e ase  arrangements was very high. Frank Cousin 's  M in is t ry  of
Technology be l ieved  th a t  ICT should merge with EE, with e f f e c t i v e  con tro l  
going t o  EELM, which was e l a t e d  with  th e  announcement of  the  System 47° .  
Cecil  Mead, ICT's chairman, and Arthur Humphreys', ICT's managing d i r e c t o r ,  
were t o l d  by a government o f f i c i a l  t h a t :
' . . . t h e  Government has made up i t s  mind t h a t  ICT should be 
merged and should be a p a r t  o f  English E l e c t r i c ,  because the
Government f e e l s  t h a t  Engl ish  E l e c t r i c  management is  f a r  
s u p e r i o r . ' 71
This was not acceptable  to  ICT, which recognised  i t s  s t r o n g e r  long 
term p o s i t i o n  and the  p o t e n t i a l  weakness of EELM's s t r a t e g y .  I t  a l s o  showed 
a lack of  unders tanding in the  MinTech. While i t  may have been p o s s ib le  to  
argue t h a t  a merger of EE, ICT and E l l i o t t s  might produce a s in g l e  B r i t i s h  
f irm which could achieve economies of s ca le  in the  l im i ted  B r i t i s h  market, 
i t  i s  obvious t h a t  MinTech had l i t t l e  concept of  the  long term 
repe rcuss ions  of  introducing  new computer ranges .  I t  was obvious ,  t h a t ,  a t  
l e a s t  on a product and marketing b a s i s ,  ICT was th e  leading UK company, not 
English E l e c t r i c .  I t  seems t h a t  the  government was making a d e c i s io n  based 
on s h o r t e r  term c r i t e r i a  than even th e  c a p i t a l  markets were making: i t  saw 
the  cash flow problems a t  ICT and judged i t  to  have f a i l e d ,  while EE, which 
had not y e t  even begun to  b u i ld  System 4 machines,  was considered  
s u c c e s s f u l .
By 1966 ICT had recovered,  with  the 1900 being d e l iv e red  in la rge  
numbers. MinTech s t i l l  supported merger,  but now with ICT as th e  leading 
p a r tn e r ,  though th e re  was concern t h a t  the two companies '  s t r a t e g i e s  were 
incompat ible72 .
68Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p p .248-249.
69See below, chapter 5, p p l80 -190.
7°Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p p .255-257.
71CBI o ra l  h i s to r y  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Arthur L.C. Humphreys in te rv iew .
72 lb id .
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In 1967 the  mood changed, mainly because Engl ish E l e c t r i c  Computers'  
s t r a t e g y  was becoming a s i g n i f i c a n t  burden on th e  pa ren t  c o rp o ra t io n .  EE 
was p os t ing  poor r e s u l t s  in th e  mid and l a t e  1960s. The company had done 
well in th e  e a r l y  1950s due to  l a rg e  demand f o r  heavy e l e c t r i c a l  p roduc ts .  
Lord Nelson c h a r a c te r i s e d  i t  as a per iod  when t h e r e  was no shor tage  of 
o rd e r s ,  only l im i ted  c ap a c i ty  t o  f u l f i l  them73. However, by the  l a t e  
1950s and e a r l y  1960s, the  heavy end of  the in d u s t ry  had slowed down. At 
the  same time,  EE's major investments  in new f i e l d s ,  ae rospace ,  nuc lea r  
power, and computers,  had not shown through in p r o f i t s .
Lord Nelson 's  put t h e se  p o in t s  forward when exp la in ing  the  major 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of the company in th e  mid-1960s. F igures  4.1 and 4 .2 ,  show 
EE's growth in th e  1950s and 1960s. However, f i g u r e  4 .3  shows t h a t  in the  
key r a t i o  of p r o f i t  to  funds employed, EE lagged a l l  i t s  r i v a l s  bar AEI, 
and was f a r  from achieving i t s  t a r g e t  of  17.5% r e t u r n  on funds employed:
73Lord Nelson, 'O rgan isa t ion  and development of  EE'.
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I n t e r e s t i n g l y  both GE and RCA made s im i l a r  c a l c u l a t i o n s  be fo re  they 
abandoned the  expensive computer market.  Both were concerned t h a t  t h e i r  
p r o f i t  to  c a p i t a l  r a t i o  was too  low to  a t t r a c t  th e  c a p i t a l  needed to  fund 
a l l  t h e i r  o p e ra t io n s74. During th e  mid-1960s EE abandoned the  expensive 
and r i s k y  f i e l d  o f  aerospace .  However, t h i s  d id  not g r e a t l y  improve EE's 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  and f u r t h e r  a c t i o n  was needed.
Meanwhile ICT was s t a r t i n g  to  accept t h a t ,  i f  i t  wanted t o  r ece ive  
g r e a t e r  government support ,  i t  would have to  go along with th e  merger.  I t  
might not have be l ieved  t h a t  EE was in a s t rong  p o s i t i o n ,  but i t  had to  
take over i t s  computer opera t ion  i f  i t  wanted f u r t h e r  s u b s id ie s .
In 1967 th e  two companies formed a j o i n t  committee to  plan a s in g le  
successor  to  th e  1900 and System 4. The hope was t o  produce a machine which 
both s e t s  of use rs  could upgrade t o .  The i n i t i a t i v e  f o r  t h i s  committee came 
from MinTech, now under the  co n t ro l  o f  Tony Benn75. Eventually  i t  tu rned 
out no such j o i n t  machine was p o s s i b l e .  The only  arrangement t h a t  i t  was 
p oss ib le  to  provide was some sof tware  to  a id  conversion from System 4 to  
ICT 1900 systems.
I t  was apparen t t h a t  merger was i n e v i t a b l e .  There was a c l e a r  
m utua l i ty  of i n t e r e s t s :  ICT wanted Government suppor t  f o r  a replacement of 
the  1900 s e r i e s ,  and EE wanted t o  ge t  out of  a cash d ra in ing  bus ines s .  
E f fo r t s  towards merger were f i n a l l y  galvanised by the  P lessey  Company, 
which l e t  i t  be known t h a t  i t  wanted to  take  over ICT. These approaches 
were as unwelcome as the  1965 p lans  fo r  EE t o  take  con t ro l  o f  ICT7®. 
However, i t  meant t h a t  th e re  were two sources o f  f inance  on the  t a b l e  f o r  
the  merged ICT/EEC company: th e  Government and c a sh - r i ch  P lessey .  
Negotia t ions  s t a r t e d  to  revolve  around how much c a p i t a l  the  Government and 
Plessey were w i l l i n g  to  commit to  a merged company, and f o r  what s take .
EE su f f e r e d  in these  n e g o t i a t i o n s  as the  weakness o f  the  System 4 
became apparen t .  EE had c e r t a i n  s t r e n g th s .  I t  could o f f e r  e x p e r t i s e  in 
r e a l - t im e  computer o p e ra t io n s .  The IBM-type a r c h i t e c t u r e  was seen as more 
advanced than th e  1900' s  design as i t  used 3 2 -c h a rac te r  word length  as 
compared to  ICT's 24 c h a r a c te r  a r c h i t e c t u r e .  However, ICT was a l ready  
updating i t s  range to  give i t  th e  longer word len g th .  Another advantage EE 
could o f f e r  was a f a i r l y  s t rong  presence in the  Eastern  European
74See below, chapte r  6 on RCA, pp248-252; ch ap te r  7 on GE, pp284-295.
75CBI o ra l  h i s to r y  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Colonel Maxwell in te rv iew.
7®ibid.
157
market77 . These coun t r ie s  were unable  to  deal  with IBM, bu t  were 
i n t e r e s t e d  in having the  technology: EE could provide  t h i s .  /
However, EE could not o f f e r  c a p i t a l  f o r  f u r t h e r  investment:  ICT's 
management saw th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of f inance  as th e  key to  making a merged 
company more success fu l  than the  s ep a ra te  f i r m s .  Ensuring t h a t  th e  fi rm 
obta ined a l a rg e  market share  meant i t  had t o  be ab le  to  f in a n c e  an 
increased number of leased and ren ted  computers. ICT saw t h i s  as c r u c i a l  
to  achiev ing  a minimum e f f i c i e n t  s c a l e 78. P lessey  and MinTech were 
w i l l i n g  to  supply f inance  to  a merged company. The outcome was t h a t  EE, 
with i t s  lack o f  market success with the  System 4, was only  given equal 
s t a t u s  to  P le ssey  in the  merged fi rm:
Table 4.7  I n i t i a l  ownership o f  ICL:
Form of 
Commitment
ICT ope ra t ions  
and a s s e t s
EEC business  
computer 
ope ra t ions  
and a s s e t s .
£18 m i l l io n
£ 3.5 m i l l io n  
+£13.5 m i l l io n  
g ran t  f o r  
development of 
l a rge  computers 
and a new 
computer range .
Source: T .Kelly  The B r i t i s h  computer indus t ry :  c r i s e s  and development. p45; 
CBI o ra l  h i s t o r y  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell and Humphreys in te rv iews.
ICL continued to  suppor t  the  System 4 in to  the  e a r l y  1970s, but 
dropped the  smal ler  members of  the  family ,  because of t h e i r  
uncompet it iveness  with IBM. I t  mainly sold the  System 4 to  l a rge  u se r s  who 
required  IBM c o m p a t ib i l i ty  or s t rong  r e a l - t im e  c a p a b i l i t y .  Even tua l ly  the  
1900 was rep laced  by the 2900 and th e  System 4 ended, though in the  mid- 
1980s ICL did s e l l  a few la rge  F u j i t s u ,  IBM-compatible, systems as p a r t  of
77CBI a rc h iv e ,  0NR, 'The B r i t i s h  computer scene,  p a r t  I I ' ,  1967.
78CBI o ra l  h i s to r y  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell in te rv iew.
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Shareholder Percentage of
of o rd ina ry  shares
ICT shareho lders
inc. Vickers 53.5
and F e r r an t i
English E l e c t r i c  18.0
Plessey 18.0
MinTech 10.5
a technology and production agreement.  However, th e  management, dominated 
as i t  was by ICT personnel,  r e j e c t e d  EE's po l icy  of  IBM-compatibil i ty .
Concluding remarks on Engl ish E l e c t r i c .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  in th e  pe r iod  1965-1967 EE was a ttempting  to  become 
a major p lay e r  in the  UK computer market.  I t  a t tempted t h i s  by fo llowing 
RCA's s t r a t e g y .  By doing so i t  might have expected to  cu t the  high R&D c o s t  
of developing computers.  Yet by t r y i n g  to r e - i n v e n t  the  range i t  pushed 
back th e  t ime when i t  could put machines on the  market,  by which time IBM 
had so ld  hundreds of 360 systems in th e  UK, and thousands worldwide.
I t  i s  a l s o  apparent  t h a t  such a grandiose scheme was out of  k i l t e r  
with Engl ish E l e c t r i c ' s  o v e ra l l  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n .  Later i t  w i l l  be seen 
th a t  RCA and GE both came to  th e  conclus ion t h a t  they  were under-performing 
in th e  market because they were t r y i n g  to  support  too many high c o s t  
p r o j e c t s  a t  th e  same time, bu t  t h i s  r e a l i t y  was not r e f l e c t e d  in t h e i r  
computer product s t r a t e g i e s .  Like RCA and GE, EE was support ing a number 
of high c o s t  expansion p a th s ,  such as e l e c t r o n i c s  through the  a c q u i s i t i o n  
of Marconi and E l l i o t t s ,  and th e  expansion in to  a i r c r a f t ,  locomotion 
engines ,  and nuc lea r  power. All  th e se  cost  a l o t  to  develop.
Given l a c k l u s t r e  f i n a n c i a l  r e t u r n s  the  computer product s t r a t e g y  in 
the  1960s was not  ap p ro p r ia te  to  the  company's s i t u a t i o n .  EE wanted to  
develop a major new group w i th in  the  company, producing computers.  However, 
t h i s  meant t h a t  i t  had to  spend la rg e  amounts o f  money on bu i ld ing  up i t s  
production and marketing c a p a c i ty ,  and had to  reach a sca le  l a rge  enough 
to  compete with  IBM. The company was not ab le  t o  fund such a programme 
because i t  had too many o the r  p r o j e c t s .  EE might have done b e t t e r ,  and put 
the  re sou rces  o f  the  company under l e s s  s t r a i n ,  i f  i t  had adopted a niche 
s t r a t e g y  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  of th e  sm al le r  US bus iness  machines f i rms  or the  
US producers of  s c i e n t i f i c  computers79 . An a l t e r n a t i v e  was to  drop o th e r  
development programmes and c o n ce n t r a te  more re sou rces  on the  computer 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .
I t  seems t h a t  EE opted to  support  i t s  o the r  a c t i v i t i e s  before  the  new 
computer o p e ra t io n .  English E l e c t r i c  concentra ted  on a reas  which were l e s s  
r i s k y  and more f a m i l i a r  to  the  f i rm ,  not s u r p r i s i n g  given i t s  poor 
performance compared to  r i v a l s .  While i t  was w i l l i n g  to  continue  to  b u i ld  
computers f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  and m i l i t a r y  control  systems i t  would not f u r t h e r  
support  the  commercial computer o p e ra t ion .  Commercial computers were too 
f a r  away from i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  a reas  o f  a c t i v i t y  and had too g rea t  an impact
79See below, chapter 8.
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on the  company's cash ba lances .
Unfor tuna te ly  th e re  a re  few management records  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  EE, 
making i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  e s t a b l i s h  how the f i rm  weighed up i t s  va r ious  
investment o p p o r tu n i t i e s .  However, i t  has been p o s s ib le  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  
i t s  grandiose  product plan was wrong, and t h a t  i t s  systems were l a t e  on to  
the  market and poorly implemented. These same problems occurred in the  
American fi rms o f  RCA and GE, where in te rn a l  records  a re  a v a i l a b l e .  I t  
seems l i k e l y  t h a t  the  process  o f  f a i l u r e  in th e  computer indus t ry  was 
s im i la r  across  a l l  th ree  f i rm s .
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Chapter 5.
B r i t i s h  bus ines s  machine fi rms and the  
EDP market.
The main focus of t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  the  d e c l in e  of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f irm 
in the  B r i t i s h  and American computer markets.  However, to  unders tand t h i s  
d e c l in e  i t  i s  necessary  to  look a t  th e  firms which managed to  surv ive  in 
the  mainframe computer in d u s t ry .  This chap te r  shows how the  B r i t i s h  
t a b u l a t o r  companies managed to  acqu i re  the  s k i l l s  needed to  move in to  
computers as t h e i r  old products  died  and how they  came to  dominate the  
f l a g s h ip  of  the  B r i t i s h  computer in d u s t ry ,  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Computers Limited.
On i t s  formation ,  ICL was the  l a r g e s t  computer company in Europe, as 
la rge  as a number of US computer companies, but i t  was not ab le  to  mould 
t h i s  in to  a winning combination.  Dominant in ICL was ICT, the  combination 
B r i t i s h  bus iness  machine in d u s t ry .  A d e t a i l e d  account of  ICL and i t s  
p redecessor  t a b u l a t i n g  machine companies has r e c e n t l y  appeared1, and t h i s  
is  used to  supplement the  a r c h iv a l  and oral  h i s t o r y  records  used in t h i s  
chap te r .
The r o o t s  of B r i t i s h  Tabula ting  Machines and Powers-Samas: r e l i a n c e  on U.S. 
technology.
The pre-World War Two t a b u l a t i n g  machine market was e f f e c t i v e l y  a 
duopoly.  Two B r i t i s h  companies,  both heavi ly  r e l i a n t  on US technology, 
supplied  the  account ing equipment f o r  the  B r i t i s h  Empire. These two fi rms 
were B r i t i s h  Tabula t ing  Machines and Powers-Samas. I t  i s  important to  
e s t a b l i s h  how th e se  two f i rms  were subserv ien t  to  US technology and how 
t h i s  handicapped them in th e  pos t-war years .
BTM was formed in 19072 as an independent company to  market and then 
to  manufacture th e  t a b u l a t i n g  products  designed by Herman H o l l e r i t h  of the  
USA3 . H o l l e r i t h ' s  US o p e ra t io n ,  the  Tabulating Machine Company, evolved
1Martin Campbell-Kelly,  ICL: a bus iness  and t e ch n ica l  h i s t o r y . Oxford,
1989.
2Tim K el ly ,  The B r i t i s h  Computer Industry  C r i s i s  and Development. 
Beckenham, Kent,  1987, p41.
3Nat ional Archive f o r  the  H is to ry  of Computing ICL/A1M, ' Induc t ion  
Course, some no tes  on ICL h i s t o r y ' ,  c i r c a  1968. This document was used in 
the induction o f  new employees.
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i n to  IBM4 , and BTM remained IBM's l icensee  u n t i l  a f t e r  the  Second World 
War. The second, smal ler ,  B r i t i s h  s u p p l i e r  of  t a b u l a t i n g  equipment was 
Powers-Samas. This company produced punched card  machines designed by James 
Powers, whose American company became a pa r t  o f  Remington Rand, the  second 
l a r g e s t  US bus iness  machines f i rm .  In the UK, Powers was s e t  up as a 
B r i t i s h  source o f  t a b u l a t i n g  equipment by th e  P ruden t ia l  Assurance 
company5 , a major user of t h i s  equipment. I t  l a t e r  took over the  French 
d i s t r i b u t o r  of  Powers machines, Samas, forming Powers-Samas6 .
During the  war both companies were allowed to  keep a la rge  percentage 
of t h e i r  ou tpu t  in the  form of  t a b u l a t o r s ;  t a b u l a t o r s  were necessary  f o r  
the  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  of the  war e f f o r t 7 . The major e f f e c t  of the  war on 
these  f i rms  was to  engender an inc reas ing  independence. Before the  war, 
Powers had had a l im ited  R&D o p e ra t io n ,  but BTM was completely under the  
wing of IBM. For both,  th e se  l in k s  were cu t  dur ing  the  war, both fi rms 
having t o  undertake  more development work themselves .  BTM a lso  became 
involved with  th e  ENIGMA code-breaking  opera t ion  a t  B le tch ley  Park8 . This 
o f fe red  BTM a chance to  get  involved in innovative work, demanding advanced 
t a b u l a t i n g  techn iques .
A f te r  th e  war the  P ru d en t i a l  sold Powers-Samas to  the  Vickers 
company, which was looking f o r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  to  d i v e r s i f y  from i t s  m i l i t a r y  
engineer ing  a c t i v i t i e s :
'The problem which f o r  th e  second t ime in t h i s  cen tury  had 
been p laced  before  th e  Vickers Board, was to  tu rn  swords in to  
p loughshares  a f t e r  th e  Second World War. The la rge  armament 
f a c t o r i e s  and p la n ts  had almost  a t  once to  s top production and we 
were faced  with the  major t a s k s  of  f in d in g  new products ,  techniques  
and new employment f o r  th e  thousands of people who were then in the  
p l a n t s .  One of those  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  going in to  r e f in e d  
eng in ee r in g  appeared to  be th e  punch card  systems / 9 .
4W. Rodgers, Think: A biography of  the  Watsons and IBM. New York,
1969.
5NAHC ICL/A1M, 'Some notes  on ICL h i s t o r y ' .
6CBI Oral His to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Col A.T. Maxwell in terviewed by 
A.C.L.Humphreys 9 /1 /80 . Both men were ICT then ICL d i r e c t o r s ,  Maxwell was 
a lso  c h a i r  o f  Power-Samas before  the  ICT merger.
7Campbell-Kelly,  ICL. pl06.
8Campbell-Kelly ICL, chap te r  5. There a re  a number of sources  on 
Blechley Park inc luding: A. Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma 1983; B. 
Randell ,  'The Colossus '  in A H is to ry  o f  Computing in the Twentieth Century , 
ed N.Metropolis e t  a l ,  New York, 1980.
9CBI Oral H is to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell in te rv iew .
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R ela t io n s  between the  B r i t i s h  fi rms and the  US l i c e n so r s  would not 
r e tu r n  t o  normal.  F i r s t l y ,  Powers became a p a r t  o f  the  more s e l f - r e l i a n t  
Vickers o rg a n iz a t io n  and l e f t  Remington's umbrella .  Secondly,  problems 
between BTM and IBM, which had been brewing f o r  a number o f  y e a r s 10, led 
to BTM p a r t i n g  company with IBM11. BTM claimed t h a t  IBM's 25% r o y a l t y  on 
equipment so ld  in the  UK was too  g r e a t  a burden f o r  BTM to  b e a r12. A l e s s  
favourab le  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  sugges ts  t h a t  IBM was happy to  end the  
arrangement as i t  was f r u s t r a t e d  by BTM's i n a b i l i t y  to  match i t s  own growth 
r a t e 13. By 'mutual agreement '  BTM and IBM te rmina ted  t h e i r  c o n t r a c t .
The B r i t i s h  bus iness  machines indus t ry  faced many c h a l l en g es ,  the  
main one being to  supply the  r a p i d l y  growing o f f i c e  automation market.  To 
do t h i s  i t  had to  f ind  the  c a p i t a l  resources  both to  b u i ld  p la n t  and to  
f inance  le a s in g  arrangements .  At an e a r l y  s tage  leas ing  became the  norm in 
the bus iness  machines market.  BTM's Puckey expla ined  t h a t  Herman H o l l e r i t h  
s t a r t e d  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  because he b e l ieved  his  systems were too complicated 
fo r  th e  u se r s  t o  cope with:  i t  was b e t t e r  fo r  th e  manufacturer  to  r e t a i n  
c o n t r o l .  However i t  did c r e a t e  a problem:
' I t  r e q u i r e s  us to  ob ta in  and use enough c a p i t a l  to  mainta in  
p roduc t ion  fo r  some years  ahead o f  the  t ime when an adequate r e tu r n  
on th e  investment can be r e a l i z e d  and the  c a p i t a l  r e g a i n e d . ' 14
Not only were the  two UK f i rms  faced with the  happy s i t u a t i o n  of
coping with growing demand, but they  also had to  deal with t h e i r  new
independence (which meant e s t a b l i s h i n g  R&D f a c i l i t i e s )  and they had to
compete with US e n t e r p r i s e s ,  which they had p rev ious ly  r e l i e d  on.
Therefore ,  a f t e r  the  war, BTM and Powers Samas were f u l l y  occupied in
inc reas ing  t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  deal with th e  demand f o r  t a b u l a t i n g
machines.  In th e  US, IBM, which a l read y  had the  most advanced knowledge of
t a b u l a t o r s ,  was developing e l e c t r o n i c s  to  be used in i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l
products ,  and soon became i n t e r e s t e d  in computers. Remington Rand was a l so
quick to  a cq u i r e  computer s k i l l s ,  indeed quicker  than IBM15. B r i t i s h
firms were occupied with the  old  technology and lagged in the  development
10Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, chap te r  4.
“ l im e s ,  11/1/50,  p l l ,  cha i rman 's  annual s ta tem en t ,  R . P h i l l p o t t .
12S i r  Walter Puckey, BTM D i r e c to r ,  'Design, Development and Marketing 
of H o l l e r i t h  and A l l ied  Machinery ' ,  London School of Economics, Seminar on 
the problems in i n d u s t r i a l  a d m in s t r a t io n . 22/11/55
13Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pp90-94.
14Puckey 'Design,  development and marketing ' .
15See below, chapter 8, pp358-361.
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of computers.
Earlv  computer work.
During th e  f i r s t  genera t ion  of  computing, th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies 
dominated th e  B r i t i s h  in d u s t ry .  The B r i t i s h  bus iness  machines f irms 
( a l r ead y  concerned with bu i ld ing  up t a b u l a t o r  c a p a c i ty  and R&D f a c i l i t i e s )  
seemed to  view th e  move towards computers as an unwelcome e x t r a  burden. In 
1955 Puckey i d e n t i f i e d  one major problem fac ing  BTM:
' t h e  ex ten t  to  which a pure computer,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  designed 
f o r  o f f i c e  use,  i s  l i k e l y  to  be of  widespread commercial 
a p p e a l . /16
This l i n e  o f  thought was a lso  found a t  Powers with the  same ques t ions  being 
asked:
' . . . t h e  big problem fa c in g  the punch card indus t ry  [was] when 
and how they  were expected to  ge t  in to  some form of e l e c t r i c  or 
e l e c t r o n i c  data  process ing  and c o m p u t in g . '17
BTM approached Prof .  A.D. Booth of  Birkbeck College to  develop i t s  f i r s t
computers18. His e a r ly  computer work led to  th e  H o l l e r i t h  E lec t ro n ic
Computer, l a t e r  c a l l e d  the  BTM 1200 (HEC I I ) ,  and a second machine the  BTM
1201 (HEC IV)19. The HEC II was a simple drum memory accounting machine,
the HEC IV was a f u l l  computer.
Unlike th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s ,  BTM had a use r  base in commercial da ta
p rocess ing ,  through i t s  punched card  customers.  I t  was th e se  on which i t
concen tra ted  s a l e s  of HEC machines20. The s a l e s  o rg an iza t io n  had a
computer depar tment  added to  i t .  This was a s top-gap  while informat ion on
computers was being d is seminated  to  th e  d i s t r i c t  s a l e s  o r g a n iz a t io n 21.
This comprehensive sa le s  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and the  e s t a b l i s h e d  market l i n k s ,
were something t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms  needed to  develop to  be s e r ious
compet itors  in th e  commercial market:
16Puckey 'Des ign, development and marke ting  ' .
17CBI Oral His to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell in te rv iew .
18A.D. Booth, 'Computers in the  U n ivers i ty  of  London, 1945-1962' in;  
A His to ry  of  Computing in th e  Twentieth Century. Ed. N. Metropolis  e t  a l ,  
New York, 1980.
19NRDC 86 /44 /3 ,  'Summary of d i g i t a l  computer production and 
development in th e  UK' 11/7/55; K. Flamm, Creat ing the  Computer. Washington
1988, pl47.
zoNRDC 86 /44 /3 ,  'Notes on s a l e s  promotion and a p p l i c a t io n  of  
compute rs ' ,  appendix to  NRDC paper no 106, 11/7 /55, 'Survey of  computer 
a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  a p p l i c a t i o n  s tu d i e s  and t r a i n i n g ' .
21 ib id .
164
Fig 5.1 BTM Sales Organisation.
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Source: NRDC archive  86/44 /3 ,  'Notes on sa le s  promotion and a p p l i c a t io n  of 
c o m p u te r s ' .
The o v e ra l l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  company was equa l ly  fu n c t io n a l :  s a le s  
production  and development were s e p a ra te  u n i t s .  The f u n c t i o n a l i t y  of  the  
company s t r u c t u r e  was very d i f f e r e n t  from the  m ul t i -p roduc t  m u l t i ­
d i v i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies were adopting .  I t  was 
a fu n c t io n  of the  s in g l e  co rp o ra te  purpose,  to  make and s e l l  da ta  
p rocess ing  equipment.
By 1955 th e r e  were 20 HEC IVs and 7 HEC I I s  on o rd e r ,  with another
3 earmarked f o r  i n t e r n a l  use22 . 50% of  orders  were f o r  p a y r o l l ,  with the
balance to  be used f o r  a number of account ing ,  produc t ion ,  and 
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  f u n c t io n s .  By t h i s  t ime Powers was a lso  able  to  o f f e r  
e l e c t r o n i c  systems. F i r s t l y  t h e r e  was the  E le c t ro n ic  Mult ip ly ing  Punch, 
which was an e l e c t r o n i c  c a l c u l a t i n g  device  sold  by the  250-s trong general  
s a le s  fo r c e .  However, the  second machine, th e  Powers Card Programme 
C a lcu la to r ,  PCC, was much c l o s e r  to  a computer, o f f e r i n g  drum s to rage  and 
a memory of  160 words. To s e l l  t h e se ,  t h e  s a le s  fo r c e  would c a l l  in members
of the  Computer Department23. Table 5.1 shows the  o rder  s i t u a t i o n  of EMP
and PCC machines in 1956:
22NRDC 86/44/3 ,  'Notes on s a l e s  promotion and a p p l i c a t io n  of
com pu te rs ' .
Table 5.1 Power-Samas computer s a l e s .
Overseas 30 EMPs d e l iv e r e d ,  70 ordered.
30 PCCs ordered .
Home 80 EMPs d e l iv e r e d .
70 PCCs ordered .
Source: NRDC archive  86 /44 /3 ,  'Notes on s a le s  promotion and
a p p l i c a t i o n  of computers ' .
These machines were small and they  could only f u l f i l  the  s m a l le s t  computer
needs.  Only BTM's HEC IV was a f u l l y  fu n c t io n a l  computer. Nei ther  could
o f f e r  to  t h e i r  customers anything to  cover l a r g e r  problems. Both companies
would make e f f o r t s  to  overcome th e se  weaknesses by n eg o t i a t in g  with  o the r
firms f o r  the  use of b igger  des igns .
Earlv  R e la t io n s  with F e r r a n t i .
The f i r s t  recorded co n tac t  between the bus iness  machine companies and 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry  was under th e  auspices  of the  NRDC. On December 
14th 1949, the  Corporation hosted th e  f i r s t  and only meeting of i t s  
Advisory Panel on D ig i ta l  Computers24 a t  which r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from a l l  
i n t e r e s t e d  f i rm s  were p re s e n t .  The NRDC wanted th e  two s e t s  of  companies 
to  come to  some arrangement to  safeguard the  UK's leading  p o s i t i o n  in 
computers,  a p o s i t i o n  given i t  by the  work a t  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  and the  
NPL. However, th e  NRDC was concerned t h a t  IBM was going to  use i t s  huge 
s a le s  network and market knowledge to  br ing the  computer in to  i t s  own, and 
e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  as the  dominant company. The NRDC posed th re e  opening 
ques t ions :
'1 )  I s  th e re  in th e  UK any f irm with the  manufactur ing,  
s e l l i n g  and s e rv ic in g  f a c i l i t i e s  of th e  In t e r n a t io n a l  Business 
Machine Corpora tion,  with p a r t i c u l a r  r e fe re n ce  to  the  manufacture of  
e l e c t r o n i c  equipment.
2) I f  not:
a) Would i t  be an economic p ro p o s i t io n  f o r  Powers-Samas 
o r  th e  B r i t i s h  Tabula ting  Machine Co., o r  both ,  [ t o ]  b u i ld  up a 
l a r g e - s c a l e  e l e c t r o n i c  manufacturing o rg a n iz a t io n ,  and could they in 
e f f e c t  do so o the r  than  by t a k in g  s t a f f  away from the  e l e c t r o n i c  
manufacturers?
b) Would i t  be economic f o r  any of the  e l e c t r o n i c  
manufacturers  to  s e t  up a s ep a ra te  s e l l i n g ,  s e rv ic in g  and adv isory  
o rg a n iz a t io n  in compet it ion with the  Powers-Samas and B r i t i s h  
Tabu la t ing  Machine o rg a n iz a t io n s?
3) I f  the  answer to  the  above two ques t ions  a re  nega t ive ,  does 
the  Panel consider t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no p r a c t i c a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  a 
j o i n t  e f f o r t  between Powers-Samas and the  B r i t i s h  Tabula t ing  Machine 
Co. on th e  one hand and one or more of th e  e l e c t r o n i c  f i rms  on the
24NRDC 86 /35 /1 ,  Advisory Panel f i l e .
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The NRDC proposed t h a t  an a l l i a n c e  be formed between the  t e c h n i c a l l y  
competent e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms and the  bus iness  machine fi rms who had 
knowledge of th e  commercial da ta  process ing market.
Lord Halsbury,  chairman of  the  NRDC, f a i l e d  to  ge t  a broad a l l i a n c e  
of e l e c t r o n i c s  and bus iness  machine f irms,  t h e r e f o r e  he s t a r t e d  to  
concen t ra te  on F e r r an t i  and BTM26. Halsbury emphasized these  two as BTM 
was, in h i s  view, more go-ahead than Powers. By 1952 i t  was obvious t h a t  
l i t t l e  was coming out of th e se  n e g o t i a t io n s .  BTM was p r im ar i ly  i n t e r e s t e d  
in p r o t e c t in g  i t s  t a b u la to r  market and Fe r r an t i  was not developing th e  type 
of computer needed fo r  commercial work.
In 1953 a t t e n t i o n  switched to  a l ink between Powers and F e r r a n t i 27. 
Apart from the  NRDC7s e f f o r t s  to  urge them to  coopera te ,  the  leade rs  of 
both companies had i d e n t i f i e d  weaknesses which th e y  be l ieved  the  o th e r  f i rm 
could help overcome. Vincent de F e r r a n t i  blamed much of the  company7s lack 
of commercial success with computers on the  i n a b i l i t y  o f  the  Computer 
Department7s small  s a l e s  f o r c e  to  compete f o r  s a l e s 28. At Powers, the  
Chairman, A.T. Maxwell, was becoming aware t h a t  th e  company was not well 
pos i t ioned  to  e n t e r  the  computer market29. One o f  h is  acqua in tances ,  S i r  
Thomas Merton, placed him in co n tac t  with the  Hungarian emigre, P ro fesso r  
Gabor, a le ad e r  in advanced Physics :
'P r o f e s s o r  Gabor convinced me t h a t  we were not developing 
te c h n o l o g ic a l ly  f a s t  enough or  on a wide enough f i e l d  to  make 
Powers-Samas in to  a computer company. The sugges t ion  was made t h a t  
we should g e t  in touch with  the  Fe r ran t i  company which a t  t h a t  s tage  
was, as i t  subsequently  has cont inued to  do, working on the  
. . . ad v an ced  f r in g e s  o f  technology.  I was in troduced to  S i r  Vincent 
F e r r a n t i ,  who a t  the  t ime was Chairman and Managing D i re c to r  of the  
company which was not quoted on the  stock exchange. We had a number 
of meet ings and we agreed t h a t  shor t  of  any s o r t  of a c tu a l  merger of 
i n t e r e s t s ,  the  b e s t  p lan  was t o  see i f  we could d iv id e  up the  
problem of  resea rch  and development between the  two companies. At 
t h i s  s t a g e ,  i f  I remember, we brought in our Managing D i rec to r s  e t c .  
and the  re sea rch  men. A f te r  a cons ide rab le  study of  the  problem, 
fou r teen  p r o j e c t s  were i d e n t i f i e d  and o f  th e se  e ig h t  were to  be 
worked on by the  F e r r a n t i  re sea rch  team and s ix  by the  Powers. These
2S ib id .
26John Hendry, Innovating f o r  F a i lu re :  Government Po l icy  and the  Earlv  
B r i t i s h  Computer In d u s t ry . 1990, chap te r  6.
27Ib id .
2SB.B. Swann, 'The F e r r a n t i  Computer Department7, unpublished, 1973.
29CBI Oral His to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell in te rv iew .
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fo u r teen  took many months to  develop, and when the  r e s u l t s  s t a r t e d  
t o  come in ,  they were r e a l i z e d  t o  be r a t h e r  d i s ap p o in t in g .  With the  
b e s t  w i l l  in the  world,  the  resea rch  teams had r e s e r v a t i o n s  about 
handing over t h e i r  own know-how and thoughts  to  the  o th e r  s id e ,  and 
S i r  Vincent and I decided r e g r e t f u l l y  t h a t  t h i s  was not the  idea l  
way to  c a r r y  out a wide-ranging development p r o j e c t  in to  the  
computer a g e . ' 30
The arrangement s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  sa le s  of computer equipment made by 
the  two companies, mainly F e r r a n t i  Pegasus computers,  would be d iv ided ,  
Powers s e l l i n g  to  commercial markets and F e r r a n t i  to  s c i e n t i f i c  and 
eng ineer ing  u s e r s .  Swann blamed t h i s  arrangement f o r  u n d e rcu t t ing  the  
success fu l  Pegasus range and p reven t ing  F e r ran t i  from developing a base in 
commercial computing. Powers f a i l e d  t o  s e l l  a s i n g l e  machine. I t  was more 
i n t e r e s t e d  in p r o te c t in g  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  equipment and, while  Maxwell may 
have recognised  weakness, most e f f o r t  went in to  a new range o f  punched card
equipment.  This was to  be the  Samastronic range of  t a b u l a t o r s  t h a t  proved
to  be a t e c h n i c a l  and commercial f a i l u r e .
The ICT Merger. 1959.
Demand f o r  BTM's and Powers'  t r a d i t i o n a l  products  remained high 
through to  the  end of the  1950s. However, the re  were under ly ing  weaknesses,  
e s p e c i a l l y  a t  Powers. F i r s t l y ,  Powers managed to  get  i t s e l f  in to  severe 
f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I t  had placed la rge  numbers of  machines in to  lease  
arrangements and was undertaking a very major development, the  c o s t l y  
Samastronic range of equipment:
'The conso l ida ted  p r o f i t  and loss  account shows a f i g u r e  of  
t r a d i n g  p r o f i t  a t  £1,180,615, which is  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  b e t t e r  than the  
corresponding  f ig u r e  in 1956, al though the  inc rease  i s  absorbed in 
h eav ie r  f inanc ing  c o s t s ,  and in the p rov is ion  a g a in s t  increased  
Research and Development expendi tu re  on f u t u r e  p r o j e c t s . ' 31
Increas ing  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and new c r e d i t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  exacerbated Powers'
problems. The c r e d i t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  made leas ing  even more a t t r a c t i v e  to
customers,  while  the  high i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  made i t  more expensive f o r  the
company to  f i n a n c e 32. On top  of t h i s ,  the growing use of  computers was
f i n a l l y  having an e f f e c t .  The company was being forced  to  r e a s s e s s  i t s
d e p re c ia t io n  p o l i c y  and had to  in c rease  re se rv e s ,  as the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  the
old punched card  equipment being rep laced  increased .  Powers achieved poor
30 ib i d .
31Times. 13 /5 /58,  pl7 ,  r e p o r t  of A.T.Maxwell 's chairman 's  address  to  
the  Powers'  annual general  meeting.
32 ib id .
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r e t u r n s  on s h a reh o ld e r s '  funds ,  a t  3% in 1956 and 4% in 195733 . I t  was 
a l so - in  a poor p o s i t io n  when i t  came to  e x p lo i t in g  th e  growth in computers.
Meanwhile BTM had managed to  extend i t s  ad hoc computer development.  
In 1956 i t  had formed a j o i n t  su b s id ia ry ,  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Computers 
Corporation Inc ,  with the  small Boston company, Laboratory For E l e c t ro n ic s ,  
which was to  develop a machine f o r  the  Chase Manhattan Bank34. The 
programme was a l so  meant to  inc lude  the  t r a n s f e r  of computer s k i l l s  to  
BTM35. While th e  co n t ra c t  with the  bank f e l l  through,  ICC did produce a 
very advanced magnetic drum s t o r e  only equa l led  by the  IBM RAMAC d isc  
system36.
A few days before the  announcement of th e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Computers 
Corporation deal another ,  more important,  deal  was s t ru ck  with GEC37. 
This was th e  formation of a j o i n t  company c a l l e d  Computer Developments 
Limited.  More w i l l  be sa id  of  t h i s  in the  next s e c t io n .  In 1957 BTM a lso  
acquired a 51% holding in the  small B r i t i s h  company, Data Recording 
Ins truments ,  to  give i t  access  to  magnetic tape  technology33.
With the  s h i f t  of the  market away from t r a d i t i o n a l  bus iness  machines, 
the  two f i rms decided to  c o n so l id a te  the  market and merge t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
to  take  on the  b ig  US p la y e r s .  According to Maxwell, n e g o t i a t io n s  between 
BTM and Powers-Samas were d i f f i c u l t 39 . Eventually  they were merged on a 
62/38 b a s i s  in favour of BTM4 0 . Vickers ,  as th e  main Powers shareho lde r ,  
was w i l l i n g  to  t ak e  a subord ina te  r o l e  i f  t h a t  meant the  mounting problems 
a t  Powers were shared with o th e r  eq u i ty  holders .
33Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pl73.
34Times. 31/5 /56 , p l9 .
35 ib i d .
36Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, ppl80-186.
37I im es ,  25/5 /56, p l9 .
38Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pl87.
39CBI Oral H is to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell in te rv iew .
4° I b i d , comment by A.L.C. Humphreys, one t ime ICL managing d i r e c t o r ,  
during h is  in te rv iew  of Maxwell.
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ICT in the  l a t e  1950s and e a r l y  1960s.
1) T ab u la to r s .
The merged company was faced with th e  l ik e l ih o o d  t h a t  rap id
tech n o lo g ica l  advance would make obso le te  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  product l i n e .
However, the  product plan announced a t  the t ime of  the  merger was r a t h e r
c o n se rv a t iv e ,  with  equal emphasis on old  systems. The aims were:
' 1 .  To become a l a r g e - s c a l e  v e r t i c a l l y - i n t e g r a t e d  da ta-  
p rocess ing  equipment manufacturer .
2. To supply products  fo r  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  punched card 
machine market,  and to  d i v e r s i f y  in to  small and medium EDP 
computers.
3. To become a p e r iphe ra l  manufacturer  and OEM 
s u p p l i e r . '** .
There was s t i l l  f a i t h  in the  old t a b u la to r  p roduc ts .  ICT be l ieved  t h a t  
th e re  was no lack of demand f o r  punched card products  and during 1961-2 i t  
increased  c a p a c i ty  to  produce punched card equipment by 50%*2 . However, 
t h i s  was the  per iod  when second genera t ion  computer systems were becoming 
a v a i l a b l e .  Systems such as th e  hugely success fu l  IBM 1401, and even ICT's 
own 1301 t o r e  in to  t a b u l a t o r  s a l e s .  In 1961-2 t a b u l a t o r  s a l e s  missed t h e i r  
t a r g e t  by one t h i r d * 3 , f i n a l l y  f o r c in g  ICT to  recognise  th e  end of 
e lec t ro -m echan ica l  bus iness  machines.
2) Obtaining second genera t ion  computer c a p a b i l i t i e s  - c r e a t in g  the  
computer company.
This s i t u a t i o n  put the  company in to  something of a c r i s i s ,  i t s  main 
chal lenge  was now ra p id ly  to  inc rease  i t s  computer a c t i v i t i e s .
Internal developments: the 1202 and the abandoned 1400/LFE venture.
At th e  t ime of the  merger,  ICT had in h e r i t e d  a number of  computer 
developments,  a l l  from BTM. F i r s t l y  t h e r e  was th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  HEC l in e  of 
small computers.  Up to  1959 something l i k e  6 HEC 1200s had been i n s t a l l e d  
in B r i t a i n  and 11 exported ,  with ano ther  30 HEC 1201s in the UK and 19 
abroad**. However, t h i s  system was becoming da ted .  In 1959 ICT s t a r t e d
*1Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pl95.
*2Campbell-Kelly,  TCL, p204.
*3 ib id .
**Computer Consultants  Ltd, B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t . 1963 
and 1965.
to  i n s t a l l  an improved model with l a r g e r  drum memory, th e  120245. This 
kept t h e  f i r s t  genera t ion  technology a l iv e  and another 28 u n i t s ; were 
i n s t a l l e d  in B r i t a i n  and near ly  30 abroad1*6 . However, i t  was only  a stop 
gap u n t i l  a second genera t ion  machine was ready47.
ICT was a l so  planning a medium-sized,  f i r s t  genera t ion  computer,  
c a l l e d  th e  1400. Development of t h i s  machine had been delayed in th e  hope 
t h a t  i t  could be based on the  system being developed in the  j o i n t  opera t ion  
with LFE f o r  Chase Manhattan48 . Chase scrapped the  c o n t r a c t  and only a 
p ro to type  was produced. Development o f  the  1400 a c c e le r a t e d  in 1958 when 
i t  was r e a l i z e d  t h a t  the  j o i n t  venture  had achieved l i t t l e .  In 1958/9 the  
company p u b l i c i z ed  the  machine heav i ly ,  but i t  was withdrawn fo llowing the  
advice of US c o n s u l t a n t s 49 - i t  could not hope to  win o rders  in the  face  
of the  new t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  compet i t ion .
Cooperation with GEC and the 1301 computer.
The more success fu l  p r o j e c t  was a j o i n t  ven ture  with B r i t i s h  GEC5°. 
The two f i rms worked to g e th e r  to  produce a second genera t ion  replacement 
f o r  th e  1200 HEC s e r i e s .  Like the  1400, the  1300 was intended to  be 
a v a i l a b l e  in a magnetic tape  and a random access c o n f ig u ra t io n .  The p r o j e c t  
went w e l l :
' I n  November 1959 In te rn a t io n a l  Computers and Tabula to rs  
Limited and the  General E l e c t r i c  Company Ltd. formed Computer 
Developments Ltd. as a j o i n t l y  owned design and coord ina t ing  group. 
The 1301 computer, the  f i r s t  outgrowth of  t h i s  u n i ted  e f f o r t ,  i s  a 
f i l e  p rocesso r  f o r  medium s iz e  companies. ICT w i l l  manufacture the  
p e r ip h e r a l  equipment and market i t  through i t s  world-wide channels .  
General E l e c t r i c  [Company] w i l l  manufacture the e l e c t r o n i c s .  At 
p re s e n t  t h e r e  are  two production pro to types  o f  the  1301 in 
c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  with a backlog o f  17 o r d e r s . '
The one problem was t h a t  the  random access ve rs ion  was dropped, and only
4STimes. 7 /1 /59 ,  pl6 ,  S i r  Cecil  Weir 's  s ta tement a t  the  1959 BTM 
annual meeting; CBI Archive, Nelson M. Blachman, Off ice  of  Naval Research,  
US Embassy, London, 'Commercial D ig i t a l  Computers In B r i t a i n ' ,  8 /1 /59 .
46Computer Consu l tan ts ,  B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t . 1965.
47Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pl84.
48Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pl86.
49ib id .
soTimes. 1 /11/60,  ICT adver t  f o r  the  1301 computer.
S1CBI Archive ,  Auerbach E lec t ro n ic s  Corporation,  'European Information 
Technology, a r e p o r t  on the  indus t ry  and the  s t a t e  of the  a r t ' ,  15/1 /61,  
t h i s  was one of  a number of indus t ry  r e p o r t s  by the  Auerbach Corp.
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magnetic tape  was a v a i l a b le  f o r  mass s to rag e .  This was because the  BTM drum 
system, which i t  had got from th e  LFE j o i n t  development,  was not 
c om pet i t ive  with newer IBM d isk  systems52. I t  appears t h a t  ICT decided 
not to  o f f e r  t h i s  f a c i l i t y  to  avoid unfavourable  comparison. This meant 
d a ta  could  only  be accessed from magnetic tape o r  punched card  p e r ip h e r a l s ,  
g r e a t l y  l im i t i n g  i t s  f l e x i b i l i t y .  GEC cons t ruc ted  the  computers a t  i t s  
Coventry telecommunications p l a n t 53 . ICT provided the  p e r ip h e ra l s  and 
so ld  i t .
The 1300 was up a g a in s t  s t i f f  compet i t ion .  ICT was fo rced  to  announce 
the  system in May 1960, because of th e  la rge s a l e s  IBM was achieving with 
i t s  second genera t ion  IBM 140154 . This was two years  ahead of d e l iv e r y ,  
which undermined confidence in d e l i v e r y  somewhat. There were a l so  a number 
of o th e r  compet i t ive  machines, such as the  EMI 1100 and the  success fu l  NCR 
315.
Despite  the  compet it ion ,  and the  lack of random access  s t o r e s ,  the  
system was a success ,  a t  l e a s t  in th e  context o f  the  UK market which was 
smal ler  than t h a t  of the  US. By 1965, 102 1301s had been i n s t a l l e d ,  with 
another  27 on o rde r ;  th e re  were a l so  24 smal le r 1300s d e l iv e red  and orders  
f o r  51, p lus  1 l a rg e r  1302 on the  o rd e r  books. £13,320,000 worth had been 
d e l iv e red  and £5,685,000 worth were on o r d e r55. In the  same p r i c e  
ca tegory  only  th e  IBM 1401 o u t - s o ld  i t  in the  UK. None of th e  o the r  B r i t i s h  
m anufac tu rers '  machines approached i t :  Fe r ran t i  and EE were concen t ra t ing  
on s c i e n t i f i c  o r  la rge  sca le  systems, both much sm al le r  markets,  while  EMI 
had problems coping with i t s  chosen commercial market.
In 1961 ICT absorbed the  j o i n t  venture  company, CDL, to  take  con t ro l  
of the  team t h a t  developed the  13015 6 . GEC continued to  manufacture the  
system57, but t h i s  rep re sen ted  the  end of GEC's i n t e r e s t  in commercial 
computing.
52Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p200.
53London School of Economics, a rch iv a l  c o l l e c t i o n ,  'Seminar on the  
problems in i n d u s t r i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' ,  A.L.G. Lindley,  Chair  and M.D. of 
GEC, 'The Development and Organiza t ion  of the  General E l e c t r i c  Co. L t d . '  
13/3/62.
5*Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p201.
55Computer Consu l tan ts ,  B r i t i s h  Commercial Computer D ig e s t . 1965.
56NAHC, ICL/A1M, ICL 1968 induc t ion  course.
57Lindley ,  'Development and o rg a n is a t i o n  of GEC'.
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The need for more systems: arrangements with RCA.
There were s t i l l  a number of  weaknesses in ICT's computer s t r a t e g y .  
The 1301 had a s a l e  p r ic e  o f  £120,00058 which covered only  the  sm al le r  
p a r t  of  the  medium sca le  market.  There was a l so  a f e e l i n g  among board 
members t h a t  th e  company s t i l l  needed ' a d d i t i o n a l  t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s ' 59 . 
To t r y  to  ge t  the  ex t ra  s k i l l s  i t  needed, i t  s t a r t e d  to  n e g o t i a t e  with  two 
American companies, General E l e c t r i c  and RCA.
N ego t ia t ions  with GE came to  nothing: GE was s imul taneously  t a l k i n g  
to  Bull o f  France and some arrangement between a l l  t h r e e  companies was 
being cons ide red .  R epresen ta t ives  of  GE came to  B r i t a i n  and d iscussed  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  purchasing a 25% s take  in ICT. However, t h e se  n e g o t i a t io n s  
pe tered  ou t .  GE was a l ready  about to  acquire la rge  s take s  in Bull and 
O l i v e t t i  so may well have completed i t s  European ambi t ions60.
In 1961 Arthur Humphreys61 was placed in charge of  the  planning 
ro le  a t  ICT, and took charge of  n e g o t ia t io n s  with  RCA62. RCA a l re ad y  had 
English E l e c t r i c  as a l i c e n se e  of the  medium s c a l e  RCA 501/EE KDP10 
computer. B r i e f l y  a l l  th r e e  f i rm s  considered some j o i n t  arrangement ,  but 
again t h i s  came to  nothing.
Talks between RCA and ICT were more su c c e s s fu l .  ICT and Bull (be fore  
i t  came under GE's wing) were given th e  r i g h t s  to  s e l l  th e  new RCA 301 
computer in Europe63. This seems to  have been a good arrangement f o r  both 
ICT and RCA. RCA was able  t o  make a large number of  cash s a le s  to  i t s  
European p a r t n e r s ,  inc reas ing  i t s  cash flow and he lp ing  to  inc rease  i t s  
economies o f  s c a l e .  ICT marketed the  system under the  name of  the  ICT 1500 
and in B r i t i s h  terms i t  so ld  w e l l .  By 1965, 89 of  the  machines were 
i n s t a l l e d ,  a t  a value of  £6 ,408,000,  and another 52,  worth £3,744,000 were 
on order  (though many of the  l a t t e r  may not have been d e l iv e red  as newer 
systems were developed);  about  40 o f  the  o rders  were abroad6*. ICT had 
coupled i t s e l f  t o  the  success  of  RCA's most success fu l  product.  Indeed
58Computer Consu l tan ts ,  B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t . 1965.
59CBI Oral His to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Maxwell in te rv iew .
6°See below, chapte r  7, pp276-278.
61A long t ime ICT/L employee who became an execu t ive  d i r e c t o r  in 1963 
and e v en tu a l ly  ro se  to  managing d i r e c t o r .
62CBI Oral His to ry  Archive ,  A.C.L.Humphreys in te rv iewed by Erwin 
Tomash, 28/2 /81 .
63Pa tam at ion . December 1961, p53.
6*Computer Consul tan ts ,  B r i t i s h  commercial computer d i g e s t . 1965.
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RCA's European l in k s  went so well  t h a t  i t  s t a r t e d  to  design a fo llow up 
system, the  Pop la r ,  to  f u l f i l  th e  needs of the  small  t a b u l a t o r  users  t h a t  
ICT and Bull had. The f a t e  of t h i s  machine ( i t  was overtaken by the  r a p id ly  
developing market)  i s  d iscussed  in th e  RCA c h a p te r65 . While the  RCA l ink  
only provided a computer f o r  ICT to  r e s e l l ,  and gave i t  few new tech n ica l  
s k i l l s ,  the  ICT 1500 enabled ICT to  gain  a l a r g e r  market share  than would 
otherwise  have been the  case and must be counted as a success fu l  shor t - te rm  
p r o j e c t .
ICT a l so  agreed to  r e s e l l  UNIVAC's success fu l  small  c a l c u l a t i n g  
t a b u l a t o r ,  the  UNIVAC 1004. Between 1963 and 1966 ICT so ld  near ly  500 of 
these  u n i t s ,  enabling ICT to  cancel an in te rn a l  p r o j e c t  f o r  such a machine. 
The 1004 was v i t a l  in genera t ing  enough cash to  enable ICT to  surv ive  i t s  
mid-1960s c r i s i s .  These systems were easy fo r  use rs  of t r a d i t i o n a l  punched- 
card equipment t o  switch t o ,  and d id  well in th e  o ld  t a b u l a t o r  market.
The takeover of EMI's computer operations.
The absorp t ion  of  GEC's computer c a p a b i l i t y  and the  deal with RCA 
gave ICT two reasonably  success fu l  second genera t ion  machines, but they 
covered only th e  small and medium sca le  computer markets ,  though t h i s  
re p resen ted  the  l a r g e s t  p a r t  of  the  European market.  ICT wanted to  decrease  
re l i a n c e  on o u ts id e  technology and improve i t s  market coverage.  In the  
ea r ly  1960s Humphreys s t a r t e d  t a l k i n g  to  EMI66, whose medium sca le  1100 
and la rge  s c a le  2400 were both aimed a t  the  commercial da ta  process ing 
market.  EMI's range was advanced, but i t  had many problems67 . F i r s t l y  the  
two systems were incompatib le ,  and, while EMI's computer department 
supported th e  1100, the  2400 was m arg ina l ised .  EMI was a small p layer  in 
the game, with  a long way to  go i f  i t  was to  command a la rg e  enough user  
base to  f in an ce  f u r t h e r  R&D.
Given th e  f r a g i l e  na tu re  of EMI's p o s i t i o n ,  and the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  a t  
l e a s t  had technology t h a t  ICT could use ,  a merger seemed reasonab le .  This 
was achieved with  an exchange of  shares  from ICT to  EMI, 10% of the  
dividend from th e se  shares  was then to  be t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the  NRDC in 
payment f o r  i t s  investment in th e  2400. Like GEC with the  1301, EMI 
continued to  manufacture the  1100 and 2400 systems under l icence  a t  i t s  
Hayes f a c t o r y ,  bu t  t h i s  was the  end of  EMI's r o l e  as a computer b u i ld e r .
While th e  t r a n s f e r  of EMI's computer a c t i v i t i e s  gave ICT ex t ra  market
65See below, chapter  6, pp228-230.
66CBI Oral His to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Humphreys in te rv iew .
67See above, chapter 3.
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share ,  th e  most important th ing  i t  gave ICT was EMI's design team. They 
were exper ienced  in th e  use o f  s o l i d  s t a t e  e l e c t r o n i c s  in computers. This 
team proved important when ICT was faced with th e  t a sk  of design ing  a whole 
family  of  t h i r d  genera t ion  computers,  and i t  was the  ex-EMI team t h a t  
developed the  sm al le r  members of  the  range.
The 1963 takeover of the Ferranti computer operation.
The EMI deal  did not give ICT techno log ica l  independence: th e  systems 
t h a t  came with i t  were not going to  survive in to  th e  t h i r d  g e n e ra t io n  of 
computers and th e  design team was of l im i ted  s i z e .  The tech n o lo g ica l  
dependence of ICT was recognised w i th in  RCA. RCA had an ove r t  p o l icy  in the  
e a r ly  1960s of s tay in g  t e c h n o lo g ic a l ly  ahead of ICT and Bul l ,  so t h a t  t h e se  
companies would always come back to  i t  fo r  u p - to - d a te  computers. To t h i s  
end RCA cons ide red ,  and s t a r t e d  designing , a very  small computer which 
would appeal t o  ICT's t a b u l a t o r  customers68. However, in 1963 RCA found 
th a t  i t s  dominance over i t s  B r i t i s h  s e l l i n g  agent had been dimin ished:
'Dur ing the  p a s t  y e a r ,  ICT and F e r r a n t i  reached an agreement 
under which the  F e r r an t i  Computer Divis ion was merged with ICT. This 
merger has increased ICT's t o t a l  computer design c a p a b i l i t y  and has 
a l so  inc reased  t h e i r  d e s i r e  to  design and manufacture to  a g r e a t e r  
e x te n t  th e  equipment which they  s e l l .  This means t h a t  more than ever 
be fore  RCA must manage t o  'keep ahead'  of  ICT's c a p a b i l i t i e s . ' 69
I t  could be argued t h a t  ICT was the  c o u n t r y ' s  premier computer
s e l l e r 70 ; however, F e r r an t i  was B r i t a i n ' s  techno log ica l  l e ad e r .  As has
a l ready  been seen ,  th e re  had been e a r l i e r  e f f o r t s  to  b r ing  about some
coord ina t ion  of  the se  s k i l l s .  These plans  had f loundered  due to  the  two
companies'  conse rva t ive  a t t i t u d e  to  the  market,  and F e r r a n t i ' s
unwil l ingness  t o  see BTM have complete contro l  o f  s a l e s .  In the  e a r l y  1960s
no such problem occurred ,  as F e r r an t i  was more than w i l l i n g  to  give up i t s
s take in computers.
F e r r a n t i  had a number of major problems71. While i t  was t r u e  t o  say
i t  probably had th e  b e s t  design op e ra t io n ,  in th e  e a r ly  1960s i t  only had
a l im i ted  number of  machines t o  o f f e r  to  the  market.  I t  had achieved i t s
bes t  success  wi th  s c i e n t i f i c  machines, but the  only  major machine t h a t  i t
had a v a i l a b l e  f o r  mass p roduc t ion ,  th e  Orion, while  dua l-purpose ,  was not
6aUS vs IBM, p x l14, RCA EDP Div is ion ,  'Bus iness  Review' 1/12/59.
69US vs IBM. px243, RCA EDP Div is ion ,  'F ive  year  plan 1963' .
7°A.S. Douglas,  CEIR (UK) Ltd, a London based computer re sea rch  and
serv ice  bureaux company, 'The European Computer Scene: 1963 ' ,  Datamation. 
Aug 1963, pp24-26.
71See above, chapter 2, pp78-82 and pp95-99.
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r e a l l y  f a s t  enough fo r  s c i e n t i f i c  o p e ra t ions ,  and had a number of t e ch n ica l  
problems. Even i f  Fe r r an t i  had decided to  con t inue  in the  computer market 
i t  had to  compete with the  market ing and leas ing  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of US and UK 
bus iness  machine f i rms.  Apart  from th e  Orion and the  small s c i e n t i f i c  
S i r i u s  computers,  a l l  e f f o r t s  had been d i r e c te d  towards th e  s u p e r - sc a le  
ATLAS development.  ATLAS had two negat ive  e f f e c t s ,  f i r s t l y  i t  worsened the  
p r o f i t  and loss  s i t u a t i o n  of  the  Computer Departments, secondly i t  had 
d i s t r a c t e d  the  department from o th e r  work.
F e r r a n t i  d id ,  however, have one commercial EDP design on th e  'back- 
b u r n e r ' :  t h i s  was the FP6000 developed by i t s  Canadian op e ra t io n ,  F e r r a n t i -  
Packard72 . The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of the  FP6000 was v i t a l  to  ICT: i t  was to  
form th e  base of  i t s  t h i r d  genera t ion  computer fam i ly .  The r e a l  problem fo r  
F e r r an t i  was t h a t  the  t h i r d  genera t ion  of computers would be f a m i l i e s  of 
mass-produced and mass-marketed systems, not a s c a l e  of f inanc ing  t h a t  the  
p r iv a t e  F e r r a n t i  company was w i l l i n g  to  consider .  Therefore ,  F e r r an t i  was 
w i l l i n g  to  cu t  i t s  losses  and merge i t s  commercial computer a c t i v i t i e s  in to  
ICT. ICT obta ined  a s t rong  design team with e x p e r t i s e  in the  area of 
s c i e n t i f i c  computing. This team, to g e th e r  with th e  FP6000 des ign ,  was v i t a l  
to  ICT. The a l t e r n a t i v e  was to  go in with ano ther  s u p p l i e r  and become 
su b se rv ien t  to  t h a t  s u p p l i e r ' s  technology, an op t ion  English Electric-LEO- 
Marconi chose by fol lowing RCA73. ICT did  not favour  t h i s  s tan ce .
ICT and th e  t h i r d  genera t ion  of computers.
A f te r  a l l  t h e  mergers a member of  the  NRDC s t a f f  wrote t h a t  ICT:
' r e p r e s e n t s  the  major component of th e  UK indus t ry  as  f a r  as 
computers and da ta  p rocess ing  a re  c o n c e rn e d . ' 74
This l e f t  ICT with  a mixed bag of incompatible machines,  some of which were
compet it ive  with each o th e r .  ICT had to  take  some a c t io n  to  un i fy  i t s
product l i n e .  Arthur Humphreys recognised the  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  had been
crea ted :
'One of the  th in g s  t h a t  p leased me very much i s  t h a t  a f t e r  
having acquired  the  F e r r a n t i  Computer Div is ion  and EMI's computer 
a c t i v i t i e s  and because o f  the  arrangement with RCA [ICT] had a la rge  
mixed bag of  computers to  o f f e r  to  the  market p lace ,  we were ab le  to  
put a l l  th e  e x p e r t i s e  and techniques  to g e th e r  and come out with an
72NAHC product l i t e r a t u r e ,  'Born in Canada, the  ICL-1900 s e r i e s  comes 
home to  r o o s t ' ,  ICL p u b l i c i t y  l e a f l e t  r e p r i n t i n g  an a r t i c l e  from Canadian 
Datasvstems. November 1969.
73See above, chapter  4, pp l46-150.
74NRDC 86/35 /4 ,  J .Crawley , 'The  UK Computer Indus t ry  with p a r t i c u l a r  
Reference to  ICT',  22 /7/64.
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e n t i r e l y  new range of computers which was th e  1900 s e r i e s . ' 75
By th e  t ime of the  1963 merger with F e r r a n t i  the  computer indus t ry  
was s t a r t i n g  t o  tu rn  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  to  developing th e  next genera t ion  of  
machines.  These were the  t h i r d  genera t ion  systems which emphasised 
c o m p a t ib i l i t y ,  improved p e r i p h e r a l s ,  comprehensive o p e ra t ing  systems, and 
the  move toward in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t s  as the  core  component. During the  t h i r d  
g enera t ion  th e  many d i f f e r e n t  computers made by a company were rep laced  by 
members o f  a common family .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between s c i e n t i f i c  computers and 
those f o r  commercial da ta  p ro ce ss in g ,  a d i s t i n c t i o n  which was a l ready  being 
b lu r r e d ,  became i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in a l l  but the  realm of super-computing and 
the  new small  engineering machines appearing from such f i rms as DEC and 
E l l i o t t s .  IBM's r e a c t io n  to  th e se  changes in the  market was to  rep lace  i t s  
whole product l i n e  with the  360 fam i ly  of computers75: t h i s  al lowed IBM 
to  achieve s i g n i f i c a n t  s ca le  economies on common sub-systems,  and gave 
users  g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y .
Every computer company found t h a t  i t  had to  make some s o r t  of  
s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n  on how to  r e a c t  to  th e  360. Most decided t o  follow IBM's 
example of  having a compatible family  a r c h i t e c t u r e .  RCA went as f a r  as to  
produce i t s  own vers ion  of th e  360, with  EE fo l lowing  in i t s  wake. ICT made 
a dec i s io n  to  produce i t s  own compatible fam i ly ,  based on the  F e r r an t i  
FP6000. F e r r a n t i ' s  Canadian s u b s id i a r y  had taken on t h i s  development as the  
B r i t i s h  o p e ra t io n  had i t s  hands f u l l  with th e  Orion and A t la s .  The 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  was devised by a F e r r a n t i  salesman, Harry Johnson, f o r  a 
system based loose ly  on the  Pegasus computer and as a fo l low up to  i t 77 . 
I t  used component technology from the  F e r ran t i -P acka rd  a i r l i n e  r e s e r v a t io n  
system, Gemini, and some of th e  systems phi losophy of  the  Orion. I t  was a 
very f l e x i b l e  design and could be configured to  cover  a l a rge  spectrum of 
the  market.
All  t h i s  c lo se ly  f i t t e d  ICT's needs. I t  was a much more advanced 
system than  ICT's own developments,  and i t  was p o s s ib le  to  produce i t  
quickly  as th e  c i r c u i t r y  had a l ready  been proved by F e r ran t i -P acka rd .  In 
April 1963 ICT dropped two in t e r n a l  p r o j e c t s  f o r  medium s ized  computers in 
favour o f  developing the  FP6000, whi le  o ther  p r o j e c t s ,  such as the  'P o p la r '  
being designed with RCA and a p r o j e c t  in h e r i t ed  from EMI, were slowed down
75CBI Oral H is to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Humphreys in te rv iew .
75US vs IBM. Dxl404, 'F in a l  r e p o r t  of SPREAD Task Group' ,  28/12/61. 
This was the  r e p o r t  t h a t  recommended the  360 s t r a t e g y .
77Campbell-Kelly,  TCL, pp221.
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and l a t e r  abandoned73. O f f i c i a l l y  Fe r ran t i  d id  not s e l l  i t s  o p e ra t ion  to  
ICT u n t i l  September 1963, but i t  i s  obvious t h a t  the  merger was accepted 
well be fo re  t h i s .  Even so,  be fo re  the  announcement of th e  360 in April  
19647 9 , ICT's product plan was s t i l l  complex8 0 :
However, fo llowing the  announcement of the  IBM 360, ICT dropped a l l  
the  aforement ioned p r o j e c t s  in favour  of an expanded FP6000/ICT1900 
programme to  cover almost th e  whole range of  the  computer market.  The 
i n i t i a l  announcements were made in September 1964 and by 1967 th e  range,  
inc luding announcements, co n s i s te d  of the  1901, 1902, 1903, 1904-5, 1906-7 
and 1909. There was a lso  a proposal f o r  a l a rge  s ca le  s c i e n t i f i c  system, 
the 1908s 2 . The 5 and 7 were s c i e n t i f i c  ve rs ions  of t h e i r  commercial 
s i b l i n g s .
The s m a l l e s t  member o f  the  family ,  the  1901, was launched in 
1965s 3 . I t s  launch was delayed f o r  two reasons:  f i r s t l y  t o  spread out R&D 
c o s t s ,  secondly t o  p r o t e c t  th e  'cash  cow' 1004 s a l e s .  The 1901 seems to  
have been s in g led  out f o r  sp ec ia l  a t t e n t i o n  and was e s p e c i a l l y  s u c c e s s fu l .  
I t  was a small system, with a s t a r t i n g  p r ice  of only £60 ,000s *. In i t s  
l a rg e r  c o n f ig u ra t io n  (c o s t in g  around £120,000) i t  came with magnetic tape  
d r iv e s .  I t  was a l so  provided with the  NIC0L85 programming language which 
was designed to  emulate t a b u l a t o r  techn iques ,  so i t  was easy f o r  punched 
card u se r s  to  switch t o ,  and was f u l l y  compatible with th e  r e s t  o f  the  
l in e .  These k inds  of f a c i l i t i e s  were unusual in th e  s m a l le s t  member of  a
7SIb id ,  pp232-240.
79F.M. F ish e r  e t  a l ,  IBM and th e  US da ta  process ing  in d u s t ry :  an 
economic h i s t o r y . New York, 1983, pl05.
so Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pp223-224.
S1A p r o j e c t  being developed by th e  ex-EMI team.
SZCBI a rc h iv e ,  0NR, 'The B r i t i s h  Computer Scene ' ,  17/5 /67.
Small:
Small/Medium:
Enhanced UNIVAC 1004.
PF18281 to  r e p la ce  the  EMI 1100 and ICT 1300. 
2201 being designed with RCA.
FP6000 so ld  as ICT 1900.
RCA 3301 t o  be so ld  as the  ICT 1600.
Orion replacement.
Atlas  replacement.
Medium/Large:
Large:
Giant:
83 ib id .
8* Ib id .
85CBI Archive,  0NR, The B r i t i s h  Computer Scene: p a r t  I I .
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computer family:  even IBM could not o f f e r  such a cheap magnetic tape  
machine.  In i t s  f i r s t  year  i t s  orders  ran to  228, a t h i r d  from 
overseas86 .
The US Off ice  of Naval Research,  ONR, saw the  whole 1900 family  as 
a success fu l  product,  and an updated s e r i e s  with e ig h t  b i t  da ta  paths 
promised more success:
'The o ther  machines have a l s o  sold s u c c e s s f u l ly  with over $200 
m i l l i o n  in value and over 650 t o t a l  s a l e s .  More than a t h i r d  a re  fo r  
expo r t ,  notably to  A u s t r a l i a ,  New Zealand, A fr i ca ,  France (over 30 
s a l e s ) ,  Germany ( to  s c i e n t i f i c  u n i v e r s i t i e s  among o t h e r s ) ,  and 
Eastern Europe. About 300 have been d e l iv e re d .  Lower cos t  1900s have 
been promised before  the  end of 1967 by d i r e c t  updating with 
m ic r o c i r c u i t s .  I t  i s  a l so  intended to  make the  6 - b i t  c h a r ac te r  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  s e r i e s  (24 b i t  words) compatible with the  8 - b i t  
extended BCD s e t  adopted by IBM and Engl ish E l e c t r i c . /S7
IBM a l so  recognised the  range as a major competi tor in the  overseas  market.
IBM was conscious t h a t  i t  did  not o f f e r  magnetic tape  f a c i l i t i e s  on i t s
s m a l le s t  system, the 360-20. IBM r a t e d  ICL and the  1900 as i t s  l a r g e s t
overseas  compet itor88.
There were a number of reasons f o r  the  success  of the  1900. I t  was,
in some ways, not as advanced as o th e r  systems announced a t  t h a t  t ime. I t
did not use the  in teg ra ted  c i r c u i t  components of RCA and EE, or hybrid
technology as used by IBM, ins tead  re ly ing  on the  t r i e d  and t e s t e d
t r a n s i s t o r .  However t h i s  gave one g re a t  advantage: by using the  same
components as th e  FP6000 i t  meant t h a t  the  medium s ized  1900s ( c l o s e s t  in
s ize  to  the  o r ig in a l  FP6000) could be d e l iv e red  four  months a f t e r
announcement. The ICT 1900 family  was a v a i l a b le  in Europe before  the  IBM
360, mainly due to  production delays  in IBM's SLT components89, and way
ahead of EE's IC based System 4. The 1900 was a v a i l a b l e  and i t  had the
philosophy of the  t h i r d  genera t ion  machines: i t  was a family  of compatible
moderately advanced machines, with some good commercial sof tware .  In the
l a t e  1960s the  1900s were given a new lease of  l i f e  when the  in te g ra te d
c i r c u i t  ve rs ions  were re l e a s e d  using 8 b i t  c h a r a c te r s  and 32 byte  words.
86Ib id .
87Ibid .
88US vs IBM px2482, IBM World Trade Corpora tion ,  'Competit ive  
Manufacturer New Sales ,  and Renta ls  I n s t a l l e d ' .
S9IBM had to  cope with massive demand f o r  SLT components due to  the  
g rea t  success o f  the  360 family .
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The c o s t  of the  1900 f a m i ly .
However, th ings  were f a r  from smooth f o r  ICT. As noted by the  ONR:
'The company is  undergoing dramatic  t r a n s i t i o n  as i t  phases out i t s  
punch card i n s t a l l a t i o n s  in favour of the  low end of  i t s  1900 s e r i e s  
of  compatible c o m p u te r s . '90
Before the  success  of the  1900 could show through in p r o f i t s ,  the  company
had some bad f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s .  In 1965 the t r a d i n g  p r o f i t  c o l lap sed  and
did  not cover ICT's inc reas ing  i n t e r e s t  burden: p re - ta x  lo s s  was £509,000
on a reduced tu rnover  of £55,250,00091. F igures  5.2 to  5.4 give the
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  the  sh o r t  l i f e  of ICT:
9°CBI Archive,  ONR, 'The B r i t i s h  Computer Scene, p t I I ' .
91ICL annual r e p o r t ,  'Review by the  chairman ' ,  1968.
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Figure 5.2
ICT Financial Statistics
Turnover, 1960-1968.
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Figure 5.3
ICT Financial Statistics
Pre-tax profit, 1960-1968
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Figure 5.4
ICT Financial Statistics
Profit ratios, 1960-1968.
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Much of  the  reason f o r  the  p r o f i t  down-turn was the  cos t  o f  growth, 
as o u t l in e d  by the  chairman, S i r  Ceci l  Mead:
' f i r s t l y ,  the  expensive p repa ra t ion  needed f o r  the  success fu l  
marketing of  the  company's new 1900 S e r i e s  computer; secondly a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  loss  in the  planned output o f  punch card  and a n c i l l a r y  
equipment, due to  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in the  change-over of 
production f a c i l i t i e s  to  computer manufacture;  and t h i r d l y ,  the  
cons ide rab le  f a l l  in revenue ( th e  UK t o t a l  was down from £4 3 .9m to  
£36 .7m) t h a t  r e s u l t e d  both from the f a l l i n g  away of d e l i v e r i e s  of 
e a r l i e r  types  of  computers,  and from th e  i n e v i t a b l e  lag in g e t t i n g  
s t a r t e d  an adequate flow o f  d e l i v e r i e s  o f  th e  1900 S e r i e s .
However, ICT a lso  su f fe red  from a f a m i l i a r  problem in the  in d u s t ry  -
t a b u l a t o r s  were being s en t  back. Customers were order ing  computers to
rep lace  punched cards .  Leased t a b u l a t o r s ,  which had been g iv ing  a s teady
stream of  income, came back to  the  f a c to ry  t o  be rep laced  by leased
computers,  with a l l  the  i n i t i a l  c a p i t a l  costs  of  th e  computer being borne
by the  s u p p l i e r .  I t  then took a number of y ea r s  f o r  the  income from the
leases  to  match the  c a p i t a l  o u t l a y  f o r  the growing number of  machines. I t
was t h i s  problem t h a t  led t o  the  formation o f  Computer Leasing Ltd,  a
leas ing  f inance  company backed by c i t y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .  This company
bought ICT computers, l eased  them o u t ,  and re p a id  inves to rs  a t  a few
percent above base r a t e ;  ICT rece ived  the remainder93. The aim was to
reduce the  f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i n  o f  l e a s in g  computers on ICT i t s e l f .
Another problem was t h a t  in th e  e a r l y  1960s ICT had b u i l t  up
f a c i l i t i e s  to  produce punched card  equipment. However, demand fo r
t a b u l a t o r s  co l lapsed  as the  computer boomed: th e  smal ler  market f o r  the se
machines could be covered by simply overhauling re tu rned  punched card
systems9 4 . These f a c i l i t i e s  had to  be converted to  computer produc t ion .
Coping with c r i s i s  - government support  fo r  R&D.
The 1900 was being accepted  well  in th e  market p lace .  The r e a l  
problem was coping with the  c o s t  o f  t h i s  success and ensur ing  t h a t  f u t u r e  
growth was not c u r t a i l e d  by th e  expense of in t roducing  the  1900 s e r i e s .  ICT 
took a number of s teps  to  improve cash flow, such as r a i s i n g  r e n t a l  p r i c e s ,  
s e l l i n g  a s s e t s  and c u t t i n g  s t a f f  and other c o s t s 95, but the  government 
stepped in to  help ICT main ta in  i t s  R&D programme when cos t  c u t t i n g
92Inves to rs  Review. 8 /1 /6 6 ,  p l l ,  r epo r t  of  Cecil  Mead's chai rman 's  
s ta tement .
93Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pp220-221.
94Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pp249-252.
95Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pp252-255.
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t h r e a t e n e d  i t .
In the  pe r iod  1963-1965 t h e r e  was cons ide rab le  debate w i th in  the  NRDC 
as t o  how t o  support  the  in d u s t ry .  This debate  was sparked by the  
announcement of  th e  IBM 360. One of  th e  f i r s t  items to  be f i l e d  in the  NRDC 
f o l d e r  marked ' t h e  UK computer d e b a te '  was an a r t i c l e  from the  Financ ia l  
Times96 . This noted t h a t  while  ICT had prev ious ly  been neck and neck with 
IBM terms of  in new o rd e r s ,  in th e  7-8  weeks fo l lowing  the  launch of the  
360 IBM orde rs  had rocke ted ,  with  over 100 on th e  books97.
The NRDC viewed ICT as th e  most important p a r t  of  the  UK indus t ry ,  
but was concerned about whether i t  could compete with IBM98. There were 
t h r e e  main f a c t o r s  in ICT's s i t u a t i o n :
1) The £10m t a b u l a t o r  bus iness  had grown in the  1950s but was expected to  
d e c l i n e ,  becoming i n s i g n i f i c a n t  by 1970.
2) The E l e c t r o n ic  Data Processing  market had been zero in 1950, but was 
growing r a p i d l y .
3) The d a ta  c a p tu r e /p e r ip h e r a l  s e c t o r ,  while not well  def ined  a t  the  t ime,  
was expec ted to  grow to  r e p la ce  the  t a b u l a t o r  bus iness  in s i z e .
Cruc ia l  to  ICT's f u tu r e  was th e  expected growth in the  computer 
b u s in ess .  This market was expected to  grow a t  between 15% to  20% per 
annum99. This was the crux of th e  problem; ICT es t im ated  t h a t ,  a t  most, 
i t  could hope f o r  only 10% growth. I t  was p re d i c t i n g  t h a t  i t s  market share  
would f a l l  from 40% in 1964 to  28% in 1974, a l lowing IBM and o the r  US 
companies to  become even more powerful.
The reason  ICT could not grow f a s t e r  than 10% per annum, in normal 
c ircumstances  an admirable achievement,  has a l r e ad y  been a l luded  to :  ICT 
was having problems in g iv ing  an adequate r e t u r n  to  i t s  i n v e s to r s .  The 
argument was t h a t ,  as ICT was earn ing  only 6% on c a p i t a l 100, t h i s  was 
not high enough to  a t t r a c t  new in v e s t o r s .  Therefore ,  i t  had to  grow using 
only th e  £65m of  c a p i t a l  i t  a l r e ad y  had. All new f inance  would have to  be 
generated  i n t e r n a l l y .  This l im i t ed  how f a s t  i t  could p lace  new machines on
"NRDC 86/35 /4 .
97Financia1 Times. 3 /6 /64 ,  Michael Shanks, i n d u s t r i a l  e d i t o r , 'C a n
IBM's r i v a l s  s t a y  the  pace '  p l4 .
"NRDC 86 /35 /4 ,  Crawley 'The UK Computer Indus t ry  with p a r t i c u l a r  
Reference to  ICT',  i n t e r n a l  r e p o r t ,  22/7/64.
" i b i d .
100Ibid.
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t o  the  market.  ICT was t e l l i n g  th e  NRDC t h a t  i t  could not grow f a s t e r  than 
10% pe r  annum due to  i t s  low p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  However, the  NRDC was framing 
an argument t h a t  ICT had to  achieve  growth r a t e s  o f  over 15% to  ensure  t h a t  
i t  could  reach a minimum e f f i c i e n t  s c a l e  to main ta in  long term R&D without 
a f f e c t i n g  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n .  The NRDC was coming to  th e  view t h a t  ICT 
was too small t o  match IBM's R&D expend i tu res .  ICT's co s t  c u t t i n g  was an 
a ttempt  to  compete with the  lower IBM cost  base ,  but t h i s  was a t  the  
expense o f  abandoning fu tu r e  developments.  The r e a l i t y  of th e  s i t u a t i o n  was 
t h a t  ICT was not opera t ing  a t  the  same cost  leve l  as IBM and was only j u s t  
capable  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  a l l  the  fu n c t io n s  i t  had to  perform to  su rv ive .
To in c rease  the p ro jec ted  growth r a t e ,  th e  NRDC be l ieved  t h a t  ICT 
needed to  have a l a rg e r  R&D budget .  ICT's spending on R&D was roughly £3m 
per annum101, about £2m a t  Stevenage and the  remaining £lm in 
Manchester,  where the old F e r r a n t i  opera t ion  was based. However, in 1965 
ICT proposed c u t t i n g  long-term re sea rch  to  save £300,000 a year .  I t  
abandoned long range development of systems f o r  the  e a r l y  1970s, al though 
p r o j e c t s  to  update  the 1900 remained. This inc luded the  1900 S e r ie s  A with 
a 'modern'  8 - b i t  da ta  path and IC components102. The NRDC be l ieved  t h a t  
i t  was c r i t i c a l  to  maintain long term re sea rch ,  as well  as cont inuing  work 
on the  1900 S e r i e s  A. I f  t h i s  was not done then th e  company would not have 
a product f o r  th e  1970s103.
Following d iscuss ions  between Basil  de F e r r a n t i ,  from ICT, and NRDC 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 10*, the  o rg a n iz a t io n s  came up with  a scheme f o r  the  NRDC 
to  suppor t  ICT's R&D work105. The scheme envisaged R&D expenditure  of 
£20m, spread over four y ea r s ,  the  NRDC was to  provide  one q u a r t e r  of t h i s :
101Ib id .
1Q2US vs IBM px2482, IBM 'Competit ive  M anufac tu re rs ' ,  Sept 1969; 
Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p253.
103NRDC 86/35 /4 ,  'The UK computer market with p a r t i c u l a r  re fe re n ce  to
ICT'.
10*NRDC 86/35 /4 ,  i n te rn a l  undated memo probably  by Crawley, 'UK 
Computer In d u s t ry -P o ss ib le  arrangements between NRDC and ICT'.
l o s NRDC 86/35/4  'NRDC Support '  a paper submitted to  th e  ICT Executive 
Committee 16 /2 /65 ,  and submitted to  th e  NRDC as a proposal  fo r  suppor t .
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Table 5.2 NRDC support fo r ICT's R&D.
£m 64/5 65/6 66/7 67/8 t o t a l
NRDC Funds 1 1.5 1.5 1 5
Tota l  R&D 3.5 4.5 5.0 5 .0 -5 .5
The f i n a l  scheme sp ec i f ie d  t h a t  th e  t o t a l  should in f a c t  be £20m.
Source: NRDC 86/35 /5 ,  'NRDC/ICT d r a f t  agreement,  13/4 /65.
ICT had a l i s t  of p r o j e c t s  i t  was car ry ing  o u t ,  some of which were 
expected to  use NRDC money:
1) Future  1900 p lans:
a)A system below the  1902 to  compete with th e  IBM 360/20 and 360/10. 
This became the very su ccess fu l  1901. NRDC money was not earmarked 
f o r  t h i s .
b)A small s c i e n t i f i c  machine was planned, with no NRDC money.
c)The development of a p ro to type  1908 super computer was being 
cons ide red .  I t  was to  have with  four t imes the  speed of the  1907, 
bu t  f u l l  development was dependent on o th e r  Government support  and 
s p e c i f i c  o rde rs .
d)The development of 'com pa t ib le  and compet i t ive  p e r i p h e r a l s '  was to  
be sponsored by the  NRDC. ICT needed to  improve i t s  p e r i p h e r a l s ,  
both to  improve the  com pet i t iveness  of the  1900 family  and f o r  s a le  
t o  t h i r d  p a r t i e s .  Sa les  of  p e r ip h e ra l s  had been a reasonab ly  
su cc e s s fu l  p a r t  of ICT's b u s i n e s s 106.
2) Future  systems:
NRDC suppor t  was earmarked f o r  developing a range to  r e p la ce  the  
1900 in t h e  1970s.
Repayment of the  £5 m i l l i o n  loan was to  s t a r t  in 1969/70 and was to  
be l inked  to  ICT's p r o f i t  on funds employed r a t i o .  I f  ICT main ta ined  a 10% 
p r o f i t  on funds employed f o r  fo u r  years ,  th e  NRDC would re c e iv e  
£5.1m107. There fore ,  to  give the  NRDC a reasonable  r e tu r n  i t  was looking 
fo r  a s u b s t a n t i a l  improvement in ICT's p r o f i t  r a t i o s .
The NRDC money was e s s e n t i a l l y  a method of supplying cheap long-term 
debt to  ICT. The company a l so  received  help from o th e r  government
106CBI Archive,  ONR, The B r i t i s h  Computer Scene,  p t l l .
107NRDC 86/35/5 ,  'NRDC/ICT Draf t  Agreement' 13/4/65.
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depar tments .  Some £700,000 was provided f o r  long term work from the 
M in is t ry  of  Technology 's Advanced Computer Technology P r o j e c t 108. This 
money was used t o  fund the  Basic Language Machine (BLM) concept developed 
by ICT's J .K I l i f f e .  The BLM concept,  combined with  P ro fesso r  Tom K i lb u rn ' s  
Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  MU5 development, was to  form the  b a s i s  of ICL's 1970s 
and 1980s systems,  the  ICL 2900109. In the 1970s ICL received  £40m from 
th e  government t o  develop the  2900110.
MinTech i n i t i a t i v e s  a lso  helped in o th e r  ways. I t  sponsored the  
Flowers Report  in to  h igher educa t ion  computing which was a major c a t a l y s t  
in the  argument f o r  increased suppor t  f o r  computers.  P ro fesso r  Flowers was 
the  c h a i r  of  th e  Un ivers i ty  Grants Committee 's  computer sub-committee,  
which was u s u a l l y  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  purchase of medium sca le  
computers111. Flowers came to  two major conc lus ions .  He concluded t h a t  
a number of u n i v e r s i t i e s  needed new la rge  s c a le  computer f a c i l i t i e s :  the  
c u r r e n t  KDF9s in s e rv ice  were out of d a te .  He be l ieved  the  ICT 1907 might 
be ab le  to  f i l l  the  need112. His second conclusion was t h a t  a number of 
reg iona l  super-computer cen t re s  were needed. As t h e r e  was no B r i t i s h  super ­
computer a v a i l a b l e ,  he recommended buying a number of CDC 6600s,  which was 
seen as a s l i g h t  to  B r i t i s h  a b i l i t i e s .
EELM and ICT used t h i s  r e p o r t  to  j u s t i f y  proposa ls  f o r  a j o i n t  super 
computer development p ro j e c t  between themselves and the  French f i rm  CITEC. 
I t  a l so  led to  increased  spending on u n i v e r s i t y  computer f a c i l i t i e s ,  and 
l a t e r  was used in ICT's arguments t h a t  sponsorship should be provided f o r  
i t s  1908 la rge  computer p r o j e c t .  However, the  r e p o r t  a l so  under l ined  how 
f a r  the  UK had f a l l e n  behind in super-computers .
None of  th e  var ious  super-computer p ro j e c t s  came to  anyth ing , but the  
proposal f o r  a National  Computer Centre  ( to g e th e r  with a number of  r eg iona l  
c en t r e s )  o u t s id e  t r a d i t i o n a l  h igher  educa t iona l  f a c i l i t i e s  was accepted.  
The National Computer Centre was e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1965113, provid ing  a 
se rv ice  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  computer use r s  and he lp ing to  d issemina te  computer
1£>8CBI Archive,  ONR, The B r i t i s h  Computer Scene, p t l l .
109Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p247.
110CBI Oral His to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Humphreys in te rv iew.
1X1NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  Kevin W i l l i s  i n t e rn a l  NRDC memo concerning a meeting 
with Prof B.H. Flowers and S i r  Wilis  Jackson of  the  UGC, 22/3 /65 .
112 i b i d .
113CBI Archive,  ONR, 'The B r i t i s h  Computer Scene, P a r t  I I I ,  The 
Regional and National  Computing C e n t r e s ' .
188
knowledge.
Flowers was not the  only person  to r a i s e  concern on the  use and 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  computers in the  UK. Professor  B la ck e t t ,  an NRDC board 
member, prepared a r e p o r t  on th e  use of computers by various  
governments114. He found t h a t  by 1964, 1565 computers were being used 
by th e  US government115, and th e  French s t a t e  used 111. The UK lagged 
behind: in a House of Lords debate  on 8 th  April  1963, Lord Blakenham s t a t e d  
t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  used 88 computers, 81 of  which were 
d o m e s t ic a l ly  produced116. However, th e  l i s t  o f  machines included some 
very  l im i t ed  systems such as the  Powers PCC c a l c u l a t o r .
One of th e  NRDC's a d v i so r s ,  P ro fesso r  G i l l ,  came to  the  conclusion 
t h a t  a 'N a t iona l  Computer A u th o r i t y '  was needed. I t  would have a dual r o l e ,  
f i r s t l y  to  d i r e c t  and supply R&D support ,  and secondly to  a c t  as an 
in format ion  source  and purchasing agency fo r  government depar tments.  While 
t h i s  d id  not come about ,  a Computer Advisory Unit  was s e t  up to  help 
Government depar tments to  adopt computer techn iques .  I t  a l so  provided 
informat ion and eva lua t ions  o f  computers,  with a s t rong  emphasis on B r i t i s h  
machines.  The agency in charge of  purchasing computers,  the  Treasury 
Support  Unit ,  a l s o  s t a r t e d  t o  favour  B r i t i s h  systems117. This became an 
ove r t  p o l icy  of  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t r e a tm e n t  fo r  ICL computers. IBM estimated  
t h a t  under C iv i l  Service Department r u l e s ,  IBM tenders  f o r  computer 
c o n t r a c t s  had to  be 25% b e t t e r  than  ICL b ids  to  s tand a chance of 
winning118.
The f i n a l  piecemeal method of support ing the  da ta  process ing  indus t ry  
was the  p ro v is io n  of tax  breaks  on th e  purchase of  equipment.  This amounted 
to  an e x t r a  20% tax  reb a te  on computer equipment. Purchasers  of computers
114NRDC 86 /35 /4 ,  Prof .  P a t r i c k  B la ck e t t ,  19/5 /64. B lacke t t  prepared 
t h i s  r e p o r t  a f t e r  r ece iv ing  a memo on th e  su b jec t  from Pro f .  G i l l ,  a long 
time adv iso r  to  the  NRDC.
115More s t a t i s t i c s  on the  use o f  computers by the  US government appear 
in chap te r  9.
116NRDC 86/35 /5 ,  Prof .  P a t r i c k  B lacke t t  memo, 19/5/64.
117NRDC 86 /35 /5 ,  in t e r n a l  memo by Crawley on a meeting a t  the  Min is t ry  
of Technology, 29 /1 /65.
118E.R. Nixon, M.D. IBM UK, S e le c t  Committee on Science and Technology 
(sub-committee A),  Session 1970-71, The prospects  f o r  the  United Kingdom 
Computer In d u s t ry  in the  1970's Vol 2; Minutes of Evidence [HC621-II] 
Q.349.
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r ece ived  a 40% g ra n t ,  r a t h e r  than th e  normal investment g ran t  o f  20%119. 
This was. something t h a t  th e  in d u s t ry  had wanted f o r  a number: of 
y e a r s 120.
ICT f u l l y  u t i l i s e d  a l l  the  support  i t  could ge t  from government while 
i t  was e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  l a rg e  1900 u se r  base.  The c o s t s  of  support ing  a 
growing u se r  base were, on occas ion ,  f a t a l  f o r  a computer o p e r a t io n 121, 
ICT ensured t h a t  i t  cushioned the  e x t r a  expense by employing any government 
g ran ts  t h a t  i t  could f i n d .
Changes in o rg a n is a t i o n  and c o n t r o l l i n g  c o s t s .
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y  ICT's o rg a n i s a t i o n  d i f f e r e d  from t h a t  of th e  m u l t i -  
product e l e c t r o n i c s  companies t h a t  a re  the main focus  of t h i s  study.  ICT's 
s t r u c t u r e  r e f l e c t e d  the  s in g l e  market place  in which i t  ope ra ted ,  with an 
o rg a n i s a t i o n  based on f u n c t io n a l  d i v i s i o n s .  I t  d id  however toy  with the  IBM 
formula of  p a r t i a l  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  by s p l i t t i n g  th e  product l i n e  in h a l f ,  
according to  system s i z e s ,  and using t h i s  to  c r e a te  s e p a ra te  p r o f i t  
c e n t r e s .  This was a sh o r t  l ived  e x e r c i s e .  Of a l l  the  companies and 
d iv i s io n s  t h a t  went in to  the  formation of ICL, BTM seems to  have been the  
dominant one.  BTM had been organised  in to  fu n c t io n a l  d iv i s io n s  and with a 
geog raph ica l ly  arranged s a l e s  o p e ra t io n .  There was, however, some d iv i s io n  
between th e  t a b u l a t o r  and computer o p e r a t io n s 122.
With the  takeover of the  F e r r a n t i ,  GEC and EMI o p e ra t io n s ,  and with 
the growing importance of computers, ICT made a move to  d e c e n t r a l i s e ,  
forming two design  and production groups.  Based in Stevenage was the  Data 
Processing Equipment Group123. This d iv i s io n :
' d e a l s  with th e  development and production o f  th e  smal ler  
computers,  of  t a b u l a t o r s  and a l l  punch card  a n c i l l a r y  equipment, and 
of p e r ip h e ra l  equipment f o r  a l l  c o m p u te r s ' . 1Z*
The second new u n i t  was the  Computer Equipment Group:
'Our Computer Equipment Group, a t  West Gorton, Manchester, and 
a l so  a t  B racknel l ,  Berksh ire ,  deals  with  the  development and 
product ion  of  the  l a r g e r  computer systems, such as A t l a s ,  Orion and
119Er ic  Moonman, B r i t i s h  Computers and I n d u s t r i a l  Innovation: The 
impl ica t ions  o f  the  Par l iamentary  S e l e c t  Committee. 1971, p i .
12°Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p247.
121See below, chap te r  6 on RCA.
122NRDC 86/44 /3 ,  'Notes on s a l e s  promotion and a p p l i c a t i o n s  of 
computers ' ,  11/7 /55.
123ICT Annual Report ,  1964.
12*ib id .
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the bigger systems in the 1900 S eries .'125
The l a t t e r  was b a s i c a l l y  the  old  F e r r a n t i  d iv i s io n .  Though t h i s  rep resen ted  
a major d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  i t  was done with the  1900 a r c h i t e c t u r e  as the  
chosen design f o r  both o p e ra t io n s .  This resembled IBM's s t r u c t u r e  with the  
General Process ing  Divis ion producing smal ler 360s and p e r i p h e r a l s ,  and 
Computer Systems Division producing l a rg e r  s ca le  computers.  The marketing 
op e ra t io n  was maintained as a s e p a ra te  fun c t io n a l  u n i t :
Fio 5.5
I-----------
Data Processing  
Equipment Group
B.Z. Ferranti
ComDU ter
Equipment Group
E.C.H. Organ
Source: ICT annual r e p o r t  1964
P.P. Hall
 1
Marketing
A.L.C.
Humphreys
F e r r a n t i ' s  in f luence  was l a r g e ,  with both B.Z. F e r r a n t i  and P.D. Hall 
having come from F e r r a n t i .  Hall  had been the  l a s t  genera l  manager of 
F e r r a n t i ' s  computer department,  so was a na tu ra l  choice as t h e  head of CEG. 
F e r r an t i  was a l s o  the  second l a r g e s t  shareholder  with  10.3% of o rd inary  
shares .  Bas il  was F e r r a n t i ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on the  board of ICT. The 
l a r g e s t  sha reh o ld e r  was Vickers with 23.6%.
However, d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  was not a success f o r  the  company. During 
the  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  of the  mid-1960s, one of the  non-executive  d i r e c t o r s ,  
S i r  Anthony Burney, was asked to  make recommendations126. He recommended 
the  c u t t i n g  of R&D and s e l l i n g  a s s e t s .  He a lso  c r i t i c i z e d  Basil  Fe r r an t i  
fo r  al lowing d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  to  go so f a r  as to  lo se  con t ro l  of 
expendi ture .  This led to  the  r e -e s t ab l i sh m e n t  of a s i n g l e  co n t ro l  over the  
R&D and produc t ion  o p e ra t io n s .  Bas i l  was forced out and long t ime company 
employee Echo Organ was placed in charge127.
The experiment with r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  was a f a i l u r e .  While i t  aped the  
success fu l  IBM s t r u c t u r e  i t  was incongruous given ICT's sm al le r  s c a le .  
IBM's p a r t i a l l y  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  d iv i s io n s  were huge compared to  the  whole of
125 i b id
126Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pp251-252. Burney was a p a r tn e r  in the  
accountants  Binder  Hamlyn.
127ICL annual r e p o r t ,  1967.
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ICT, and in any case they were s t r i c t l y  c o n t r o l l e d 128. Rather l i k e  the  
s i t u a t i o n  a t  F e r r an t i  when t h e r e  were computer o pe ra t ions  in both 
Manchester and London, coord ina t ion  seems to  have been incomplete and c o s t s  
were not kept under c o n t ro l .
ICT compared to  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies.
The main focus of t h i s  case  s tudy is  t o  show the reasons  why ICT, 
r a t h e r  than an e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm ,  came to  dominate th e  B r i t i s h  in d u s t ry  ( the  
ICL merger i s  covered in the  EE c h a p te r ) .
The bus iness  machines f irms c l e a r l y  s t a r t e d  from a d i f f e r e n t  po in t  
from any of  the  B r i t i s h  or American e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. The d r iv e  in to  
computers was led by changing demand with in  i t s  usual  market p lace :  i t  was 
a m a t te r  of  su rv iva l  r a t h e r  than d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  In some r e s p e c t s  the  ICT 
h i s t o r y  i s  s i m i l a r  to  the  exper ience  o f  US bus iness  machines companies, 
e s p e c i a l l y  a t  the  po in t  of e n te r in g  th e  manufacture of computers. Like i t s  
US c o u n te r p a r t s ,  acqu ir ing  the  r i g h t  s k i l l s  was a l l  important;  ICT did  t h i s  
by t a k in g -o v e r  the  computer departments  of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. In 
the  US, bus iness  machines companies acquired  th e  small e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  
f i rms t h a t  s t a r t e d  bu i ld ing  computers in th e  1950s129. The only 
exception  to  t h i s  was IBM, which grew i n t e r n a l l y  by b u i ld in g  on i t s  
exper ience  of  incorpora t ing  e l e c t r o n i c s  in to  i t s  t a b u l a t i n g  machines.
What i s  d i f f e r e n t  i s  th e  h igher  leve l  of d i r e c t  government 
i n t e rv e n t io n  surrounding the  ICT h i s t o r y .  In th e  US the  government 's  r o l e  
was l im i t ed  to  purchasing sys tems130, though on a vas t  s c a l e .  In the  UK 
i t  was deemed necessary  to  in te rvene  in the  f a s t e s t  growing in d u s t ry  in the  
world t o  ensure  t h a t  B r i t a in  main ta ined  a fo o tho ld  in t h i s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  
important technology. ICT rece ived  an important c o n t r ib u t io n  from the  
s t a t e .
ICT's R&D f ig u r e s  seem small compared to  th e  f i g u r e s  t h a t  a re  bandied 
about f o r  IBM. Thomas Watson J n r ,  who in h e r i t e d  con tro l  o f  IBM from h is  
f a t h e r ,  e s t im ated  t h a t  i t  spent $750 m i l l io n  on the  eng ineer ing  of the  360 
Ser ies  and up t o  $4.5bn was spen t  on a l l  t h e  c o s t s  of in t roducing  the  
fam i ly131. However, when comparing ICT's spending on the  1900 with say 
RCA's expend i tu re  on the  Spectra  70, i t  does not seem to  have been so f a r
12aSee below, chapte r  8,  pp320-325.
129See below, chapte r  8, s e c t io n s  on NCR, and Burroughs pp330-350.
13°See below chapte r  9, pp349-401.
131Thomas J .  Watson Jnr  and P e r t e r  P e t re ,  Father  Son and Co-mv l i f e
a t  IBM and bevond. 1990, p347.
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out o f  l i n e 132. During the  development of th e  Spec t ra ,  in the  mid-1960s, 
RCA was spending around $15m per annum on e n g in ee r in g 133; in some years  
i t  was much l e s s  than t h i s 134. ICT, supported by the  government,  could 
a t  l e a s t  match these  kind of  expend i tu res .  ICT had a l so  taken s teps  to  
reduce th e  number of a reas  in which i t  had to  spend development 
money135, so i t  did not have to  spread i t s  development funds as t h i n l y  
as the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies d id .
Government support  was v i t a l  in al lowing ICT to  con t inue  long range 
development while  main ta ining a reasonable  e a rn ings  t o - e q u i t y - r a t i o .  I t  
must a l s o  be s a id  t h a t  the  support  was ta rg e te d  a t  long term p r o j e c t s  which 
did  a c t u a l l y  lead  to  commercial p ro d u c ts .  MinTech backing f o r  the  Advanced 
Computer Technology P ro jec t  (ACTP) led to  ICT's BLM development,  and t h i s ,  
t o g e th e r  with Manchester U n i v e r s i t y ' s  MU 5, was used as th e  base f o r  the  
ICL 2900 s e r i e s .  Afte r  the  merger,  ICL continued to  need government 
a s s i s t a n c e :  a t  t h e  time i t  r e ce ived  £17m of government funds f o r  f u r t h e r  
development work. The government 's  involvement in the  merger a l so  enabled 
ICL to  ge t  £18m from the  P ie s sey  company. These funds were e s s e n t i a l  to  
ICL136. To main ta in  growth the  f i rm  needed funds to  p lace  more leased 
machines onto th e  market and to  pay f o r  f u r t h e r  developments. Eventually  
another  £40m of  government funding was found f o r  the  launch of the  2900 
s e r i e s  of  computers in the  1970s.
ICT's problems were f i n a n c i a l  r a t h e r  than t e c h n i c a l ;  indeed i t  has 
been seen t h a t  ICT was w i l l i n g  to  buy technology elsewhere i f  i t  considered 
i t s e l f  no t up to  the t a sk .  The t ime of  c r i s i s  was the  pe r iod  when a new 
genera t ion  of systems was in t roduced .  ICT/L seems to  have always needed 
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  cope with th e  f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i n  of  in t roducing  new 
ranges .  The government deemed i t  necessary  to  s t e p  in as i t  thought t h a t  
ICT was unable to  f ind  enough funds to  cope with th e  cash flow problems of 
ca r ry ing  out R&D and marketing a new system, as well as funding l e a se s .  
Likewise,  in th e  US i t  was t h i s  problem th a t  fo rced  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms 
out of th e  market.
One g r e a t  advantage ICT/L had was t h a t  i t  was seen as the  UK's
132At the  1967 p re -deva lua t ion  r a t e  of $2.80.
133US vs IBM. McColl is te r t r9634 ,  McCol l is te r  was RCA's Computer 
Systems D i v i s i o n ' s  vice p re s id e n t  of marketing.
134See below, chapter  6, t a b l e  6 .5 ,  p234.
135See below, ppl80-191.
136CBI o ra l  h i s to ry  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Humphreys in te rv iew .
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premier computer company. As such i t  was to some degree p ro te c te d .  For many 
buyers ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in government,  ICT/L received sympathet ic  t re a tm en t  when 
buying machines.  I t  i s  seen below t h a t  f irms such as Burroughs and NCR 
e x p lo i t e d  t h e i r  e s t a b l i s h e d  u se r  bases  in n iche markets to  b u i ld  t h e i r  
computer b u s in e s s e s 137. For ICT the  UK was i t s  niche,  s ince  around 40% 
of th e  UK market would s t a y  loyal t o  the  B r i t i s h  producer,  a base from
which ICL could compete with American producers.
ICT had to  make the  t r a n s i t i o n  from punched card  technology to
computers as th e  l a t t e r  superseded th e  former. ICT was more capable  of
dea l in g  with the  vagar ies  o f  the  commercial computer market than the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies. ICT had long d e a l t  with th e  needs of commercial da ta  
p rocess ing  customers.  ICT a l s o  had an e s ta b l i s h e d  user base ,  a group of 
c l i e n t s  which i t  was able  to  upgrade to  computers. I t  a l so  meant t h a t  ICT 
had an e s t a b l i s h e d  s a le s  f o r c e ,  an expensive o rg a n is a t io n  f o r  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms to  bu i ld  up, and an area they had l i t t l e  exper ience  of .
The concen t ra t ion  of th e  f i rm  on a s i n g l e  market was th e  major 
d i f f e r e n c e  from the e l e c t r o n i c s  co rp o ra t io n s .  Apart from some p a r t i a l  
a t tempts  a t  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  the  company was focused from top t o  bottom 
on a s i n g l e  fu n c t io n .  ICT was not tempted to  go too  f a r  down th e  path of 
v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  even when i t  was d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  manufacturing 
computers. All funds were focused on producing systems and t h e i r  sof tware .  
Components were bought from o u t s id e :  Fe r ran t i  and l a t e r  o th e r s  suppl ied  
ICT's b a s ic  components, P lessey  provided memory in the  1960s and e a r l y  70s 
and CDC made ICT's d i s c  d r i v e s .  ICT thus d id  not have th e  expense of  
developing the  f u l l  pa raphe rna l ia  o f  e l e c t r o n i c  systems and could 
con cen t ra te  resources  on developing computers. E l ec t ro n ic s  f i rms  had the  
oppos i te  a t t i t u d e .  They would develop new components, such as ICs, and then 
e x p lo i t  them in end products .  E l e c t ro n ic s  firms t r i e d  to  develop and supply 
as much as p o s s ib le  from in t e r n a l  sources ,  bear ing  m u l t ip le  c o s t s  a t  once.  
The c o n f l i c t  t h i s  could cause w i th in  the e l e c t r o n i c s  company is  b e s t  
descr ibed  in th e  RCA and GE c h a p t e r s 138. ICT recognised t h a t  technology 
was only p a r t  of the  compet i t ive  mix in the computer indus t ry .  Unlike EE, 
when i t  came to  the  t h i r d  gen e ra t io n  of  computing, ICT recognised  t h a t  
component technology was much l e s s  important than having a well  thought out 
product t h a t  i t  could produce r a p i d l y .  ICT did  not hold back i t s  t h i r d  
genera t ion  systems to wai t  f o r  ICs to  become a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  wanted to  o f f e r  
an in t r a -co m p a t ib le  range of  systems as soon as i t  could .  EE, and i t s
137Chapter 8, pp330-350.
138See below, chapters 6 and 7.
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American co u n te rp a r t  RCA, put a g r e a t  emphasis on the  core  component 
technology and l e s s  on the  system and software des ign .
The d i f f e r e n t  approaches of  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  and bus iness  machines 
f i rm s  had, we have seen, been noted by the manager o f  F e r r a n t i ' s  Computer 
Department soon a f t e r  he l e f t  F e r r a n t i  and jo ined  Burroughs. Writ ing in 
Datamation139, he noted the  focus  of bus iness  machines f irms on 
computers,  as compared to  th e  s id e  l i n e  t h a t  they  were in F e r r a n t i  and 
o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  He a l so  noted th a t  the  US bus iness  machines firms 
were not over-worr ied  about producing every nut and b o l t  o f  the  machine. 
They supp l ied  a system, but many components and sub-systems were supplied  
from o u t s id e ,  i f  they were b e t t e r  and cheaper.  I t  appears t h a t  these  
lessons  had been l e a r n t  by ICT, and i t  benef i ted  from the  focus of  e f f o r t  
in a s i m i l a r  way t o  the  US f i r m s .  ICT/L c e r t a i n l y  seemed more market-aware,  
and had a g r e a t e r  d e s i r e  to  remain in the in d u s t ry ,  than the  B r i t i s h  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s .  Looking a t  both th e  UK and th e  US case s tu d i e s  in t h i s  
t h e s i s ,  i t  i s  f a r  from s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  i t  was th e  bus iness  machine f irm 
t h a t  ended up dominating the  one B r i t i s h  mainframe computer manufacturer  
to  su rv ive  in th e  1970s market.
Yet ICT/L f a i l e d  to  su rv ive  without government suppor t .  I t  may have 
su f f e re d  from a c e r t a i n  burden imposed on i t  by i t s  r o l e  as th e  s t a t e -  
supported computer f l a g s h ip .  There seems to have been an expec ta t ion  t h a t  
the  UK's f l a g s h i p  should cover th e  whole market f o r  computers.  While i t  has 
been s a id  t h a t  ICT was c o n ce n t ra t in g  on computers,  t h i s  was s t i l l  a broader 
market than many of  the  sm al le r  American companies t a c k l e d .  S im i la r  s ized  
US f i rms  concen t ra ted  on even sm a l le r  niches  than j u s t  the  computer 
in d u s t ry .  NCR concen t ra ted  on th e  r e t a i l  and banking i n d u s t r i e s ,  Burroughs' 
main market was i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  banking c l i e n t e l e .
Having por t rayed  the  B r i t i s h  business  machines in d u s t ry  as more i n ­
tune w i th ,  and b e t t e r  ab le  to  cope w i th ,  the  complex EDP market,  i t  could 
be argued t h a t  Lord Halsbury was c o r r e c t  in the  e a r l y  1950s to  t r y  to  ge t  
bus iness  machines fi rms to  take  a leading ro l e  in the  computer in dus t ry .  
However, t h i s  would have been a t  th e  expense of  B r i t a i n  fo rego ing ,  even 
more than was th e  case ,  one of th e  grea t  advantages the  USA had: the  
innovation engendered by having a number of com pet i t ive  domestic companies 
feeding from each o t h e r s '  i d e a s 140. In any case ,  BTM and Powers-Samas 
were both somewhat l a c k l u s t r e  compared to  t h e i r  o ld  American l i c e n s o r s ,  and
139Brian P o l l a r d ,  'A comparison of computer i n d u s t r i e s  in the  US and 
the UK', Datamation. May/June 1960, pp51-52.
14°M. P o r t e r ,  The compet i t ive  advantage of n a t i o n s . 1989. P o r te r  has 
pointed to  such i s sues  in the  make up o f  a c o u n t ry ' s  compet i t ive  advantage.
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were not much o f  a base on which to  b u i ld  a su ccess fu l  computer in d u s t ry .  
The a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  bu i ld ing  an in d u s t ry  based on th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s ,  was 
equally  u n l ik e ly  given the  lack of  success t h a t  th e se  f i rms  had. Taking 
t h i s  p o in t  of view, i t  seems t h a t  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  a s s e t s  t h a t  the  UK en te red  
the computer indus t ry  with were cons iderab ly  l e s s  s u i t e d  to  e x p lo i t i n g  the  
computer innovation than the  US i n d u s t r i a l  base .
The fo l lowing chapters  on th e  American in d u s t ry  f u r t h e r  exp lore  the  
weaknesses of th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  in the  computer in d u s t ry  and the  
g re a te r  focus and market awareness of  the  bus iness  machines f i rm s .
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Part I I .
Electronics firms in the United States computer market.
The B r i t i s h  e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms f a i l e d  to  mainta in a presence  in th e  computer 
i n d u s t ry .  I t  could  be specu la ted  t h a t  t h i s  was because th e  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  
as a whole was small and weak compared to  the  huge US market,  leaving  room 
f o r  j u s t  one domestic producer.  While the re  maybe a case  f o r  t h i s ,  we a l so  
have t o  c ons ide r  whether the  weakness was in s te ad  with the  e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies themselves .  When comparing what happened in B r i t a i n  with the  
course of  events  in America, i t  i s  s t r i k i n g  t h a t ,  here  to o ,  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  
in d u s t ry  showed l i t t l e  a b i l i t y  to  compete s u c c e s s f u l l y  with  the  bus iness  
machines in d u s t ry .
The fo l lowing case s tu d i e s  o f  th e  Radio Corpora tion  of America and 
General E l e c t r i c  show t h a t ,  as in the  UK, the  computer a c t i v i t i e s  of the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  did not perform well  and were m arg ina l i sed .  Using the  
evidence and t r a n s c r i p t s  of  th e  a n t i - t r u s t  case  US vs IBM, i t  can be seen 
j u s t  how d i f f i c u l t  i t  was f o r  such a firm to  o r i e n t a t e  i t s e l f  to  the  
commercial d a ta  process ing  market.
RCA and GE survived longer in the  l a r g e r  US market than did the  
B r i t i s h  f i r m s ,  bu t  they s t i l l  could not e s t a b l i s h  themselves as success fu l  
compet i tors  and both abandoned t h e i r  computer d i v i s i o n s .  This was d e sp i t e  
the  f a c t  t h a t  th ey  were two of  th e  l a r g e s t  companies in th e  world,  dwarfing 
the  bus iness  machines f i rm s .  The huge te ch n ica l  and f i n a n c i a l  re sources  
a v a i l a b l e  to  th e se  fi rms did  not enable  them to  secure  a s i g n i f i c a n t  market 
p o s i t i o n .
As in B r i t a i n ,  the  American indus t ry  became dominated by bus iness  
machines f i r m s .  However, they  were more su cc e ss fu l  than t h e i r  B r i t i s h  
c o u n te r p a r t ,  ICT. In the  US th e r e  were a lso a number s t a r t - u p  companies 
t h a t  a l so  performed well in th e  computer market,  and i t  w i l l  a l so  be seen 
th a t  one e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm,  Honeywell, a lso  managed to  su rv ive .  All t h e se  
fi rms were focused and committed to  t h i s  new technology ,  a major c o n t r a s t  
to  the  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  of  the  m u l t i - p ro d u c t  e l e c t r o n i c s  
co rp o ra t io n s .  Chapter 8 shows the  d i s t i n c t  c o n t r a s t  of s t y l e  exh ib i ted  by 
the  American bus iness  machines f i rm s .
The much g r e a t e r  depth o f  i n t e r n a l  in format ion  a v a i l a b l e  on the  US 
e l e c t r o n i c s  companies allows f u l l e r  study of  th e  problems of resource  
a l l o c a t i o n  w i th in  firms t h a t  were c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d .  I t  a l so  shows 
j u s t  how d i f f i c u l t  i t  was f o r  th e se  firms to  c ap tu re  th e  non- techn ica l  
s k i l l s  needed t o  be success fu l  in th e  business  machines market.  While they
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had many advantages on the  technology s ide ,  i t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  these  
became l e s s  important as the  ind u s t ry  developed, i t  i s  a l so  c l e a r  t h a t  they 
were l e s s  ab le  to  t a i l o r  product and market s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  were both i n ­
tune with the  market and with the  s t a t e  of f in an ces  of th e  company.
The US s tu d ie s  are  ab le  to  expand on the  weaknesses found in the  
B r i t i s h  c h ap te r s ,  which showed problems of funding m u l t ip l e  growth paths  
and d i f f i c u l t i e s  with producing a p p ro p r ia te  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  success  wi th in  
the  bus iness  machines market.
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Chapter 6.
RCA and the Electronic Data Processing Business.
Earlv  RCA.
RCA's r o o t s  were back in the  e a r l y  te lecommunications market.  I t  
s t a r t e d  l i f e  as the  American Marconi Company1 , the  US s u b s id i a r y  of  the  
w o r ld ' s  lead ing  telecommunications company, Marconi. During and a f t e r  the  
F i r s t  World War th e  US government, e s p e c i a l l y  the  US Navy, s t a r t e d  to  put 
p re s su re  on Marconi to  s e l l  i t s  American o p e ra t io n s 2 . Marconi was seen as 
having a monopol is t ic  hold over r ad io  communications, a s i t u a t i o n  made 
worse by i t s  f o r e ig n  ownership.  Under t h i s  government p re ssu re  Marconi was 
fo rced  to  s e l l  i t s  American s u b s id ia ry  to  a US consortium led by General 
E l e c t r i c .  The US government encouraged f u r t h e r  co n so l id a t io n  of the  rad io  
in d u s t ry ,  lead ing  to the  a s s e t s  of GE, Westinghouse and AT&T being pooled 
to  form RCA. This meant t h a t  the  USA had a f i rm  t h a t  had con t ro l  over a l l  
the  p a t e n t s  needed to produce every aspec t  of r ad io  equipment.
I n i t i a l l y  th e  firm was l i t t l e  more than the  embodiment of  a c a r t e l .  
Much of  th e  c a p i t a l  equipment i t  used,  and a l l  the  consumer s e t s  i t  so ld ,  
were produced by GE and the  o the r  shareho lde rs .  The Nat ional Broadcasting 
Company and th e  marine communications network were the  main ope ra t ions  t h a t  
i t  c o n t r o l l e d .  However, during the  1920s and 1930s RCA became more 
independent.  There were two reasons  f o r  t h i s .  F i r s t l y  the  ' r a d i o  r i n g '  
r i s k e d  coming under a n t i - t r u s t  s c r u t in y .  Secondly RCA became annoyed with 
the  s lu g g ish n es s  of the  producer companies to  make consumer s e t s  t h a t  were 
in l i n e  with  market demand, as well as having to  give i t s  s u p p l i e r s  a 20% 
margin on a l l  th e  s e t s  i t  so ld3 . In 1929 i t  acquired  the  consumer 
e l e c t r o n i c s  company, Vic to r4 , to  which i t  added the  vacuum tube ope ra t ions  
of GE and Westinghouse to  form the  RCA Vic tor Company and RCA Radiotron.  
At t h i s  s tag e  th e  company became independent.  I t  was the  s u p p l i e r  of the
JM. Graham, RCA and the  Video Disc: the  bus iness  of r e s e a r c h . 
Cambridge, Mass. 1986, p33; R. Sobel,  RCA, New York, 1986, p21; J .C .  Warner 
(Vice P r e s id e n t ,  Radiotron Div is ion ,  RCA Manufacturing Company I n c . ,  1934- 
1938), 'A h i s t o r y  of Radio Corporat ion of America-the years  to  1938' ,  RCA 
Engineer. August/September 1957, pp3-9.
2General J .G. Harbord, 'Radio in the World War and the  o rg a n is a t i o n  
of an American-owned tr ansocean ic  r a d io  s e r v i c e ' ,  The Radio Indus t ry :  the  
s to rv  of  i t s  development as to ld  bv leaders  of the  indus t ry  to  the  s tuden ts  
of the  g radua te  school of Business Adminis t ra t ion .  George F. Baker 
Foundation. Harvard U n iv e r s i ty . 1928, pp67-96.
3Graham, RCA and the  video d i s c . p39.
4Ib id , p43.
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l a r g e s t  p u b l i c  broadcas t ing  system, NBC, had an i n t e r n a t io n a l
te lecommunications  bus iness ,  and was now a v e r t i c a l l y  in t e g ra te d  
e l e c t r o n i c s  company: with in  a few years  e l e c t r o n i c s  was to  account f o r  the  
m a jo r i t y  o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .
There a r e  th r e e  aspec ts  of  RCA's ea r ly  h i s t o r y  t h a t  a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
impor tan t ,  a l l  o f  which are  l inked .  F i r s t l y  the  company's growth was guided 
by one c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r ,  General5 David Sarnoff .  As in so many companies, 
t h i s  c e n t r a l  a u to c r a t  r e in fo r ce d  the  formal o rg a n i s a t i o n  of  the  f i rm  with 
the  s t r e n g t h  o f  h i s  a u th o r i t y .  Sarnoff  ensured t h a t  re sea rch  had a c en t r a l  
r o l e  in th e  company:
'We have pa ten ts  gran ted  by the United S ta t e s  Government fo r  
en g in ee r in g  and e l e c t r i c a l  developments in r ad io  development; we 
e x e r c i s e  th e  proper ty  r i g h t s  inherent in the se  p a t e n t s ;  we are  
soundly f inanced .  These a re  gr ievances  enough f o r  those  who come to 
reap  and not to sow, who cry  monopoly but f e a r  c o m p e t i t io n . '
'More than 1000 eng ineers  engaged in r a d io  re sea rch  express 
th e  e f f o r t s  of the  Radio Corporation and i t s  a s s o c i a t e s  t o  develop 
t h i s  a r t  and indus t ry .  M i l l ions  of  d o l l a r s  a re  spent annual ly  by the  
Corpora t ion  and i t s  a s s o c ia t e d  i n t e r e s t s  in th e se  e f f o r t s .  We a re ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  in e v i ta b ly  in possess ion  of many va luab le  p a ten t  r i g h t s ,  
t h e  f r u i t s  of i n t e n s iv e ,  continuous and c o s t l y  r e sea rc h .  But we 
doubt whether any o the r  co rpo ra t ion  in the  i n d u s t r i a l  h i s t o r y  of  the  
c oun t ry ,  possess ing pa ten ted  inven t ions ,  has ever l icensed  so many 
o f  i t s  compet i tors  and a t  so e a r l y  a s tage  in the  development of  a 
new a r t . ' 6
Late r  th e  f i r m ' s  research  a s s e t s  were pooled in to  one o f  the  w or ld ' s  
l a r g e s t  l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  the  Sarnof f  Research Centre.
RCA had a c r u c ia l  ro le  as a p rovider  of technology to  the world.  In 
the mid-1930s th e  company was faced with a squeeze in i t s  domestic 
e l e c t r o n i c s  markets ,  caused on the  one hand by the  d ep re ss ion ,  on the  o th e r  
by a s u r f e i t  o f  s u p p l i e r s .  I t  r e a c te d  by cu t t in g  back overseas  o p e ra t io n s ,  
the  idea being t o  s e l l  o f f  t h e se  o p e ra t ions ,  such as EMI and JVC, and used 
the  monies r a i s e d  to  b o l s t e r  th e  domestic o p e ra t io n s .  A f te r  t h i s  RCA no 
longer ope ra ted  d i r e c t l y  overseas ,  i t  was not a la rg e  ex p o r te r  nor did  i t  
own many ove rseas  ope ra t ions ;  in s tead  i t  so ld  technology. I t  used i t s  
pa ten t  ownership to  earn overseas  income from l i c e n c e s .  I t  a l so  sold  some 
of i t s  ou tpu t  t o  overseas  f irms to  re-market.  In the  B r i t i s h  case  s t u d i e s ,
5During th e  war Sarnoff was given the t i t l e  of  general  in the  Signal
Corp.
eD .S a rn o f f , 'The development of the  radio  a r t  and rad io  indus t ry  s ince  
1920' ,  The Radio Industry :  th e  s t o r v  of  i t s  development as t o ld  bv leaders  
of the  i n d u s t ry  to  the  s tuden ts  of the  graduate  school of Business 
A dm in is t ra t ion .  George F.Baker Foundation Harvard U n iv e r s i t y . Mass, 1928, 
p97-113.
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i t  has a l r ead y  been seen t h a t  ICT r e s o ld  RCA computers7, while  EE b u i l t  
them under l i c e n ce 8 . These arrangements were not l im i ted  to  the  UK or to  
computers; t h i s  was a la rge  t r a d e  f o r  RCA.
Given RCA's s t rong  te c h n ic a l  base and the  a t t i t u d e  of  Sarnoff to  
pub l ic  s e r v i c e ,  i t  i s  not s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  RCA fa red  well  out o f  th e  1939-45 
war:
'From a $100 m i l l io n  co rpo ra t ion  in 1938, RCA soared  to  the  
b i l l i o n  d o l l a r  co rpo ra te  rank in 1955 . . .
RCA's post-war expans ion .
Demand f o r  a l l  the  company's products  grew g r e a t l y  a f t e r  the  war. NBC 
led the  expansion of b roadcas t  r a d io  and t e l e v i s i o n .  This in tu rn  led to  
big  demand f o r  the  company's consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  equipment. RCA and EMI 
had developed b roadcas t  q u a l i t y  t e l e v i s i o n ,  and i t  was RCA which a f t e r  the  
war s t a r t e d  to  d r iv e  towards co lour  t r an sm iss io n .  In response  to  a 
mechanical  co lour  system under development a t  CBS, RCA i n i t i a t e d  a huge 
development p r o j e c t  to  produce an e l e c t r o n i c  co lour  system10. This 
development had a major impact on RCA and on i t s  computer op e ra t io n ,  
p u l l in g  cash away from th e  computer programme.
Not only  were the  b roadcas t  and consumer ope ra t ions  in r a p id  growth, 
but so a l so  were RCA's component and c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  b u s in e s se s .  A f te r  
the  war,  RCA had the  oppor tun i ty  to  s e l l  the se  new developments in to  both 
the  m i l i t a r y  market,  e s p e c i a l l y  when rev ived  by the  Korean and Cold Wars, 
and in the  c i v i l  market.
The fo l lowing graphs show RCA's growing s a l e s  ( f i g  6 .1 )  and p r o f i t  
( f i g  6 . 2 ) .  What i s  no tab le  i s  t h a t  p r o f i t s  were l e s s  s t a b l e .  Figure  6 .3 ,  
which shows p r o f i t  as a percentage  o f  s a l e s ,  shows two d i s t i n c t  t roughs :  
both of  the se  were a s so c ia t e d  with high development c o s t s  of some major RCA 
p r o j e c t s .  The f i r s t  t rough ,  in the  1960s, caused in p a r t  by the  c o s t  of 
p u t t i n g  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  on the  market,  g r e a t l y  damaged the  computer 
o p e ra t io n .  The second, dur ing  1969-72, led to  the  te rm in a t io n  of the  
computer bus iness  and i t s  s a l e  to  Sperry Rand:
7See above, chap te r  5 . ,  pp l7 3 -174.
8See above, chap te r  4, p p l42 -143 and ppl47-150.
®Dr Elmer W. Engstrom ( s e n io r  execu t ive  VP RCA), 'A h i s t o r y  of  Radio 
Corporat ion o f  America; th e  years  1938 to  1958 ' ,  RCA Engineer . June-Ju ly  
1958, pp29-34.
10C. Leyton e t  a l ,  Ten Innovations :  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s tudy on 
techno log ica l  development and the  use of  q u a l i f i e d  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers  
in ten  i n d u s t r i e s . 1972, p i 19.
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Figure 6.1
RCA’s annual sales, 1951-1973.
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Figure 6.2
RCA’s annual pre-tax profit, 1951-1973.
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Figure 6.3
Pre-tax profit as a percentage of sales
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A f te r  th e  war, RCA was producing an ever  expanding range of 
e l e c t r o n i c s .  In common with most companies, be fo re  the  war RCA had been 
f u n c t i o n a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d ,  but the  p ressu res  of growth and an ever-widening 
technology led t o  change. As o u t l in e d  by RCA's own head of  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
t h e re  were a number o f  problems to  be coped with:
Product  l eade rsh ip  was d iv ided .
Coordinating  a product was proving d i f f i c u l t .
There was a high a d m in i s t r a t i v e  load.
P r o f i t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  was d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e leg a te .
The outlook was f o r  f u r t h e r  growth and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n 11.
There fore ,  RCA adopted a m u l t i - d i v i s i o n a l ,  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  p r o f i t  cen t re  
o rg a n i s a t i o n :
"B as ic a l ly ,  the  o rg a n is a t io n  changes tak ing  p lace  a re  the  
outcome o f  RCA's adopt ion of th e  philosophy of  d e c e n t r a l i z in g  the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  o p e ra t io n s .  This philosophy may be f u r t h e r  
de f ined  as the  de lega t ion  of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and a u t h o r i t y  to 
in d iv id u a l s  fo r  the  p r o f i t a b l e  conduct of the  business  o pe ra t ions  of 
i n t e g r a t e d  u n i t s  w i th in  the  Corporation.  By in te g ra te d  u n i t  i s  meant 
one having a l l  of i t s  own fu n c t io n s ,  such as eng ineer ing ,  
purchas ing ,  manufacturing,  marketing,  and any o the rs  necessary  to  
manage a p a r t i c u l a r  product  l i n e  or l i n e s .  Such a u n i t  becomes the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  one person"12.
A f te r  a temporary arrangement where the  whole of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  
ope ra t ion  was under one o rg a n i s a t i o n  the  company was d iv ided  in to  four  
ope ra t io n a l  groups:
Defence E lec t ro n ic  Products ,
Commercial ( l a t e r  I n d u s t r i a l )  E lec t ron ic  Products ,
Radio Marine Communications,
National Broadcast  Company.
DEP and CEP a re  the  most important groups in t h i s  s tudy, i t  was the  CEP 
group which c o n t r o l l e d  the  Computer Systems D iv is ion .
11J .L .  Mastran, Admin is tra to r  Organ iza t iona l  Planning, "How RCA 
Organizat ion i s  Planned to  Meet Changing Needs", RCA Engineer. Feb-March
1956, pp32-35.
12Ibid.
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RCA's e a r l v  computer work.
In the  l a t e  1940s and e a r ly  1950s RCA was busy, f u l f i l l i n g  the  demand 
f o r  consumer e l e c t r o n i c s ,  developing colour t e l e v i s i o n  and supplying 
advanced e l e c t r o n i c s  fo r  the  US armed fo r c e s .  RCA had only a l im i ted  
involvement in th e  genes is  of the  computer. At the  f i r m ' s  P r ince ton  
l a b o r a t o r i e s  a small team b u i l t  a la rge  analogue computer,  the  Typhoon13, 
fo r  US Navy a e ro n au t ic a l  r e s e a r c h 1*, but t h i s  d id  not lead to  f u r t h e r  
developments.
Of more importance was RCA's e a r ly  work with computer s to rage  
te chn iques .  As th e  leading e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rm,  RCA was consu l ted  on p o t e n t i a l  
memory techn iques  fo r  a number of e a r l y  computer developments, such as the  
I n s t i t u t e  of  Advanced S tudies  computer, the  US Army sponsored ENIAC, and 
the  JOHNNIAC b u i l t  by the  Rand Corpora tion15. For th e se  p r o j e c t s ,  RCA 
developed the  SELECTRON tube .  This was an advanced and h igh ly  complex 
e l e c t r o n  tube memory device .  However, the  Williams Tube from Manchester 
proved much s im ple r ,  cheaper,  and became a v a i l ab le  much e a r l i e r .  Eventually  
a l l  the  machines adopted o th e r  techn iques ,  except th e  JOHNNIAC, a copy of 
the  e a r l i e r  IAS machine, which did use the S e lec t ron  tu b e .  RCA produced 
2000 of th e  tubes  fo r  var ious  p r o j e c t s 16.
In the  e a r l y  1950s RCA developed a second, and much more important ,  
memory techn ique .  This was the  magnetic f e r r i t e  core  which could s to r e  
information in a matrix of  magnetised magnetic r i n g s .  This became the  
s tandard  computer memory system through to  the  mid-1970s17. There was a 
l o t  of con t rove rsy  about who developed t h i s  techn ique  as i t  was 
s imul taneous ly  developed by Jay F o r re s t e r  of the  Massachuset ts  I n s t i t u t e  
of Technology. F o r r e s t e r ' s  device was used in the  SAGE a i r -d e f e n c e  p r o j e c t  
which proved to  be a c r u c i a l  stepping stone f o r  IBM in i t s  development of
13US v IBM. Px344A, RCA press  r e l e a s e ,  'Quar te r -Cen tu ry  o f  Research 
is  behind RCA's EDP sys tem s ' ,  13/4/60.
14US v IBM, t r a n s c r i p t  ( t r )  8652. Arthur D. Beard,  Chief Engineer RCA 
Computer Systems Divis ion .
15Saul Rosen 'E le c t r o n ic  Computers: A h i s t o r i c a l  su rvey '  A ssoc ia t ion  
of Computer Manufacturers Computing Survey March 1969, p l7 ;  F.C. 
Gruenberger,  'The His to ry  of the  JOHNNIAC', Annuals of  the  His to ry  of 
Computing. J u ly  1979, p49
16Jan Rajchman (RCA Engineer),  'E a r ly  Research on Computers a t  RCA', 
A His to ry  o f  Computing in th e  Twentieth Century. N. Metropol is ,  J .  Howlett,
and G-C Rota, e d s . ,  New York, 1980, pp465-469.
17Ib id.
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computer s k il ls 13.
The Advanced Development Group.
In 1950 th e  company formed a spec ia l  team of eng ineers ,  th e  ADG19. 
During i t s  e i g h t  years  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i t  was charged with the  ta sk  of 
spreading the  use of new d i g i t a l  and computer techniques  to  a l l  p a r t s  of 
the  company:
'At t h a t  t ime, in th e  development of  RCA's Camden 
o rg a n iz a t i o n ,  we were th e  only advanced development group and we had 
been support ing  in t h a t  a c t i v i t y  both m i l i t a r y  and commercial type 
endeavours .  So i t  was q u i t e  n a tu ra l  f o r  t h i s  group to  be given the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of looking a t  d i g i t a l  technology f o r  both commercial 
and m i l i t a r y  [ u s e s ] . ' 20
During i t s  f i r s t  four  years  much of  the ADG's e f f o r t  was focused on 
commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s .  From 1954 onwards i t  became in c re a s in g ly  involved 
in m i l i t a r y  work, even tua l ly  becoming a pa r t  of  the  West Coast M iss i le  and 
Surface Radar Div is ion  in 195821.
1) ADG and the  BIZMAC commercial computer.
The ADG's f i r s t  p r o j e c t  was th e  foundat ion of  RCA's Computer Systems 
Div is ion .  In 1950 ADG s t a r t e d  the  development of  the  BIZMAC. This was a 
computer designed e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  s o r t i n g  through la rge  da tabases .  I t  used 
the new magnetic core s to rage  plus  a random access  drum memory. However, 
i t s  main f u n c t io n  was to  access  da ta  held  on hundreds of  low cos t  magnetic 
tape d r iv e s  which held the  da tabase .  Photographs of  the  machine show t h a t  
i t  was t r u l y  impressive.  I t  weighed 250 tons and took up 18,000 s q . f t . ,  
almost every p a r t  of i t  made by RCA i t s e l f 22.
I t  was b u i l t  under c o n t r a c t  to  th e  US Army's Ordnance Corps, and used 
fo r  keeping c o n t ro l  of the  tank spares  s to re s  in D e t r o i t :
'A c o n t r a c t  was n e g o t ia ted  in 1951 with the  Army Ordnance 
Corps f o r  equipping one of  t h e i r  large supply  depots (Letterkenney, 
Pa . )  with th e  RCA BIZMAC e l e c t r o n i c  p rocess ing  system. In 1952, the  
Ordnance Corps reques ted  enlargement of the  c o n t r a c t  to  cover the  
inventory  con t ro l  a t  one of t h e i r  l a rg e s t  s tock  con t ro l  p o in t s ,  the  
Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command. Delivery  of the  complete system
1BSee below, chapter  8,  pp313-314.
19US v IBM. tr8446, Beard.
20lb i d , tr8655 .
21lb i d , tr8653.
22CBI Archive; Martin H. Weik, Second Survey of Domestic E lec t ro n ic  
D ig i ta l  Computing Systems: r e p o r t  No. 1010, B a l l i s t i c  Research Labs, 
Aberdeen Proving Ground Dept of  Army, June 1957.
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was s e t  f o r  1 9 5 5 . '23 
The c o n t r a c t  was worth $ 4 .5m. RCA remained a major s u p p l i e r  of computers 
to  th e  US armed fo rce s  f o r  l o g i s t i c  con tro l  purposes .
In 1954 the  Commercial E lec t ron ic  Products  Group took over
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  BIZMAC and decided to  s e l l  th e  system on a
commercial b a s i s 24. However the  machine did not s e l l  in g re a t  numbers:
somewhere in th e  region of  6 were made. Users inc luded a la rge  mail order
fi rm and two la rge  personal insurance companies in New York, users  with big 
da tabase  problems. I t  was dogged by problems of  u n r e l i a b i l i t y ,  not r e a l l y  
a g r e a t  s u r p r i s e  fo r  such a complex f i r s t  genera t ion  system. The low level  
of s a l e s  has led some to  the  conclus ion th a t  the  product  was a f a i l u r e 25. 
However, i t  was a l a rge  and expensive system and generated  revenue of 
between $10-20 m i l l io n  dur ing 1955-1958. I t  a l so  allowed RCA to  develop a 
working knowledge of the  commercial market p lace .
The ADG had a s t a f f  of only 30, which was too small to  cope with such 
a l a rge  system. The Commercial E lec t ro n ic  Products group formed th e  BIZMAC 
Engineering Group, c o n s i s t in g  o f  100 eng inee rs ,  which took over 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  system26. From t h i s  new group grew the  E lec t ro n ic  
Data Processing  D iv is ion ,  l a t e r  becoming the  Computer Systems Div is ion 
(CSD), and ev en tu a l ly  becoming the  Information Systems Group.
With the  BIZMAC group con t inu ing  work on t h a t  machine th e  ADG was 
f reed  f o r  o th e r  p r o j e c t s .  I t  went on to develop a number o f  defence 
systems, and th e  follow-up to  the  BIZMAC, the second genera t ion  501 system.
2) ADG and m i l i t a r y  computer p r o j e c t s .
Before looking a t  the  r e s t  of RCA's commercial computer o p e ra t io n s ,  
i t  i s  worthwhile o u t l i n in g  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  in defence computers,  as these  
d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  the economics and o rg an is a t io n  of  the  e a r l y  commercial 
p roducts .  ADG worked on a number of  minor m i l i t a r y  developments. These 
included a magnetic log ic  computer, borab-aiming systems and encrypt ion
23J .  Wesley Leas, Chief Product Engineer,  Computer Engineering,  
Engineering Products  D iv is ion ,  Camden N.J. 'Engineer ing  th e  RCA BIZMAC 
System' RCA Engineer . Dec/Jan 1955/6, pl0-21.
24US vs IBM. tr8652, Beard.
25US v IBM. tr56507-8,  F.G. Withington. Withington was an indus t ry  
a n a ly s t  and au thor  of A .D .L i t t l e  C onsu l t an t s '  r e p o r t s  on the  computer 
in dus t ry .
2SJ .  Wesley Leas, 'Engineer ing  th e  RCA BIZMAC System' RCA Engineer.  
Dec/Jan 1955/6,  pplO-21.
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t e chn iques27. However, the  most n o tab le  e a r ly  work of the  ADG was in the  
use o f  s o l i d  s t a t e  t r a n s i s t o r i s e d - e l e c t r o n i c s  in la rge  m i l i t a r y  systems: 
t h i s  a b i l i t y  was used by the  ADG to  design the  501 t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  computer 
f o r  th e  Commercial E lec t ro n ic  Products  Group. In 1958 ADG abandoned i t s  
dual commercial and defence r o l e  and became s o l e l y  involved in the  m i l i t a r y  
s ide  o f  th e  company, the  Defence E lec t ro n ic  Products  group (DEP):
'There  were two events  which I th ink  bore on t h i s  [ the  
abso rb t io n  in to  DEP]. One was t h a t  the  Commercial Computer Group had 
grown cons iderab ly  and was capable  of doing [ i t s ]  own advanced 
development work as well as product des ign .  And, secondly ,  the  
M iss i le  Group had r e c e n t ly  won an award f o r  the  BMEWS system, which 
e n t a i l e d  a considerab le  amount o f  d i g i t a l  tech n o lo g y . '  8
The B a l l i s t i c  M iss i le  Early Warning System (BMEWS) was one of the  
major s t r a t e g i c  con tro l  mechanisms developed in the  1950s. I t  was probably  
second only t o  th e  huge Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, SAGE system29. 
BMEWS was a compute r -contro l led  warning system covering  the  USA, Canada and 
Great B r i t a i n .  As prime c o n t r a c to r ,  RCA was not only in charge of  the  sub­
c o n t r a c t o r ' s  e f f o r t s ,  but a l so  had to  i n t e g ra te  a l l  the  systems in to  one. 
IBM was chosen as the  s u p p l i e r  o f  th e  major c e n t r a l  computer, but RCA was 
able  to  supply th re e  computer types  of  i t s  own30; the  CDP, RADCON and 
DIP. They a l l  used a common a r c h i t e c t u r e  and packaging. They had var ious  
r o le s  in p rocess ing  rad a r  d a ta ,  t r a n s m i t t i n g  the  da ta  and then d i sp la y in g  
the  end r e s u l t  a t  the  NORAD command bunker in Colorado. The IBM system used 
was the  top  of  t h e  range 7090 t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  computer, a good o ppor tun i ty  
fo r  RCA to  look a t  t h i s  machine.
Following BMEWS, RCA rece ived  another l a rge  c o n t r a c t ,  t h i s  t ime fo r  
a communications network f o r  the  US Air Force.  This was ComLogNet31, 
which was to  t r a n s m i t  l o g i s t i c s  informat ion around the  world.  Computers f o r  
l o g i s t i c s  work proved a s t a p l e  f o r  RCA a f t e r  BIZMAC. This system used the  
Communication Data Processor (CDP) computer to  b u f f e r  and switch high speed 
data  t r a n s f e r s  through microwave and high cap a c i ty  cable  l i n k s 32 . The
27US vs IBM. t r8653-4.  Beard.
2SIb id ,  tr8661 .
29See below, chapter  8,  pp313-314. SAGE had a profound e f f e c t  on 
computer technology and on IBM in p a r t i c u l a r .
3° US V IBM. tr8677,  Beard.
31La te r  known as Autodin 1.
32Robert J .  Segal and Howard P. Guerber (RCA en g in ee r s ) ,  'COmLogNet 
Automatic Store-and-Forward Message-Switching C e n t r e s ' ,  RCA Engineer . 
Feb/March 1962, pp30-33.
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prime c o n t r a c to r  was Western Union, a f i rm  well used to  such communications 
systems.
I n i t i a l l y ,  t h i s  p r o je c t  was not  handled by the  Defence E lec t ro n ic  
Products Group. I t  was c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  normal computer a c t i v i t y  and was 
based in the  commercial ope ra t io n .  I t  was expected t h a t  th e  CDP would be 
b u i l t  in con junc t ion  with the  l a rg e  s ca le  601 commercial computer being 
cons t ruc ted  by th e  EDP Divis ion .  However, in 1960 a s ep a ra te  Communications 
and Contro ls  Div is ion  was formed to  take  over t h i s  work, see f i g u r e  6.4 
below.
Fig 6 .4
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Source: ' IEP E f f e c t s  Major R eorgan iza t ion" ,  RCA Engineer. August /Sept 1960, 
p38.
In 1962 the  communications o p e ra t io n  was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  DEP33 and the  
l inks  between t h e  CDP and 601 systems were completely severed .  I t  w i l l  be 
seen t h a t  t h i s  had a se r ious  e f f e c t  on the 601 p r o j e c t .
33US vs IBM. tr8723,  Beard.
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RCA and the  second genera t ion  of  computers.
BIZMAC was only a p a r t i a l  e n t r y  in to  the  market.  However, i t  gave RCA 
a chance to  b u i ld  up a team of  eng inee rs ,  and gave i t  a base f o r  fu tu r e  
work. In the  second genera t ion  of  computers,  l i k e  i t s  o f f - s p r in g  EMI, RCA 
made a d r iv e  to  become an important p layer  in the  market.
The 501 computer.
With the  BIZMAC engineer ing  team taking over r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h a t  
system, ADG was not only f r eed  to  do i t s  defence work, but a l so  t o  prepare 
the  l o g ic a l  design f o r  RCA's, f i r s t ,  second genera t ion  system, the  501. 
Design of  t h i s  system was quick ly  a s s im i la te d  in to  the  EDP D iv is ion .  There 
were t h r e e  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c to r s  in th e  market p o s i t io n in g  of t h i s  machine:
1) I t  used f u l l y  t r a n s i s t o r i z e d  log ic ,  bu i ld ing  on the  developments
of the  Semiconductor and M ate r ia l s  D iv is ion ,  which had worked on 
t r a n s i s t o r s  f o r  m i l i t a r y  p roduc ts34 .
2) I t  was a pure ly  commercial system, with l i t t l e  p rov is ion  fo r  
s c i e n t i f i c  a p p l i c a t i o n .  The system was one of  the  f i r s t  to  o f f e r  the  
bus iness  language COBOL, but i t  was not i n i t i a l l y  provided with the  IBM 
FORTRAN language which was the  s t a p l e  language f o r  eng ineer ing35 .
3) The system was t a rg e te d  a t  a perceived gap in the  market fo r  
medium c a p a c i ty  machines36.
Figure  6.5  shows how the  501, and i t s  d e r iv a t io n s ,  was meant to  f i t
in to  the  market and e x p lo i t  weaknesses in the  IBM range. RCA hoped to
e x p l o i t  a gap t h a t  i t  perceived in the  market f o r  middle s i z e  computers:
34 H .M .E l l io t t ,  'The RCA 501 System',  RCA Engineer. Feb-March 1959,
p39.
35US v IBM. tr9404,  E.S. M cCol l is te r .  McColl is te r  was the  Marketing 
Vice P re s id e n t  o f  the  Computer Systems Div is ion.
36US v IBM. Px l l4 ,  'Bus iness Review of the  E lec t ron ic  Data Processing 
D i v i s i o n ' ,  1 /12/59 ,
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By the  t ime the  above graph was drawn the  o r i g i n a l  501 had been 
renamed the  503, and had been extended upwards with the  504 and down with 
the  502. The 501 was RCA's r e a l  market en t ry ,  based not only on the  BIZMAC 
exper ience ,  bu t  a l so  the  design work of the  s em i -m i l i t a ry  ADG and the  
developments of  the  Semiconductor Divis ion ,  again  based on i t s  m i l i t a r y  
work.
The a d d i t i o n  of the  upper and lower machines announced to  the  t r a d e  
.journal Datamation, t h a t  RCA:
' fo rm er ly  a somewhat s i l e n t  member of  the  Solid  S t a t e  Computer 
Manufac turers '  A s s o c i a t i o n . . .have d e f i a n t l y  s t a r t e d  an aggress ive  
marketing campaign37.
The machine was de l ive red  qu ick ly :  one was i n s t a l l e d  i n t e r n a l l y  in April
1959, and th e  f i r s t  customer d e l i v e r y  was in June,  t o  the  Bureau of
Weapons38 . By November 1959 t h r e e  had been d e l iv e re d ,  twenty one were on
order  and f o u r t e e n  l e t t e r s  of i n t e n t  had been rece ived .  Even tua l ly  about
100 were i n s t a l l e d 39. Of the se  th e  m i l i t a r y  used 29*°.  Most of  the
m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  were used by the  US Army fo r  l o g i s t i c s  work. Overal l  the
marketing s t a f f  concluded t h a t  th e  system was compet i t ive  a p a r t  from some
minor flaws in p e r ip h e ra l s :
' I t  i s  my unders tanding t h a t  th e  501 was a compet i t ive  system; t h a t  
i t  was well  designed by th e  s tandards  of  th e  t ime. I t  had 
a r c h i t e c t u r a l  f e a tu r e s  which were considered to  be e x c e l l e n t .
I t  was somewhat weak in some of i t s  p e r ip h e ra l  
equ ipm en t . . .such as the  card  r e a d e r  and punching equ ipm ent . . .and the  
l i n e  p r i n t e r ,  with which we had considerab le  t r o u b l e ,  b u t ,  as a 
c e n t r a l  system, the  501 was considered a good design and compet i t ive  
with  o th e r  equipment in th e  market p l a c e . ' 41
The 301 success  and the  601 f a i l u r e .
However, th e  501 could only cover the medium sca le  market.  The f irm 
was concerned t h a t  t h i s  would mean i t  would miss out on la rg e  s a l e s  
elsewhere.  The d iv i s io n  est imated  t h a t  both the  l a rge  s ca le  and small s ca le  
markets would grow in s i z e :
37Datamation Sept/Oct 1959 p31.
3aUS v IBM, p x l14, 'EDP Business Review', Dec 1959.
39US v IBM. px244, RCA, Computer Systems Divis ion 'F iv e  Year P l a n ' ,
March 1965.
4°CBI Archive,  Inventory of automatic  data p rocess ing  equipment in the
Federal Government. Bureau of  th e  Budget, Executive Off ice  of the
P res id en t ,  J u ly  1966.
41US v IBM. tr9543, M cCol l is te r .
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Table 6.1 Future demand for computers, and RCA's projected market share.
Large Scale  Systems Small
6000 f i rm s  with  100+ 2000
c l e r i c a l  employees
8000 f i rms  with 
50-99 c l e r i c a l  employees
t o t a l  market 2000
RCA's planned share  416 (20%)
Source: US v IBM, px l14, Dec 1 1959 Business Review,
The d i v i s i o n  planned to  cover the  smal le r s ca le  
and a l so  to  in troduce  the  la rge  s ca le  601. Figure  6.6  
expected to  give RCA a very broad market coverage.  I t  
o f f e r  computer across  the  broad, g r e a t l y  expanding the  
s e r i e s  of  computers had covered:
Scale  Systems 
4000
4000 
8000 
615 (8%) 
pp 55-56.
market with the  301 
shows t h a t  t h i s  was 
was now planning to 
market t h a t  the  501
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RCA systems and predicted competition.
Source: US vs IBM, px114, RCA ‘EDP Business Review1, 1/12/59.
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Thus RCA was o f f e r in g  one of  the  most comprehensive ranges on the  
market,  second only to  IBM. The fol lowing t a b l e  shows th e  eng ineer ing  
re sou rces  and marketing expend i tu res  t h a t  were planned to  support  the  
second g e n e ra t io n  systems:
Table 6 .2 .  Forecas t  Engineering and Marketing c o s t s .
$Mi11 ion '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 Tota l
General Engineer ing 9.3 9.1 8 .3  8 .4  8.7  9.1 52.9
Marketing 9.2 12.5 16.0 18.6 20.9 22.8 100.0
Source: US v IBM, px l14, Dec 1 1959 Business Review, p53.
With th e se  r e so u rce s ,  RCA expected to  s t a r t  sh ipping machines qu ick ly .  
However, i t  expected t h a t  income would lag behind expend i tu res .  The reason 
f o r  t h i s  was t h a t ,  l i k e  a l l  th e  o th e r  f irms in the  in d u s t ry ,  RCA had to  
follow IBM's example and p lace  most o f  i t s  machines onto the  market under 
le as ing  arrangements ,  so i t  expected to  take a number of  year s  f o r  r e c e i p t s  
to  match the  value  of the  systems shipped out;  a p r o f i t  was not expected 
u n t i l  1964:
Table 6 .3
Financial Forecast for the Computer Division 1960-65.
$Hillion 7 60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 Total
Met Value Shipped 37.8 73.9 109.3 132.2 165.7 351.2 870.1
Met Sales 12.6 47.7 55.8 78.5 114.2 196.5 505.3
Profit or Loss -10.2 -8.2 -5.4 -1.1 8.8 24.1 8.0
Source: OS v IBM. px!14. Dec 1 1959 Business Review, p53.
The 301.
The 301 and 601 were announced toge the r  in April  I960*2 . The 301 
was the  l e s s  ambit ious machine, p r im a r i ly  aimed a t  the  commercial market.  
I t  was p i tch ed  in a much more p r i c e - s e n s i t i v e  p a r t  o f  th e  market than the  
l a rg e r  s c a le  501 and 601: RCA did  i t s  bes t  to  t i g h t l y  'v a lu e  e ng inee r '  the  
system to  keep th e  p r ic e  down. I t  was a lso  in a h igher  volume p a r t  of  the  
market. The f i rm  b u i l t  a new p la n t  in Palm Beach, F lo r id a ,  to  produce the  
301*3 . Of the  $ 9 .3m spent  on eng ineer ing  in 1960, the  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  item
*2 Arthur S. Kranzley,  RCA Product Planning and EDP Methods Department 
manager, 'P lann ing  the  RCA 601 System' ,  Datamation. Sept /Oct 1960, p30.
*3H.M. E l l i o t t ,  manager of engineer ing ,  'RCA and Commercial Computer 
Systems' ,  RCA Engineer . Dec60-Jan61, pp5-7.
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was th e  development of the  301. As t a b l e s  6.2 and 6 .3  showed, RCA committed 
i t s e l f  to  a l a rg e  marketing campaign and a p o l ic y  of  accep t in g  la rg e  losses  
on i t s  computer o p e ra t io n s ,  so as to  e s t a b l i s h  the  301 's  market sha re .  By 
doing t h i s  i t  was hoped t h a t  the  i n s t a l l e d  301s would b r ing  in good r e n t a l  
revenues in th e  f u tu r e .
N ever the le ss ,  the  company took s teps  to  ensure  t h a t  i t  did not spend 
too much on th e  301 p r o j e c t .  I t  l e a r n t  from the  problems t h a t  i t  had 
encountered with the p e r ip h e ra l s  on the  501 system and co n t rac ted  t h i r d  
p a r ty  companies to  supply p e r i p h e r a l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  punched card equipment 
and p r i n t e r s .  There was a secondary reason f o r  t h i s .  RCA was competing fo r  
an o rde r  in excess  of 30 machines to  be used a t  USAF bases  fo r  l o g i s t i c s  
work, probably  connected to  the  ComLogNet programme. To use the  e x i s t i n g  
USAF d a ta ,  IBM compatible punched card p e r ip h e r a l s  were needed'*'*. 
I n i t i a l l y  these  were obta ined  from IBM; l a t e r  ICT and Bull provided punched 
card equipment. P r i n t e r s  came from Anelex and o p t i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  r e a d e r s ,  
f o r  cheque process ing  e t c ,  from F arr ing ton .  Most im por tan t ly  random access  
d isk  d r iv e s ,  th e  most important pe r ip h e ra l  of a l l ,  came from Bryant.
Unfor tuna te ly  the  Bryant disk d r ives  proved u n r e l i a b l e  and d i f f i c u l t  
to  s e rv ice * 5 . They a l so  proved unsu i tab le  f o r  r e a l - t i m e ,  o n - l i n e  da ta  
p rocess ing .  These problems l a t e r  fo rced  RCA to  r e s t a r t  i t s  p e r ip h e ra l  work, 
and to  t r y  to  provide i t s e l f  with b e t t e r  d i sk s .  However:
' . . .w h e n  RCA decided to  redevelop i t s  p roduc ts ,  i t  had l o s t  
the  c o n t in u i ty  of the  engineer ing  e f f o r t  t h a t  had been going on in 
such th in g s  as p r i n t e r s  and e s s e n t i a l l y  had to  r e e s t a b l i s h  i t s  
eng ineer ing  s k i l l s  and manufacturing s k i l l s  in those  a re a s .  So in a 
sense t ime was l o s t  by th e  e a r ly  d e c i s io n  t o  abandon these  
p e r ip h e ra l  developm ents . '*6
One p e r ip h e ra l  p r o j e c t  did  remain a key pa r t  of  RCA's s t r a t e g y ,  t h i s  was
RCA's a l t e r n a t i v e  to  the  d isk  d r iv e ,  the  RACE. RACE was meant to  leapfrog
the c u r r e n t  d isk  d r ive  technology,  but proved to  be a major product
f a i l u r e ,  and put RCA f u r t h e r  behind in s to rage  techn iques .  The inadequacies
of RACE are  s tu d ied  below.
Another problem with the  301 was t h a t ,  l i k e  the  501, i t  was not
i n i t i a l l y  o f f e r e d  with a FORTRAN compiler f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  work*7 . The
problem was t h a t  during the  1960s most f irms wanted to  use t h e i r  computers
fo r  both commercial and s c i e n t i f i c  work. Therefore RCA t r a n s f e r r e d  Arthur
**US v IBM. tr9599, McCol l is te r .  
*5US v IBM. tr9009-9010, Beard. 
*6 Ib id ,  tr9004.
*7US v IBM. tr9404,  M cCol l is te r .
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Beard from th e  DEP group to  the  EDP D iv is ion :  he was b r i e f e d  with 
developing a r i th m e t i c  co-processors  f o r  the  501 and 301 computers,  to  
improve t h e i r  u se fu lness  as s c i e n t i f i c  machines*8 . At th e  same time a 
FORTRAN compile r was provided f o r  both machines.
However, o v e ra l l  the  301 was a success .  IBM c re d i t e d  i t  as such:
'RCA, in the  p a s t ,  had been one o f  the  most success fu l  of the
IBM compet i tors  with the  RCA 301 s e l l i n g  some 620 s y s t e m s . '* 9
The f i r s t  301 was de l ive red  in February 1961, with the  l a s t  being de l iv e red  
in 1967. In 1965 the  US government was using 95 of  them, most f o r  l o g i s t i c s  
work, some f o r  c i v i l  a d m in i s t r a t io n 50. The r e s t  of  the  s a l e s  were spread 
widely throughout the r e s t  of the  EDP indus t ry .  I t  seems to  have been the 
r i g h t  s c a le  system f o r  the  r a p id ly  growing market,  though i t s  s a l e s  were 
only some 1-2% of  the  equ iva len t  IBM system, the  1401.
The 601.
This was the  l a r g e s t  machine in RCA's range and was marketed as the 
f l a g sh ip  system. Unfortunate ly  i t  sank. I t  was a la rge  s ca le  computer 
designed to  handle la rge  amounts of da ta .  I t  came in two v e r s io n s :  the  
basic  603 f o r  genera l  purpose da ta  process ing ,  and the  604 which was 
enhanced f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  work51, using a s im i la r  co-p rocesso r  u n i t  to  the  
301. The b a s ic  p r i c e  was around $1.5m or r e n t a l  of  $31-34,000 per month. 
I t  was designed to  run a number of  programs a t  once,  and used the  s o - c a l l e d  
Omni-channel inpu t -ou tpu t  system t o  con tro l  up to  64 p e r ip h e ra l s  
s imul taneously52 . I t  was a lso  meant to  o f f e r  'unprecedented  c o m p a t ib i l i ty  
with RCA d a ta  process ing and communications equipment and o ther  
p r o c e s s o r s ' 53 . I t  used so c a l l e d  modular packaging to  enable i t  to  be 
e a s i l y  enhanced. However, the  system even tua l ly  o f f e red  n e i t h e r  o f  these  
advanced f e a t u r e s .  The packaging technique used led to  g re a t  d i f f i c u l t y ,  
and i t  was completely  incompatible with any RCA or  o the r  system.
*8US v IBM. t r8945, Beard.
*9US v IBM. px4462, IBM , 'Competit ive Environment ' ,  4 /2 /66 .
soCBI Archive,  Inventory of  automatic da ta  p rocess ing  equipment in the
fede ra l  government. Bureau of the  Budget, Executive O ff ice  of  the
Pres id en t ,  J u ly  1966.
s l Arthur S. Kranzley, Manager, Product Planning and EDP Methods, RCA 
EDP D iv is ion ,  'P lann ing  the  RCA 601 System',  Datamation.  Sept/Oct 1960, 
p31.
52P a tam a t ion . RCA 301 and 601 announcement a d v e r t ,  May/June 1960, pl4 .
53Ibid.
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A number of  f u r t h e r  problems came from th e  broken r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  the  
601 and th e  m i l i t a r y  CDP computer. With the  EDP Divis ion  f u l l y  occupied 
with producing th e  501 and 301, i t  was decided t h a t  the  601 would be b u i l t  
a t  the  m i l i t a r y  opera t ion  in Camden5*. This was log ica l  as i t  was 
envisaged t h a t  th e  601 and the  CDP computer, t o  be used in ComLogNet, would 
be c lo se  r e l a t i v e s .  RCA hoped t h a t  the  601 would b e n e f i t  from t h i s  l i n k ,  
and planned to  s e l l  the  601 to  the  telecommunications in d u s t ry .  I t  was 
e s t im ated  t h a t  the  New Je r sey  Bell  Telephone Company alone would have a 
requirement  f o r  100-150 of the se  systems55. A number of  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
a rose .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  has a l ready  been seen t h a t  the  computer communications 
o pe ra t ion  became a s ep a ra te  u n i t  of the  I n d u s t r i a l  E lec t ro n ic  Products 
Group, and then jo ined  the  Defence E lec t ron ic  Products Group. This meant 
t h a t  th e  CDP and 601 design teams became separa ted  and the  designs  diverged 
mass ively .  Secondly th e r e  was a lack of  communications between the  EDP 
Divis ion  and th e  Camden manufacturing s i t e .
The 601 had been cos ted  in the  expec ta t ion  t h a t  i t  would b e n e f i t  from 
shar ing  many components with the  CDP. McColl is te r saw t h i s  as th e  roo t  of 
the  p r o j e c t ' s  c o s t  problems:
'from what I learned  of i t ,  I would say i t  [ the  cos t  e r r o r s  of the  
601 p r o j e c t ]  was probably e r r o r s  in judgement as to  what c o s t s  were 
l i k e l y  to  be to  accomplish the  func t ions  t h a t  had been s p e c i f i e d ,  
but t h e r e  was a l so  one o rg an iza t io n a l  ac t ion  t h a t  may have 
c o n t r ib u te d  to t h i s .
There was a p a r a l l e l  machine c a l l e d  the  CDP or Communication 
Data P rocesso r ,  which was the  processor  in the  ComLogNet, l a t e r  
c a l l e d  Autodin Communication System, f o r  the  f e d e ra l  government, and 
o r i g i n a l l y  i t  had been expected th a t  th e  601 and the  CDP would be 
one and th e  same machine, but fo r  perhaps severa l  reasons ,  t h i s  
tu rned  ou t  not to  be so.
For one reason because what had been in one o rgan iza t io n  was 
subsequent ly  put in to  two o rgan iza t ions  and t o  a c e r t a i n  e x te n t  each 
pursued i t s  own independent way.56
However, th e  divorce  from the  CDP was only one of i t s  problems. RCA 
a lso  f a i l e d  to  d e l i v e r  the  performance and fu n c t io n s  promised. I t  s u f fe red  
from mass ively  h igher production c o s t s  than had been expected,  mainly 
because of  a unique packaging problem:
'A lso ,  t h e r e  was d i f f i c u l t y  in provid ing some of  the  
fu n c t io n a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  had o r i g i n a l l y  been announced. . . f o r  one 
t h in g ,  th e  601 system was intended to  be an o n - l i n e  type of system 
and a multi-programming type of  system, and the  c o s t  o f  some of th e
5*Arthur S. Kranzley, Datamation. Sept/Oct 1960, p31.
55Us v IBM, px l14, 1959 Business Review.
56US v IBM. t r9546,  McCol l is te r .
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c o n t r o l l e r s  to put the se  c a p a b i l i t i e s  on l i n e ,  so to  speak, with the  
c e n t r a l  p rocesso r ,  were so f a r  out of  l in e  t h a t  t h i s  was 
economically  j u s t  a t o t a l l y  imprac t ica l  th in g  to  d o . . .
. . . F i n a l l y . . . t o  achieve  the performance t h a t  had been
s p e c i f i e d  in the  c e n t r a l  p ro ce sso r ,  they had to  go to  the  ex tens ive  
use  of coax ia l  cab le  in the  back frame o f  th e  system, and t h e r e  were 
so many of  these  w ires ,  and they were so b u l k y . . . t h a t  i t  was 
v i r t u a l l y  a physical  im p o s s i b i l i t y  to  in te rco n n ec t  a l l  of  th e  po in t s  
on the  back s ide  of the  machine t h a t  had to  be in te rconnec ted .
So, j u s t  in summary, t h e r e  were severe  t e c h n ic a l  problems, 
both in a fu n c t io n a l  and in a manufacturing sense ,  and t h e r e  were
a l s o  severe  f i n a n c i a l  problems, so much so t h a t  the  company began to
look f o r  a way out of the  programme. '57.
In e a r l y  1962, the  company stopped o f f e r i n g  the  601 f o r  s a l e 58. I t  
was only sold  f o r  j u s t  over a y ear :  RCA accepted about f i v e  o rde rs  f o r  the  
system.
Managerial changes and f i n a n c i a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
By 1962 th e  EDP Div is ion  had a number of  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I t s  to p -o f -  
the - range  601 had become a very pub l ic  f a i l u r e  and th e  resources  t h a t  could 
have been used t o  bu i ld  ano ther  system had been wasted.  The 501 was g e t t i n g  
old and needed r e p l a c in g ,  i t s  s a l e s  were slowing up d ra m a t i c a l ly ,  and the  
f irm needed to  improve i t s  p e r ip h e ra l  equipment. By 1962 RCA had invested  
SlOOm in the  depar tment59, but had not seen any p r o f i t  from t h i s
investment,  and th e re  was l i t t l e  expec ta t ion  of  an imminent r e t u r n .  
Consider ing the  market success  of the  501 and 301 i t  can be concluded t h a t  
the  d i v i s i o n  was not as success fu l  as  could have been expected.
A number o f  new personnel  were brought in to  deal with th e  co s t  and 
t e ch n ica l  problems. Beard was bought in to  head engineer ing  in 1961 and 
M cColl is te r  was poached from Burroughs and took over marketing.  In 1962 a 
new v ice  p r e s i d e n t ,  Art  Malcarney50 , took con t ro l  of  the  o p e ra t io n ,  and 
he appoin ted Arnold Weber, ano ther  long term RCA employee, as General 
Manager of  th e  EDP Div is ion .  Malcarney had p rev ious ly  been in charge o f  the  
Camden p l a n t  which had produced th e  601 and had been very c r i t i c a l  of  the  
running of  the  EDP D iv is ion61.
At the  co rpo ra te  l e v e l ,  Dr Elmer W. Engstrom became p re s id e n t  of  RCA.
57Ib id ,  t r9544.
58US v IBM. t r8457 /8 ,  Beard.
59Harold B erg s te in ,  'RCA and EDP' Datamation. Oct 1962 p57, an a r t i c l e  
based on in te rv iews  with M cC ol l i s te r .
6° US v IBM. t r8722, Beard.
61I b id ,  t r8723-8 .
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He ordered th e  computer o pe ra t ion  to  cu t  i t s  lo s se s  and to  break-even:
' . . . i n s t r u c t i o n s  from the  co rp o ra t io n ,  from the  Chairman and the  
P r e s id e n t ,  were to  reduce our losses  [by] h a l f  [each] year  from the  
end of 1 9 6 1 . . . and to  achieve  a b r e a k e v e n  by the  end of 1964 . /6Z.
The reason  fo r  t h i s  was t h a t  RCA was undergoing a p r o f i t s  squeeze in
the  e a r l y  1960s, as was seen in f i g u r e s  6.2 and 6 .3 .  This was because the
fi rm was under tak ing  a number of expensive development p r o j e c t s ,  a p a r t  from
computers.  The l a r g e s t  o f  t h e s e ,  and the  one t h a t  drew heav i ly  on the
company t r e a s u r y ,  was the  co s t  of  b r ing ing  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  to  th e  market.
This meant not only p repar ing  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  mass production  of
domestic s e t s ,  but a lso  the  bu i ld in g  o f  c a p i t a l  equipment to  give NBC and
t h i r d  p a r ty  t e l e v i s i o n  s t a t i o n s  th e  a b i l i t y  to  t r a n sm i t  in c o lou r .
T e lev is ion  was seen as c e n t r a l  to  RCA's o pe ra t ions  and many hundreds of
m i l l i o n s  were sunk in to  i t .  Beard be l ieved  t h a t  th e  e f f o r t  in t e l e v i s i o n
was l a r g e r  than  the  company's e f f o r t s  in computers:
' . . . I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  was some g re a te r  t o t a l  e f f o r t  in t e l e v i s i o n  
from th e  engineer ing  po in t  of  view than th e re  was in the  
com pu te r . /63
To pay f o r  t h e se  developments the  company had t o  r e in  back on lo s ses  
e lsewhere ,  so th e  computer o p e ra t ion  was ordered to  cut  lo s s e s .
While th e  development of  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  was undoubtedly the  main 
reason f o r  RCA suspending i t s  e f f o r t s  to in c rease  market share  in th e  
computer i n d u s t ry ,  th e re  were o th e r  RCA developments t h a t  impacted on the  
computer o p e ra t io n .  For example Beard mentions t h a t ,  from 1959, th e  DEP was 
expanded s u b s t a n t i a l l y 6*. I t s  main area of  growth was th e  Ast ro  
E lec t ro n ic s  D iv is ion .  This was RCA's space and b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  o pe ra t ion  
which became involved in many a sp ec t s  of the  space and nuc lea r  weapons 
programme. I t s  most p ub l ic  r o l e  was as the  prime c o n t r a c to r  f o r  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f o r  the  lunar lander .  In 1965 the  Ast ro  Div is ion employed 3202 
q u a l i f i e d  eng inee rs  and s c i e n t i s t s 65 ; the  EDP d iv i s io n  employed only 217. 
Many o th e r  m i l i t a r y  p r o j e c t s  needed th e  s k i l l s  o f  computer en g in ee r s ,  a 
f u r t h e r  draw on RCA's l im i ted  pool o f  exper ts .
Overa l l  RCA had a p o l i c y  of expanding i t s  defence o p e ra t io n s :
'Defense e l e c t r o n i c s  i s  a c o n s i s t e n t l y  broadening f i e l d  and i t  
i s  m a n i f e s t ly  impossible  to  have a r e p re se n t a t i o n  in a l l  a r e a s .  I t
6ZUS v IBM. tr9619, M cCol l is te r .
63US v IBM. tr8717, Beard.
6* Ib id ,  tr8715.
65Impact o f  Federal Research and Development Programs. House of 
R ep resen ta t ives  Se lec t  Committee on Government Research,  88th Congress, 2nd 
s es s ion ,  r e p o r t  number 1938, December 28, 1964.
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i s  our po l icy  to  develop pre-eminence in s e l e c te d  te ch n ica l  
a r e a s . /6S
While most o f  th e se  developments were pa id  fo r  by government c o n t r a c t s ,  and 
th e r e f o r e  d id  not dra in  the  f i rm  of funds (indeed r a t h e r  the  o p p o s i t e ) ,  i t  
d id  mean t h a t  RCA's s k i l l s  had to  be spread t h i n l y .
Table 6 .5  (page 234) shows t h a t  during the  e a r ly  and mid-1960s,  RCA 
cu t  th e  amount o f  money i t  spent on developing computer systems. I t  is  
argued l a t e r  t h a t  these  cu ts  undermined RCA's t h i r d  genera t ion  computers,  
as i t  was dur ing  t h i s  period t h a t  they  were being designed.  Figure 6.7 
shows t h a t  EDP s a le s  s tagna ted  from 1962-66. Cutting  expansion meant 
reduced lo s s e s .  As f ig u r e  6 .8  shows, t h i s  allowed the  Computer Systems 
Divis ion  to  crawl towards break-even. However, from 1966-7, when p r o f i t s  
from co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  s t a r t e d  to  flow in ,  the  computer ope ra t ion  was again 
allowed t o  expand and bu i ld  up la rg e  losses  in i t s  e f f o r t s  to  ga in  market 
share:
66Arthur L. Malcarney, then Executive Vice P res iden t  DEP, 'The Outlook 
fo r  DEP.' RCA Engineer . August/Sept 1961, pp6-9.
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Figure 6.8
Computer Systems Division. 
Annual Pre-Tax Loss.
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P o l i c i e s  of  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  keeping th e  second g enera t ion  product l i n e  a l i v e .
The new e d i c t  to  move towards break-even was not to  be c a r r i e d  out
a t  a l l  c o s t s .  I t  was aimed a t  c u t t i n g  losses  by 50% per annum while  the  
co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  expansion ran i t s  course,  and was to  be c a r r i e d  out 
without damaging RCA's market p o s i t i o n .  This bo i led  down to  a t h r e e  po in t  
s t r a t e g y  f o r  th e  computer o p e ra t io n :
' a )  P r o t e c t  i t s  c u r r e n t  revenue and p re sen t  customer p o s i t i o n ,  both
domestic and fo r e ig n .
b) Become a p r o f i t  c o n t r i b u t o r  to  RCA.
c) Maintain  a growth which i s  a t  l e a s t  comparable to  t h a t  of the
in d u s t ry  as a w h o l e . ' 67
The plan was to  reduce the  number of new systems placed on the  market.  This 
would allow r e n t a l  income to  ca tch-up  with c a p i t a l  expendi tu re  on new 
lease s .
At t h i s  t ime RCA be l ieved  i t  was number two in the  market,  a t  l e a s t  
in terms of  systems being shipped i f  not in terms of e s t a b l i s h e d  use rs  
base:
Table 6.4  Market share  bv value  of new computers shipped.
Company % of  t o t a l  $ volume
IBM 78.7
RCA 4.0
RemRand UNIVAC 3.5
NCR 3.2
GE 3.2
Honeywell 2.4
CDC 2.1
Burroughs 1.1
Others 1.8
Source: US v IBM. px242, 'RCA EDP Five Year Plan 1963-1967' .
To ensure  t h a t  i t s  systems s tayed  compet it ive  enough to  mainta in  i t s  
p o s i t i o n  in th e  market, i t  had to  undertake a programme of  improvements to  
i t s  product l i n e ,  while not d ra in in g  con^any funds .  This led to  a number 
of small enhancement p r o j e c t s .
67US v IBM. px242, RCA 'EDP Five Year Plan 1963-1967' .
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a) The enhanced 501 and 301.
Beard 's  f i r s t  ta sk  on o f f i c i a l l y  j o in in g  the  Computer Systems 
Divis ion  (CSD) was to  design a 'speed  pack'  f o r  the  5016S. This u n i t  
improved the  speed of the  501 by 30%, helping to  keep the system a l i v e  f o r  
a few y e a r s .  However, t h i s  was seen as only a temporary measure. S im i la r  
packs were provided f o r  o th e r  RCA machines to  allow them to  c a r r y  out a 
secondary s c i e n t i f i c  r o l e .
bl The 3301.
The 501 was in h e re n t ly  old and needed replacement,  RCA decided to  
in t roduce  an improved and l a r g e r  s ca le  cousin to  the  301, the  3301, to  do 
t h i s .  I t  was designed to  u t i l i s e  d isk  d r iv e s ,  and had the  now usual RCA 
a r i th m e t i c  co -p rocesso r ,  now r e f e r r e d  to  as the  PINE u n i t .  However, i t  was 
marketed heav i ly  with the  RACE s to rage  system (see  below),  and i t  was t h i s  
t h a t  i t  hoped would give  i t  a compet it ive  edge.  I t  was intended t h a t  the  
3301 would give 301 users  a way of increas ing  t h e i r  computer power without 
having to  swap t h e i r  da ta  to  a new a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  but the  f i rm  had 
r e l a t i v e l y  low expec ta t ions  of  the  system:
' I t  was not a new des ign .  I t  w a sn ' t  intended to  be the  
foundation of a f u tu r e  l i n e  of products ;  r a t h e r ,  i t  was a product  
t h a t  we could develop r e l a t i v e l y  qu ick ly ,  a t  r e l a t i v e l y  low 
eng ineer ing  expense, t h a t  would give us an a d d i t io n a l  o f f e r i n g  to  
take  the  p lace  of  the  601, and t h a t  in a sense would give us t ime to  
ge t  on with a complete new product program[me] in the  long range 
f u t u r e . /69
However, r a t h e r  than being in the  601 sca le  i t  was in the  same p r i c e  region 
as th e  501. McCol l is te r  es t im ated  i t  cos t  $2m t o  develop the  33017° .  One 
s i g n i f i c a n t  improvement over the  301 was i t s  a b i l i t y  to  opera te  as an on­
l in e  r e a l - t i m e  computer and as a communications machine. I t  was given the  
marketing t i t l e  of the  3301 REALC0M, to  u n de r l ine  i t s  communications 
a b i l i t i e s .  I t  b e n e f i t ed  from some of  th e  601 r e s e a rc h ,  using the  same very 
f a s t  memory.
Using a l l  these  co s t  saving t a c t i c s ,  i t  was est imated  t h a t  only 50 
3301s needed to  be so ld  to  break-even: Beard es t im ated  t h a t ,  from i t s  t ime 
of announcement in August 1963, 80 were s o ld 71. I t  has been argued t h a t  
these  r e l a t i v e l y  low s a l e s ,  and the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  was quickly  e c l ip se d  by
6aUS v IBM. t r8456, Beard.
69US v IBM. tr9623,  McCol l is te r .
7° I b id ,  t r9623.
71US v IBM. tr8990,  Beard.
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the  t h i r d  genera t ion  SPECTRA s e r i e s ,  meant t h a t  the  machine was a 
f a i l u r e 7 2 . However, given the  s top-gap  na ture  of  the  machine and t h a t  
Beard t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  so few needed to  be sold to  recover  c o s t s ,  i t  must be 
counted as one of  RCA's success fu l  products .
Pe r iphe ra l  f a i l u r e :  the  RACE system.
RCA's p e r ip h e ra l  problems continued.  As has been mentioned, the
inadequacies  o f  RCA's own p r i n t e r s  and punched card  u n i t s  on th e  501 led 
to  i t  purchasing  these  devices  from elsewhere.  I t  had to  do the same with 
d isk  d r i v e s .  I t  has been seen t h a t  th e  Bryant d isk  d r iv e  proved u n r e l i a b l e  
and was not a match f o r  IBM systems. I t  was not r e a l l y  u n t i l  the  l a t e  
1960s, and the  e s tab l ishm ent  of a number of so c a l l e d  'p lug  compat ib le '  
manufacturers  who produced copies  of IBM k i t ,  t h a t  an adequate source of 
IBM type d isk  d r ives  became a v a i l a b l e  fo r  purchase .  Beard o u t l in e d  the  
perceived s t r e n g th s  and weaknesses of  the  firm:
'we f e l t  t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  RCA was very 
s t r o n g . . .
We r e a l i z e d  t h a t  RCA was not p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t rong  in the
mechanical  or e lec t ro -m echan ica l  a reas ,  but t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y  could be 
achieved e i t h e r  in s ide  the  company or obta ined  ou ts id e  the  company 
as was necessary .
So, in the  e a r l i e r  ye a r s ,  I be l ieve  we looked on i t  p r im ar i ly  
as a t echno log ica l  cha l lenge  which we f e l t  very  o p t i m i s t i c  
a b o u t . ' 73
With th e  f a i l u r e  to  secure  adequate devices  from t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  RCA 
concen t ra ted  i t s  e f f o r t s  on producing a pe r ip h e ra l  system t h a t  would le ap ­
frog  the  c u r r e n t  technology. This was the  RACE which was heav i ly  marketed 
with th e  3301 and, f o r  a whi le ,  with the  t h i r d  genera t ion  SPECTRA 70 
s e r i e s .  Like NCR's CRAM, RACE used magnetic c a r d s 74. The cards  were held
in a ro b o t i c  magazine,  which, when s e l e c t e d ,  mechanical ly  t r a n s p o r t e d  the
cards  t o  a r o t a t i n g  drum. The card  was a t tached  to  the  spinning drum and 
read by magnetic heads and would then be re tu rned  to  the  magazine. RACE 
could hold a massive 250 m i l l i o n  b i t s  o f  informat ion.  RCA hoped t o  d e l i v e r  
the  system by 1965.
I t  was a f a i l u r e  f o r  a number of reasons .  F i r s t l y  such a complex 
mechanism proved expensive and u n r e l i a b l e .  The cards  wore out qu ick ly ,  and 
had to  be r e g u l a r l y  copied to  p r o t e c t  th e  da ta ;  t h e r e  was no way of  t e l l i n g  
which cards  were wearing out so they  a l l  had t o  be copied .  I t  a l s o  took a
72F ishe r  e t  a l ,  IBM and the  US da ta  process ing  indus t ry :  an economic 
h i s t o r y . New York, 1983, pp202-203.
73US v IBM. 8487-a, Beard.
74Ib id , tr9046.
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long t ime to  access  the  d a ta .  Worse s t i l l  was the  f a c t  t h a t  in 1964 and 
1965 IBM in troduced the  2311 and 2314 disk d r i v e s .  These o f f e r e d  massive 
improvements over  old d isk  systems75. The 2311 was cheap, while  the  2314 
could be d a i sy  chained to g e th e r  to  give near ly  as much s to rage  as the  RACE, 
while a llowing much f a s t e r  a ccess  t imes .  RACE could not compete with these  
systems. I t  a l so  f u r t h e r  delayed RCA's e f f o r t s  to  develop b e t t e r  d isk  
d r iv e s  f o r  i t s  computers.
RCA was more success fu l  in supplying communications p e r ip h e ra l s  fo r  
i t s  computers.  Linked to  t h i s  was a p ro jec t  to  provide i t s  computers with 
the  a b i l i t y  to  con t ro l  i n d u s t r i a l  processes remote ly ,  but t h i s  development 
was abandoned in an a ttempt t o  save money.
RCA's overseas  p a r tn e r s ,  and p lans  f o r  t h i r d  genera t ion  systems.
RCA had some success in s e l l i n g  i t s  second genera t ion  designs  abroad, 
a bus iness  which had some impact on RCA's p lans  fo r  t h i r d  genera t ion  
computers.
RCA's f i r s t  overseas  computer c o l l a b o ra t io n  was with English 
E l e c t r i c 76 . As has been seen,  EE took the 501 design and produced the  
' a n g l i c i z e d '  KDP 1077 which i t  sold in small numbers. However, as EE 
became f u l l y  occupied with i t s  own and LEO's systems, i t  decided not to  
l icence  the  301. This proved a boon fo r  ICT. ICT had been s luggish  in 
computers, and i t  needed an u p - to - d a te  small-medium sca le  computer t h a t  
could f i l l  th e  needs of  l a r g e r  t a b u l a t o r  users  who wanted to  t r a d e  up to  
the  new technology.  Machines Bull  of  France had a s im i l a r  requirement.  Both 
companies o rdered  a number o f  301s to  r e s e l l ,  genera t ing  cash s a le s  f o r  
RCA, which meant i t  avoided th e  need to  fund le a se s  on the se  machines. ICT 
sold  over 80 301s as the  ICT 1500 and Bull so ld  more than 95. A few were 
a l so  shipped to  H i tach i .  RCA a l s o  bought some punched card p e r ip h e ra l s  from 
ICT and Bul l .
This was b ig  bus iness  f o r  the  RCA EDP Div is ion  with $15 m i l l io n  of 
overseas  s a l e s  in 1962 and an expected $25 m i l l io n  in 196378. RCA
a c t i v e l y  s t r o v e  to  p reserve  i t s  p o s i t io n .  I t  be l ieved  t h a t  i t  had to
develop machines t h a t  were t e c h n i c a l l y  ahead of  the  systems t h a t  i t s
75 lb i d , tr9048.
76See above, chapter  4,  p l4 2 - 146.
77CBI Archive ,  J .  Cowie, J.W. Hemann, P.D. Maycock, Off ice  of Naval
Research, London Branch, 'The B r i t i s h  computer scene,  PT 2, The B r i t i s h
computer i n d u s t r y '  17 May 1967.
7aUS v IBM. px242, RCA 'EDP Five Year Plan 1963-1967' .
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customers could c r e a te  themselves ,  while  a l so  ensur ing  t h a t  they  f i t t e d  
in to  th e  marketing plans  of th e se  customers.  In the  e a r l y  1960s RCA was 
consider ing  how to  rep lace  i t s  second genera tion  systems. I t  decided t h a t  
i t  should o f f e r  a compatible range o f  computers from th e  small s c a le  to  
very la rge  computers.  I n i t i a l l y  i t  was planning a s e r i e s  c a l l e d  the  ULTRA, 
though t h i s  was rep laced  by th e  Vanguard s e r i e s 79. Vanguard was planned 
to  be RCA's main computer family ,  bu t  i t  decided to  s t a r t  developing an 
even sm al le r  system c a l l e d  the  POPLAR. This system was t a r g e t e d  a t  helping 
the t a b u l a t o r  companies to  upgrade t h e i r  users  to  computers,  bu t i t  was 
very cau t ious  about using the  system in i t s  domestic American market:
'At the  p resen t  t ime, we a re  a c t i v e l y  a t  work with ICT in the  
lo g ic a l  design of  t h i s  system, and expect to  produce the  u n i t ,  with 
the  f i r s t  d e l i v e r i e s  beginning in ea r ly  1965. While the  machine may 
prove to  be a t t r a c t i v e  in the  domestic market,  i t  must be so ld  on a 
c a r e f u l l y  conceived marketing plan i f  we a re  to  avoid the unusually  
high marketing c o s t s  which would be a t t e n d a n t  with a machine of  such 
small average d o l l a r  r e n t a l .  Never the less ,  we expect POPLAR to  make 
a c o n t r ib u t io n  toward f u t u r e  domestic r e v e n u e . '  °
By 1963 th e  EDP d iv i s io n  employed 926 personnel  in marketing,  n ear ly
40% of  i t s  t o t a l  s t a f f  of 2471s 1 . Given the  p o l i c y  of reducing lo s se s ,
a machine t h a t  would add d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e ly  to  t h i s  s t a f f  was not seen as
a good p ro sp e c t .  As i t  was, while  the  market ing team was growing
c o n t in u a l ly ,  t h e  engineering s t a f f  had been cu t  back from 755 to  579 to
save c o s t s .
The POPLAR plan f e l l  to  p i e c e s .  F i r s t l y  ICT acquired  F e r r a n t i ' s  
computer o p e ra t io n ,  g iv ing i t  the  engineer ing  s k i l l s  necessary  t o  develop 
i t s  own t h i r d  genera t ion  system. Secondly, B u l l ' s  con t inua l  c r i s i s  had 
become too much fo r  th e  French government, who so ld  i t  to  General 
E l e c t r i c 82 . GE did  not want to  cont inue  to  buy RCA equipment.  F in a l ly  
IBM's announcement of the  360 fam i ly  scuppered a l l  RCA's t h i r d  genera t ion  
p lans ,  as the  360 was in troduced e a r l i e r  than had been expected.
This meant t h a t  f o r  i t s  t h i r d  genera t ion  systems, RCA had t o  r e tu r n  
to  old a l l i e s  t o  s e l l  i t s  computers abroad. Engl ish E l e c t r i c  decided to  
fol low RCA's r a d i c a l  t h i r d  g en e ra t io n  s t r a t e g y ,  and produced another  
a n g l i c i s e d  RCA system, the  System 483 . Siemens and H i tach i  produced p a r t s
79Ib id .
80 ib id
81 ib id
82See below, chapter  7, pp276-278.
83See above, chap te r  4, ppl46-150.
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of th e  RCA range and imported the  r e s t .  All t h r e e  t i e d  themselves in to  
RCA's t h i r d  genera t ion  s t r a t e g y ,  which is  o u t l i n e d  below.
RCA and the  t h i r d  genera t ion  SPECTRA.
IBM's announcement of  the  360 family of computers r a d i c a l l y  changed 
the  market,  though t e c h n i c a l l y  the  system was only a cu lmination  of  a 
number of t r e n d s 8*. I t  in troduced a u n i f i ed  l i n e  of commercial and 
s c i e n t i f i c  computers and made obso le te  most second genera t ion  systems. The 
360 was announced much e a r l i e r  than o the r  f irms expected and was backed by 
IBM on a sca le  t h a t  took th e  indus t ry  by storm. Every o th e r  f i rm  had to  
o f f e r  something to  compete with the  new IBM range .  RCA dropped i t s  plans  
fo r  the  Vanguard and Poplar systems, to  concen t ra te  on a new range.  While 
RCA had been working on the  small s ca le  Poplar,  the  main family ,  Vanguard, 
was a long way from product ion .  RCA had to  take  quick a c t io n  to  announce 
a new range t h a t  was compet it ive  with the 360.
In April  1964, w i th in  two or th ree  weeks of  the  360 announcement, 
RCA's p lanning s t a f f  rece ived  Art Malcarney's permission to cease the 
Vanguard programme and to  s t a r t  work on a r a d i c a l  new s t r a t e g y 85. The 
Five Year Plan of June 196485 o u t l in ed  a new range ,  c a l l e d  a t  the  time 
the  New Product Line,  and which became known as th e  SPECTRA 70. There were 
two main elements behind the  design of the  S pec t ra ,  the  f i r s t  of  these  was 
the  choice  of  advanced components:
'The new RCA product l i n e  w i l l  have t o t a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s
which w i l l  be a t  l e a s t  a match f o r  those  o f f e r e d  by IBM System 360.
Fur thermore,  s e v e ra l ,  i f  not a l l ,  of the  systems in th e  product l i n e
w i l l  be b u i l t  with t r u l y  in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t s  r a t h e r  than the  semi- 
in t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s  which IBM plans to  use in i t s  system. This 
should re p re se n t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  ' f i r s t '  f o r  RCA. We expect  the  new 
product l i n e  to  provide us with the f u t u r e  product c a p a b i l i t y  to  
enable  us to  meet the  goals  which are  shown in the  p l a n . ' 87
For IBM i t  was more important to  ge t  a t h i r d  gene ra t ion  family  on the
market, r a t h e r  than wait  a year  or  two fo r  t h i r d  genera t ion  components to
be made a v a i l a b l e .  RCA, us ing i t s  knowledge as a b u i ld e r  of m i l i t a r y
systems and component maker, hoped th a t  i t s  t e ch n ica l  prowess could
overcome being behind IBM's conceptual leap forward .  Eventua l ly ,  the  upper
h a l f  of  the  Spec tra  range in troduced r ea l  t h i r d  g enera t ion  components to
8*See below, chap ter  8,  pp320-325.
85US v IBM. tr9626, McColl is te r .
86US v IBM. px243, Computer Systems Div is ion  'F ive  Year P l a n ' ,  June
1964.
87Ibid.
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the  commercial computer world.  The lower h a l f  o f  the  range used second 
genera t ion  components. This was due t o  the f a c t  t h a t  in t e g ra te d  c i r c u i t s  
were s t i l l  expensive ,  and would have made the  sm al le r  machines too 
expensive ,  as semiconductors make up a l a rg e r  p ropor t ion  of  th e  c o s t  of 
smal le r  systems.
However, t h i s  was only h a l f  of  th e  plan and the  market s t r a t e g y  f o r  
the  machine was very r a d i c a l  f o r  th e  time. The product p lanners  decided 
t h a t  the  new family  should be made program compat ible with the  new IBM 
360a s . One problem with t h i s  idea was t h a t  t h e r e  were no 360 machines 
a v a i l a b le  to  copy a t  t h a t  t ime.  Beard 's  team of  engineers  ' r e v e r s e  
engineered '  th e  systems using the  ' p r i v i l e g e d  i n s t r u c t i o n  s e t '  of  the  
36089 . In e f f e c t  they produced a completely d i f f e r e n t  machine, but one 
which could run 360 programs. RCA's a r c h i t e c t u r e  was unique,  based in p a r t  
on the  Vanguard, but to  the  use r  i t  was s im i la r  to  the  360.
There were some d i f f i c u l t i e s .  IBM delayed g iv ing  RCA d e t a i l s  of  the  
360 's  in p u t -o u tp u t  p ro to c o l s 90. This meant t h a t  the  Spectra  had to  have 
i t s  own o p e ra t in g  system, and t h a t  i t s  p e r ip h e ra l s  were not completely  plug 
compatible with IBM's. However, u se r s  had a r e a l  choice :  they  could run the  
same so f tw are ,  and use the  same d a t a ,  on e i t h e r  the  new RCA or IBM ranges .
RCA perceived  a number of  advantages in being compatible with the  new 
IBM range. RCA wanted to  become th e  n a tu ra l  second source of computers to  
la rge c o rp o r a t io n s 91. A la rge  f i rm  could decide to  adopt the  IBM 360 but 
would have the  s a f e ty  of having a second source of  compatible equipment. 
I t  a l so  meant t h a t  RCA could b e n e f i t  from the  huge amount of software  t h a t  
was expected to  be w r i t t e n  f o r  th e  360.
This l a t t e r  poin t  was one of  th e  reasons f o r  r e j e c t i n g  some of  the  
o ther  s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  were put forward .  Beard be l ieved  t h a t  a n a tu ra l  
t a c t i c  would have been to  produce a t h i r d  genera t ion  family  compatible with 
the old 301 and 330192 . This would have allowed RCA to  keep i t s  old  use r s  
locked in to  i t s  unique a r c h i t e c t u r e  and ex p lo i t  the  software  t h a t  had been 
w r i t t en  f o r  th e se  machines. However, the 301 a r c h i t e c t u r e  was not as 
advanced as th e  360 and would not have o f fe red  RCA the  chance to  e x p lo i t  
new hardware and sof tware ideas .  Other f i rms t r i e d  to  e x p lo i t  IBM's
8eUS v IBM. tr9056, Beard; t r9626 ,  McColl is te r .
89US v IBM. tr8475, Beard.
9° I b i d .
91US v IBM. tr8518, Beard; px244, 'Five year  p l a n ' ,  March 1965.
92US v IBM. tr8525, Beard.
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dec is ion  to  produce a new system not based on the  old IBM machines. The 
most s u cce ss fu l  o f  these  was Honeywell 's  200 family  of computers,  which 
were based on the  IBM 1401, which had a user base of over 10,000. I t  was 
Honeywell 's  hope t h a t  users  of  th e se  machines would upgrade to  i t s  new and 
more advanced, but s t i l l  compat ib le ,  machines93. GE a l so  hoped to  b e n e f i t  
from IBM's move to  the 360. I t s  l a rge  600 s e r i e s  was c lose  to  compatible 
with th e  s c i e n t i f i c  IBM 7090/94 computers and i t  hoped to  upgrade t h i s  
market94 .
However, RCA saw g r e a t e r  p o t e n t i a l  in leaving behind second 
genera t ion  a r c h i t e c t u r e s ,  and adopt ing the  new po l icy  of  making a 
t e c h n i c a l l y  advanced 360 lo o k a l ik e .  RCA expected the  market f o r  the  Spectra  
to  f a l l  in to  two phases.  The f i r s t  phase was envis ioned to  c o n s i s t  of  RCA 
competing to  i n s t a l l  the  f i r s t ,  t h i r d  genera t ion  machine in a customer 's  
computer room. In the  second phase,  during the  l a t e  1960s, i t  was expected 
t h a t  th e  main t r a d e  would be in replacement systems95. RCA expected th e re  
to  be a move to  la rge  systems: users  who s t a r t e d  of  with a medium s ized  
360/40 would r e q u i r e  a l a r g e r  system. This was not j u s t  because da ta  
p rocess ing  needs always i n c re a se ,  but a lso  because RCA expected th e re  to  
be a change in the  way computers were used. I t  be l ieved  t h a t  computers 
would become p a r t  of ' l a r g e  in t e g r a t e d  management sy s te m s '96. They would 
become in c re a s in g ly  a p a r t  of  in format ion provid ing networks.  To t h i s  end 
RCA hoped t h a t  th e  RACE would provide  the huge da ta  s to r e  t h a t  would be 
needed in such a r o l e ,  and t h a t  te rm ina ls  being developed as p a r t  of 
m i l i t a r y  programmes could be a t t a ch e d  to  these  systems, to  provide managers 
with access  to  t h i s  informat ion system97. A number o f  companies had t h i s  
v is ion  o f  a c e n t r a l i s e d  i n t e r a c t i v e  computer information  system. However, 
i t  seems t h a t  RCA was not t h a t  committed to  i t .  RCA was not in th e  
f o r e f r o n t  of  developments in the  f i e l d  of  t im e -sha r ing ,  the  method by which 
many people can use a computer a t  once,  which was a core  f e a t u r e  o f  such 
a system.
Whether t h i s  scheme would a c t u a l l y  take  p lace  was somewhat academic; 
the  computer market was expanding r a p i d l y  anyway. Es tab l i shed  u se r s  always 
requ i red  new systems, and a l l  the  t ime more bus inesses  were f in d in g  t h a t
93See below, chap ter  8,  pp354-358.
94See below, chap ter  7, pp270-272.
95US v IBM. px244, 'F ive  year  p l a n ' ,  March 1965.
96Ib id .
97Ib id .
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computers were e s s e n t i a l .  Within th e  scheme of IBM c o m p a t ib i l i t y ,  RCA had 
to  ensure  t h a t  users  would be w i l l i n g  t o  look to  RCA as th e  second s u p p l ie r  
of da ta  p rocess ing  equipment.  RCA hoped t h a t  i t s  newer technology would 
o f f e r  c e r t a i n  advantages:
'We f e l t  t h a t  we could  not underprice  IBM product  f o r  product 
because i t  i s  very d i f f i c u l t  to  take out c o s t  in a computer system, 
b u t  i t  i s  not so d i f f i c u l t  t o  put in added performance.  So, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  the  philosophy t h a t  we adopted was to  provide equipment,  
a p rocesso r  in t h i s  c a se ,  a t  about the  same p r i c e  as IBM, in f a c t  
almost ex ac t ly  on i t ,  p lus  o r  minus a few p e r c e n t . . .bu t  t o  be able  
to  have anywhere from 35 to  45 percent  g r e a t e r  performance or 
g r e a t e r  computational a b i l i t y  than  the  corresponding IBM system. So 
we were holding a t  the  same p r i c e  but emphasizing p e r fo rm an c e . '98
IBM had very high p r o f i t s  b u i l t  into i t s  p r i c e s :  i t  was by f a r  the
most p r o f i t a b l e  computer company9 9 . RCA could compete with IBM's sca le
by forego ing  a la rge  amount of  t h i s  p r o f i t .  I t  a l s o  planned to  avoid p a r t s
of the  market t h a t  requ i red  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e ly  high marketing and support
expenses.  R e f lec t in g  i t s  e a r l i e r  lack of enthusiasm f o r  the  small Poplar
machine, RCA planned:
'To become the primary second su p p l ie r  to  major U.S. co rp o ra t io n s .
To co ncen t ra te  marketing e f f o r t  on m u l t ip l e  systems s a l e s  or
$10,000 monthly r e n t a l  s y s t e m s . ' 100
' . . .W e  were i n t e r e s t e d  p r im ar i ly  in customers who were ready 
f o r  la rge  da ta  p rocess ing  sys tem s . . .  someone j u s t  g e t t i n g  s t a r t e d  in 
the  da ta  process ing  system would s t a r t  in a some small way . . . such  
use r s  r e q u i r e  a l o t  o f  support  and help and e d u c a t i o n . ' 101
RCA hoped t h a t  the  S p ec t ra ,  and the  t a r g e t i n g  of l a rge  s ca le  u se r s ,
would make RCA th e  number two computer company by th e  end of  the  1960s. RCA
wanted to  achieve  a 10% market sh a re ,  a t a r g e t  which i t  be l ieved  was the
level a t  which th e  d iv i s io n  would become s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 102.
SPECTRA and the  e d i c t  to  s top lo s s e s .
This d i r e c t  a s s a u l t  on IBM's new family had to  be done w i th in  the 
terms of  the  e d i c t  t h a t  the  Computer Systems Div is ion  (CSD) had to  halve
i t s  lo s ses  each year .  This was r e f l e c t e d  in the  eng ineer ing  budget
a v a i l a b l e  to  th e  d iv i s io n  dur ing  th e  years 1964-1966, th e  years  of peak
9aUS v IBM. tr9269-70, M cC ol l i s te r .
" S e e  below, chap ter  8, t a b l e  8 .2  p323; t a b l e  8 .3  p324.
1QOUS v IBM. px245, '1966 f i v e  year  p l a n ' .
1Q1US v IBM. t r9938,  Beard.
1Q2US v IBM. px244, 'F iv e  y ea r  p l a n ' ,  March 1965.
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Spectra  70 development.  The fo llowing t a b le  shows what was a v a i l a b l e .  I t  
should be noted t h a t  t h i s  inc ludes  engineer ing  support  f o r  th e  o lde r  
machines t h a t  s t i l l  were in the  f i e l d :
Table 6.5
EDP Engineering Expenditures. $'i
59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66* 67** 68**
Advanced
Development
1.62 1.80 1.57 0.99 0.47 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.75
Design and 
Development
5.29 7.82 9.29 5.87 7.57 9.35 16.76 12.75 15.11 16.31
Net 5.29 9.44 11.10 7.44 8.56 10.43 17.06 13.05 15.61 17.06
Engineering
Cost
I of sales 115 64.8 29.3 8.3 9.9 10.5 21.1 15.5 13.7 11.5
**planned.
Source: OS v IBM. px245, 'Five Year Plan 1966/ .
There a re  var ious  e s t im a te s  of  what IBM spent on the  360, ranging up 
to  $4.5bn, inc lud ing  monies spent on new p l a n t  and marke t ing103. What 
is  sure  i s  t h a t  IBM was o p e ra t ing  a t  an o rder  of magnitude h igher  than 
RCA's Computer Systems D iv is ion .  This d id  show through in the  end product.  
The Spectra  was le s s  well  engineered: Spectras  were l a r g e r ,  power hungry, 
needed massive a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g  and were l e s s  r e l i a b l e :
'1)RCA equipment apparen t ly  r e q u i r e s  l a r g e r  amounts of 
d ed ica ted  p reven t ive  maintenance t ime than t h a t  of  our main 
com pet i to r ,  IBM. Customers t h a t  have both our equipment and IBM 
equipment a r e  aware o f  t h i s ,  and t h i s  works to  our de t r im en t  in the  
market p la ce .
2)RCA equipment i s  apparen t ly  more s e n s i t i v e  to  environmental  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  than t h a t  of  compet it ion ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  IBM. This makes 
our customers somewhat s e n s i t i v e  to  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  [between] our 
maintenance po l icy  and t h e i r s .  I am t o l d ,  f o r  example, t h a t  360 /30 's  
can be l e f t  without any maintenance whatsoever f o r  weeks on end. 
Yet,  most o f  our systems r e q u i r e  t h a t  we take  the  system from the  
customer f o r  per iods  of  t ime every d a y . ' 104
On top  o f  t h i s ,  RCA's dec is ion  to s top development of  e l e c t r o ­
103See below, chap te r  8,  pp320-325.
1Q4US v IBM. dx621, J.W. Rooney, 'A dm in is t ra to r  F ie ld  E n g inee r ing ' ,
in te rn a l  memo, 26/6 /69 .
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mechanical p e r ip h e r a l s  led to  con t inu ing  problems, problems which p e r s i s t e d  
even a f t e r  th e  loss  c u t t i n g  o rd e r  ended. While Spec tra  was i n i t i a l l y  
marketed with  RACE and bought in d isk  d r iv e s ,  RCA ev en tu a l ly  decided to  
r e s t a r t  p e r ip h e r a l  design .  At th e  end of 1967, 18 months a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  
Spectra  d e l i v e r i e s ,  RCA could supply  an e q u iv a len t  to  IBM's 2311 d isk  
d r iv e 105. Before t h i s  RCA had l o s t  pa t ience  with Bryant and had bought 
these  dev ices  from CDC, and even from IBM106. What concerned RCA was 
th a t  p e r i p h e r a l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s to ra g e  dev ices ,  were becoming a very 
s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of a machine's  r e n t a l  income.
However, by the time RCA could o f f e r  i t s  own 2311 e q u iv a len t ,  IBM had 
added the  2314 to  i t s  range,  a system which o f f e red  massive s to rage  
capac i ty  f o r  la rg e  u se r s ,  the  type o f  users RCA wanted to  s e l l  t o .  RCA 
wanted to  produce an equ iva len t  of  t h i s  system qu ick ly ,  but again  i t s  
p e r iphe ra l  p lans  were thrown in to  confusion. F i r s t l y  Jim Linnel,  who had 
headed the  development of th e  2311 clone,  l e f t  the  company with h is  
engineers  to  form his  own company, Linnel E l e c t r o n ic s .  He developed and 
sold IBM plug compatible p e r i p h e r a l s 107. Secondly the  whole p e r ip h e ra l  
opera t ion  was moved, which seems to  have caused a l o t  o f  problems. This 
d i s ru p t io n  meant t h a t  RCA could not supply i t s  own 2314 equipment u n t i l  
1970, f i v e  yea r s  a f t e r  IBM. During 1968/9 RCA accepted t h a t  RACE would 
never be compet i t ive  and decided t o  buy 2314 type equipment from 
Memorex108. When RCA ev en tu a l ly  managed to  produce th e se  d isk  d r iv e s  
i t s e l f ,  IBM i n s t a n t l y  r e l e a s e d  th e  re v o lu t io n a ry  3330 Merlin d r iv e ,  once 
again p u t t i n g  RCA a t  a d isadvan tage .  RCA was always a genera t ion  behind in 
the  market f o r  random access  s to ra g e  systems.
Given RCA's small R&D budget,  i t  i s  not s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  i t s  sof tware 
development was inadequate .  While th e  po l icy  of  being 360 compat ible 
l im i ted  the  amount of software  work RCA had to  do, i t  was s t i l l  faced with 
one of  th e  g r e a t e s t  1960s problems, t h a t  of  p rovid ing  a comprehensive 
opera t ing  system. The s tandard  ope ra t in g  system, TDOS, was adequate to  
s t a r t  w i th ,  bu t  r a p id ly  aged and needed updating by the  end of the  
decade109. A second problem was t h a t  the  two sm a l le s t  Spec t ra s ,  the  
70/15 and the  70/25,  only o f f e re d  su b -se t s  of th e  i n s t r u c t i o n  s e t  and were
1Q5US v IBM. tr9913, Beard. 
l o s Ib id  tr9935 .
107Ib id ,  tr9914.
l o s Ib id ,  t r9936.
109Us v IBM. t r l2 1 3 5 ,  Rooney.
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not o f f e re d  with COBOL compile rs .  COBOL was th e  main bus iness  language so 
t h i s  damaged s a l e s ,  and the  small  machines were not  p a r t i c u l a r y  su cce ss fu l .
The reason TDOS was not updated was t h a t  RCA was working on a new 
t im e -sh a r in g ,  v i r t u a l  memory o p e ra t ing  system, the  TSOS-VMOS. This was 
RCA's l a r g e s t  sof tware p r o j e c t .  Two machines, th e  70/46 and 70/61, were 
s p e c i a l l y  developed in the  l a t e  1960s to o f f e r  la rge  s ca le  i n t e r a c t i v e  
computing. However, TSOS-VMOS took much longer to  develop than was 
expected,  not only  a f f e c t in g  th e se  two machines,  but a l so  g r e a t l y  damaging 
RCA's next fam i ly  of machines which was designed to  use TSOS-VMOS as i t s  
mani o pe ra t ing  system110.
F i n a l l y  th e r e  was one very su rp r i s in g  weakness. Despite  the  f a c t  t h a t  
RCA's Memory Products Divis ion  was a reasonably  la rg e  s u p p l ie r  of memories 
to  the  computer and c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r i e s ,  i t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  f a i l e d  
to  provide memory of good enough r e l i a b i l i t y  and fu n c t io n a l  advantage to  
the Computer Systems D iv is ion .  In 1968 t h i s  came to  a head when the  then 
Information Systems Div is ion informed th e  co rpo ra te  management t h a t  i t  had 
to  p lace  an o rde r  fo r  $35m worth of memory f o r  a proposed ad d i t ion  to  the  
Spectra  s e r i e s ,  the  70/49, with an ou ts ide  company. ISD wrote to  Bob 
S a rno f f111, informing him t h a t  the  d iv i s io n  of  th e  two opera t ions  was 
i l l o g i c a l  and t h a t  they should be merged:
'Development p rocesses  must involve  more than t h e o r e t i c a l  
a n a ly s i s  and i t s  immediate physica l  embodiment. A thorough 
unders tanding  and c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  mechanical  design,  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
m a n u f a c tu r a b i l i ty ,  and m a i n t a i n a b i l i t y  of  a complete memory system 
is  r e q u i r e d .  Nothing l e s s  can meet compet it ion today. Economical and 
fu n c t io n a l  t r a d e - o f f s  between hardware and software  must be 
optimized .
The p resen t  s t r u c t u r e  w i th in  RCA i s  not conducive to  e f f i c i e n t  
o p e ra t io n  o r  to  meet th e se  requ i rem ents ..............
This i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  what was poin ted out in the  Booz, Allen & 
Hamilton Report of  March 7, 1967. I t  i s  what has been demonstrated 
by th e  in o rd in a te  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in t ry i n g  to  provide  
r e l i a b l e  memory s tacks  f o r  our computer shipments in 1967 and 1968. 
Poor s t a c k s  may have c o s t  us as much as  $10,000,000 in those  two 
y e a r s .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  our problem is  po r t r ayed  by what has been 
inadequate  p rov is ion ing  in th e  eng ineer ing  budgets of  Memory 
P r o d u c t s___
Under a s t r u c t u r e  provid ing fo r  a memory group sepa ra te  from 
the  groups re q u i r in g  th e  memories as one o f  t h e i r  bas ic  design 
components,  the  g r e a t e s t  e f f i c i e n c y  cannot r e s u l t .  The o b je c t iv e s  of 
the  two groups are  not always in p a r a l l e l .  Doing the  job p rope r ly  is  
made much more d i f f i c u l t .  Meeting compet it ion today r e q u i r e s
110See below, pp241-247.
111Gen. S a r n o f f ' s  son,  Robert ,  had taken over the  company on h is  
f a th e r s  r e t i r e m e n t .
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organ iz ing  in the most s t r a ig h t fo rw a rd  manner in a u t h o r i t y  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 112.
Whether the  merger a c tu a l ly  occurred  i s  unknown. Once RCA had sold  i t s  
computer o p e ra t io n ,  i t  then so ld  i t s  memory manufactur ing f a c i l i t i e s  to  
DEC. What i s  c l e a r  i s  t h a t ,  in th e  eyes of the  computer d i v i s i o n ,  the  
d e c e n t r a l i s e d  s t r u c t u r e  was d i s j o i n t i n g  the companies development work.
SPECTRA 70 in th e  market and th e  end of  cash r e s t r i c t i o n s .
Despi te  th e  r e s t r i c t e d  r e so u rce s  a v a i l ab le  to  develop the  Spec t ra ,
i t  f a red  moderately  well in the  market.  By the  end of  1965 th e re  were over
100 o r d e r s 113. While not a g r e a t  number, t h i s  was in l i n e  with the  slow
growth RCA wanted fo r  CSD a t  th e  t ime.
The most successfu l  machine was the  70/45, the  s m a l l e s t  of the  f u l l
s ca le  machines.  With the success o f  t h i s  system, RCA in troduced a sm a l le r ,
but f u l l y  f u n c t io n a l  system, below th e  70/45, c a l l e d  the  70/35. Unlike the
o the r  small machines i t  used IC components and had the  f u l l  i n s t r u c t i o n
s e t .  I t  was in e f f e c t  a value engineered  70/45, and became the r e a l  base
level  machine.  I t  a lso  o f f e red  an emulator f o r  the  old  IBM 1401 machine,
the  l a r g e s t  u s e r  base in th e  wor ld11*. IBM noted t h a t  t h e  Spectra  range
had a number o f  advantages:
' -H igher  in t e rn a l  speed in comparison with comparable IBM System/360 
models.
- - O n e - th i rd  higher speed magnetic tape d r iv e s  a t  eq u iv a l en t  r e n t a l s  
compared t o  IBM.
--High speed p r in t in g  i s  provided a t  $300 to  $600 below our p r i c e s .
- - A v a i l a b i l i t y  of magnetic t a p es  on th e  Model 15 gives  them a
magnetic tape  system in a p r i c e  range where we have no c u r r e n t  
e n t r y . ' 115
Never the less  IBM was not w orr ied ,  noting t h a t  RCA's marketing was 
very c o n s e r v a t iv e 116. Though IBM did  not know i t ,  t h i s  was because of  
the  o rde r  t o  reduce losses  to  pay f o r  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  development. 
However, c o n d i t io n s  a t  RCA were changing ra p id ly .  IBM market watchers noted 
t h a t  in 1966 two of RCA's major investments were s t a r t i n g  to  g enera te  a 
r e tu rn :
112US v IBM. px840, Memo from J.R.Bradburn to  R.W.Sarnoff,  18/12/68,  
Bradburn was CSD's general  manager.
113US v IBM. px245, 'F iv e  year  p l a n ' ,  1965.
114US v IBM. dx960, C.E. F i z z e l l ,  IBM General Data Processing  HQ, Memo 
to T.J.Watson J r ,  IBM CEO, 11/12/64.
l l s Ib id .
116Ib id .
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'RCA is performing very well as a co rp o ra t io n .  I t s  colour  
t e l e v i s i o n  program[me] i s  h igh ly  success fu l  and i t  has been doing 
very  well  in government and defense bus iness .  The da ta  process ing  
p o r t i o n  of  RCA has not been doing very well  f o r  the  l a s t  two ye a r s .
This is  s i g n i f i c a n t  on the  bas is  t h a t  in the  e a r l y  '60s RCA 
undertook two major program[mes]- - -colour t e l e v i s i o n  and data  
p r o c e s s i n g . /117
IBM s t a f f  were not sure  how t h i s  new p r o f i t a b i l i t y  would a f f e c t  the  
computer o p e ra t io n s .  IBM thought RCA would take  one o f  two courses  of 
a c t i o n :  us ing the  t e l e v i s i o n  p r o f i t s  to  r e i n v e s t  in the  computer
depar tment ,  o r  abandoning genera l  purpose computers and c oncen t ra t ing  on 
communications systems. The c a p i t a l  re leased  by t h i s ,  t o g e th e r  with the  
t e l e v i s i o n  p r o f i t s ,  could be used f o r  o the r  a reas  of expansion. As i t  
tu rned  out RCA decided to  back the  computer o pe ra t ion  f u r t h e r ,  while  a l so  
expanding in o th e r  d i r e c t i o n s .
In 1966 th e  computer d iv i s io n  proposed to  the  co rpora t ion  t h a t  i t  be 
allowed to  run up large  new lo s se s ,  in an a ttempt to  achieve a h igher 
market share :
' . . t h i s  was f u l l y  accepted ,  by the  co rp o ra t io n ,  and the  reason 
i s  t h a t  they  f e l t  we were making good progress  and they  f e l t  t h a t  
t h i s  was a worthwhile investment in the  f u t u r e  of the  b u s i n e s s . '
' . . I  th ink  they  f e l t ,  as they  had f e l t  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  i t  was an 
in d u s t ry  t h a t  had s i g n i f i c a n t  growth p o t e n t i a l  f o r  the  RCA 
Corpora tion  and t h a t  a t  some po in t  in th e  fu tu r e  had a s i g n i f i c a n t  
p r o f i t  p o t e n t i a l . '
' . . A c t u a l l y ,  the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of the  t e l e v i s i o n  bus iness  had 
become q u i t e  s t rong a year  or  two p r i o r  to  t h a t . '
' I  th ink  the  o v e r a l l  p r o f i t  p o s i t io n  of the  co rpo ra t ion  made 
i t  p o s s ib l e  f o r  them to  support  th e  Div is ion a t  th e  level  
recommended by D iv is ion  management, but  obviously  they would not 
have done t h i s  i f  they  d id  not f e e l  t h a t  the  Div is ion  had a 
p o t e n t i a l  in the  f u t u r e  f o r  becoming an important p a r t  of the  t o t a l  
o v e r a l l  RCA o p e r a t i o n . ' 113
From 1966 CSD was given permission to  place machines on the  market,  without 
the  need to  balance th e  books. At th e  same time the  company took on a 
number of  new s t a f f  to  support  i t s  expansion. Of these  new s t a f f ,  the  key 
p layer  seems to  have been Chase Morsey, who took over the  co rpo ra te  v i c e ­
pres idency  f o r  marketing.  In the  l a t e  1960s he bought in a number o f  IBM 
marketing s t a f f  and made market share  the  key g o a l119, and RCA again 
t r i e d  to  become the number two in the  i n d u s t r y 120. M cCol l is te r ,  who
117US v IBM. px4459, IBM Data Processing  Group '1967-1968 Operat ing 
P lan '  7/11/66 p l84 .
l i a US v IBM. tr9620-9622, McColl is te r .
119Sobel RCA, pl95.
12° US v IBM. px340, RCA 1970 Annual Report .
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adm it ted ly  had been s i d e - l i n e d  by these  changes,  be l ieved  t h i s  was a
fu n c t io n  of  Chase Morsey's p a s t  r o l e  in Ford:
' . . . h e  was very conscious  of market share  s t a t i s t i c s  and he 
was a l so  i n f l u e n t i a l ,  and t h i s  caused th e  d i v i s i o n  to  give 
inc reas ing  recogn i t ion  to  share  of  the  m a r k e t . . '
' I  th ink  i t  was a legacy from h is  exper ience  in the  automobile 
i n d u s t r y . . / l z l
McColl is te r  did  not th ink  t h a t  t h i s  was a good in f luence :
'because  i t  tended to  place  the  emphasis upon inc reas ing  
market share  and r e l a t i v e l y  deemphasized c o n t ro l  o f  expenses and 
achiev ing  p r o f i t ,  and the  end r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  the  expenses in the  RCA 
Computer Divis ion mounted to  the p o in t  where th ey  co n t r ib u te d  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to  RCA's withdrawal from the  b u s i n e s s . ' 122
Given freedom to  lose  money, RCA was able to  increase  i t s  market share .
RCA's own es t im a te s  of  i t s  share  seem high but they  do show th e  kind of
growth aimed a t ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  a big  increase  in 1970:
Table 6 .6  RCA market sh a re .  1968-71.
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971plan
Domestic
Market Share 4.1% 3.7% 7.5% 5.8%
Source: US v IBM. dx952, RCA '1971 Business Plan I I ' .
This was achieved by o f f e r i n g  la rge  d iscoun ts .  A much favoured t a c t i c  was 
to  o f f e r  a p o t e n t i a l  customer a l a rg e r  machine f o r  the  same r e n t a l  as a 
smal ler  one123. However, the  most important method th e  fi rm used to 
a t t r a c t  new use r s  was the  Accrued Equity C on t rac t .  Users were o f f e re d  
machines on a s ix  year  l ease  b a s i s .  At the  end of  the  s ix  y e a r s ,  the  user  
owned the  machine and no more payments were r e q u i r e d 12-*. However, so 
t h a t  the  use r  could s t i l l  b e n e f i t  from the advantages of l e a s in g ,  they  had 
the  option  of  swapping to  a l ease  c o n t r a c t  a t  any t ime in th e  s ix  y ea r s  and 
upgrade to  a new machine. This proved a d i s a s t e r  f o r  RCA. RCA was in the  
h a b i t  of  d e p re c ia t in g  i t s  leased computers over s ix  y e a r s ,  which was 
r e f l e c t e d  in the  accrued eq u i ty  c o n t r a c t .  However, IBM, with i t s  much lower 
cos t  base ,  could a f fo rd  to  d e p r e c ia t e  over fo u r  year s  and could w r i t e - o f f  
leased machines qu icker ,  meaning t h a t  they could a f f o r d  to  r e p la c e  a 
genera t ion  o f  leased machines must f a s t e r 125. In o th e r  words, t o  keep
121US v IBM, t r l 1156-57, McColl is te r .
122Ib id ,  t r l 1158.
123US v IBM. t r l2 2 1 7 ,  Rooney, d iv i s io n a l  VP f o r  Marketing.
12*US v IBM. tr9803, McCol l is te r .
125US v IBM. t r l2 2 1 9 ,  Rooney.
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per iod .
The e f f e c t  of t h i s  was tw o-fo ld .  F i r s t l y  RCA's d r iv e  to  expand 
S p e c t r a ' s  market base happened a long time in to  the  t h i r d  genera t ion  of 
computing, most being d e l iv e re d  in 1970. By t h i s  t ime a s i g n i f i c a n t  
percentage  o f  IBM 360s had been f u l l y  dep rec ia ted  and i t  was p repar ing  to  
in troduce  the  next range,  the  370. Secondly, the  d i v i s i o n ' s  accountants  had 
counted the  accrued c o n t r a c t s  as f i rm  sa le s  which made i t s  ba lance  shee t  
much s t ro n g e r .  However, when the  IBM 370 was r e l e a s e d ,  and RCA was forced  
to  r e a c t  by in t roducing  the
RCA-Series of computers, u se r s  swapped accrued e q u i ty  c o n t r a c t s  f o r  l eases  
so as to  ge t  th e  new, more powerful systems. F inanc ia l  d i s a s t e r  ensued, as 
is  desc r ibed  below.
Other uses f o r  RCA's new-found p r o f i t s .
Before cons ide r ing  t h i s ,  i t  i s  worth while h ig h l ig h t in g  the  f a c t  t h a t  
RCA was a l so  us ing i t s  p r o f i t s  to  fund o ther  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s  as w e l l .  In 
the  l a t e  1960s i t  was not j u s t  the  CSD management t h a t  changed, so did  the  
co rpora te  l e ad e rsh ip .  Bob Sarnof f  g radua l ly  took over from h is  f a t h e r  as 
head of RCA, e v en tu a l ly  becoming Chairman, P r e s id e n t ,  and CEO. IBM lawyers 
in the  a n t i - t r u s t  case made g r e a t  p lay  of RCA's change o f  emphasis a t  t h i s  
t ime. Ear ly  1960s Annual Reports t a lk ed  of RCA's f u l l  commitment to  
' computers ,  co n t ro l  and communications'  the  '3  C s ' .  This changed to  a 
po l icy  of  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ;  RCA s t a r t e d  to spread i t s  r i s k .  The fo llowing 
t a b l e  shows i t s  major a c q u i s i t i o n s :
Table 6 .7  RCA a c q u i s i t i o n s .  1966-71.
Date Company Method of payment Value
05/19/66 Random House 
(pub l i sh in g )
Common s tock $ 4 0 . lm
05/11/67 Hertz  Corp. 
( c a r  r e n t a l )
P re fe r r ed  and 
common Stock
$248.4m
03/31/70 Banquet Foods common s tock $116.5m
10/14/70 Cushman & 
Wakefield Inc.
Common Stock $30.0m
02/24/71 Coronet Inds. Common Stock $183.9m
$618.9m
Source: US v IBM. Dx965 and 966, IBM a t to rn ey s  compiled t h i s  l i s t  from RCA 
annual r e p o r t s .
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IBM made the  poin t t h a t  RCA's commitment to  i t s  e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t i e s  
was l e s s  a t  t h i s  t ime,  and t h i s  was one o f  th e  reasons i t  abandoned 
computers in the  e a r l y  1970s. Some of the se  purchases caused major 
problems, e s p e c i a l l y  Hertz .  In th e  e a r ly  1970s r e c e s s io n ,  i t  proved 
impossible  f o r  Hertz to  s e l l  i t s  ex - lease  c a r s ,  a d i s a s t e r  f o r  i t s  
f in a n c es .  This d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  th e  computer o p e ra t io n .  In 1971 A.L.Conrad 
took over the  Presidency and CEO r o l e s  in the  company, r e f l e c t i n g  the  
f a i l u r e  of  Bob S a r n o f f ' s  dual p o l i c y  of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  and computer 
expansion.
The RCA Se r ie s  and the  c o l la p se  of  th e  SPECTRA.
RCA knew t h a t  IBM's next s e r i e s  was going to  be announced in 1970 and 
i n s t a l l e d  in 1971. This was something of  a problem. RCA's long term p r o je c t  
f o r  new systems had s t a r t e d  in 1966. The ground r u l e s  were : -
'C o m p a t ib i l i ty  with Spec tra  70 and where p o s s ib le ,  with IBM is  
a ground r u l e .  This p o l ic y  w i l l  permit  maximum growth in a replacement 
market and r e t e n t i o n  of our own c u s t o m e r s . ' 126
However, B read 's  system'X ',  which was meant to  f u l f i l  the  above c r i t e r i a ,  
was can ce l led  in 1969127. This was because i t  was expected to  take  too 
long to  ge t  to  th e  market,  and had a number of  a r c h i t e c t u r a l  problems. 
However, i t s  replacement,  the  New Technology S e r i e s ,  faced the  same 
problem. F. Withington, of th e  c o n su l t a n t s  A.D. L i t t l e ,  informed RCA's 
s t a f f  t h a t ,  in h i s  opin ion, the  advanced concepts of the  NTS could not be 
brought t o  the  market u n t i l  1973. This forced th e  f irm t o  put th e  NTS on 
the back burner as a long term p r o j e c t  fo r  a f u t u r e  concept of computing:
' I  t h in k  t h a t  in looking a t  the  next family  o r  genera t ion  of  
equipment beyond Spec t ra ,  t h e r e  was a lengthy debate between people 
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  programming systems, t h a t  i s ,  the  so c a l l e d  sof tware 
o r g a n iz a t io n ,  and the  people r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  hardware or equipment 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  and perhaps the  engineer ing  o rgan iza t io n  as w e l l ,  as 
to  e x a c t l y  what the  na tu re  o f  t h i s  product should b e . ' 128
However, A.D. L i t t l e  t o l d  the  company th a t  i t  needed a new system e a r l i e r  
than 1973 to  main ta in  i t s  broad l i n e  s t r a t e g y ,  which A.D. L i t t l e  considered 
the  only way of  ach ieving the  company's goal of being the  i n d u s t r y ' s  number 
two:
'When I f i r s t  got to  RCA Arthur D. L i t t l e  had been h i red  to  
review the  marketing s t r a t e g i e s  o f  the  RCA Corporation and product
126US v IBM. px245, 'EDP Five Year P l a n ' ,  March 1966.
127US v IBM. 12225/6, Rooney.
128US v IBM. t r9809, M cC ol l i s te r .
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s t r a t e g y .  At a meeting I a t t en d ed  they p resen ted  the  concept t h a t  you 
had t o  have a broad product l i n e  because you could not p o s s ib ly  s e l l  
enough share  of any p a r t i c u l a r  product ca tegory  to  ach ieve t h i s  goal 
[o f  being number 2 to  IBM] and t h a t  s t r a t e g y  was accepted as being 
v a l i d . '
To cover i t s  shor t  term needs,  RCA re so r te d  to  re launch ing  what was 
e s s e n t i a l l y  th e  same product:
'The RCA Ser ies  was an a t tem pt  to  b r ing  out what was seemingly 
a new product l ine  f o r  whatever psychologica l  in f luence  i t  might have 
on th e  marketplace .
But i t  was a r e s t y l e d  product l i n e .  There was a new s e t  of 
covers ,  the  frames were th e  same, and i t  was e s s e n t i a l l y  a cosmetic 
t r ea tm en t  o f  the  e x i s t i n g  Spec t ra  70 Ser ies  with new model numbers and 
new p r i c i n g . ' 130
'They were not p r e c i s e l y  the  same p ro cesso rs .  A r c h i t e c t u r a l l y  
they  were th e  sam e . '131
The main d i f f e r e n c e  was t h a t  new manufacturing techniques  and components 
made th e  hardware cheaper t o  produce,  and the  memory was speeded up132. 
Half the  new RCA Ser ies  was to  use th e  old  TDOS systems, th e se  were the  RCA 
2 and 6. The o th e r  h a l f ,  the  RCA 3 and 7, were t o  be o f f e re d  with the  t im e­
shar ing VMOS 4 opera t ing  system. I t  was on VMOS t h a t  RCA focused i t s  main 
marketing e f f o r t .  However, th e  development of VMOS remained a s i g n i f i c a n t  
problem. In l a t e  1970 i t  was 6-9 months behind schedu le133. I t  was 
est imated  t h a t  t h i s  would lead to  a loss  of 17-20 RCA3 orders  and 20-22 
RCA7 o r d e r s 134. This r ep re sen ted  $2.14ra of monthly r e n t a l  income, and 
was desc r ibed  as being c lo se  to  a d i s a s t e r 135.
129US v IBM. t r l l 8 1 4 ,  Rooney.
13° US v IBM. tr9817, M cC ol l i s te r .
131US v IBM. t r l2 2 4 0 ,  Rooney.
132lb i d , t r l 2 2 4 1 .
133US v IBM. dx872, Memo from A.L.Fazio (head of VM0S4 development) 
to J.W.Rooney, ' Impact of  VM0S4 S l ip p a g e ' ,  24/12/70.
134Ib id .
135Ib id .
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The RCA S e r ie s  and the  market environment.
The RCA S e r ie s  was launched a t  a d i f f i c u l t  time f o r  th e  computer 
indus t ry .  The d iv i s io n a l  Vice P r e s id e n t  fo r  Marketing,  J.W. Rooney, noted 
t h a t :
'The economic s i t u a t i o n  f o r  the  computer bus iness  in 1970 was 
q u i t e  bad. As I r e c a l l ,  t h e  shipments t h a t  y ea r  were down some 20% from 
the  previous  year .
In 1971 th a t  s i t u a t i o n  p e r s i s t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  as long as we were in 
b u s i n e s s . /136
At the  t ime Datamation p red ic ted  t h a t  IBM would only reach one t h i r d  of  i t s  
1970 d e l iv e r y  quota137. This was a d i f f i c u l t  environment f o r  the  new
machine.
A second problem was the  com pet i t ive  s tance  IBM was t ak in g .  The IBM 
370/155 and 165 were announced in June 1970 and the  smal ler  135 and 145 in 
September 1970138. The 135 and 145 of fe red  v i r t u a l  memory and t im e­
shar ing o p e ra t in g  systems, and the  l a r g e r  machines were qu ick ly  rep laced  
by the  158 and 168 which o f f e r e d  the  same f u n c t io n s .  They used IC
components and semiconductor memory, r a t h e r  than magnetic core  memory. The 
combination was f a s t e r ,  more powerfu l,  and produced cheaper machines. 
Within th e  IBM range the  system t h a t  most concerned RCA was the  370/145, 
which f e l l  r i g h t  in to  RCA's most success fu l  c l a s s  o f  machine.
Due t o  th e  s tag ing  of  IBM's announcements the  sm al le r  370s were
announced a f t e r  the  RCA S e r i e s .  This was the cause of  the  argument:
'Wel l ,  the  370/45 was announced w i th in  days a f t e r  we had
announced th e  RCA 6. . . i t  was our opinion t h a t  IBM had p r iced  the  145
out of i t s  normal r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  [ the ]  o t h e r . . .systems t h a t  they  had
announced. We f e l t  t h a t  t h e r e  was a good p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  an a l t e r a t i o n  
had been made in p r i c in g  th e  system as a d i r e c t  response  to  the
announcement of  the  RCA 6.
In a d d i t io n  to  t h a t ,  we f e l t  t h a t  t h e i r  d e l iv e r y  p a t t e r n ,  as i t  
would r e l a t e  t o  the  l a r g e r  memories in the  145, was not c o n s i s t e n t  with 
the  o th e r  p a t t e r n s  of d e l i v e r i e s  on the o th e r  newly announced machines, 
and we f e l t  t h a t  i t  was, in e f f e c t ,  a r e t a l i a t i o n  [ a g a in s t ]  the
announcement o f  the  RCA 6 139.
RCA made some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  to  IBM t h a t  the  145 was ' p r i c e d  s e l e c t i v e l y '
to  a t t a c k  RCA140. RCA be l ieved  t h a t  the  145 was announced s p e c i f i c a l l y
136US v IBM. t r l2 2 6 4 ,  Rooney.
137P a tam at ion . 15th October 1970, pl7.
138F ish e r  e t  al  IBM and the  US DP Industry .  p367.
139US v IBM. V. 0. Wright t r l 3 1 1 4 .  Wright had jo ined  RCA from IBM as 
head of government marketing.
14° US v IBM. dx868, i n t e r n a l  RCA memo, J .Johnson to  the  head s a l e s  
E.Donegan, 3 /2 /7 1 .
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to  h i t  RCA, as i t  had a d e l iv e r y  t ime of  18 months r a t h e r  than IBM's usual 
12 months. RCA argued t h a t  i t  was announced ahead of schedule  in o rder  to  
h i t  RCA 6 s a l e s .  I t  was a l so  argued t h a t  the  p r i c in g  of the  semiconductor 
memory was a r t i f i c i a l l y  low. IBM responded t h a t  th e  de lay  in d e l iv e r y  was 
due to  the  t ime i t  took to  b u i ld  up y ie ld s  of memory ch ip s ,  and t h a t  the  
p r ic e  was s e t  to  r e f l e c t  th e  c o s t  t h a t  was expected to  be achieved as IBM 
advanced down th e  learn ing  curve of  producing th e se  dev ices .  These are  
s tandard  p r a c t i c e s  in th e  semiconductor i n d u s t r y 1*1 and RCA did  not 
pursue the se  compla in ts .  In any case th e  145 o f f e r e d  the  g r e a t  advantage 
of t im e -sh a r in g ,  which r e q u i re d  la rg e  amounts of  f a s t  memory. I f  nothing 
e l s e ,  RCA b e l ieved  t h a t  i t s  r e p r e s e n ta t i o n s  to  IBM kept i t  conscious of the  
f a c t  t h a t  i t  was under a n t i - t r u s t  s c r u t in y .
A second problem IBM c re a te d  f o r  RCA concerned p e r i p h e r a l s .  Not only 
did IBM in t roduce  the new 370 computers,  but a t  more or l e s s  the  same time 
i t  in troduced th e  very advanced 3330 Merlin d isk  d r iv e ,  and the  ASPEN tape 
d r ive :
'T h e i r  announcement of the  3330 disk  with the  370 family  we f e l t  
was very s i g n i f i c a n t ,  very  profound, and would have a g r e a t  impact on 
RCA i f  we were to  compete a g a in s t  IBM in t h i s  market p l a c e . ' 1*2
At t h i s  t ime RCA had only j u s t  managed to  produce the  2314 d r iv e  t h a t  IBM
had in troduced in the  mid-1960s.  RCA wrote to  IBM asking f o r  d e t a i l s  of  the
new systems j u s t  a f t e r  they  were announced1*3 . However, th e  m a te r ia l  IBM
sent RCA did  not conta in  enough information to  enable  i t  to  s t a r t  copying
the  systems1**. In August 1971 RCA ev en tua l ly  rece ived  a re fe ren ce
manual on the  Mer lin ,  the  same month i t  was d e l iv e r e d .  Memorex and ISS, the
two leading  plug compatible manufactures,  had managed to  ge t  t h i s
informat ion much e a r l i e r ,  bu t  RCA wanted to  develop t h i s  v i t a l  equipment
i t s e l f 1*5 .
1*1E. Sc ibbe ras ,  M ul t ina t iona l  e l e c t r o n i c  companies and na t io n a l  
economic p o l i c y .  Greenwich, Conn., 1977.
^ US v IBM. t r l l 9 3 9 ,  Rooney.
1*3US v IBM. dx936, IBM v ice  p re s id e n t ,  J .W.Birkenstock, re p ly in g  to
RCA's r e q u e s t ,  22/7 /70 .
1**U5 v IBM. dx937, RCA correspondence to  Birkenstock .
^ US v IBM. t r l2 2 6 2 ,  Rooney.
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The RCA Ser ies  marketing s t r a t e g y  and the c o l lap se  of the  SPECTRA.
In r e a l i t y  the  RCA Se r ie s  was a marketing ploy , an a ttempt to  re - launch  
the old  range with some evo lu t io n a ry  improvements. In support  of t h i s ,  RCA 
came up with a s t r a t e g y  to  ' i n t e r c e p t '  the  IBM range:
'There was a very e l a b o r a t e  s t r a t e g y  a t  the  t ime as to  where 
th e se  u n i t s  o f  the  RCA s e r i e s  would f a l l  a g a in s t  the  IBM [range] ,
e i t h e r  as i t  was announced or  was expected to  be announced in t h i s
e la b o r a te  s t r a t e g y  the  RCA s e r i e s  would f a l l  a t  c e r t a i n  p o i n t [ s ]  w i th in  
the  IBM product l i n e  spectrum and th a t  IBM would be unwil l ing  to  
d i s t u r b  the  equ i l ib r ium  of  t h a t  product spectrum and, t h e r e f o r e ,  negate 
the  r a t i o n a l e  of the  RCA product c o n c e p t . ' 146
The RCA Ser ie s  machines were planned to  be p os i t ioned  a t  the  mid-poin t
between IBM machines in terms of  s c a l e .  The hope was t h a t  as a use r  decided
t h a t  he wanted to  t rade  up to  a l a r g e r  machine, he would be a t t r a c t e d  to
the  RCA system r a t h e r  than th e  IBM, which would o f ten  be too big  a jump.
This plan f e l l  to  p ieces  as i t  was r e a l i s e d  t h a t  the  p a r t  of  the  range t h a t
was to  use VMOS would be l a t e .  A second problem was t h a t  the  p o t e n t i a l l y
l a r g e s t  s e l l i n g  of  RCA's normal machines, the  RCA 6, was p i tched  d i r e c t l y
a g a in s t  the  IBM 370/145, which was not only keenly p r iced ,  but a l s o  o f f e red
f u l l  t im e-sha r ing  f a c i l i t i e s .
While the  RCA f a i l e d  to  i n t e r c e p t  the  370, i t  d id  manage to  a f f e c t  the
old Spectra  range .  McCol l is te r  desc r ibed  the  RCA Ser ie s  as 'blowing the
SPECTRA out of th e  w a t e r ' 147. In th e  l a t e  1960s, up to  and inc luding
1970, the  Spec tra  had gone through a v e r i t a b l e  boom d e sp i t e  the  computer
recess ion :
'This  investment has a l r e ad y  r e s u l t e d  in a more r ap id  growth r a t e  
f o r  RCA than f o r  the  domestic indus t ry  as a whole. In 1970, th e  value  
of RCA's ne t  domestic shipments ro se  by more than 50 Der cen t  while 
t h a t  of  the  indus t ry  f e l l  by more than 20 per c e n t . ' 14
However, the  RCA Ser ie s  o f f e re d  much improved pr ice /per formance  r a t i o s ,  so
users  of the  Spec tra  sen t  back both leased and accrued e q u i ty  machines in
exchange f o r  th e  new machines. In th e  f i r s t  seven months o f  1971 78 old
computers had been re tu rn e d ,  and ano ther  137 were a l ready  booked in f o r
r e t u r n 149. The fo llowing t a b l e  breaks  down the  causes  of  th e se  r e t u r n s ,
and upgrading to  new systems accounts  fo r  the  g r e a t  m a jo r i ty :
146US v IBM. tr9838,  M cC ol l i s te r .
147Ib id ,  tr9839.
148RCA Annual Report ,  1970.
149US v IBM. dx872, RCA 'Returns  P r e s e n t a t i o n ' ,  4 /8 /71 .
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Table 6.8 Reasons for users returning RCA computers
System Losses to  Losses o th e r  than Upgraded
Competit ion Competition
301 2 7 9
501 1 -
3301 5 1
70/15 2 1
70/25 - 1
70/35 10 5 30
70/45 20 8 81
70/46 1 2 18
70/55 - - 5
70/60 - - 4
RCA 2 _  _2 ___
40 26 149
Source: US v IBM, dx872, RCA 'Re turns  P r e s e n t a t i o n ' ,  4 /8 /71 .
A second problem was t h a t  the  computer recess ion  a f f e c t e d  which machine 
upgraders went t o .  In the  p a s t  u se r s  traded  up from second to  t h i r d  
g ene ra t ion ,  spending the same money to  get a more advanced and powerful 
machine. This t ime Spectra 70/45s were traded up to  ' low y i e l d '  RCA2s, the  
same computer power f o r  l e s s  d o l l a r s 150.
RCA's investment in computers v ia  leases  and eq u i ty  c o n t r a c t s  was being 
wasted.  Machines were being re tu rn e d  much e a r l i e r  than th e  d e p re c ia t io n  
po l icy  had a llowed.  This fo rced  the  Information Systems Group to  up da te  
i t s  December 1970 plan,  and in Apri l  1971 the  'Bus iness  Plan I I '  was 
produced which cut the  ex p ec ta t io n s  f o r  the  Information Systems 
D iv is ion151. Revenue fo r  1971 was expected to  f a l l  from $323m to  $261m. 
This was because,  while gross  shipments were i n c re a s in g ,  ne t  shipments were 
f a l l i n g :
15° I b id .
151US v IBM. dx952, '1971 Business Plan I I ' .
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Table 6.9
Business Plan I I :  e f f e c t  of  r e tu rn e d  computers on RCA's ne t  computer 
shipments.
($m s a l e s  va lue)  Business Plan 2 Business Plan 1
Gross Shipments:
RCA 171 118
Spectra  170 20£
341 320
Minus value of  re tu rned
Spectra  computers 155 90
Net Shipments:
RCA 171 118
Spec tra  _15 112
186 230
Source: US v IBM. dx952, 'Bus iness  Plan I I ' ,  1971.
The outcome was an expected loss  of  $37m in 1970: worse s t i l l  was a la rge  
inc rease  in th e  'cash  r u n - o f f ' .  This was the  cash outf low to  pay f o r  the  
new RCA machines being b u i l t  and put out on le ase :
Table 6.10 
$m
Current Assets  
Long Term Receivables 
Net Fixed Assets
Total  Assets
Net Assets
Asset Turnover
Cash Run-off
Source: US v IBM. dx952,
RCA Investment
1968 1969
116 140
27 55
126 127
269 322
242 286
.8 .8
75 45
'Business  Plan I I ' ,  1971.
1968-1971.
1970 1971 BP2
163 193
103 146
144 188
410 527
372 481
.6 .5
89 126
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RCA's reassessment  of i t s  c o s t s  and f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n .
The r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  was even worse.  Chase Morsey s t a r t e d  to  take  a dim 
view of  the  s i t u a t i o n  in the  computer d iv i s io n ,  and i t s  e f f e c t s  on the  r e s t  
of th e  company. He became concerned t h a t  even th e  new p lan ,  p r e d i c t i n g  a 
loss  of $37m f o r  1970, was way o f f  t a r g e t ,  as th e  d i v i s i o n ' s  accounting 
procedures were so i r r e g u l a r 152. This was l a t e r  backed up by the 
c r i t i c i s m s  of  th e  Accounting P r i n c i p l e s  Board153. The d iv i s io n  had been 
counting 70% of the  expected revenue from an accrued e q u i ty  plan in year 
one. I t  was t r e a t i n g  these  as c e r t a i n  s a l e s ,  and w r i t i n g  70% of  t h e i r  value 
into the  books immediately154. I t  became ev iden t  t h a t  the  r e a l i t y  was 
t h a t  th e se  machines were being t r a n s f e r r e d  to  leases  and then  being 
re tu rned  to  the  fi rm: Accrued Equi ty Contracts  were f a r  from c e r t a i n  s a l e s .
The problems a t  the  computer d i v i s i o n  came a t  the  same time t h a t  both 
Hertz and NBC were s u f f e r in g  from a downturn in consumer demand. Figure 6.2 
(page 197) showed t h a t  RCA's p r o f i t s  co l lapsed  in 1970. Morsey poin ted  out 
to  Sarnof f  t h a t  the  increased t r a d in g  loss  a t  th e  computer d iv i s io n ,  and 
the la rge  in c rease  in the  d i v i s i o n ' s  ne t  a s s e t s ,  had accounted f o r  $181m 
of the  $247m f a l l  in p r o f i t s 155. I t  a lso  accounted f o r  $140m of  the  
company's nega t ive  cash flow of  $315m th a t  y e a r .  For the  coming decade 
Morsey b e l iev ed  t h a t  the  company's cash requirement had r i s e n  from $700m 
to  $lbn; in th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  the  decade he expected t h a t  i t  would be the  
computer o p e ra t io n  which would be th e  main d ra in  on cash.  He i l l u s t r a t e d  
t h i s  with th e  fo llowing t a b l e ,  showing th a t  th e  s in g le  b ig g es t  d ra in  on 
cash was expected to  be the  computer ope ra t ion :
152US v IBM. px347a, Memo from D.A. P e t e r i e  (whose r o l e  i s  unknown) 
to  Morsey 26 /5 /71 ,  which c r i t i c i s e d  accounting procedures;  px955, Morsey 
to  Donegan 29 /6 /71 ,  concerning a r e p o r t  by Arthur Young concerning.major 
accounting problems, e s p e c i a l l y  regard ing  in v e n to r i e s  and d e p r e c i a t i o n .
153US v IBM. t r l4058 ,  Conrad, RCA's new CEO.
154US v IBM. t r l3580-13600, Wright.
155US v IBM. px201, r e p o r t  from Chase Morsey to  Sarnoff  and Conrad, 
27/8/71.
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Table 6.11 Cash Flow of Domestic Operations.
$m 1971-1976 t o t a l
Serv ices  208
Government Systems 27
Commercial Systems (51)
Consumer E lec t ro n ic s  44
Elec t ro n ic  Components 132
Solid  S t a t e  (36)
NBC/Records 269
Coronet I n d u s t r i e s  3
Cushman & Wakefield 5
s u b - to t a l  M l
Computer Systems (703)
Indus t ry  Systems (155)
s u b - to t a l  (8581
Management Reserve (170)
Total  (4271
Average cash out flow per year  (71)
Source: US v IBM. px201, r e p o r t  from Chase Morsey to  Sarnoff  and Conrad, 
27 /8 /71.
'As a r e s u l t  of these  changes,  i t  is  c l e a r l y  necessary  to  r e a s s e s s  
RCA's cash requirements  and new funding c a p a b i l i t y  over the  next s ix
» aft - — a* / 1 5  6y ears .
Morsey then went on to  make a t e l l i n g  p o in t  by comparing RCA's 
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t u s  with t h a t  of  o th e r  e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c  and computer 
companies. F i r s t l y  he showed t h a t  RCA's r a t i o  of  earn ings  to  f ixed  charges 
was lower than  th e  average f o r  th e  e l e c t r i c a l  and computer i n d u s t r i e s ,  and 
was f a l l i n g  th e  qu ickes t :
156 ibid
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Table 6.12 Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges.
'67 '68 '69 '70 t o t a l  chan< 
in cover %
RCA 10.3 9.1 7.8 3.5 (66)
G.E. 11.9 10.5 7.5 6.4 (46)
in 3.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 31
Westinghouse 15.9 11.8 10.6 5.5 (64)
Average 10.4 8 .9 7.6 5.5 (47)
Burroughs 7.2 6 .8 5.5 3.9 (46)
Honeywell 6.2 6.9 6.0 3.2 (48)
IBM 35.7 46.7 57.8 41.6 17
NCR 4.7 4.2 4.1 2.5 (48)
Sperry Rand 9.9 10.6 6.3 4.7 (52)
Average 12.7 15.0 15.9 11.1 (12)
Source: US v IBM. px201. Chase Morsey r e p o r t  to  Sarnof f  and Conrad 27/8
Morsey be l iev ed  t h a t  t h i s  was th e  r a t i o  on which investment bankers made 
t h e i r  d e c i s io n s .  RCA's low and f a l l i n g  s t a t u s  sev e re ly  l im i ted  th e  amount 
of new borrowing RCA could r a i s e .
As i t  was, RCA a lready  had a very  poor d e b t / e q u i ty  p o s i t i o n  compared 
to  a number o f  th e  o ther  companies l i s t e d .  Morsey was very concerned about 
the  high gear ing  of the  f irm:
Table 6.13 Debt/Equitv  R a t io .
'67 '68 '69 '70
RCA .79 .79 .77 .88
GE .32 .30 .27 .22
ITT .69 .56 .55 .52
Westinghouse .36 .32 .28 .44
Average .46 .39 .37 .39
Burroughs .48 .74 .57 .60
Honeywell .59 .61 .56 .87
IBM .14 .12 .11 .10
NCR .69 .42 .61 .82
Average .44 .44 .44 .51
Source: US v IBM. px201, Chase Morsey r e p o r t  to  Sarnof f  and Conrad 27/8 /71 .
Morsey guessed t h a t  the  r a t i o  would have to  r i s e  to  between 1.25-1,.80 by 
1976, b e l i e v in g  t h a t  RCA would not be ab le  to  r a i s e  f inance  a f t e r  i t  passed 
a r a t i o  of 1 .23.  Even plans to  s e l l  th e  radio  network and stop development
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of t h e  h igh ly  expensive v id e o d i s c 157 would not cover t h e  f i r m ' s  cash 
needs158.
When the  rev i sed  1971 computer bus iness  plan a r r iv e d  on S a r n o f f ' s  desk 
i t  was accompanied by a note  from th e  Finance Depar tment ' s  H .L .L e t t s159. 
He concluded t h a t :
'Unless  the s u b s t a n t i a l  cash requirements  of Computer Systems can 
be improved i t  may prevent us from making investments  in o th e r  a reas  
of  RCA with b e t t e r  and more immediate r e tu r n s  on c a p i t a l . ' 160
His main concern was t h a t  c o s t s  a t  CSD had got out of hand. The head of
government marketing,  V.O.Wright, who had jo ined  RCA from IBM, be l ieved
t h a t  t h i s  had been a major problem. This was because RCA machines were so
e a s i l y  comparable to IBM systems t h a t  any c o s t  d isadvantage  would show
through to  customers immediately.  There were a number of f a c t o r s
undermining RCA's cos t  base:
' I t  stemmed from seve ra l  sources.  One was the  f a c t  t h a t  the  
manufactur ing process in RCA was not as f u l l y  automated as I had seen 
i t  automated in IBM manufactur ing.
RCA was not devoting s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  in engineering a 
product to  th e  matter o f  c o s t .  They tended to  eng ineer  the  product  to  
ge t  i t  b u i l t ,  but ignore what i t  might c o s t  to  b u i ld  i t  a f t e r  i t  was 
eng ineered .
There was no value eng ineer ing  work going on a f t e r  the  product 
was developed to  reduce c o s t  w i th in  the manufacturing o r g a n i z a t i o n . . .
The c o s t ,  as I r e c a l l  i t ,  when I f i r s t  got i n v o lv e d . . . e a r l y  in
1 9 7 1 , . . .  was running a t . . . a b o u t  42% of revenue. That i s ,  the  cos t  of
the  product was about 42% of r e v e n u e . . . '
' . . . I  was aware o f  IBM's manufacturing c o s t ,  as I had remembered
from my days with IBM, would have run something on the  order of 14 to  
15% of  r e v e n u e . ' 161
Wright went on to  es t imate  t h a t  Sperry Rand's manufactur ing cos t  was 24% 
of revenue and a t  Burroughs i t  was 21%.
Morsey's arguments won the  day. In July  1971 Conrad recorded a video
157M. Graham, RCA and the  Video Disc: the  bus iness  of r e s e a r c h . 
Cambridge, Mass. 1986.
158ib id .
159US v IBM. dx952, '1971 Business Plan I I ' ,  and L e t t s '  accompanying 
l e t t e r ,  16/4 /71.
16° i b i d .
161US v IBM. t r l 3 5 5 9 -6 1 , Wright.
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taped message f o r  the  workers o f  the  computer o pe ra t ion  to  scotch rumours 
t h a t  RCA was about to  s e l l  o u t162. However, in August 1971 such a plan 
was under c o n s id e ra t io n .  On the  16th o f  September the  s en io r  management 
came to  th e  dec i s ion  t h a t  the  commercial computer d iv i s io n  had t o  be sold 
o f f  to  p r o t e c t  developments in th e  r e s t  of th e  company163. On th e  17th 
Conrad in v i t e d  Morsey to  p resen t  th e  proposal to  the  Board:
'As a r e s u l t  o f  the  f a c t o r s  ou t l in ed  in the  forgoing  a n a ly s i s  of 
CSD and i t s  impact on RCA, the  conclusion has been reached t h a t  the  
a d d i t i o n a l  investment requ i red  in CSD no longer appears  to  be a prudent 
f i n a n c i a l  r i s k .  The major reasons  f o r  t h i s  conclus ion  are  as fo l lows:
*The f u r t h e r  de lay  in the  achievement o f  s u s ta in ed  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
a t  CSD to  the  middle or l a t e  70s,  as opposed to  the  e a r ly  70s,  could 
jeopardize the a b i l i t y  of the Corporation to finance i t s  cap i ta l  requirements.
*The many heal thy  and v i t a l  pa r t s  of the  r e s t  of RCA could be 
hindered in the  event of a down tu r n  in the  economy in the  mid-1970's 
because o f  the  high level of o u t s id e  f inanc ing  re q u i re d  to support  the  
growth of  CSD (as well as the  o th e r  p a r t s  o f  RCA).........
* I t  should be recognized t h a t  RCA does have s t r e n g th s  in c e r t a i n  
sp ec ia l  and more narrowly def ined  compute r - re la ted  bus inesses  and these  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  can be pursued on a prudent b a s i s  wi thout  r i s k i n g  la rge  
amounts of  c a p i t a l .
Beyond th e se  f a c t o r s ,  the  dominant presence of IBM in the computer 
in d u s t ry  c o n t r ib u t e s  to  the  d i f f i c u l t y  of achiev ing  a v iab le  computer 
bus iness  f o r  RCA. The manpower and f i n a n c i a l  resources  of  IBM, 
inc lud ing  th e  s i z e  and s t r e n g th  of the  marketing,  re sea rch  and 
development o rg a n iz a t io n s ,  a re  such th a t  achieving  market share growth 
as well  as accep tab le  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  i s  extremely [ u n l i k e l y ] . /164
After  n e g o t i a t i o n s  with a number of  companies Sperry bought RCA's 
commercial computer opera t ion  f o r  $137m165. In September of 1971 RCA s e t  
up a r e s e rv e  o f  $490m to  cover th e  losses  i t  had su s ta ined  on the  
opera t ions  o f  th e  computer d i v i s i o n 166. Late r  the  company was ab le  to  
reduce t h i s  r e s e rv e  by $78m as the  d isposa l  was l e s s  f i n a n c i a l l y  damaging 
than had been expected because Sperry managed to  ge t  a b e t t e r  than expected
162US v IBM. t r l3939-42 ,  Conrad.
163l b i d , t r l 3 9 4 3 -4 .
164US v IBM. Px208.
165I n i t i a l l y  Sperry paid RCA $70 .5m with the  r e s t  pa id  over f i v e  years  
according t o  th e  revenue genera ted  by the RCA systems in the f i e l d .  RCA 
estimated in 1971 t h a t  t o t a l  payments would be from $100.5m to  $130.5m. As 
Sperry d id  r e l a t i v e l y  well a t  keeping the RCA i n s t a l l e d  base the  payments 
were a t  the  top of the  range.
166RCA 1971 annual r e p o r t .
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r e tu r n  from the  RCA o p e ra t io n .  Under th e  s a l e s  arrangement,  a p a r t  of  the  
p r i c e  was l inked  to  the  Computer Systems D i v i s i o n ' s  performance under 
Sperry  management in t h e i r  f i r s t  few years of c o n t r o l .  The RCA computers 
f i t t e d  in well  with S p e r r y ' s  range ,  a range which included some p a r t i a l l y  
IBM compat ible machines167. RCA's systems improved t h i s  a b i l i t y  and 
Sperry main ta ined  a reasonab ly  la rge  business  in pseudo-IBM compatible 
systems.
There were a number of r e a c t io n s  to  RCA's abandonment of computers.  
Datamation led with a head l ine  ' I n  Breach of Ten Thousand p ro m ise s '168. 
A number of  ' au to p sy '  a r t i c l e s  ensued169. In general  RCA was seen as 
l e t t i n g  down i t s  customers.  On the  o ther  hand, f i n a n c i a l ,  r a t h e r  than 
in d u s t ry ,  j o u r n a l s  saw the  RCA move as very accep tab le :
'RCA's recen t  announcement to  leave the  computer mainframe 
b u s in e s s ,  even though i t  has r e s u l t e d  in a $250 m i l l i o n 170 non­
r e c u r r in g  w r i t e - o f f ,  e l im in a te s  an area of  con t inu ing  earn ings  lo s s ,  
one which has demanded a g r e a t  amount of management t ime and a t t e n t i o n ,  
and a l so  r e tu r n s  the  company to  being predominantly a consumer goods 
company.' 171
The same a r t i c l e  went on to  p r e d i c t  an upswing in consumer demand, and t h a t  
with a 14.4 p r i c e : e a r n in g s  r a t i o  the  company was well  under the  p r i c e  of 
s im i la r  o rg a n iz a t io n s .  The recommendation was to  buy; RCA's main concern 
was the  f i n a n c i a l  m arke t ' s  view not th e  computer m arke t ' s  view of  i t .
Conclusion.
The above case  study shows j u s t  some of the  d e t a i l  t h a t  is  a v a i l a b le  
on RCA's computer ven ture .  Like EE and GE172, RCA went through a period 
of s e l f  a p p r a i s a l  a t  the  t ime i t  decided to  leave the  market,  the  concern 
being t h a t  remaining in the  compet i t ive  computer market would unduly a f f e c t  
the  f i r m ' s  o th e r  o p e ra t io n s .  In an e a r l i e r  pe r io d ,  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  and 
defence work had rece ived  a h igher  p r i o r i t y  when investment funds were 
squeezed by the  number of h i - t e c h  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  th e  f i rm  was pursuing. This 
seems to  have been where th e  r e a l  damage to  th e  computer opera t ion  was
167See below, chap te r  8,  pp364-366.
168Datamation. 15/10/71,  p7.
169Pa tam at ion . 'RCA Computer Systems "I suppose you could c a l l  t h a t  
beginners luck" ,  1/11/71, p42-45; 'RCA Autopsy: The cause was w i th in '  
1/12/71, p42.
17° A f te r  t a x .
171Wall S t r e e t  T r a n s c r ip t .  8 /11 /71 .  p26103.
172See next chapter.
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done. I f  RCA had attempted i t s  b ig  market push a t  an e a r l i e r  s t ag e ,  i t  
would have been in a p o s i t i o n  where a much l a r g e r  p ropo r t ion  of Spec tra  70 
machines would have been f u l l y  deprec ia ted  and have earned a bottom l in e  
p r o f i t  when the  IBM 370 was launched.
One of  the  computer d i v i s i o n ' s  g r e a t  weaknesses was t h a t  i t  was fo rced  
to  work out o f  sequence with  th e  market.  Having funds denied in the  e a r ly  
1960s, but being able to  grow s u b s t a n t i a l l y  in the  l a t e  1960s, meant t h a t  
i t  was s e l l i n g  th e  wrong computers a t  the  wrong t ime. I t  exacerbated the 
whole sequence by i t s  r e c l o t h i n g  of  the  Spectra as th e  RCA S e r i e s .  However, 
t h i s  was unavoidable .  RCA was in a ' c a tc h  22' p o s i t i o n :  i t  had to  in troduce  
a new range to  prevent IBM's new s e r i e s  rep lac ing  a s u b s t a n t i a l  number of 
the  IBM compat ible S p ec t ra s .  C om pat ib i l i ty  was not an advantage a t  t h i s  
t ime. At t h i s  s tage  i t  was concern about IBM poaching RCA customers which 
drove RCA to  launch i t s  new range ,  d e sp i t e  the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  des troyed i t s  
old i n s t a l l e d  base.
Above a l l ,  RCA's computer d i v i s i o n  had to cope with a h igher co s t  base 
than IBM. When th e  emphasis changed from c u t t i n g  lo s se s  to  buying market 
share ,  i t  seems t h a t  c o n t r o l l i n g  c o s t s  took second p lace .  This was a f a t a l  
e r r o r  given i t s  d i r e c t  compet i t ion  with  the low c o s t ,  high output IBM.
Even the  company's r o l e  as a broad based e l e c t r o n i c  fi rm was of 
ambiguous advantage.  C e r t a i n ly  th e  Advanced Development Group g r e a t l y  aided 
market e n t r y .  The d iv i s io n  was a l so  helped by RCA's e x p e r t i s e  in in te g ra te d  
c i r c u i t s ,  a l lowing i t  to  lead the  market with t h i s  kind of  technology.  
However, th e  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  o rg a n i s a t i o n  led to  problems. The d ivorce  of  the  
CDP and the  601 helped to  scupper th e  f l a g sh ip  of  the  RCA range.  Equally 
the  Computer Systems D iv is ion  rece ived  l i t t l e  he lp  from th e  Memory Systems 
D iv is ion ,  indeed i t  proved something of  a handicap.
RCA was not fo rced out o f  the  market by s p e c i f i c  a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e  
ac t io n s  by IBM. Indeed, a t  th e  beginning of the  s t o r y ,  RCA was much l a r g e r  
than IBM and could wield a l o t  of  market power. However, IBM's day to  day 
s t r a t e g i e s ,  i t s  low c o s t  base ,  high abso lu te  level  o f  R&D, and i t s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  p o s i t i o n  in the  bus iness  machines market,  a l l  overwhelmed RCA's 
h a l f - h e a r t e d  e f f o r t s  which were su b je c t  to  the  needs of  th e  r e s t  o f  the  
company. RCA missed i t s  oppo r tu n i ty  to  succeed in the  computer market when 
i t  decided to  support  co lou r  t e l e v i s i o n  development to  th e  h i l t ,  though 
t h i s  proved a p r o f i t a b l e  o p t io n .  When i t  did decide  to  back i t s  computer 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  again the  t iming was out of s tep  with the  s tage  of  product 
cycle t h a t  the  Spectra  70 range was a t ,  and the  d r iv e  f o r  market share  a t  
the end of  t h i s  p r o d u c t ' s  l i f e  was an expensive mis take.
There fore ,  l i k e  the  o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, RCA was not in a
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p o s i t io n  to  suppor t  a l l  i t s  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s  s im ul taneous ly ,  and a t  l e a s t  
in the  sh o r t  run ,  i t  was faced  with periods  of  c a p i t a l  r a t i o n i n g .  This 
forced i t  to  choose between i t s  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  in a number of  p o t e n t i a l l y  
very p r o f i t a b l e  markets.  By th e  end of the  pe r iod  s tu d ie d ,  RCA was under 
some p re s su re  and p re fe r re d  to  support  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s  away from the  
r i s k y ,  though p o t e n t i a l l y  p r o f i t a b l e ,  e l e c t r o n i c  eng ineer ing  s e c t o r .  The 
purchase of ca r  r e n t a l  f i rms and food companies was an a t tempt  to  s t a b i l i s e  
i t s  income, and was d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  sake of  defence .  I t  had used 
more of i t s  high p r o f i t s  from colour  t e l e v i s i o n  f o r  t h i s  purpose than f o r  
developing i t s  computer d i v i s i o n .  The f a c t  t h a t  some of  th e se  purchases  
a l so  caused the  fi rm problems increased  the p re s su re  on i t  t o  r e in  back on 
i t s  computer ope ra t ions  where i t s  lack of  unders tanding of  th e  market cycle  
had caused such la rge lo s se s .
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Chapter 7
General Electric and the Commercial Data Processing Market.
Competition f o r  funds and th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of c a p i t a l  w ith in  the  
co rpora t ion  played an important r o l e  throughout th e  l i f e  of RCA's Computer 
Systems D iv is ion .  Another important issue was t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  
advantage accru ing  to  the  computer opera t ion  from being p a r t  of a 
d i v e r s i f i e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm  a f t e r  th e  s tage when d i g i t a l  computer s k i l l s  
were being c o l l e c t e d  to g e th e r .  General  E l e c t r i c ' s  h i s t o r y  in the  indus t ry  
is  s i m i l a r ,  though i t  i s  a more complex s to ry .  GE su f fe re d  from numerous 
poor management dec is ions  which exacerbated i t s  problems, and stopped i t  
from tak ing  advantage of the  s t r e n g t h s  t h a t  the  f i rm  undoubtedly had. I t  
was fo rced  out of the  indus t ry  in s i m i l a r  c ircumstances  to  RCA, having to  
cope with the  same kind of i n t e r n a l  p ressures  on i t s  f in an ces .
The pos t  war General E l e c t r i c  Corpora tion.
Like Engl ish E l e c t r i c  and F e r r a n t i ,  GE was born in the  heavy 
e l e c t r i c a l  i n d u s t ry 1 . I t  produced every th ing  e l e c t r i c a l  and e l e c t r o n i c  and 
became one of  th e  l a r g e s t  co rp o ra t io n s  in the  world,  and e a s i l y  the  l a r g e s t  
in the  e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c  in d u s t ry .  By 1955 i t  was th e  fo u r th  l a r g e s t  
company in the  U.S.A and had th e  t h i r d  l a rg e s t  work f o r c e 2 . By 1960 i t  had 
sa le s  of  $4.4 b i l l i o n  and 250,000 employees3 .
Unt i l  t h e  Second World War GE, as with so many success fu l  companies, 
was run by a t i g h t  c e n t r a l  au tocracy .  The leading  f i g u r e s  were the  Chief 
Executive O f f i c e r s :  Char les  A. Coff in ;  Edwin Rice;  and Gerard Swope4 . 
These men made GE highly  su cc e s s fu l :  GE was in the  f a s t e s t  growing indus t ry  
in the  world and was twice the  s i z e  o f  i t s  n e a r e s t  r i v a l ,  Westinghouse.
During th e  war the  company expanded very r a p i d l y  and in many new 
d i r e c t i o n s .  In 1939 s a l e s  were $300 m i l l i o n ,  dur ing  the  war i t  broke the
1Alfred  Chandler,  Scale and Scope. 1990, pp212-221.
ZW.B.Harris,  'The overhaul o f  General E l e c t r i c ' .  Fo r tune . December 
1955, p i 10. This a r t i c l e  was based on an in te rv iew with GE's CEO, Ralph J .  
Cordiner.
3CBI Archive,  Auerbach E l e c t ro n ic s  Corporation,  'A co rpo ra te  bus iness  
s t r a t e g y  f o r  informat ion p rocess ing ,  1960-1970, Indus t ry  A n a ly s i s . '  June 
1960, chap te r  IV. This in d u s t ry  survey was prepared by the  computer 
indus t ry  consul tancy  Auerbach Corpora tion f o r  RCA's Advanced M i l i t a r y  
Systems D iv is ion .
^ H a r r i s ,  'The overhaul of GE', For tune . 1955.
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$1 b i l l i o n  mark. The new CEO, R .J .  Cordiner ,  was concerned t h a t  c e n t r a l i s e d
decision-making was a handicap f o r  th e  r a p id ly  d i v e r s i f y i n g  company:
'The ba s ic  problem, he [Cordiner] had d iscovered  was not GE's 
g i g a n t i c  s i z e  but i t s  f a n t a s t i c  d i v e r s i t y .  He had t o  f i g u r e  out how 
to  make decision-making f l e x i b l e  a t  th e  o p e ra t io n a l  level where 
minutes c o u n t . ' 5
Therefore ,  GE s t a r t e d  a process  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n 6 . The aim was to 
fragment the  company in to  o pe ra t ing  departments which would have day to  day 
management r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The c e n t r e  was to  be reduced to  co rpora te  
planning and coord ina t ing  i n t e r - d i v i s i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s ;  a l l  c e n t r a l  
fu n c t io n a l  co n t ro l  was to  end. During 1948-9 th e se  p lans  were t e s t e d  out 
in a number of a f f i l i a t e d  f i r m s ,  such as th e  white  goods company, 
Hotpoint7 . During the  e a r ly  1950s Cordiner extended d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  to  
the r e s t  of  the  company. The r e o rg a n i sa t io n  caused a g re a t  deal  of 
d i s ru p t io n  and f o r  a while led to  a downturn in p r o f i t  r a t i o s .  However, 
Cordiner hoped t h a t  in the  long term these  changes would lead to  b e t t e r  
con tro l  over the  company8 . The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  case  s tudy c a s t  doubt on 
whether t h i s  was achieved.
The company's bas ic  o pe ra t ing  u n i t  became the  depar tment .  By 1955 
th e re  were one hundred independent opera t ing  depar tments ,  organised  in to  
22 D iv is io n s ,  which in tu rn  made up th e  4 Operat ing Groups. The breakdown 
of GE's a c t i v i t i e s  was:
Table 7.1 GE group s a l e s .
Apparatus (mostly e l e c t r i c a l  c a p i t a l  goods) 30%
I n d u s t r i a l  Products and Lamps
( c a p i t a l  goods and consumer non-durables) 28%
Appliances and E lec t ro n ic s
(durab les  and c a p i t a l  goods) 27%
Atomic Energy and Defence Products 15%
Source: Auerbach Corp, 'A co rpo ra te  bus iness s t r a t e g y  f o r  information 
p r o c e s s in g ' ,  chap te r  IV, 1960.
This s t r u c t u r e  was quickly  changed with the format ion of an E lec t ro n ic  and 
F l ig h t  Systems Group. This new group contained th e  Defence E lec t ro n ic s
5 Ib id .
6 Ib id .
7 Ib id .
s Ib i d .
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Div is ion9 , which in tu rn  c o n t r o l l e d  the Heavy and Light M i l i t a ry  
E lec t ro n ic s  Departments,  which both had i n t e r e s t s  in computer technology. 
However, when the  Computer Department was formed i t  was a p a r t  of the  
In d u s t r i a l  E lec t ro n ic s  Div is ion of  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  Group. N ever the le ss ,  the  
group s t r u c t u r e  was le s s  important than  the  department l e v e l ,  where day- to-  
day co n t ro l  lay .
The company t r i e d  to  develop o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  intended 
ensure t h a t  th e  opera t ing  u n i t s  worked in the  same d i r e c t i o n ,  and t h a t  
th e re  was an adequate flow of informat ion wi th in  the  company. The e a r l i e r  
experiments with the d e c e n t r a l i s e d  s t r u c t u r e  showed t h a t  th e re  was one 
major problem; the  i n t e r e s t s  of  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  a f f i l i a t e s  were not 
always th e  same as GE's o v e ra l l  co rpo ra te  i n t e r e s t s .  Cordiner wanted to  
allow a degree of  ope ra t iona l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  y e t  a l so  t o  have c e n t r a l  
con t ro l  over long-term planning . To do t h i s  GE s e t  up th e  Off ice  of the  
P r e s id e n t ,  supported by the  Serv ices  D iv is ion10. There were 4,000 s t a f f  
in the  Serv ices  Div is ion.  Of th e se  3,300 were in the  c e n t r a l  research  
l a b o r a t o r i e s ,  bu t many of th e  r e s t  were involved in the  Management 
Consu l ta t ion  Serv ice .  This ope ra t ion  was involved in managerial  re sea rc h ,  
advis ing  departments on management m a t te rs ,  and coo rd in a t in g  i n t e r ­
department a c t i v i t i e s .  The Management Consu l ta t ion  Serv ice  supplemented the  
ten fu n c t io n a l  Vice P res iden ts  whose ensured t h a t  new methods of management 
were d isseminated  to  the  o p e ra t io n a l  departments and t h a t  s tandards  were 
main ta ined .  The u l t im a te  level  of  c o n t ro l  was the  P r e s i d e n t ' s  O ff ice .  This 
co ns is ted  of  Cordiner and s ix  o th e r  Vice P r e s id e n t s .  The main r o l e  of the  
P r e s i d e n t ' s  O ff ice  was to  c o n t in u a l ly  'n e e d le '  o p e ra t io n a l  u n i t s ,  not j u s t  
with regard  to  immediate p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  but a l so  to  ensure  t h a t  planning 
was adequa te ly  c a r r i e d  out and t h a t  depar tmental  plans  f i t t e d  in to  the  
o v e ra l l  co rpo ra te  scheme.
General E l e c t r i c ' s  en t ry  in to  the  market f o r  commercial computers.
Like RCA, GE entered  the  computer indus t ry  on the  back of  a s in g le  
la rge c o n t r a c t .  I t  a l so  jo ined  a t  th e  same time as RCA, EMI, Ph i lco ,  and 
a number of  o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s ,  who, fo l lowing t h e  Korean war, 
extended t h e i r  range of e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t i e s  in to  computers.  At t h i s  
s tage  i t  was becoming obvious t h a t  th e  computer was going to  be the  b a s i s  
of a big in d u s t ry  and o f f e red  an oppor tun i ty  f o r  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms to  
u t i l i s e  t h e i r  know-how. These f i rms a l l  made t h e i r  b id s  to  e n t e r  the
9Auerbach, 'A corpora te  s t r a t e g y  f o r  information p ro c e ss in g '  , chap IV.
10H arr i s  ' t h e  overhaul of GE', For tune . 1955.
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indus t ry  a t  the  cusp of the  t r a n s i t i o n  from valve-based computers to  s o l id  
s t a t e  systems.
The general  manager o f  the  E lec t ron ics  D iv i s i o n ' s  Commercial and 
Government Equipment Department,  George Metcalf ,  wrote a r e p o r t  in 1954 on 
the  computer indus t ry ;  he be l ieved  i t  was a market on the  br ink of  a 
boom11. GE's e a r ly  computer work was somewhat u nd i rec ted ,  being 
undertaken a t  the  t ime t h a t  the  f i rm  was re o rg a n i s in g  i t s e l f  in to  
d e c e n t r a l i s e d  p r o f i t  c e n t r e s .  There was a lack of  d i r e c t i o n  a t  t h i s  t ime, 
and indeed i t  w i l l  be argued t h a t  t h i s  was the  pe renn ia l  problem f o r  GE's 
computer o p e ra t io n s .
Before the  company s t a r t e d  commercial computer work i t  became 
involved in some e a r ly  computer development p r o j e c t s .  I t s  f i r s t  computer 
work s t a r t e d  in 1948 with a re sea rch  programme on computer guidance f o r  the  
a n t i - m i s s i l e  m i s s i l e  Thumper, but t h i s  was cance l led  in 1950. In 1951 the  
fi rm s t a r t e d  to  develop a mid-course guidance computer fo r  the  Hermes 
m i s s i l e 12. However, the  most important pre-commercial development GE 
undertook was th e  one-off  ORAC computer which i t  produced fo r  the  United 
S ta t e s  Air  F o r c e ' s  Wright F ie ld  Development C en t re13. This was developed 
by GE's E le c t ro n ic  Laboratory and was completed in 1954 f o r  R&D work a t  the  
USAF re sea rch  c e n t r e .  The success fu l  product ion of  ORAC led to a number of  
bus iness  p lans  recommending t h a t  GE en te r  the  production  of computers.  
These were a l l  r e j e c t e d  by Cordiner who explained in March 1956 to  C la i r  
Lasher, an au thor  of one of  the se  proposals  and who l a t e r  became head of 
the  Computer D iv is ion ,  t h a t :
'Under no c ircumstances  w i l l  the  General E l e c t r i c  Company go 
in to  th e  bus iness  machine b u s in ess .  However, sometime in the  f u t u r e ,  
in support  of our h i s t o r i c  bus inesses  i t  may be necessary  f o r  us to  
go in to  th e  process computer b u s i n e s s . ' 14
I t  was i r o n i c  t h a t  i t  was a t  about the  same time t h a t  GE became the  
f i r s t  company in the  world to  i n s t a l l  a computer f o r  commercial work. In
l x George Snively ,  'General  E l e c t r i c  Enters  the  Computer B u s in e s s ' ,  
Annals of  th e  H is to ry  of  Computing. Volume 10, Number 1, 1988, pp74-78. 
Snively jo in ed  G.E. in 1952 as the  superv isor  of  Accounting a t  G.E. 
E lec t ro n ic s  Labora to r ies  and a t  the  time of  w r i t i n g  t h i s  a r t i c l e  was 
p re s id en t  of th e  Technical  Equipment Rental Corpora t ion ,  by way of GE's 
Computer D iv is ion .
12Auerbach, 'A co rpo ra te  business  s t r a t e g y  f o r  information 
p r o c e s s in g ' ,  chap te r  IV.
13Sn ive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  Annals of the  H is to ry
of Computing. 1988.
14Ibid.
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1954 a UNIVAC 1 was i n s t a l l e d  a t  GE's newly cons t ruc ted  Appliance Park15. 
Indeed GE's in te r n a l  market f o r  computers was l a rg e ,  not s u r p r i s i n g  given 
t h a t  i t  produced so many high technology products .  Late r  GE's own Computer 
Department e s t a b l i s h e d  the  In t e r n a l  Sales Sec tion  to  market computers 
wi th in  the  f i rm 16. By the  l a t e  1960s GE rep resen ted  0.3% of US computer 
demand17.
ERMA.
Apart  from his  r e j e c t e d  bus iness  plan f o r  computers,  Lasher had a lso  
asked th e  head of the  Microwave Laboratory in Palo A l to ,  H.R. (Barney)
O ld f i e ld ,  to  in v e s t ig a t e  a computer being designed f o r  the  Bank of
America18. This system was the  E lec t ro n ic  Recording Machine, Accounting,  
'ERMA', designed by the  Stanford  Research I n s t i t u t e  under c o n t r a c t  to  the  
Bank of  America19. The design  of  t h i s  computer s t a r t e d  in 1951, a 
remarkably e a r l y  s tage  f o r  a pure ly  commercial des ign20. ERMA was to  be 
used to  automate the record  keeping on curren t  accounts .  O l d f i e l d ' s  small 
l a b o ra to ry  s t a r t e d  an assessment of the machine in April  195621.
According to  Snively ,  O ld f ie ld  was a grea t  b e l i e v e r  in computers,  and
u n i l a t e r a l l y  s t a r t e d  n e g o t i a t io n s  with  the Bank of  America to  produce the  
design f o r  the  bank. Armed with a $30m l e t t e r  of  i n t e n t  f o r  40 machines,  
O ld f ie ld  flew to  the  East  Coast and met Dr Walter Baker the  general  manager 
of the  E le c t ro n ic s  Divis ion .  Baker had been planning to  s t a r t  a computer 
l ab o ra to ry  a t  Syracuse,  based on th e  ORAC s t a f f ,  but he gave the  ERMA 
p r o j e c t  permission to  go ahead. C ord ine r ' s  d i k t a t  t h a t  th e  fi rm would not 
produce commercial computers was ignored as they  argued t h a t  ERMA was a 
form of  process  automation,  and process  automation was a core  a c t i v i t y  f o r
15F.M. F ish e r ,  e t  a l ,  IBM and th e  U.S. da ta  p rocess ing  indus t ry :  an 
economic h i s t o r y . New York, 1983. p9.
16Auerbach, A co rpora te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y  f o r  informat ion p ro c e s s in g , 
chap te r  IV.
17US vs IBM. px3222, IBM, 'A co rpora te  s tudy of the  General E l e c t r i c  
C o rp o ra t io n ' ,  1968. One of a s e r i e s  o f  IBM r e p o r t s  on com pet i to rs .
l s Sn ive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  Annals of  the  h i s to r y  
of computers .
19Ib id ;  Keith Flamm, Creating  th e  Computer: Government. Indus t ry  and 
High-Technology. Washington D.C., 1988 pl25.
2°CBI Archive , 'The  s to r y  of  the  G.E. E lec t ro n ic  Data Processor fo r  
bank au to m a t io n ' ,  ERMA Systems Laboratory,  Menlo Park,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  May 15,
1957. A p re l im ina ry  document f o r  i n te rn a l  c i r c u l a t i o n .
21Ibid.
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GE22. The c o n t r a c t ,  however, went f u r t h e r :  i t  had a number of c lauses  
b u i l t  in to  i t  t o  deal with r o y a l t y  payments t o  th e  bank i f  GE sold  the  
system to  o th e r  u s e r s 23.
ERMA was f a i r l y  advanced: i t  used t r a n s i s t o r s  and core memories 
wherever p o s s ib l e .  By luck, or judgement, GE was using th e  same window of 
oppor tun i ty  to  e n te r  the  computer market as o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies: 
the  cusp between the  f i r s t  and second g e n e ra t io n s  o f  computers.  
S i g n i f i c a n t l y  a number of the  ERMA personnel had worked on semiconductors 
elsewhere in GE24 . The system included magnetic tape  d r iv e s  from Ampex 
and p e r ip h e r a l s  f o r  the  magnetic encoding and read ing  of cheques.  The f i r s t  
ERMA was d e l iv e re d  in l a t e  1958 and, a f t e r  debugging, was in s e r v ice  by 
l a t e  1959.
However, the  grand unve i l ing  o f  the f i r s t  machine was not a happy 
moment f o r  Barney O ld f ie ld .  Cord iner,  inv i ted  to  th e  ceremony as CEO of GE, 
saw t h a t  i t  was a cover ope ra t ion  fo r  bus iness  computers and f i r e d  
O ld f ie ld 25. Lasher was placed in charge of r e o r i e n t i n g  the  opera t ion  to  
the  a rea  of  i n d u s t r i a l  con t ro l  computers once the  ERMA deal was over.  By 
t h i s  s tage  the  c o n t r a c t  was worth $40m, and two o th e r  banks had ordered 
ERMA systems26.
NCR/GE 304.
The second v i t a l  c o n t r a c t  t h a t  GE won came from th e  National Cash 
R eg i s te r  company. By the  1950s, NCR was in a d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t i o n .  Second 
genera t ion  computers were s t a r t i n g  to  rep lace  t r a d i t i o n a l  bus iness  
machines,  bu t NCR had l i t t l e  background in t h i s  a r e a .  NCR re a c te d  to  t h i s ,  
l ik e  o th e r  bus iness  machine f i rm s ,  by s e t t i n g  out to  purchase the  s k i l l s  
needed to  produce computers27. NCR's f i r s t  move was to  acqu ire  a small
22Snive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  annuals  of  the  h i s t o r y  
of computers .
23CBI Archive,  'Proposal ICB 1100101 ERMA', February 3 1956, t h i s  was 
the o r i g i n a l  GE bid  f o r  the  ERMA c o n t r a c t .  This document was co n t r ib u ted  
by the  head of  GE's ERMA Labora tory ,  G.T. Jacob i .
24CBI Jacobi  c o l l e c t i o n ,  GE book le t  in troducing  the  ERMA team prepared 
by Barney O ld f i e ld ,  undated.
25Snive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  Annals of the  h i s t o r y  
of computers .
26Auerbach, 'A co rpora te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y  f o r  informat ion
p r o c e s s in g ' ,  chap te r  IV.
27See below, chapter 8, section on NCR, pp330-339.
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s t a r t  up company, the  Computer Research Corpora t ion ,  to  do i t s  design 
work28 . However, progress  on a f i r s t  genera t ion  machine was slow and i t  
was dropped as i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  i t  could not compete with s o l i d  s t a t e  
computers29. NCR had to  o f f e r  a second genera t ion  machine to  i t s  c l i e n t s ,  
so i t  c o n t r a c te d  GE to  design and produce the  e l e c t r o n i c  s ec t io n s  of  a new 
machine, th e  NCR304, inc luding  the  c e n t r a l  p rocesso r  i t s e l f 30. This work 
commenced e a r l y  in 195731.
GE es t im ated  t h a t ,  i f  t h i s  o rde r  led to  GE b u i ld in g  40 systems, i t  
would be worth $15m32, but NCR was hoping to  s e l l  100 of these  
machines33 . GE was given th e  r i g h t  to  market the  system as the  GE304 
wi th in  th e  company, and i t  b u i l t  fo u r  fo r  i n t e r n a l  use3ANCR missed i t s  
t a r g e t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  and only sold  33. Never the less ,  t h i s  s t i l l  helped GE 
e s t a b l i s h  i t s  computer o p e ra t io n 35.
Other e a r l v  computer developments.
Most of  GE's computer eng inee r ing  a c t i v i t y  in 1957 was devoted to  the  
two main c o n t r a c t s .  At i t s  d i sp o sa l  were 220 engineers  and, i r o n i c a l l y ,  an 
IBM 704 f o r  design work36 . One o the r  development was the  'paper  
p r o c e s s o r ' ,  a small drum memory computer,  designed in conjunct ion  with the  
ERMA37. I t  was f o r  p rocess ing  accounts  in sm al le r  bank branches and GE
2aUS vs IBM. tr6115,  R.S. Oelman, NCR Chairman and CEO.
29 'The New NCR Data Process ing  System',  Datamation. May/June 1958, 
ppl2-14.
3° I b i d .
31US vs IBM. px320, 'Computer Department p r e s e n ta t io n  to  the  GE 
Executive O f f i c e ' ,  1964. This was a p re s e n ta t io n  to  the  P re s id e n ts  O ff ice  
as a p a r t  of i t s  ro le  of ' n e e d l i n g '  ope ra t iona l  depar tments.
32CBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ;  C l a i r  Lasher, 'marketing  p re sen ta t io n  - 
Product Scope Review Meet ing ' ,  1957. The Product Scope Review was an 
important s tage  in the  format ion of th e  computer d iv i s io n  and is  d iscussed  
in d e t a i l  below, pp298.
33Ib id .
3ACBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  GE Computer Department, '304 E lec t ro n ic  
Business Data P rocesso r '  undated brochure .
35F ishe r  e t  a l ,  IBM and th e  da ta  process ing i n d u s t r y . p87.
36CBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  Geiser  ' eng ineer ing  p r e s e n t a t i o n '  to  the  
Product Scope Review Meeting,  1957.
37CBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  Lasher ,  'market ing p r e s e n t a t i o n '  to  the  
Product Scope Review meeting.
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hoped to  s e l l  them to  ERMA u se r s .  I t  was not o f f e re d  to  a wider market.
N ever the le s s ,  some of  the  Department 's  work was more in keeping with 
the  P r e s i d e n t i a l  e d ic t  to  avoid bus iness  computers.  A con t ro l  computer 
c a l l e d  th e  Tin Processor was designed to  con t ro l  the  t i n  making p rocess .  
There were s i m i l a r  c o n t r a c t s  t o  make computers to  con t ro l  e l e c t r i c i t y  
genera t ion  p l a n t s 38. A monitoring  computer was a l so  produced f o r  the  
t e s t i n g  of j e t  engines a t  th e  A i r c r a f t  Gas Turbine D iv is ion .  Lasher 
expected the se  types of systems to  be worth $10-20m to  GE over the  f i r s t  
f i v e  year s  o f  ope ra t io n s .
Lasher a l so  noted t h a t  the  Department of Defence was very important 
to  the  computer indus t ry .  I t  was es t imated  t h a t  the  government computer 
market was worth $250m in 1957, inc luding  n ear ly  $100m spent on re sea rch  
and development39 . GE wanted to  break in to  t h i s .
The Product Scope Review Meeting.
From an e a r ly  s tag e ,  the  computer opera t ion  was using s t a t i o n e r y  
marked 'Computer Department ' .  According to Snively  t h i s  was most ly  due to  
O l d f i e l d ' s  e f f o r t s  to  ge t  th e  ERMA c o n t ra c t* 0 . This may have been 
premature,  as in 1956, when co n t ro l  was in the  hands o f  the  I n d u s t r i a l  
E lec t ro n ic s  D iv is ion ,  th e  d i v i s i o n a l  general  manager, Harold S t r i c k l a n d ,  
i n s i s t e d  i t  be c a l l e d  the  I n d u s t r i a l  Computer Department*1. Formally the  
o rg an is a t io n  was s e t  up in 1956 as a sec t ion  of  the  Technical  Products 
Department, but in January 1957 i t  rece ived  depar tmental  s t a t u s * 2 . At 
t h i s  s tage  th e  Computer Department became involved in a new planning 
mechanism.
O ld f ie ld  had e s t a b l i s h e d  the  computer opera t ion  in Phoenix,  Arizona.  
He thought i t  was a good lo c a t io n  to  a t t r a c t  the  s k i l l e d  s t a f f  needed, but  
i t  a l so  had the  added advantage o f  being a long way from GE's main c en t r e s  
in the  North E as t .  This r e f l e c t e d  th e  back door method by which he had 
s t a r t e d  to  produce commercial machines.
In 1957, once i t  had become a f u l l  department,  i t  became th e  s u b jec t  
of a Product Scope Review meeting.  This was the  f i r s t  new department to
3SIb id .
39Ib id .
*°Snive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  Annals of th e  h i s t o r y  
of computing.
*1Ib id .
*2CBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  'Summary - Product Scope Review m ee t in g ' ,
1957.
262
undergo t h i s  p rocess ,  which was intended to  ensure  t h a t  the  new 
o rg a n isa t i o n  f i t t e d  in to  th e  o v e r a l l  company scheme and d id  not impinge on 
another  depar tm en t ' s  a u th o r i t y * 3 . Most of t h i s  process  was c a r r i e d  out 
by simply sending out a s ta tement  o u t l i n in g  th e  d epa r tm en t ' s  r o l e  to  161 
var ious  bodies  in the  company. Most departments had no product c o n f l i c t  
with th e  new department.  However, t h r e e  o p e ra t in g  departments f e l t  they 
overlapped s i g n i f i c a n t l y  with the  new ope ra t io n .  This led to  a review 
meeting held  over a th re e  day per iod  in October 1957**.
The c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t s  was with the fo l lowing  departments :  Heavy 
M i l i t a ry  E l e c t r o n ic s ,  Light M i l i t a r y  E l e c t ro n ic s ,  and I n d u s t r i a l  C ontro ls .  
Also p re sen t  a t  the  review meeting were r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from: A i r c r a f t  
Nuclear Propu ls ion ,  A i r c r a f t  Accessory Turbines ,  M iss i l e  and Ordnance 
Systems, and Apparatus S a le s .  These probably a t tended  as la rge users  of 
computers.  These ope ra t iona l  depar tments were jo in ed  by th e  head of  the  
I n d u s t r i a l  E lec t ro n ic s  D iv is ion ,  S t r i c k lan d ,  to g e th e r  with  a number of 
c o n su l t an t s  from the  Management Consul ta t ion  Serv ice*5 .
The conclusion of the  conference was t h a t  th e  two m i l i t a r y  
e l e c t r o n i c s  departments had an i n t e r e s t  in the  com pute r - l ike  elements of 
t h e i r  t a c t i c a l  systems. I t  was concluded, however, t h a t  the  Computer 
Department should be in charge of  sa le s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l ,  bus iness  and 
s c i e n t i f i c  computers to  the  m i l i t a r y .  I t  was recognized t h a t  a number of 
slow da ta  logging and small co n t ro l  systems were the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of 
I n d u s t r i a l  C ontro ls ,  but t h a t  l a r g e r  sca le  co n t ro l  systems were the  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the  computer o pe ra t ion .  By th e  mid-1960s almost a l l  
i n d u s t r i a l  systems were the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  the  I n d u s t r i a l  Contro ls  
D iv is ion.
The most i n t e r e s t i n g  a spec t  of  th e  meeting was the  p re s e n ta t i o n s  made 
by the se  depar tments,  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  plans p re sen ted  by the  Computer 
Department. I t  amounted to  a formal business  plan  and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of 
the  need f o r  a s epa ra te  computer ope ra t io n ;  th e  department  s t i l l  f e l t  i t  
needed to  j u s t i f y  i t s e l f .  I t s  bus iness  plan emphasized i n d u s t r i a l  systems, 
and while  i t  was w i l l in g  to  b u i ld  systems of  a l l  types  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  
companies, i t  downplayed commercial computers, even though almost a l l  the  
computers i t  was s e l l i n g  were going to  banks. The o f f i c i a l  product plan was 
to take p a r t  in four  f i e l d s :
*3Ib id .
** ib id .
*5Ib id .
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' I n d u s t r i a l . and here  we recognize two c a te g o r ie s  of product-  
computing f o r  con t ro l  and bus iness  and s c i e n t i f i c  computing. Because 
t of  the  t echno log ica l  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  manufacturing economies, and 
u l t im a te  system i n t e g r a t i o n ,  we claim t h a t  th e se  products  a re  w i th in  
the  product  scope of the  Computer Department.
Business , and here  we d e f i n i t e l y  r e s t r i c t  ourse lves  to  
d e f i n i t e  markets where we can demonstrate to  Company management t h a t  
such p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w i l l  be p r o f i t a b l e 46 .
M i l i t a r y , not as c o n t r a c to r s  f o r  complete t a c t i c a l  systems 
employing da ta  p rocess ing ,  but only as c o n t r a c to r s  f o r  computers and 
advanced computer developments purchased s e p a r a t e ly  by the m i l i t a r y ,  
and
Appl ica t ions  o f  computers to the  s o lu t io n  of  i n d u s t r i a l ,  
bus iness  and m i l i t a r y  problems which f a l l  w i th in  our scope of  
i n t e r e s t . 47
O ld f ie ld  then presented  a number of t a b l e s  and graphs showing how the  
bus iness  machines, ERMA and 304, were laying th e  foundat ion  fo r  work more 
in l i n e  with C ord ine r ' s  views. F i r s t l y  he o u t l in e d  a b e l i e f  t h a t  general  
purpose computers were the  core  of  th e  computer market and t h a t  whi le  
con t ro l  systems were going to  grow in importance t h i s  market would not be 
as l a rg e :
Table 7.2 Computer market s i z e :
es t im ates  f o r  1957 & 1967.
1957 1967
$m $m
Indus t ry
General Purpose 166.6 530.0
(bus iness  & s c i e n t i f i c )
Specia l  Purpose
( c o n t r o l ,  da ta  logging e t c )  10.5 150.0
Business 85.5  245.0
Government 291.0 475.0
Total  553.6 1400.0
Source: CBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  O l d f i e l d ' s  'opening p r e s e n t a t i o n ' ,  s l i d e  5, 
Product Scope Review Meeting,  October 1957.
This was a conse rva t ive  e s t im a te .  O ld f ie ld  had a l r e ad y  noted t h a t  in 
the  previous  t h r e e  years  th e  computer market had t r i p l e d .  Lasher, then in
46Because of  ERMA and 304 computers banking was one of these  a re a s .
47CBI Jacobi  c o l l e c t i o n ,  Barney O ld f ie ld ,  'Opening p r e s e n t a t i o n '  
Product Scope Review Meeting,  1957.
charge of  market ing,  s t a t e d  t h a t  the  i n d u s t r y ' s  backlog of  orders  
r e p re se n te d  two f u l l  y e a r s '  worth o f  production .  He e s t im a ted  t h a t  the  
backlog would l a s t  u n t i l  I96048 . The plan a l so  p re d ic t ed  t h a t  the  d iv ide  
between co n t ro l  and general  purpose computers would d im in ish .  Having 
i d e n t i f i e d  the  importance of the  genera l  purpose computer,  O ld f ie ld  then 
o u t l in e d  th e  kind of economies of  s ca le  t h a t  could be achieved from 
producing a l l  types of computers. To show t h i s  he l i s t e d  the  common 
components, and the  numbers used,  in each of  the  machines t h a t  the  
department planned to  make:
Table 7.3 'Diaital Coinuter Buildina Blocks7
Flip
Flops
Memories 
Registers Cores Drums
Tape
Dnit
Predicted
Sales
ERMA 875 7 130 8 95
Paper
Processor
200 5 1 1 47
NCR 304 660 27 132 10 52
Machine 
Tool Director 600 3 1 8
Tin Line 
Data
Processor
1500 3 1 15
Total 154145 2928 19214 55 1335
Source: CBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  O ld f i e ld  'opening p r e s e n t a t i o n ' ,  s l i d e  6, 
Product Scope Review, October 1957.
To reduce the co s t  of producing process  con t ro l  computers,  the  
manufacture and sa le  of  general  purpose machines would allow increased 
sca le  economies.  There fore ,  the  Computer Department argued t h a t  i t  should 
continue  to  produce commercial computers to  reduce th e  c o s t  o f  making 
i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t ro l  systems. To p l a c a t e  sen ior  management the  depar tm en t ' s  
s a l e s  plan emphasised in c re a s in g ly  la rg e  non-commercial a c t i v i t i e s .  Figure 
7.1 shows th e  depar tment 's  p r e d i c t i o n s  fo r  f u t u r e  s a l e s ,  which c l e a r l y  
shows an in c reas in g  emphasis on non-commercial computers,  a plan which was 
not kept t o :
4SCBI Jacobi c o l l e c t i o n ,  C l a i r  Lasher 'marketing p r e s e n t a t i o n ' ,
Product Scope Review, October 1957.
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F ig u re  7 . 1
Planned Buildup of GE’s Computer Sales.
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The Computer Department t o l d  GE management t h a t  i t s  main development 
p r o j e c t s  were f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  computers*9 . However, O ld f ie ld  had a plan 
to  r e p la ce  the  e lec t ro -mechanical  memory of th e  i n d u s t r i a l  con t ro l  machine 
under development, with a magnetic core  memory, a change which would make 
i t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  commercial use50. When he succeeded O ld f ie ld ,  Lasher 
prepared ano ther  product plan and persuaded th e  company t h a t ,  given GE's 
work on the  ERMA and 304 computers and the  boom expected in the  market, 
bus iness  machines were a worthwhile a c t i v i t y  f o r  GE. The process  machine 
was given i t s  core  memory and became the  200 s e r i e s  of computers51. This 
was the  f i r s t  range of commercial systems to  be a l l  GE's own work and which 
i t  could market f r e e l y 52. Lasher managed to  get  the  u n c e r t a in ty  
surrounding the  department stopped. He was more o f  a company man and got 
permission to  market the  200 s e r i e s  to  coinnercial u se r s ,  b e l a t e d ly  al lowing 
the department to  e x p lo i t  th e  s t a r t  made with th e  ERMA and 304.
Taking on IBM 1960-1965. 
llHardware.
By the  mid 1960s GE had four  computer eng ineer ing  groups a t  work. 
These covered th e  four main hardware products t h a t  the  computer department 
was s e l l i n g ,  the  200 s e r i e s  o f  computers,  the  400 range,  the  600 range and 
p e r ip h e r a l s .  This d e c e n t r a l i s e d  approach to  engineer ing  led to  a number of 
problems, not l e a s t  of which was lack of  c o m p a t ib i l i t y  between systems.
The 200 ser ie s .
Following the  banking systems, GE turned to  general  purpose systems 
ap p l icab le  t o  both s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n  and bus iness  use.  The f i r s t  
computer which GE had so le  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  was the  GE22553. The 225 
was based on a process c on t ro l  computer,  the  312, which, with a magnetic 
core memory in s tead  of  a magnetic drum, proved s u i t a b l e  f o r  commercial
49CBI Jacobi  c o l l e c t i o n ,  K.H. Geiser ,  Manager of Engineer ing,  
'eng inee r ing  p r e s e n t a t i o n ' ,  Product Scope Review Meeting,  1957.
soSn ive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  Annals of the  h i s t o r y  
of computing.
51I b i d .
52Ib id .
53Snive ly ,  'GE e n te r s  the  computer b u s i n e s s ' ,  Annals of the  h i s t o r y  
of com put ing ' .
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a p p l i c a t i o n 54.
The 225 was seen by Datamation as GE's long awaited en t ry  in to  the  
general  computer market55. No longer was i t  j u s t  making sp ec ia l  purpose 
machines o r  sub-con t rac ted  systems. I t  was expected t h a t  GE would use the  
unve i l ing  of the  225 to  reduce the  $12m r e n ta l  b i l l  i t  pa id  IBM each year 
fo r  i t s  leased computers56 . In f a c t  GE used i t s  exper ience  as a computer 
user  as an a d v e r t i s i n g  gimmick. The 225 was i n i t i a l l y  so ld  fo r  s c i e n t i f i c  
duty ,  which was of most use t o  GE i n t e r n a l l y 57. However th e  development 
of the  commercial a p p l i c a t io n  programming language, GECOM, led to  i t  being 
used in many commercial environments .  Weil be l ieved  t h i s  language was a 
t im ely  product ,  which was a p redecesso r  of the  s tandard  bus iness  language 
COBOL58.
The 225 was the  most su ccess fu l  of GE's e a r l y  machines. I t  was 
announced in June 1960 and f i r s t  d e l iv e red  in Apri l  1961s ®. I t  was a 
small to  medium sca le  system. By 1966 the system had been extended to  
include  a number of sm al le r  and l a r g e r  v a r i a t i o n s :
Table 7 .4  Sales of the  GE 200 s e r i e s  up to  1966
I n s t a l l e d  On Order
205 42 10
215 53 3
225 139 2
235 60 8
Source: US vs IBM. px4462, IBM 'com pe t i t ive  env ironment ' ,  1966.
The 215 and 235 were updated machines in t roducing  b e t t e r  components, an 
improved a r i t h m e t i c  u n i t  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  use and b e t t e r  p e r ip h e r a l s  f o r  the  
bus iness  u s e r 60 .
The eng ineer ing  group t h a t  was in charge of  th e  200 machines was a lso
54Datamation. March/April 1959, p l8 .
55Pa tamat ion . July/August 1960, 'Datamation in bus iness  and S c ie n ce ' ,  
p p l l -12 .
S6Ib id .
57US vs IBM. t r7007,  Weil.
58Ib id ,  t r7262.
59US vs IBM. px4462, IBM, 'Competit ive  Environment ' , 4 /2 /66 .  This was 
a survey of IBM's com pet i to rs .
6°US vs IBM. tr7172, Weil.
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placed in charge of suppor t ing  ERMA, and i t s  fo l low  up, the  21061, of 
which 53 were so ld  from 1959 to  th e  mid-1960s62. I t  a l so  looked a f t e r  
development of the  Datanet 30 communications p ro cesso r ,  which w i l l  be 
d iscussed  l a t e r .  By 1963 th e  200 range had given GE 2% of  the  computer 
market63 . I t  was to  remain important to  GE f o r  th e  r e s t  of the  Computer 
Department 's  l i f e ,  as i t  was one o f  th e  key machines in GE's t im e-sha r ing  
and s e r v ice  ope ra t io n s .
The 400 ser ie s .
At the  same time as the  small and medium sca le  200s were being 
updated, ano ther  GE engineer ing  group was b r ing ing  the  medium sc a le  400 
s e r i e s  to  the  market. The range was announced as the  425, 435, 455 and 
46564 , and in a d v e r t i s i n g  the  range was nick-named the  ' c o m p a t ib l e s '65 . 
During t h i s  per iod  IBM be l ieved  GE was making a d i r e c t  a s s a u l t  on i t s  
market66 . From 1963-66 IBM judged t h a t  GE was t r y i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h  a 
s trong p o s i t i o n  in the  computer market.  IBM saw t h i s  as a major t h r e a t  
because of GE's huge f i n a n c i a l  r e so u rc e s .  The 400 led t h i s  d r ive ,  being the  
most comparable range to  IBM's 360 family67, though i t s  design preda ted  
the 360. However, the range never f u l f i l l e d  i t s  e x p ec ta t io n s ,  a number of 
the  machines were never d e l iv e re d  and, while th e  400s were compat ible 
within  the  f am i ly ,  they were not compatible with any o th e r  GE range.
The l a r g e r  members o f  th e  family  were not d e l iv e re d .  They were
d iscont inued  due to  compet it ion  from o the r  developments w i th in  the
department.  While IBM decided to  cover as much of  the  computer market as 
poss ib le  with  th e  360, GE dropped the  la rge r  400 s e r i e s  machines f o r  a 
wholly unconnected s e r i e s :
'The machine reached the  poin t where a pro to type  e x i s t e d  on 
the  manufacturing f l o o r ,  I be l ieve  t h a t  cont inued bus iness  
examinat ion,  plus  continued compet it ion f o r  resources  in the  
Computer Department by th e  o th e r  computer l i n e s - - s p e c i f i c a l l y  the
61Ib id  t r7176 .
62US vs IBM. px4462, IBM, 'Compet it ive  env i ro n m en t ' , 1966.
63US vs IBM. px321, GE, 'Computer Department P re s e n ta t i o n  to  Executive  
O f f i c e ' ,  Apr i l  20 1965, c h a r t  12.
6AUS vs IBM. tr7178, Weil.
65US vs IBM. dx490, GE press  r e l e a s e  3 /12/63 .
66US vs IBM. px3222, IBM Market Evaluation Department,  'A company 
study of General E l e c t r i c '  December 1968.
67US vs IBM. px4462, IBM, 'Compet it ive  Envi ronment ' ,  1966.
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600--even tuaHy came to  the  po in t  where the  development of  t h i s
second [ l a r g e r ]  member o f  th e  400 family was abandoned. '68
Ins tead  of  extending the  range up, t h i s  second g enera t ion  system was given 
a sm al le r  cous in ,  the  41569 . The 400s were general  purpose machines,  
though they  were seen as p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  bus iness  u se r .  
Despite IBM's concern t h a t  the  400 range and GE's re sou rces  rep re sen ted  a 
major com pet i t ive  combination,  the  i n i t i a l  market ing of the  400 was not a 
g rea t  success .  By 1966 only 255 were i n s t a l l e d  and 137 were on o rd e r ,  not 
a l a rge  base f o r  the  t ime7 0 . GE had reac ted  to  t h i s  lack of  s a le s  and the  
announcement of  the  IBM 360 fam i ly  by c u t t in g  p r i c e s ,  but s a le s  were s t i l l  
l im i ted .  Much of  the problem was t h a t ,  as a l ready  mentioned, the  GE range 
of computers was f a r  from being ' c o m p a t ib le ' .  The 400 was not compatible  
with the  o ld e r  200 range,  nor with th e  o ther  GE ranges ,  the  l a r g e r  600 
s e r i e s ,  and th e  smal le r  115 range t h a t  was d e l iv e re d  l a t e r  in the  
decade71 . This was completely  out of step  with the  growing c o m p a t ib i l i t y  
within  o th e r  f i r m s '  ranges  and a l so  a f fec ted  the  level  of  economies of  
s ca le  t h a t  GE could achieve .
The 400 d id  c o n t r ib u te  to  a slow r i s e  in GE's market share and i t  d id  
o u t s e l l  prev ious  p roducts .  N ever the le s s ,  s a l e s  were not high enough to  
achieve GE's goal of c ap tu r ing  10% of th e  computer market ( the  400 had been 
the main hope o f  ach ieving t h i s  t a r g e t ) 72.
The 600 series and peripherals.
The t h i r d  of the  fou r  engineer ing  groups w i th in  the  Computer 
Department was headed by J.W.Weil.  I t s  ro le  was t o  develop a system t h a t  
was a l a r g e r ,  m u l t i - p ro c e s s o r  computer designed f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  work. Again, 
i t  had th e  t i t l e  'Compatible '  y e t  i t  was not compat ible with any o th e r  GE 
system. Like the  400 s e r i e s ,  i t  was l a rg e ly  designed before  the  IBM 360 and 
was b a s i c a l l y  a second gene ra t ion  system73. I t  had, however, an advanced 
a r c h i t e c t u r e  with  a number o f  f e a t u r e s  t h a t  made i t  un iquely  a t t r a c t i v e  in 
a number of  a p p l i c a t i o n s .
68US vs IBM. tr7182, Weil.
69US vs IBM. px4462, IBM, 'Competit ive  Environment ' ,  1966.
7°Ib  i d .
71Ib id .
72US vs IBM. px321, GE, 'Computer Department P re se n ta t io n  to  the  
Executive O f f i c e ' ,  20/4 /65 .
73US vs IBM. t r7192,  Weil.
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The 600 range had two l in eag es .  The f i r s t  l i n e  of development was the  
M-236, a computer developed by the  Heavy M i l i t a r y  E lec t ro n ic s  
Department74 . The M-236 was produced f o r  the  c o n t ro l  of la rge  s t r a t e g i c  
rada r  systems us ing 'wired  lo g i c '  and had f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  the  r e a l - t im e  
con t ro l  of such a system. R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  th e  p r o j e c t  was t r a n s f e r r e d  
from Syracuse to  Phoenix and W ei l ' s  engineer ing  group. The 600 s e r i e s  
r e f l e c t e d  the  a r c h i t e c t u r e  and component design of  the  M-236. One area  of 
overlap was the  memory o rg a n i s a t i o n ,  which not only  allowed f o r  r e a l - t im e  
a p p l i c a t io n s  but a l so  helped in developing so c a l l e d  t ime-shared  
computers75 . The 600s were to  become the  co rner  stone of GE's t ime­
shar ing76 and se rv ice  bureau developments, which i s  d iscussed  below.
The second branch of  i t s  an ces t ry  came from i t s  being t a r g e t e d  to 
rep lace  the la rge  number of IBM 7090/7094 s c i e n t i f i c  computers:
' . . . t h e  machine was b a s i c a l l y  a s c i e n t i f i c  machine derived 
from the  7090 /7094 . '77
' . . .  what we were doing was t ry i n g  to  d i sp la ce  equipment of 
th e  7090 family  t h a t  was a l ready  i n s t a l l e d . ' 78
GE had t a rg e te d  a market f o r  which i t  was a major customer i t s e l f ;  i t  had 
a la rge  in t e r n a l  demand f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  computing power. The design of the  
GEC0S opera t ing  system was 'based heav i ly  on th e  knowledge we had as users  
of  IBM 7090 and 7094 s c a le  equipment '79. The 600 was nea r ly  program 
compatible with the  7090 machines, and was given something of a boost  when 
i t  became c l e a r  t h a t  the  360 was not backwardly compat ible with old IBM 
systems. I t  was not as easy to  t r a n s f e r  from a 7090/94 to  a 360 as i t  was 
to  move to  the  GE 600. GE's plan was to  o f f e r  7090 users  a b e t t e r  
p r ice :per formance  r a t i o  than t h e i r  c u r ren t  machines,  whi le  avoiding the 
la rge  reprogramming ta sk  needed to  upgrade to  th e  IBM 360 family .  A GE635 
o f fe red  4-5 t imes  the  performance of  the  IBM 7090, a t  20% l e s s  c o s t 80.
74Ib id ,  t r7178.
75US vs IBM. pxl205, in te r n a l  IBM d iscuss ion  paper on GE's success in 
t im e-sha r ing .
76Time-shared computers allow many, i n t e r - a c t i v e ,  u se r s  to  access  a 
computer a t  the  same time.
77US vs IBM. t r7192, Weil.
7SI b i d , tr7213.
79Ib id ,  tr7217.
soCBI Archive,  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Data Publi sh ing  Co, EDP Indus t ry  and 
Market Report .  15/7/64, p p l -5 .
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Honeywell rece ived  a s im i l a r  w in d fa l l  f o r  i t s  200 range which was 
compatible with IBM's main second genera t ion  bus iness  computer, the  
1401s 1 .
This s t r a t e g y  was success fu l  as ' t h e  i n i t i a l  accep tance '  o f  the  600 
s e r i e s  was good8 2 . The f i r s t  members of the  range ,  the  625 and 635, were 
jo ined by the  smal ler  605 and 615, but  the  la rge  s c a l e ,  t ime-shared  645 was 
never so ld  commercially83.
I n i t i a l l y  sa le s  of the  l a r g e r  IBM 360 machines were comparat ively 
weak, one reason being i n c o m p a t ib i l i t y  with th e  7090/94. IBM re a c t e d  to  
t h i s  by announcing 12 hardware emula tors f o r  o ld e r  systems. One of the  
g rea t  advantages of the  360 was t h a t  i t  could use Read Only Memory and 
could emulate o th e r  systems f a i r l y  e f f i c i e n t l y .  This m i t iga ted  some of the  
600 s e r i e s '  advantage.
Apart  from the f a i l u r e  to  market the  645 t h e r e  were o th e r  l e s s  
success fu l  a sp ec t s  of the  600 p r o j e c t .  Despite th e  f a c t  t h a t  GE had i t s  own 
components d i v i s i o n  i t  could not produce the memory sub-systems of  the  600. 
The Oklahoma Ci ty  based Memory Equipment Department suppl ied  f e r r i t e  cores  
fo r  the  200 and 400 s e r i e s ,  but was not ab le  to  supply the  f a s t e r  600 
memories. These were bought from F ab r i t ek ,  Lockheed, and Ampex8*.
The b ig g e s t  c r i s i s  f o r  the  600 s e r i e s  was i t s  suspension from the  
market during 1966/785 . There were two reasons f o r  t h i s .  F i r s t l y  600 
computers proved very d i f f i c u l t  to  mainta in  in th e  f i e l d ,  with a l o t  o f  
down-time. Secondly the  i n s t a l l e d  machines were f a i l i n g  to  d e l i v e r  the  
computing power t h a t  had been a d v e r t i s e d  f o r  them86. The 615, 625 and 635 
de l iv e ry  programmes were suspended to  s o r t  out th e  problems. The suspension 
led to  a number o f  redundancies a t  t h e  Phoenix f a c t o r i e s  and undermined 
morale in the  o rg a n i s a t i o n .  The 600 s e r i e s  had been very much the  f l a g s h ip  
of GE's range8 7 , so i t s  f a i l u r e  was a big blow to  the  f i rm .  I t  a l so  had
81See below, chapte r  8,  pp354-358.
82US vs IBM. px4829, Arthur D. L i t t l e  i n c . ,  'The computer in d u s t ry - th e  
next f i v e  y e a r s ' ,  October 1964.
83See below, pp274-276.
e*US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company study of  GE' 1968.
S5I b i d ; Tr7222-6, John Weil.
86IDC, EDP Indust ry  and Market Report.  12 /1 /67 , pp4-5.
87US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company study o f  GE' 1968.
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a negative effec t on the p ro fita b ility  of the computer operation88.
The fo u r th  of the  Computer Department 's  eng inee r ing  groups had 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  developing p e r ip h e ra l  equipment. Desp i te  the  ex i s t ence  
of t h i s  u n i t ,  GE, l ik e  RCA, had problems supplying  e lec t ro -m echan ica l  
p e r i p h e r a l s .  One of the  major problems was mass s to rag e  d i sc  d r iv e s ,  a 
c r i t i c a l  element in a mainframe system. For a number of year s  Burroughs,  
and to  a l e s s e r  ex ten t  CDC, suppl ied  these  dev ices  to  GE89. In 1968 GE 
f i n a l l y  s t a r t e d  t o  supply i t s  own IBM 2311-compatible d i s c  d r iv e s .  These 
d r ive s  were used on i t s  own systems and were a l so  so ld  t o  the  leas ing  
company Greyhound, which marketed them to  IBM 360 u s e r s 90 . However, by 
the t ime th e se  were suppl ied ,  IBM was r e l e a s in g  new d r iv e s  which GE was not 
able to  keep up with .
21Time-sharina equipment and s e r v i c e s .
One of  th e  b r i g h t e s t  spots  in GE's computer p o r t f o l i o  was the  
advances i t  made in i n t e r a c t i v e ,  t ime-shared  computer systems. GE became 
involved in two o f  the  premier conceptua l developments in computing in the  
1960s. Time-sharing allowed m u l t ip le  users  to  use a mainframe computer in 
r e a l - t i m e ,  running  t h e i r  own programs and g e t t i n g  r e s u l t s ,  without ever  
knowing t h a t  o th e r  users  were s imultaneously  on the  system. This was a 
g rea t  advance over batch process ing  where programs and da ta  had to  be 
en tered  s e q u e n t i a l l y  on magnetic tape  or  punch ca rd s .  Batch process ing was 
a p a r t i c u l a r  handicap f o r  eng ineers  and program developers  who had to  wait  
a long t ime to  f in d  out whether programs worked, making debugging a slow 
process .  The s c i e n t i f i c  community wanted an i n t e r a c t i v e  form of computing 
to  overcome th e se  problems. C e n t r a l i s e d  t ime-shared computers were seen as 
the  answer.  At t h i s  t ime i t  was not thought t h a t  d i s t r i b u t e d  resources  in 
the  form of  minicomputers were an economic s o lu t io n ;  on ly  l a t e r  in the  
1960s did  DEC and SDS s t a r t  to  prove t h a t ,  in f a c t ,  the  minicomputer was 
a v iab le  op t ion .
88US vs IBM. tr8339, I n g e r s o l l ,  f in a n c i a l  manager o f  the  computer 
opera t ion  1967-1969.
89IDC, EDP Industry  and Market R epor t . 30 /4 /64 , pp3-4.
9° US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company study o f  GE', 1968.
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Dartmouth System.
The s im ple r ,  but commercially most s u c c e s s fu l ,  of GE's t im e-sha re  
systems was developed from work done a t  Dartmouth Col lege91. In th e  e a r l y  
1960s the  c o l l e g e  developed a language and o pe ra t ing  system c a l l e d  
Dartmouth BASIC, probably the  most famous computer language ever .  I t  was 
produced using a GE 225 and was picked up by GE's Valley Forge M iss i le  and 
Space Divis ion  f o r  i t s  own eng ineer ing  design work92. The M iss i le  and 
Space Div is ion  s t a r t e d  to  o f f e r  t ime on i t s  system to  o th e r  companies in 
i t s  a rea .  With th e  success of  t h i s  ad-hoc s e r v ic e  bureau, the  Computer 
Divis ion s t a r t e d  marketing a f u l l y  engineered vers ion  to  o u ts id e  users  and 
s t a r t e d  to  develop a computer bureau se rv ice  i t s e l f 93. The machine i t  was 
s e l l i n g  and ope ra t ing  was known as th e  265. This was b a s i c a l l y  a second 
genera t ion  235 computer, coupled with GE's communications computer, the  
DataNet 30, which handled a l l  the  inpu t -ou tpu t  r o u t i n e s .  By 1968 the  system 
could handle 40 simultaneous u se r s  and had a l i b r a r y  of 400 programs94 . 
This development kept the  second genera t ion  GE200 in ope ra t ion  f o r  a l o t
longer than would otherwise been th e  case .  Even in 1968 t h e r e  was s t i l l  a
small demand f o r  these  u n i t s 95.
The same system was a l so  implemented on th e  420 and 635. The main 
marketing emphasis was placed on th e  GE635 which could i n t e r a c t  with 120 
users  s imul taneously .  They o f f e red  th e  same s u i t e  of  programs as the  265. 
Indeed both systems were used in th e  network run by GE; th e  use r  d id  not 
know which system he was us ing,  except t h a t  t h e r e  was a l a rg e r  charge f o r  
using the  f a s t e r  63596.
MULTICS System.
The second t ime-shar ing  development was a l so  a w indfa l l  from o u t s id e .  
I t  was a h igh ly  p re s t i g io u s  ven tu re ,  though i t  led to  few commercial s a l e s .  
In 1964 the  Massachusetts  I n s t i t u t e  o f  Technology was th e  USA's leading 
cen t re  f o r  r e a l - t i m e  computing and arguably i t  was the  leading academic 
computing hub. MIT's labs had developed many impor tant computer systems, 
e s p e c i a l l y  in th e  area of a i r  defence systems, inc lud ing  the  Whirlwind and
91US vs IBM. tr7107, Weil.
92US vs IBM. px3222, IBM NA company study of  GE' 1968.
93Ib id .
94Ib id .
95Ib id .
96Ibid.
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SAGE systems. SAGE was the  huge computerized North American c o n t in e n ta l  a i r  
defence environment,  by f a r  the  l a r g e s t  computer p r o j e c t  in the  1950s„ and 
1960s. MIT was in t e r e s t e d  in improving the e f f i c i e n c y  of engineers  working 
on such p r o j e c t s .  One method of  doing t h i s  was to  use a t ime-shared  
computer. MIT e s t a b l i s h e d  a programme ca l l ed  P r o j e c t  MAC to  develop the  
MULTICS o p e ra t in g  system. This was an e f f o r t  t o  produce a h ighly  complex 
op e ra t ing  system, to  give eng ineers  the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d  ope ra t ing  
environment to  work in .  The p r o j e c t  was funded by the  Defence Advanced 
Research P r o j e c t s  Agency. DARPA had been formed to  coord ina te  and fund 
ba s ic  re sea rch  f o r  a l l  the  US armed fo r c e s ,  so was a l so  very  i n t e r e s t e d  in 
improving s c i e n t i f i c  p r o d u c t iv i ty .
A number of  companies competed f o r  what was one of  the  most ta lked  
about computer p ro je c t s  in th e  country97. MULTICS c a l l e d  f o r  huge 
process ing  power and a number of hardware re f inem en ts ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in the  
area of memory. To get i t s  635 and DataNet equipment chosen GE had to  f i g h t  
o f f  s t rong  ch a l l en g es ,  notably  from IBM, DEC and CDC. GE could o f f e r  a more 
s u i t a b l e  system: the 635 which, thanks to  i t s  m i l i t a r y  l ineage  and 
supporting  DataNet 30, o f f e re d  more o f  the  necessa ry  f e a tu r e s  in terms of 
communications and memory management9®.
GE announced the  combination of the  635 and DataNet 30, to g e th e r  with 
the  many m od if ica t ions  and enhancements req u i red  by MIT, as th e  64599. 
The f i r s t  and only  sa le  of the  system outs ide  o f  MIT and GE was to  AT&T's 
Bell  L a b o ra to r i e s ,  which was the  w or ld ' s  leading  commercial re sea rch  
c e n t r e .  Bel l  Labs was a l so  i n t e r e s t e d  in improving e f f i c i e n c y  and the  way 
in which computers worked with eng inee rs .  IBM was worr ied t h a t  t h e r e  was 
a snowball e f f e c t  behind the se  p re s t i g io u s  o rd e rs  and t h a t  GE was a 
t h r e a t 100.
However, MULTICS was a re s ea rc h  p r o j e c t ,  th e  645 system was not 
commercially marketed101. MULTICS was not d e l iv e re d  u n t i l  a f t e r  GE had 
sold  i t s  computer opera t ion  to  Honeywell, and then  i t  only had a few u s e r s .  
The Bell  Labora to r ies  recognised j u s t  how la rge  and complex MULTICS was
97US vs IBM. pxl246, The Wall S t r e e t  Journal 18/11/64. A copy of t h i s  
a r t i c l e  on the  replacement o f  IBM computers with GE systems a t  AT&T's Bell  
Labs was sen t  t o  IBM's top execu t ives  with a memo recommending t h a t  i t  be 
kept on t h e i r  desks u n t i l  IBM had captured  the  lead in t im e-sha r ing .
98US vs IBM. pxl205, IBM i n t e r n a l  d iscuss ion  paper ,  18/6/64.
" US vs IBM. tr7108,  Weil.
100US vs IBM. pxl205, IBM i n t e r n a l  d iscuss ions  paper 18/9/64.
1P1US vs IBM. tr7234, Weil.
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tu rn in g  out to  be,  and withdrew i t s  engineers  from the  p r o j e c t ,  s e t t i n g  
them to  work producing a s t r i p p e d  down opera t ing  system c a l l e d  UNIX, which 
is  now the  dominant s c i e n t i f i c  and mini computer ope ra t ing  environment. 
Nonetheless ,  th e  645 gave p r e s t i g e  to  GE and added l u s t r e  to  the  t im e-share  
computers based on the  l e s s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d ,  but immediately workable,  
Dartmouth system.
Sales of time-share computers and services.
In 1968 an IBM r e p o r t  noted th e  rap id  growth in t im e-sha re  systems
s a l e s 102. I t  was est imated  t h a t  in 1965 the re  were only 6 such machines,
12 in 1966 and 100 a t  the  end of  1968, 50 of which were d e l iv e red  in the 
f i r s t  6 months of  1968. IBM es t im ated  th a t  GE had i n s t a l l e d  j u s t  over h a l f  
of th e  t o t a l .  On top of  t h i s ,  GE was the le ad e r  in t im e-sha re  bureau 
s e r v i c e s .  These se rv ice s  o f f e r e d  customers a te rmina l  in t h e i r  premises 
which allowed them to  communicate with  a remote t ime-shared  computer. GE 
had 3000 t e rm in a ls  in the  f i e l d ,  800 with in  GE and 2200 with ou ts ide  
c l i e n t s .
Revenue growth from the  bureau se rv ice  had been sp ec ta c u la r .  In 1965 
GE was expec t ing  to  s e l l  $10m worth o f  s e r v ic e s ,  and expected t h i s  to  grow
to  over $40m by 1970103. However, by IBM e s t i m a te s ,  the  bureau se rv ice
market had reached $50m by 1967, of  which GE was es t im ated  to  have $30m. 
In 1968 IBM expected the  market to  reach $100m, with GE mainta in ing  i t s  60% 
s take .  The one problem GE had with t h i s  market was the  f a i l u r e  to  ge t  a 
r e tu rn  on i t s  work with MIT and MULTICS, but the  Dartmouth based 200 and 
400 machines were success fu l  and put i t  ahead of  IBM in t h i s  one a rea .
3 ) I n t e r n a t io n a l  Expansion.
P o t e n t i a l l y  GE's overseas  ope ra t ions  o f f e red  even g r e a t e r  reward than 
i t s  le ad e rsh ip  in t im e-sha r ing ;  however, t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  came to  no th ing.  
Outside of the  USA, IBM i d e n t i f i e d  GE and ICT/L as i t s  main compet i tors .  
Unlike RCA, which used l i c e n se e s  t o  s e l l  i t s  equipment abroad, GE bought 
fo re ign  computer companies as a way of  d i r e c t l y  e n te r in g  overseas  markets.  
The two o p e ra t io n s  t h a t  i t  c o n t r o l l e d  were the  computer arm of the  I t a l i a n  
fi rm, O l i v e t t i ,  and a 66% holding in French f i rm  B u l l 104. These two 
a c q u i s i t i o n s  g r e a t l y  decreased  GE's r e l i a n c e  on the  USA computer market:
1Q2US vs IBM px3222, IBM 'A company s tudy of GE', 1968.
1Q3US vs IBM. px321, GE, 'Computer Department P resen ta t io n  to  the 
Executive O f f i c e '  20/4/65.
1P4US vs IBM. px3222, IBM, 'A company s tudy of GE', 1968.
276
Table 7.5 GE's share of national computer markets. 1968.
Country Total size of 
national market 
in Points1 '000s
% of world
computer
market.
GE's share of 
national market.
\ of. GE's total
computer
activity.
U.S.A. 128,166 62.1 6.2 37.2
France 10,977 5.3 45.3 23.4
Italy 3,435 1.7 62.8 10.2
Germany 8,336 4.0 17.2 6.7
Hetherlands 1,979 1.0 31.2 2.9
Belgium 1,161 .6 52.1 2.8
Switzerland 2,516 1.2 18.8 2.2
U.K. 18,463 8.9 1.9 1.7
Sweden 1,845 .9 19.0 1.6
Spain 1,061 .5 31.4 1.6
Canada 3,992 1.9 5.9 1.1
Mexico 527 .3 44.2 1.1
Austria 481 .2 42.6 1.0
Japan 13,605 6.6 1.4 .9
Australia 2,192 1.1 8.4 .9
Argentina
Others2
414 .2 44.2 .9
7,281 3.5 11.2 3.8
Total 206,431 100.0 10.3 100
1) IBM measured market share in p o i n t s ,  1 point  was the  eq u iva len t  to  $1 of 
monthly income received i f  a l l  equipment i n s t a l l e d  was leased .
2)16 c o u n t r i e s  none over 150,000 p o in t s .
3)IBM's e s t im a te  t h a t  GE had 10.3% of  the world market seems too high 
compared to  o th e r  evidence,  GE's own es t imates  never put them above 5% of 
worldwide shipments.
Source: US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company h i s t o r y  of the  General E l e c t r i c  
Corpora t ion '  1968.
Bull and O l i v e t t i  brought more than j u s t  local  market share  to  GE. 
Bull had a la rg e  range of systems c a l l e d  GAMMA computers, t h e  smal ler  
systems of  which had sold  reasonab ly  well in Europe105. Bull a l so  had 
e x p e r t i s e  in punched card and p r i n t e r  devices which could have s t reng thened  
GE's p e r ip h e ra l  a c t i v i t i e s .  La te r  both firms designed computers which were 
added to  GE's worldwide range.  These were O l i v e t t i ' s  success fu l  small 
computer, th e  GE115106, and th e ,  even smal ler Bull/GE 50.
However, th e re  were a l so  problems, e s p e c i a l l y  a t  Bul l .  Bull had 
completely l o s t  contro l  of c o s t s .  I t  produced a la rge  range of  computer and 
punched card  equipment; c o s t s  o f  main ta in ing such a wide range had got out 
of hand. Bull had even added to  i t s  c o s t  burdens by undertaking an a b o r t iv e  
super-computer p r o j e c t .  I t s  range of  computers was very  old and s a le s  
slowing down. Even i t s  new machines were outmoded: f o r  example the  GAMMA
105'Bui 1 ' s ru le  in Europe ' ,  Datamation. September 1961, pp30-3. 
l o s IDC, EDP Industry  and Market Repor t . 18 /3/65, pp l-3 .
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300 system, r e l e a se d  in 1961, s t i l l  r e l i e d  on drum memory107. GE had a 
g rea t  deal  of t ro u b le  in c u t t i n g  B u l l ' s  high c o s t  base :  Bull employed 
11,500 compared t o  GE's own Computer Department which employed 9,500.  
However, s t a f f  were d i f f i c u l t  to  cu t as the  French s t a t e  put p re s su re  on 
GE not to  make c u t s ;  c o s t s  a t  Bull remained a con t inua l  problem f o r  the  
f i r m 108.
However, an even g r e a t e r  f a i l u r e  was GE's i n a b i l i t y  to  i n t e g r a t e  i t s  
overseas  a c q u i s i t i o n s  with i t s  fo u r  US-based computer eng ineer ing  groups.  
This in t u rn  led to  lack of  con t ro l  over expendi tu re .  Each p a r t  of  GE was 
engaged in i t s  own development and production work, with l i t t l e  
coo rd in a t io n .  F a i lu re  to  i n t e g r a t e  th e se  a c t i v i t i e s  meant t h a t  i t  was not 
achieving the  economies o f  s c a l e  t h a t  were p o s s ib l e .  By 1968 IBM es t imated  
t h a t  GE had invested  $100m in i t s  overseas a f f i l i a t e s ,  but due to  i t s  
incompetent management i t  had f a i l e d  to achieve a p r o f i t  from these  
a s s e t s 109.
Product f a i l u r e  and re trenchment.
l)The i n a b i l i t y  t o  unify  th e  product  range.
Undoubtedly GE had an i n t e r e s t i n g  computer p o r t f o l i o .  Not only did  
i t  have the  usual  hardware and software  o rg a n i s a t i o n s ,  but i t  a l so  had the  
second l a r g e s t  i n t e r n a t io n a l  presence and the  innovat ive  t im e-shar ing  and 
bureau a c t i v i t i e s .  During th e  mid-1960s GE undertook i t s  f i r s t  major r e ­
s t r u c t u r i n g  programme s ince  th e  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  p o l i c y  of  the  e a r l y  1950s. 
As a p a r t  o f  th e s e  changes i t  a t tempted ,  but f a i l e d ,  to  p u l l  i t s  d i s p a r a t e  
computer a c t i v i t i e s  t o g e th e r .  The number of o pe ra t ing  groups was increased  
from f i v e  to  t e n ,  one of  which was the  Information Systems Group (ISG), the  
s t r u c t u r e  of which is  shown below:
Figure 7.2
GE CEO F.R. Borch
President of ISG I  Aero Engine froups 
H.L. Weiss
Information Systems 9 w p  
Group Exec J.S . Seitfe
Advanced Development Information Services Information Systems
A Resource Planning Division Equipment Division
Division
Source: 1967 Annual Report .
107' B u l l ' s  300 S e r i e s ' ,  Datamation.  November 1961, p47.
l o s US vs IBM px3222, IBM, 'A company study of  GE', 1968.
109Ib id .
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While t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  seems l o g i c a l ,  the  r e a l i t y  was very d i f f e r e n t :  
t h i s  was only a paper o r g a n i s a t i o n .  GE completely f a i l e d  t o  i n t e g r a t e  the  
ope ra t ions  of i t s  var ious  arms. R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  hardware was s p l i t  
between the  US Information Systems Equipment D iv is ion  and th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Information Systems D iv is ion ,  and th e  r e a l i t y  was t h a t  t h e r e  were many more 
s u b -d iv i s io n s  t h a t  were not working to g e th e r .  The main problem t h i s  c rea ted  
was t h a t  a t tem pts  to  un ify  the  hardware a r c h i t e c t u r e  t h a t  GE used, to  cut 
development c o s t s  and to  achieve  s c a l e  economies from producing common 
components, a l l  f a i l e d .  Table 7 .6  shows t h a t  GE continued to  support  a very 
complex range o f  incompatible computers:
Table 7.6 
Domestic:
GE products :  breakdown bv n a t io n .
France
Large Scale 
Medium Scale
Small Scale
Large Scale 
Medium Scale 
Small Scale
I t a l y Large Scale 
Medium Scale 
Small Scale
600-sold  and manufactured 
400-sold  and manufactured 
200-support  f o r  i n s t a l l e d  machines 
115-marketing only 
50-marketing only
600-marketing only 
400-marketing (and manufacturing?) 
50-so ld  and manufactured 
Gamma 10-sold and manufactured 
Gamma 55-sold  and manufactured
Unit  Record Accounting Machine 
Punched Card machinery
600-marketing only  
400-marketing only  
115-sold and manufactured 
130-sold  and manufactured
Source: US vs IBM. px3222, IBM, 'A company h i s t o r y  of  the  General E l e c t r i c  
C o rp o ra t io n ' ,  1968.
In general  l a rge  and medium sca le  systems were th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the  
US o p e ra t io n s ,  while  Europe looked a f t e r  the  small  machines.  However Bull 
had to  suppor t  i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  base of  medium s c a l e  GAMMA u se r s ,  and may 
have manufactured some of  the  GE400 systems so ld  in Europe. At one time 
France was given r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  developing medium-sized 
computers110.
All  of  GE's la rge  range of  systems were incompatib le  with each o th e r .  
ICT had had a s im i l a r  problem a f t e r  i t  had acqu i red  th e  o pe ra t ions  of  
Fe r r an t i  and EMI. ICT ta ck led  i t  by unifying a l l  i t s  development on the  
1900 a r c h i t e c t u r e .  GE never managed to  achieve t h i s  and f a i l e d  to  produce 
a s in g le  u n i f i e d  l i n e ,  d e sp i t e  wasting  re sources  on a number of f a l s e
11PUS vs IBM. t r7 2 4 1 , Weil.
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s t a r t s .
GE s t a r t e d  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  programmes to  r e p la ce  the  whole of  i t s  
range with a s in g l e  compatible f am i ly .  In f a c t  t h e  f i r s t  plan f o r  a s in g le  
range of  machines to cover the  whole o f  the  computer market predated the  
400 and 600 l i n e s .  In 1962 a team in Phoenix s tu d i e d  a s e r i e s  of  machines
dubbed the  WXYZ range111. Of the se  only the  middle ones,  the X and Y,
were s e r i o u s l y  s tud ied .  The X machine became th e  400 s e r i e s ,  but th e  Y was 
cance l led  in favour  of the  600 p r o j e c t ,  based as i t  was on m i l i t a r y  work. 
GE came up with the  term 'The Compatibles '  t o  d e sc r ib e  i t s  200 s e r i e s  and 
used th e  same term fo r  the  400 and 600 ranges.  This was only l i p  se rv ice  
to  the  concept.  The concept of  the  WXYZ s e r i e s  was ahead o f  the  r e s t  o f  the  
market, but d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  of development in to  fo u r  sep a ra te  development 
groups seems to  have worked a g a in s t  th e  idea of  a u n i f i e d  range.
A f te r  the  purchase of the  European f i rms  and fol lowing the
announcement of  the  IBM 360 family ,  GE once again  tu rned  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  to  
producing an in te g ra te d  range of computers.  During 1964-66 Lou Raeder,  the  
general  manager of  the  computer o p e ra t io n ,  supported a programme to  develop 
a s i n g l e ,  worldwide, range of  systems112. I t  was c h r i s t e n e d  the  100 Line 
and was to  b u i ld  on the  perceived s t r e n g th s  GE's d i s p a r a t e  computer teams:
'The 100 l i n e  had a s e r i e s  of p ro cesso rs .  They were to  some 
ex te n t  o r ien ted  in the  same d i r e c t i o n s  t h a t  the  IBM 360 had been 
o r i e n t e d .  I t  was an e ig h t  b i t  by te  machine and co n s i s ted  p r im ar i ly  
of  th r e e  s e t s  of  p ro cesso rs ,  the  s m a l l e s t  of which were to  be 
manufactured in I t a l y ,  the  medium sca le  ones were t o  be manufactured 
in France,  and the  l a rg e r  s c a l e  ones were to  be designed and
manufactured in the  US, in P h o e n ix . ' 113
The Computer Department hoped t h a t  such a range could inc rease  i t s  
share of  the  market from 3% to  10%114.
IBM a l so  developed a system by which design r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  could be 
div ided i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  However, t h i s  was done w i th in  a framework of  t i g h t  
c en t r a l  c on t ro l  over ba s ic  a r c h i t e c t u r e  and design  p ro toco ls  to  ensure  
complete c o m p a t ib i l i t y .  Nothing was s a id  about how t h i s  was to  be achieved 
within  GE.
The whole concept of  the  100 l i n e  came in to  ques t ion  in 1966 when
111lb id t r7238.
112Ib id ,  tr7240.
113I b i d , tr7240.
X1*US vs IBM. px321, GE, 'Computer Department P resen ta t io n  to  the  
Executive O f f i c e ' ,  20/4/65.
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Hershner Cross took over th e  o p e r a t i o n 115. His f i r s t  a c t  was t o  put the  
600 s e r i e s  in to  h ibe rna t ion  u n t i l  i t s  problems had been so r ted  ou t .  His 
second a c t  was t o  c a l l  f o r  an assessment of the  100 plan:
' . . a  study was c a l l e d  a t  Crononvil le ,  New York, a t  GE's 
i n s t a l l a t i o n  th e r e ,  the  worldwide marketing and engineer ing  and 
general  management [were] involved.
We broke up in to  work groups,  s tud ied  the  100 l in e  versus  the  
then e x i s t i n g  400 l i n e s ,  and we were asked to  recommend should we 
con t inue  with our e x i s t i n g  l i n e s  worldwide or  should we a c t u a l l y  go 
ahead with the  100 l i n e .
All the  study groups recommended we go ahead with the  100 
l i n e . . .Hershner Cross ove rru led  a l l  the  s tudy groups and decided 
t h a t  the  100 l in e  would be abandoned, I assume fo r  resource  
r e a s o n s . ' l l s
The I t a l i a n  ope ra t ion  ignored t h i s  and went ahead with i t s  small machine, 
the  GE115. Weil b e l ieves  t h a t  t h i s  was because the  I t a l i a n  opera t ion  had 
a s t rong  general  manager who was w i l l i n g  to take  personal  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
When the  range was c ance l led ,  the  French un i t  had a l ready  secured 15 o rders  
fo r  i t s  140 and 145, but the se  were cance l led  and emphasis in Europe was 
placed on the  o ld  GE400117. However, the  115 was marketed worldwide and 
g r e a t l y  b o l s t e r e d  GE's o therwise  weak low end machines.  I t  was the  only GE 
computer to  s e l l  over one thousand systems118.
Following the  f a i l u r e  to  e s t a b l i s h  the  100 l i n e  as the  worldwide GE 
a r c h i t e c t u r e  ano ther  study, P r o je c t  Charley,  was i n i t i a t e d  in France.  This 
was the  design o f  a more advanced system than the  100, but with more or 
le s s  the  same r o l e 119. A f te r  a number of meetings in P a r i s  nothing was 
decided save a few s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .
Then came the  E.R.W. s tudy,  named a f t e r  the  p r o j e c t  manager Eugene 
R. White. The p r o j e c t  was i n i t i a t e d  by John Haanstra who had been appointed 
as head of development in th e  US in 1966120. Again i t  was a s i m i l a r  plan 
to  the  100 Line and P r o je c t  Charley.  I t  a l so  came to  a dead end, mainly 
because Haanstra  became to  head of th e  Information Systems Div is ion ,  with 
i t s  emphasis on the  GE600.
Plans f o r  such a system were then dropped u n t i l  the  Advanced Product
115US vs IBM. tr7240,  Weil.
116Ib id ,  t r 7 2 4 1 .
117IDC, EDP Indus t ry  and Market Repor t . 12/1 /67,  pp4-5.
118IDC, EDP Indus t ry  R epor t . 23/12/68, plO.
119US vs IBM. t r7242, Weil.
12° US vs IBM. tr7243 ,  Weil; px3222, IBM 'A company study of G.E. '  
1968, unusual ly  f o r  GE i t  had imported Haanstra from IBM.
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Line scheme121. The s to r y  of  th e  APL i s  t i e d  up with the  s t o r y  of GE's 
d epar tu re  from th e  ind u s t ry  and w i l l  be considered l a t e r .
2) The po l icy  of  re trenchment.
From 1966 the  d i s a r r a y  in the  product l i n e  s t a r t e d  m a t e r i a l l y  to  
a f f e c t  th e  p o s i t i o n  of th e  Information Systems Group, with inc reas ing  
lo s se s .  In 1965 Hershner Cross took over from Lou Raeder as general  manager 
and ended the  100 Line122. He a l so  took the 600 o f f  the  market u n t i l  i t s  
problems were so r ted  ou t .  In l a t e  1966 J .S .  Smith took over and a po l icy  
of c o s t  c u t t i n g  was s t a r t e d 123. The industry  a n a l y s t s ,  IDC, es t imated  
t h a t  by 1967 GE l o s t  $400m on i t s  computer o p e ra t io n s ,  $50m of which came 
from th e  f i r s t  18 months of  th e  ownership of  B u l l 124. The dropping of 
the  140 and 145 and the  suspension of  600 s e r i e s  s a l e s ,  allowed f o r  a 
programme of cutbacks in France.  The dropping of  th e  100 Line and the  hold 
on the  600 s e r i e s  a l so  allowed f o r  c u t s  in the  USA. Engineer ing,  sof tware 
development and marketing depar tments  were cu t  back, lead ing  to  th e  loss  
of s eve ra l  hundred jobs .  In Phoenix,  500 were l a i d  o f f  from manufacturing 
p o s i t i o n s .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  t h e  Computer Research Laboratory,  which d e a l t  with 
fundamental r e s ea rc h ,  was shut down a l to g e th e r .
Another method of  re t renchment was to  con cen t ra te  on fewer v e r t i c a l  
markets.  One of th e  major ones chosen was banking. GE had remained s t ro n g e r  
in t h i s  s e c to r  than  o the rs  fo l lowing  ERMA, but i t  t r a i l e d  IBM and Burroughs 
by a long way. GE hoped t h a t  i t  could  win bus iness  from banks upgrading 
ERMA and 200 s e r i e s  systems125. The aim was to  co ncen t ra te  i t s  marketing 
e f f o r t  on fewer markets,  b u i ld in g  up i t s  presence in th e se  a r e a s ,  while 
trimming marketing c o s t s .
Desp ite  th e  l a y -o f f s  and o th e r  cos t  c u t t i n g  measures, IBM thought 
t h a t  GE s t i l l  had co s t  problems, e s p e c i a l l y  in France125. I t  be l ieved  
t h a t  GE had not d e a l t  with the  d u p l i c a t io n  of re sea rch  f a c i l i t i e s  across  
the  US, French and I t a l i a n  o p e ra t io n s .  Another problem was t h a t  p re s su re
121US vs IBM. t r7615 ,  R. Bloch. Bloch was one of  the  new personnel 
brought in from ou ts id e  to  break th e  log-jam in GE's computer o p e ra t io n .  
He had held a s en io r  p o s i t i o n  in Honeywell and jo ined  GE a f t e r  a per iod  
with th e  c o n su l t a n t s  Auerbach E le c t ro n ic s  Corp.
122Us vs IBM. t r7224 ,  Weil.
123IDC, EDP Indus t ry  and Market Report . 12/1 /67,  pp4-5.
124Ib id .
12SIDC. EDP Indus try  and Market Repor t . 23 /2 /67 , pp4-5.
125US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company study of  the  GE' 1968.
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from th e  French government had r e s t r i c t e d  the  number of redundancies  t h a t  
had been made t h e r e 127. In IBM's view, GE had been inep t  in i t s  handling 
of  i t s  e x c e l l e n t  opportuni ty  in th e  in t e r n a t io n a l  market12®. I t  had old 
p roduc ts ,  which were not s e l l i n g  well  enough to  u t i l i s e  th e  la rge  
f a c i l i t i e s  and personnel t h a t  i t  had. Only the  115 was a modern machine. 
Costs were a major problem but th e se  problems were being exacerbated  by the  
lack of  modern machines; no m a t te r  how e f f i c i e n t  GE became i t  would s t i l l  
be unable to  s e l l  these  o ld  systems.
By 1968 a l l  these  problems had f u r th e r  damaged ISG's bottom l in e  
performance.  Despite  the  e f f i c i e n c y  d r i v e ,  GE's market share  was d e c l in in g .  
IBM gauged t h a t  in 1967-8 GE's US opera t ion  a c t u a l l y  saw a f a l l  in s a le s  
of 3%, while  i t s  i n t e rn a t io n a l  s a l e s  grew by only 11%, a g a in s t  an average 
market growth r a t e  of 25%129.
Despite  a l l  these  problems, IBM concluded t h a t  in 1968 GE was not 
going t o  leave t h e  indus try :  r a t h e r  th e  oppos i te ,  i t  expected GE to  t r y  to  
j u s t i f y  the  $400m i t  had a l ready  l o s t  by inves t ing  in a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
compet i t ive  system. With GE's v a s t  re sou rces ,  IBM expected i t  to  make one 
f i n a l  e f f o r t  to  br ing the  whole ope ra t ion  to g e th e r .  The new head of ISG, 
J .S .  Smith,  was seen by IBM as one o f  GE's most success fu l  managers,  having 
a l ready  tu rned  th e  Outdoor Light ing  Department around130. He bought in 
new managers, managers t h a t  had e x p e r t i s e  in computers,  such as Bloch and 
Haanstra .  The o f t -quo ted  GE adage,  'A good manager, no m at te r  what h i s  
background, can manage a n y t h i n g '131, seeas to  have been wearing t h i n .
1Z7Ib id .
128Ib id .
129Ib id .
13° I b i d .
131"GE's Edsel”, Forbes. 1/4/67, p280.
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Competition f o r  funds and the  d e c i s io n  to  abandon computers.
During 1968-1971 two r e p o r t s  were w r i t t en  w i th in  GE which determined 
the  f u t u r e  o f  both GE's Information Systems D iv is ion  and the  co rpo ra t ion  
as a whole. The r e s t  of t h i s  chap te r  w i l l  look a t  th e  background to  these  
two documents.
l lThe Advanced Product Line.
In 1968 Bloch, head of the  Advanced Development and Resource Planning 
D iv is ion ,  s t a r t e d  work on the  'APL Master P l a n ' 132. The APL was GE's 
plan to  make th e  one f i n a l  push in the  market t h a t  IBM was p r e d i c t i n g .  The 
aim was to  take  the  company in to  a s trong number two p o s i t i o n  in the  
i n d u s t ry 133. The plan c a l l e d  f o r  GE to  bu i ld  on i t s  c u r r e n t  u se r  base 
and to  a t t a c k  IBM d i r e c t l y .
Before the  APL plan was f i n a l i s e d  the re  was an ex tens ive  c o n su l t a t io n  
per iod .  In April  1969 B loch 's  D iv is ion  presented  a plan to  th e  Information 
Systems S t r a t e g y  Board, c a l l i n g  f o r  GE f i n a l l y  to  launch a u n i f i e d  computer 
range and to  t r y  to  achieve a 10% market share ,  seen as th e  minimum sca le  
needed to  compete with IBM134. The s ca le  of such a p r o j e c t  was immense. 
Total  l i f e  t ime revenue was expected to be $8.2bn, p r e - t a x  p r o f i t  was 
expected to  be $2.3bn135. The f u l l  APL plan showed t h a t  t h i s  would 
req u i re  a very b ig  improvement in i t s  market performance,  which had been 
in d e c l in e :
Table 7.7 GE's share  o f  the  computer market.  1964-69.
% of shipments 1964 65 66 67 68 69
worldwide 2.1 2.5  5 .0  4 .2  3.6 3.9
U.S.A 4.2  2 .5  2.9
Source: US vs IBM. px353, 'APL Master P l a n ' ,  1 /1 /70 .
Although r e n t a l  income from the  i n s t a l l e d  Current Product Line (CPL) was 
expected to  pay f o r  some of the  APL development,  th e  plan s t i l l  c a l l e d  f o r  
a massive i n j e c t i o n  of funds in to  the  ISG. P r o f i t s  would take  years  to  flow
132US vs IBM. px353, 'APL Master P l a n ' ,  1 /1/70.
133US vs IBM. tr7636,  Bloch.
13*US vs IBM. px322, 'A l t e r n a t i v e  Business S t r a t e g i e s ,  P re se n ta t i o n
to  Information Systems S t r a t eg y  Board ' ,  15/4/69.
135Ib id .
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in,  and cash flow would be negat ive  u n t i l  the  mid-1970s.  The la rge  amount 
of cash and c a p i t a l  needed was not only  to  cover developing ,  bu i ld in g  and 
s e l l i n g  the  range,  GE a l so  had to  fund a big  in c rease  in l e ase s  i f  i t  was 
to  reach a 10% market share .  The income from th e  CPL was not l i k e l y  to  
cover much of t h i s  c o s t .
The fo llowing graphs show th e  e f f e c t  th e  APL plan was expected to  
have on the  f inances  of  th e  Information Systems Group. 7 .3  shows t h a t  the  
APL was expected to  genera te  very la rg e  revenues .  However, 7.4  shows t h a t  
no p r o f i t  could be expected from the  APL u n t i l  1974, while  7.5 shows th a t  
the  cumulative cash flow was expected to  be nega t ive  u n t i l  1978. F in a l ly  
f i g u r e  7 .6  shows t h a t  the  Information Systems Group as a whole was expected 
to  be in loss  u n t i l  1974:
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Figure 7.3
Forecast worldwide revenue from
the GE700/APL plan.
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Figure 7.4
Forecast worldwide pre-tax profit 
from the full GE700/APL plan.
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Figure 7.5
Forecast cumulative cash requirement 
for the GE700/APL plan.
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^
Figure 7.6
Forecast total ISG pre-tax profit 
for the full GE700/APL plan.
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2)The Ventures Task Force.
ISG had been a con t inu ing  d ra in  on the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  but i t  
r e p re se n te d  only a smal l  f r a c t i o n  o f  GE's v a s t  e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c s  
empire. However, the  APL plan c a l l e d  f o r  a much l a r g e r  commitment. ISG was 
c a l l i n g  f o r  th e  co rpora t ion  to  earmark computers as one o f  i t s  'Venture 
A c t i v i t i e s ' ,  a longside  GE's a c t i v i t i e s  in c i v i l  nuc lea r  power and c i v i l  
ae ro -en g in es .  All  th ree  were seen as markets t h a t  would grow much f a s t e r  
than the  genera l  economy, and as such would be allowed massive i n j e c t io n s  
of  c a p i t a l  to  enable  GE to  cap tu re  s i g n i f i c a n t  s takes  in th e se  i n d u s t r i e s .  
Together the  c o s t  of suppor t ing  a l l  th ree  ven ture  a c t i v i t i e s  was huge, 
fo rc in g  GE to  r e a sses s  whether i t  could support  a l l  o f  them. This 
reassessment was c a r r i e d  out by the  Ventures Task Force. The Task Force was 
headed by R.H. Jones,  a long t ime employee of GE, who l a t e r  became CEO and 
Chairman, undoubtedly helped by h i s  work on the se  r e p o r t s 136.
The Task Force p resen ted  a number of r e p o r t s  to  the  board intended 
to  a s s i s t  them ' i n  eva lu a t in g  the  bus iness  p ro p o s i t io n  advanced by [ the ]  
Information Systems Group '137. The aim was to  put the  APL plan in to  the  
context  o f  the  whole company. I t s  work began in November 1969138. I t  
s t a r t e d  by in te rv iewing a number o f  ISG s t a f f  to  e s t a b l i s h  what the  
p o s i t io n  of  the  Advanced Product Line was. I t  a l so  took advice  from ou ts ide  
the  company, notably  the  computer indus t ry  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  A .D .L i t t l e  and 
Diebold.  Jones wanted to  g e t  an idea o f  where GE stood in the  market and 
where the  in d u s t ry  was going139. While most d i scu ss io n s  cen tred  d i r e c t l y  
on the  l i k e l y  outcome of  th e  APL p la n ,  t h i s  was done a g a in s t  a background 
of  g r e a t  concern about th e  a b i l i t y  of GE to  fund any f u r t h e r  major 
p r o j e c t s .  There was a growing view in the  company t h a t  GE's f i n a n c i a l  
performance was not good. Over the  pe r iod  1965-1969 earn ings  per share  had 
f a l l e n  by n e a r ly  25%14° and as a consequence the  company's share  p r ice  
had under-performed the  r e s t  o f  th e  market:
136US vs IBM. tr8752, R.H.Jones.
137US vs IBM. px371A, Venture Task Force 'P re l im in a ry  Report on the  
Computer B u s in e s s ' ,  2 /2 /70 .
138US vs IBM. px371, Ventures Task Force ' p r e l im in a ry  r e p o r t ' .
139Ib id .
1AOIb id .
290
Table 7 .8  GE stock performance.
GE s tock  p r i c e  1965-69 -26%
Dow-Jones Average -17%
Westinghouse -7%
Source: US vs IBM. px225, Ventures Task Force 'P re l im in a ry  r e p o r t  on [ the ]  
computer b u s in e s s '  undated.
The p o l i c y  of c an c e l l in g  new computer l i n e s ,  and the  cu ts  in s t a f f ,  
had reduced lo s se s .  In the  f i n a n c i a l  s ta tement suppl ied  by Honeywell to  
shareho lders  when i t  acquired  GE's computer o p e ra t io n ,  lo s ses  a re  shown to  
have been reduced. However, as has been seen, t h i s  was done a t  th e  co s t  of 
new product l i n e s ,  and the  APL would have led to  v a s t  new lo s se s :
Table 7 .9  ISG sa le s  and p r o f i t .
$B 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Sales & 179.1 248.2 315.5 357.0 411.6
Rental
Pre-Tax (74.6) (101.8) (58.5) (29.6) (.9)
Earnings
Net Earnings (39.6) (55.8) (42.5) (11.4) 4.7
Source: US vs IBM. dx554, Honeywell, 'S ta tement to  s h a r e h o l d e r s ' ,  21/8 /70.
Overa l l  the  GE Corporation had seen tu rnover  continue  to  inc rease ,  
but p r o f i t  growth had been u n in s p i r in g  in the  l a t e  1960s. Figures  7.7  shows 
how tu rnover  had grown, while  f i g u r e  7 .8  shows how p r o f i t s  had been much 
more e r r a t i c :
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Figure 7.7
G.E.’s Sales, 1961-1970.
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Figure 7.8
G.E.’s Net Profit, 1961-1970.
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Against  t h i s  background of poor p r o f i t  performance,  GE was faced with 
the  p rospec t  o f  funding t h re e  very la rg e  developments in the  e a r l y  1970s. 
Even wi thout  the  APL plan ,  GE was expec ting  g r e a t l y  to  increase  i t s  gear ing 
r a t i o  to  pay f o r  the  o th e r  p r o j e c t s .  The c r i t i c a l  concern was the  negative  
cash flow t h a t  the  APL would cause .  The o ther  two ven ture  a c t i v i t i e s  were 
a l so  expected to  be cash hungry.  In j e t  engines  GE had been f a i r l y  
su c c e s s fu l ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in supplying the  engines f o r  the  m i l i t a r y  C5A Galaxy 
t r a n s p o r t e r ,  but i t  was f in d in g  i t  very  d i f f i c u l t  to  make a p r o f i t  from i t s  
commercial bus iness ,  and expected to  lose  money on t h i s  opera t ion  f o r  many 
y e a r s 141. To improve i t s  p o s i t i o n  in the  c i v i l  market i t  was developing 
two new engines .  One was f o r  the  new genera t ion  of  ' a i r b u s e s ' 142, wide 
bodied medium haul a i r c r a f t .  The second development was fo r  an engine to  
be used in supersonic  passenger  a i r c r a f t .  IBM es t im ated  t h a t  GE would not 
show a p r o f i t  on i t s  s u b s t a n t i a l  engine investment u n t i l  the  mid-1970s.
The second major investment was in nuc lea r  power. GE had a backlog 
of o rders  in 1968 worth $2bn143. By 1970, GE had completed or  had on 
order 54 nuc lea r  p l a n t s 144. In 1970 alone 7 p l a n t s  were completed145. 
To cope with t h i s  demand GE had invested  $250m in the  l a t e  1960s146. 
However i t  was a l so  s u f f e r in g  from la rge  losses  in nuc lear  power due to 
major c o s t  overruns on ' t u r n k e y '  c o n t r a c t s 147. These c o n t r a c t s  were f o r  
complete power p l a n t s ,  f o r  which GE was supplying the  genera t ing  equipment 
and a c t in g  as c i v i l  eng ineer .  The c o n s t ru c t io n  c o s t s  on these  p la n t s  had 
been much h igher  than expected,  leading to  lo s se s  on the  c o n t ra c t s  and 
fo rc ing  GE to  use an o u ts id e  c o n s t ru c t io n  company f o r  f u t u r e  work.
However, both nuc lea r  power and c i v i l  j e t  engines  were seen as areas  
of massive p o t e n t i a l ,  a t  l e a s t  matching t h a t  of  computers.  The Task Force 
concluded t h a t :
'Bese t  with mounting p ressures  f o r  immediate growth in 
e a rn in g s ,  car ry ing  an in o rd in a te  load o f  lo s se s  from major r i s k  
ven tures  t h a t  have not s e q u e n t i a l l y  o f f s e t  each o t h e r ' s  f i n a n c i a l  
impacts as o r i g i n a l l y  planned, and fa c in g  inc reas ing  f i n a n c i a l
141US vs IBM. px3222, IBM, 'A company s tudy of  GE', 1968.
142Not the  a i rbus  of  Airbus I n d u s t r i e s  but a gener ic  term fo r  the  type 
of a i r c r a f t .
143US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company s tudy of  GE', 1968.
144US vs IBM. dx555, Annual r e p o r t  1970.
14SIb i d .
146US vs IBM. px3222, IBM 'A company s tudy of  GE', 1968.
147US vs IBM. dx555, Annual Report 1970.
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demands from i t s  core b u s in e s se s ,  [ th e ]  General E l e c t r i c  Company 
cannot undertake any h a l f - b i l l i o n  d o l l a r  ven ture  t h a t  produces 
s u b s t a n t i a l  immediate ne t  income l o s s e s . ' 148
This conclus ion was reached before  any of the  weaknesses o f  the  APL plan
were cons ide red .
When i t  came to  the  APL plan i t s e l f ,  the  Task Force appears to  have 
been more impressed with the  n iche s t r a t e g i e s  o f  o th e r  f i rm s .  Examples 
included Burroughs in banking (an a rea  GE had l o s t ) ,  NCR in banking and 
r e t a i l  and CDC in the  s c i e n t i f i c  market,  which were a l l  carv ing  out t h e i r  
own n iches .  However, the  Task fo rce  recognised t h a t  ISG could not follow 
t h i s  path as i t s  c u r re n t  user  base was a l ready  very d i sp e r s e d .  I t  concluded 
t h a t  the  t a r g e t  of 10% of  the  market could only be achieved by an ac ross -  
the -board  approach, or i t  r i s k e d  lo s ing  i t s  c u r r e n t  u se r  base .  GE would 
have to  take  on the  whole market,  not only the  genera l  producers  l i k e  IBM 
and Honeywell, but a l so  those  en trenched niche producers .  The Task Force 
was a l so  concerned th a t  the  APL plan d id  not take  in to  account p o s s ib le  IBM 
re a c t io n s  to  being challenged by such a huge company across  i t s  whole 
product l i n e .
Another problem was in ensur ing  th a t  the  APL o f f e re d  s i g n i f i c a n t  
pr ice /per formance  advantages over IBM. I f  i t  could not do t h i s  i t  would be 
d i f f i c u l t  to  ge t  customers to  swap s u p p l i e r s .  ISG was looking f o r  a 20% 
performance/pr ice  advantage over IBM. However, t h i s  seems to  have been an 
impossible  t a r g e t .  I t  was noted t h a t  in 1969 47% of ISG's c o s t s  were 
rep resen ted  by manufacturing,  as compared to  20% a t  IBM148. I f  IBM 
reduced i t s  very high p r o f i t  margins by even a small amount GE would be 
squeezed ou t .
The Ventures Task Force a l so  thought t h a t  th e  APL plan was weak in
some of  i t s  assumptions .  The plan envisaged t h a t  by 1975 IBM's market share
would have f a l l e n  from 66% to  59%, but t h i s  depended on vigorous a n t i - t r u s t
ac t io n s  a g a in s t  IBM150. The plan a l s o  made very o p t i m i s t i c  assumptions
about the  e f f i c i e n c y  of  the  s a l e s  f o r c e  i t  wanted to  b u i ld :
'To reach our market p o s i t i o n  o b je c t iv e  in [ t h e ]  U.S.A. by 1975 [we] 
must inc rease  [our]  s a le s  f o r c e  60-70% per year  in s i z e  and must 
develop salesmen who a re  twice as p roduc t ive  [as ]  those  of 
IBM'15
The Task Force did not h e s i t a t e  to  recommend the  s a l e  of ISG. I t
148US vs IBM. px371A, Ventures Task Force r e p o r t  to  the  CEO, 2 /2 /70 .
149Ib id .
15° Ib id .
151I b i d 9 quoting ISG execu t ive  T. Vanders lice .
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recommended t h a t  the b e s t  p o t e n t i a l  buyer would be ano ther  g e n e r a l i s t  
company, but one which had complementary s t r e n g t h s :  Honeywell was
recommended152. The Honeywell H200 was s t rong in th e  market f o r  medium 
sca le  systems, while  GE's 400 was weak and ag ing .  In th e  area  o f  l a rge  
s ca le  systems Honeywell was weak, and while  the  GE 600 had had i t s  
problems, i t  was back on s a l e  and was a r e l a t i v e l y  advanced machine. I t  was 
argued t h a t  they  were only compet i t ive  in the  area  of  small s ca le  machines. 
Impor tan t ly  both firms were in need o f  a new range of  machines: i t  would 
be cheaper to  develop one system f o r  both companies.
The d e c i s io n  to  leave the  in d u s t ry  was taken soon a f t e r  th e  Task 
F o rce ' s  recommendation. Honeywell and GE merged t h e i r  computer i n t e r e s t s  
in to  a new company c a l l e d  Honeywell Information Systems, which i n s t a n t l y  
had a work fo rce  of 50,000. Honeywell had a s tak e  of  81.5% and GE 18.5%, 
which i t  soon so ld  to Honeywell. GE did  not abandon computers a l t o g e t h e r .  
I t  had long detached i t s  con t ro l  and i n d u s t r i a l  computer op e ra t io n s  from 
the  bus iness  machines a re a .  I t  a l so  r e t a in e d  i t s  computer bureau o p e ra t ion  
and computer communications network, both of which supp l ied  a cons tan t  cash 
flow and were usefu l f o r  i t s  own o p e ra t io n s .  GE Information Systems, GEIS, 
remains a s i g n i f i c a n t  bus iness .
Conclusion.
The reasons  fo r  General E l e c t r i c  leaving the  market were s i m i l a r  to  
those of  RCA. They were a combination of f e a r  t h a t  suppor t ing  m u l t ip l e  
growth pa ths  would d ra in  co rpo ra te  funds to  a c r i t i c a l  p o in t ,  and an 
i n a b i l i t y  to  match IBM's low c o s t s  and success fu l  marketing s t r a t e g y .  RCA's 
dec is ion  was made following the  c r i s i s  caused by d isp lacement of  Spectra  
computers by newer RCA S e r i e s  machines before  the  former had been f u l l y  
d ep rec ia ted .  However, whi le  GE had a l ready  l o s t  money on some a sp ec t s  of 
i t s  computer o p e ra t io n s ,  the  c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  was the  la rg e  sums t h a t  would 
have been re q u i re d  to complete the  APL plan; wi thout  the  APL product  l in e  
GE's execu t ives  did not see any scope f o r  th e  company in the  computer 
indus t ry .  The corpora te  s t a f f  did  not be l ieve  t h a t  GE could  undertake such 
a la rge  investment,  f e e l i n g  t h a t  funds could be b e t t e r  used e lsewhere .  In 
these  c ircumstances  GE was w i l l i n g  t o  give up the  chance o f  being a p layer  
in a market t h a t  i t  acknowledged would continue to  be one of the  major 
growth s e c to r s  of the economy. I t  opted ins tead  to  provide  funds f o r  o th e r  
p r o je c t s  - p r o j e c t s  which were c l o s e r  to  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  f i e l d s  of 
exce l lence .  From 1970 to  1974 GE r a i s e d  $600m in long term debt to  fund i t s
152US vs IBM. px331A, Ventures Task Force, ' P r e s e n t a t i o n  to  the  Board 
of D i r e c t o r s '  24/4/70.
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o p e ra t io n s :  much of t h i s  debt was used to  f inance  the  aero engine and 
nuc lea r  power d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s 153.
This t h e s i s  argues t h a t  compet it ion  fo r  funds weakened the  a b i l i t y  
of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms to  i n v e s t  in t h e i r  computer ope ra t ions  a t  c r u c ia l  
s tages  in the  development o f  the  indus t ry .  N ever the le ss ,  the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  
was th e  computer department which was s a c r i f i c e d  when f inances  were t i g h t  
has to  be expla ined .  I t  was, a f t e r  a l l ,  the f a s t e s t  growing market around. 
In GE's case  the  reasons were i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to  compete with IBM, numerous 
poor management d e c i s io n s ,  and a f a i l u r e  to  i n t e g r a t e  the  computer 
o p e ra t ion  in to  one. The f i rm  did  not ex p lo i t  the  market c rea ted  by the 
ERMA, and f a i l e d  to develop a u n i f i e d  family of  machines, both of  these  
can be seen as major m is takes .  GE's lack of a s in g l e  product range meant 
t h a t  i t  was not e x p lo i t in g  the  economies of s c a le  t h a t  o th e r  f i rms were 
ach iev ing .  I t  a l so  meant t h a t  i t  was d u p l ic a t in g  i t s  engineer ing  a c t i v i t i e s  
across  i t s  many designs ,  and d u p l i c a t i n g  t h i s  e f f o r t  in th re e  c o u n t r i e s .  
GE a l so  managed to  waste r e sou rce s  on dead end p r o j e c t s .  In both the  USA 
and France programmes to  develop a s in g le  range of  computers were s t a r t e d  
and dropped, d e sp i t e  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  r e s t  of  the  ind u s t ry  had developed 
such f a m i l i e s .
Bloch be l ieved  t h a t  GE's p o l icy  of  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was the  problem; 
ISG was not ab le  to  ope ra te  as a coherent o r g a n i s a t i o n 15**. Even with in  
the  o p e ra t ing  u n i t  th e re  was l i t t l e  coord ina t ion .  In h is  eyes i t  was t h i s  
excess ive  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  which prevented the  f i rm  from c re a t in g  a s in g le  
product l i n e  before  the  APL p lan .  Bloch be lieved t h a t  i f  such a range had 
been b u i l t  then a 10% market share  could have been achieved in the  e a r l y  
1960s. This was seen as the  minimum market s i z e  needed to  fund new 
developments, such as the  APL.
D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  a l so  l im i ted  GE's oppor tun i ty  to  e x p lo i t  economies 
of scope flowing from the  wider e l e c t r o n i c  i n t e r e s t s  of  th e  f i rm .  When the  
computer ope ra t ion  s t a r t e d ,  Barney O ld f ie ld  argued t h a t  the  production of 
con t ro l  computers went hand in hand with bus iness  machines155. However, 
GE's p o l ic y  of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  meant t h a t  t h i s  ope ra t io n  was soon moved 
in to  a s ep a ra te  p r o f i t  c e n t r e ,  the  I n d u s t r i a l  Contro ls  D iv is ion .  One of  the  
few machines t h a t  seems to  have b e n e f i t e d  from c ross  f e r t i l i s a t i o n  of  ideas 
w ith in  GE was th e  600 s e r i e s  which drew on the  development of the  m i l i t a r y  
M-236 computer b u i l t  by the  Light M i l i t a ry  E lec t ro n ic s  D iv is ion .  However,
153US vs IBM. t r8273,  I n g e r s o l l .
15*US vs IBM. t r7646,  Bloch.
155Table, 7.3, p265.
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these  systems were not b u i l t  t o g e th e r ,  negating any product ion  advantages.  
One a rea  in which 6E did a c t i v e l y  t r y  to  take  advantage o f  i t s  scope was 
in the  f i e l d  o f  basic  components. IBM noted t h a t  GE had a p o l icy  of 
sourc ing components i n t e r n a l l y .  However, IBM went on to  note  t h a t  GE had 
l o s t  market share  in the  semiconductor indus t ry ,  and saw t h i s  p o l ic y  as 
ty ing  the  Information Systems Group to  one of th e  l e s s  success fu l  component 
sou rces156. The Semiconductor Products  Department had been a l a t e  mover 
in developing in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t s .  I t  did not inves t  l a rg e  sums in the 
design of ICs u n t i l  1967. GE never r e a l l y  had a t h i r d  genera t ion  computer 
system. There seems to  be a connection between t h i s  and GE's weakness in 
the  a rea  o f  ICs.
On the  o th e r  hand, the  co rpo ra te  work on the  use o f  computers was of 
b e n e f i t  to  ISG. Examples of t h i s  included the development of  the  Dartmouth 
system and the  information s e rv ice s  ope ra t io n s .  I t  was in t h i s  area  t h a t  
GE had i t s  main successes .
The fo llowing chap ter  shows t h a t  the  success fu l  f i rms  in the  indus t ry  
ensured t h a t  they  were focused on th e  computer in d u s t ry .  To a f irm l ik e  GE 
i t  was a new market which was very d i f f e r e n t  to  i t s  o ld  product l i n e s .  The 
concluding chap te r  looks again  a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  e x p lo i t  economies of s ca le  
and scope,  the  disadvantages  of support ing m u l t ip l e  growth pa th s ,  the  
p o t e n t i a l  weaknesses of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and lack of  focus  on ind iv idua l  
markets.  All of  these  conclus ions  have a d i r e c t  re levance  to  the  f a i l u r e  
of GE in t h i s  market.
156US vs IBM. px3222, IBM, 'A company study of GE', 1968.
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Chapter 8
Strategies and organisations of the successful US computer companies.
The case  s tu d ie s  o f  the  mul t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms show t h a t  
v e r t i c a l l y  and h o r i z o n t a l l y  in t e g r a t e d  companies f a i l e d  to  t ake  f u l l  
advantage of  the  economies t h a t  they  should have been ab le  to  e x p lo i t .  
However, t o  unders tand  why th e se  f i rm s  f a i l e d  i t  i s  necessary  to  understand 
how o th e r  more success fu l  companies opera ted.  In the  UK the  f i rm  which 
surv ived was ICT/L, but t h i s  was with cons ide rab le  s t a t e  suppor t .  In the  
USA t h e r e  a re  many more examples of f irms t h a t  surv ived  in the  computer 
market.  This chap te r  w i l l  look a t  the  opera t ions  o f  the  more focused US 
companies, to  see how they  were d i f f e r e n t  from F e r r a n t i ,  EMI, EE, RCA and 
GE. The companies to  be looked a t  a re :
1 ) IBM.
2)NCR and Burroughs,  which focused on the u t i l i s a t i o n  of  a niche s t r a t e g y  
b u i l t  on e s t a b l i s h e d  market p o s i t i o n s .
3 ) S t a r t  up companies, CDC and DEC, which s u c c e s s f u l ly  i d e n t i f i e d  new niche 
s e c t o r s .
4) Honeywell and Sperry Rand. While both these  companies had a product mix 
c l o s e r  to  t h a t  o f  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies so f a r  s tu d ie d ,  they d i f f e r e d  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  in t h a t  both had a much la rge r  commitment to  computers.
Some i n i t i a l  da ta  may help to  in d ica te  th e  o v e ra l l  p o s i t i o n  of the  
bus iness  machines and s t a r t - u p  companies compared to  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  
Figures  8 .1 - 8 .3  show th e  share  of  the  i n s t a l l e d  base o f  computers t h a t  the  
major US companies had. Figure 8.1  i l l u s t r a t e s  IBM's lead over th e  r e s t  of 
the  in d u s t ry ,  with a c o n s i s t e n t  70% share .  F igures  8 .2  and 8 .3  show the  
market share  of  the  o th e r  major companies. These f i g u r e s  show the  f a l l  of 
Sperry-Rand from i t s  p o s i t i o n  as IBM's major com pet i to r .  They a l so  show 
t h a t  in th e  1960s, while  Sperry and Honeywell tended t o  have a l a rg e r  
market share  than GE and RCA, th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  had a use r  base as 
la rge  as such fi rms as Burroughs and NCR. By t h i s  measure RCA and GE were 
not completely  ' o u t  of  th e  b a l l  p a r k ' .  These f i g u r e s  a l s o  show the  boos t 
given to  Honeywell and Sperry when they  purchased the  computer d iv i s io n s  
of the  two major case s tudy f i rm s ,  they  a lso  in d i c a t e  th e  success  of CDC 
in the  1960s, and the  success  o f  Burroughs and DEC in th e  1970s.
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Figure 8.1
US EDP market shares: 
Percent of installed computers.
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F ig u re  8 .3
US EDP market shares: 
Percent of installed computers.
16-
14-
12-
10 - Honeywell and GE 
Figures mergered.
Sperry and RCA 
figures merged.
GE.
RCA.
Sperry-Rand.
-e -
Honeywell.
Year. US vs IBM, px4827, data produced by the US government to show IBM’s  market dominance.
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The second s e t  of graphs show a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between GE, 
RCA and th e  r e s t  of  the  in d u s t ry .  By 1969 computers made up a t  l e a s t  20% 
of co rpo ra te  revenue in every company bar GE and RCA, which never even saw 
10% of t h e i r  s a l e s  coming from computers.  While NCR's commitment to  EDP 
seems l e s s  in these  graphs,  i t  should be noted t h a t  computers and 
informat ion technology were impor tant to  i t s  success  in i t s  o the r  bus iness  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  support ing i t s  s a l e s  of  accounting equipment to  the  banking and 
r e t a i l  i n d u s t r i e s :
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Figure 8.4
EDP as a percentage of company revenue.
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Figure 8.5
EDP as a percentage of company revenue.
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IBM.
l )L eadersh ip  of  the  pre-War bus iness  and s c i e n t i f i c  machine market.
'You never saw another  company q u i t e  l i k e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Business Machines Corp.- where a l l  men d ress  w e l l ,  every o f f i c e  boy
i s  a p o t e n t i a l  Leader, and the  Leader g e t s  $442,500 in one y e a r ___
I t ' s  m arve l lous . f l
Evidently  Fortune magazine was impressed by th e  co rpo ra te  success  
engendered w i th in  Thomas J .  Watson's company. IBM's p r o s p e r i t y  was founded 
on i t s  dominance of the  market f o r  punched card  and t a b u l a t i n g  systems, 
based on th e  technology of Herman H o l l e r i t h .  The fo re runne r  of IBM, the  
Computing, Tabula ting and Recording Company was an amalgam of  a t ime clock 
producer,  a weighing machine company and the  company t h a t  produced the  
s t a t i s t i c a l  t a b u la t i n g  equipment invented by Dr Herman H o l l e r i t h 2 . This 
company was formed in 1911 but i n i t i a l l y  i t  did  not f a r e  w e l l .  In 1914 
Thomas J .  Watson Snr was appointed t o  head the  company, and made i t  a 
success3 . This success came from the  huge demand f o r  t a b u l a t i n g  equipment 
a f t e r  th e  war.
During th e  in te r -war  years  IBM was ope ra t ing  in a r a p i d l y  growing 
market. P r iv a t e  co rpora t ions  were i n c re a s in g ly  tu rn in g  to  t a b u l a t i n g  
techniques  to  automate t h e i r  a d m in i s t r a t io n  systems. This was r e f l e c t e d  in 
the adoption o f  a new name t o  d e sc r ib e  IBM's main p roduc ts ,  E l e c t r i c  
Accounting Machines4 . The expanding r o l e  of government bureaucracy a l so  
proved a s i g n i f i c a n t  market f o r  IBM5 .
IBM saw i t s e l f  as a complete s e rv ice  o p e ra t ion :  i t s  machines were 
viewed as too  complex f o r  users  to  purchase and s e r v ic e  themselves .  
Therefore IBM only leased machines to  u se r s ,  provid ing  i t s  own s e r v i c e  and 
maintenance s t a f f .  This provided good, s teady income. I t  a l so  meant IBM 
could fo rce  u se r s  to buy i t s  own sup p l ie s  f o r  the  machines6 .
In Watson's f i r s t  year  with IBM th e re  were 1400 employees, and the  
firm had s a l e s  o f  $4m and p r o f i t s  of  $1.3M. Employment reached 10,000 in
l x I n t e r n a t io n a l  Business Machines ' ,  For tune . January 1940.
2Rex Malik,  'And Tomorrow The W orld? ' . 1975, p36.
3Wi11iam Rodgers Think: A biography of th e  Watsons and IBM. 1969, New 
York. This book gives an account of  th e  Watson's con t ro l  over IBM.
4Martin Campbell-Kelly, ICL A business  and t e ch n ica l  h i s t o r y . 1989, 
p91. Campbel l-Kel ly 's  book i s  one of th e  few s tu d i e s  t h a t  t a c k l e s  t h e ,  p r e ­
computer, t a b u l a t o r  e ra .
5Malik And tomorrow the world? pp36-37.
6 Ib id .
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1930 and by 1945 tu rnover  was over $140m7.
SO growth was impressive,  as were p r o f i t s ,  bu t i t  was not one o f  the  
w o r ld ' s  l a r g e s t  co rp o ra t io n s ,  not in th e  league of  f i rms  l i k e  GE, Ford, and 
RCA, though Watson ensured IBM rece ived  as much p u b l i c i t y  as th e se  l a rg e r  
f i r m s .  What i s  notable  i s  t h a t  growth was almost s o l e l y  i n t e r n a l l y  
gene ra ted ,  and most of t h i s  was based on the  t a b u l a t i n g  o p e ra t ion  r a t h e r  
than any of th e  o ther  b u s in e s se s ,  such as weighing machines and t ime 
c lo ck s .  The only  merger was with a ty p ew r i te r  company. This move was 
s i m i l a r  to  the  merger of the  t a b u l a t o r  f i rm Powers and th e  ty p e w r i t e r  f irm 
Remington, forming Remington Rand, IBM's main com pet i to r .
Under Watson S e n io r ' s  guidance th e  company managed to  ach ieve an 80% 
share  o f  the  t a b u l a t o r  market. There were many f a c t o r s  behind t h i s  success .  
Watson ploughed back much of the  p r o f i t 3 , he a l so  s e t  up a compet i t ive  
re sea rch  and development environment within th e  c o rp o ra t io n 9 . Campbell- 
Kelly  g ives  one example of how t h i s  worked. One weakness in IBM's range 
during the  F i r s t  World War was lack o f  a t a b u l a t o r  t h a t  p r in t e d :  under 
IBM's com pet i t ive  research  environment four  were developed, a l l  competing 
f o r  th e  r i g h t  to  go in to  p roduc t ion .  Even when t h i s  machine was developed, 
i t  was held back so t h a t  old  leased machines were not r e tu rned  u n t i l  f u l l y  
d e p re c ia te d .  This is  an e a r l y  example of IBM being very conscious of  how 
i t s  p o l i c y  of r e n t in g  systems meant t h a t  c e r t a i n  com pet i t ive  p r a c t i c e s  had 
to  be modif ied .  The p r in t i n g  t a b u l a t o r  was not in troduced because th e  model 
i t  r ep laced  had not been in s e r v ice  f o r  the minimum time req u i red  - f i v e  
ye a r s .  An awareness of  t h i s  problem was not ev iden t  w i th in  RCA. During the  
computer pe r io d ,  with the  p o t e n t i a l  damage to  market share  of not 
p re sen t in g  new technology qu ick ly ,  IBM again modified i t s  behaviour .  During 
t h i s  l a t e r  pe r iod  i t  used i t s  lower c o s t  base to  d e p r e c i a t e  i t s  machines 
f a s t e r  than o th e r  f i rm s ,  which allowed i t  to  in t roduce  new gene ra t ions  more 
qu ick ly .
V i ta l  to  th e  p o l icy  of  leas ing  machines, r a t h e r  than s e l l i n g  them, 
was the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  t o  f in an ce  the  c o s t  of  p u t t i n g  new machines 
on to  the  market.  As has a l ready  been mentioned, Watson ploughed back the  
very la rge  p r o f i t s  the  company was making. Shareholders  b e n e f i t ed  both from 
the reasonab le  div idends and the  f a c t  t h a t  high p r o f i t s  funded f u r t h e r  
expansion, the reby  ensur ing f u tu r e  r e n t a l  income.
Underpinning t h i s  s t r a t e g y  was a low cos t  base .  Low c o s t s  al lowed IBM
7Ibid  pp36-39.
a Ib id ,  p36.
9Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, p63.
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to  d e p re c ia t e  equipment more qu ick ly  than o ther  f i r m s ,  al lowing i t  to  t u r n ­
over  computer genera t ions  f a s t e r ,  while  m ain ta in ing  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and 
th e r e f o r e  genera t ing  the  c a p i t a l  f o r  le a se s .  E f f i c i e n c y  and s t r a t e g y  were 
th e r e f o r e  l inked :  low c o s t s  made po ss ib le  a market s t r a t e g y  which kept 
compet i to rs  o f f -ba lance  with a r a p id  advance in computer g enera t ions .  This 
s t r a t e g y  was most pronounced dur ing  the  1960s, when th e  360 s e r i e s  of 
computers was int roduced even while  second gen e ra t io n  computers were 
s e l l i n g  w e l l .  The 360 was then i t s e l f  replaced in the  e a r l y  1970s by the  
370, well  be fo re  firms l ik e  GE and RCA could cope with a new genera t ion .
One s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a tu r e  o f  th e  pre-computer IBM was t h a t  i t  a l so  had 
a l a rge  share  of the  marketplace  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  and s t a t i s t i c a l  c a l c u l a t i o n  
punched card  machinery,  though t h i s  s p e c i a l i s t  a rea  was much smal le r  than 
the  commercial market. I n i t i a l l y  Powers machines seemed more ap p rop r ia te  
to  t h i s  market as they could be more r a p id ly  a l t e r e d  to  ca r ry  out new 
c a l c u l a t i o n  t a s k s .  However, IBM re a c te d  by in t roduc ing  a 'p lug  board '  
con t ro l  panel which enabled i t s  system to  be r a p i d l y  ' reprogrammed'10. 
This a b i l i t y  came with the  600 s e r i e s  of  e l e c t r o n i c  c a l c u l a t o r s  which IBM 
s t a r t e d  to  produce in the  e a r l y  1940s. The f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  the  plug board 
was a boon to  resea rch  e s tab l i sh m en ts  t h a t  o f ten  had a number of d i f f e r e n t  
c a l c u l a t i o n s  to  perform. Therefore  IBM had a fo o th o ld  in the  s c i e n t i f i c  and 
eng ineer ing  markets,  and t h i s  proved an e a r ly  in c en t iv e  f o r  the  f irm to  
e n te r  the  computer indus t ry .
IBM had a l so  in troduced a new la rg e r  card  format of 80 columns: 
however, th e  new machines could a l so  read the  cards  produce by the  old  45 
column system. Powers' a t tempt  to  in troduce  a 90 l i n e  system was not a 
g re a t  success  because i t  f a i l e d  to  be downward compat ible  with i t s  o ld  
c a r d s 11.
Above a l l ,  IBM was a marketing o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  both i n t e r n a l l y  and 
e x t e r n a l l y .  Within the  company s logans  were bandied about to  encourage 
a c t i v i t y ,  such as 'Make th in g s  happen'  and the  s i n g l e  word, t h a t  appeared 
throughout th e  company and f o r  which Watson was renowned, 'T h in k ' .  Watson 
developed h i s  management technique  in NCR. He emphasised marketing: the  
salesman was king.  I t  seems t h a t  feedback and c o n su l t a t i o n  between 
development teams, manufacturing and marketing s t a f f  was s t rong.
This b r i e f  o u t l in e  of e a r l y  IBM has h ig h l ig h te d  a c r u c ia l  phase in 
i t s  h i s t o r y .  So many of  th e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  were to  be important in the
10Ib id ,  p160.
“ Ib id ,  p82.
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computer in d u s t ry  were being ta ck led  by IBM in t h i s  e a r l i e r  pe r iod :  the  
l ink  between a so l id  c a p i t a l  base and the  a b i l i t y  to  grow with a leased 
product  l i n e ;  ensuring  t h a t  new technology was compatible with o ld ;  
ensur ing  t h a t  new technology did  not c o n f l i c t  with  the  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c i p l i n e  
requ i red  to  p r o f i t  from leased p roduc ts ;  the  importance o f  market ing;  the  
prominence of  informat ion w i th in  the  o rg a n i s a t i o n ;  and s t rong  l e ad e r s h ip .  
These p o l i c i e s  were made p o s s ib le  by la rge  s c a l e  and low c o s t s ,  i t s  
u l t im a te  compet it ive  advantage.
2)  Becoming a computer company.
On the  e n t ry  of the  USA in to  the  Second World War, Watson Snr wrote 
to  the  P r e s id e n t  o f f e r in g  the  s e r v ic e s  of IBM to  the  coun t ry12. However, 
in essence  IBM's a c t i v i t i e s  did not change g r e a t l y .  I t  d id  b u i ld  a new 
p lan t  to  produce mechanisms such as guns igh ts ,  but the  m a jo r i ty  of  IBM 
f a c t o r i e s  were simply t o ld  to  produce more t a b u l a t o r s .  The war n e c e s s i t a t e d  
a g r e a t l y  increased  government bureaucracy,  and IBM machines were in big  
demand in Washington; thousands of machines were consc r ip ted  in to  m i l i t a r y  
and government s e r v ice .  Remington Rand, IBM's c h i e f  r i v a l ,  had a number of 
bus inesses ,  inc luding munitions f a c t o r i e s ;  much of  Remington's e f f o r t  was 
d iv e r ted  to  the  l a t t e r 13.
However, IBM machines were not j u s t  needed f o r  the  running of the  
war, they  a l so  formed the  backbone of  c ryptography, the  a r t  of code 
breaking. The f l e x i b i l i t y  of IBM machines, and t h e i r  l a r g e r  card  s i z e s ,  
made them th e  b e s t  su i t e d  t o  t h i s  t a s k .  IBM a l s o  found t h a t  one of the  
developments i t  was sponsoring in s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t o r s  was usefu l  in t h i s  
r o l e .  In 1937 IBM s t a r t e d  to  fund th e  development of  the  Harvard Mark 
1/Automatic Sequence Contro l led  C a lcu la to r  (ASCC)1* which was completed 
in 1944. This was an e lec t ro -m echanica l  c a l c u l a t o r  system, in the  main 
produced from e x i s t i n g  IBM components15. However, i t  was soon overhauled 
by the  very e a r l y  computers coming from such groups as Eckert  and Mauchly 
a t  the  Moore School16.
IBM improved on the  ASCC, and in 1948 produced the  SSEC, S e le c t iv e
12K.D. Fishman The Computer E s tab l i shm en t . New York, 1981, pp34-5,  
quoting Thomas Watson Jn r .
13Ib id .
14Ib id .
15T.E. Iv a 11, E lec t ron ic  Computers: P r i n c i p l e s  and A p p l i c a t io n s . 2nd 
Ed. 1960, pp9-11.
16Fishman, The computer e s t a b l i sh m e n t . Chapter 2.
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Sequence E le c t ro n ic  C a lcu la to r .  This was s t i l l  e s s e n t i a l l y  an e l e c t r o ­
mechanical c a l c u l a t o r ,  and i t  was no t  in the  league o f  the  f i r s t  r e a l  
computers then being co n s t ru c ted .
During th e  war and the immediate post-war per iod  IBM was in c reas in g ly  
r e l i a n t  on th e  new e l e c t r o n i c s  technology to  improve th e  speed of i t s  
t r a d i t i o n a l  punched card and t a b u l a t o r  systems. The key product was the  600 
s e r i e s  of  e l e c t r o n i c  t a b u l a t o r s .  In 1948 the  604 c a l c u l a t i n g  punch was 
in t roduced, of which 560017 were produced and which f u r t h e r  increased  
IBM's s take  in th e  engineering c a l c u l a t o r  market18.
There fore ,  IBM was moving towards computers along two t r a c k s :  through 
i t s  involvement in one-o ff  s c i e n t i f i c  systems, and in in c re a s in g ly  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  e l e c t r o n i c  t a b u l a t o r s .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y  both t r e n d s  involved IBM 
tak ing  on more p ro fes s iona l  e l e c t r o n i c s  engineers  and s c i e n t i s t s :  a f t e r  the  
war IBM had s i g n i f i c a n t l y  expanded i t s  s k i l l  base.
Many of th e  computer e n t h u s i a s t s  in IBM crowded around Thomas Watson 
Jn r ,  who a f t e r  th e  war was made p r e s id e n t  of the  company, with h i s  f a t h e r  
chairman and CEO. One of the  new employees with an academic and resea rch  
leaning was Ralph Palmer19. In response  to  the  concerns of  a major IBM 
customer20 t h a t  i t  was being swamped by punched ca rds21, Palmer 
proposed the  Tape Processing Machine (TPM). This was to  be one of the  f i r s t  
machines to  work with magnetic tape  s to rage  mechanisms, connected to  a 
modified 60422 . I n i t i a l l y  the  company was cool on t h i s  development as the  
s a l e s  s t a f f  concluded t h a t  such t ap e  based systems would never s e l l 23 . 
Their  claim was t h a t  users  p r e f e r r e d  th e  a b i l i t y  to  p ic k -o u t  punched cards  
in any order  r a t h e r  than the  s e q u e n t i a l  s to rage  of  magnetic tape .
On the  o th e r  hand IBM salesmen were i n c r e a s in g ly  speaking to  
customers who had been thoroughly e n th r a l l e d  with the  new technology of  
UNIVAC, the  commercial o f f s p r i n g  of  Eckert and Mauchly's computer 
developments, which been taken over by r i v a l  Remington Rand.
The Korean War in te rvened to  push IBM in to  computers v ia  i t s
17Campbell-Kelly,  ICL, pl60.
18Fishman The computer e s t a b l i s h m e n t . p38.
19Ib id .
2°Metropoli tan  L i fe .
21Ib id  p39.
22Malik,  And tomorrow the  w or ld? . p55.
23Fishman, The computer e s t a b l i s h m e n t . p39.
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i n t e r e s t s  in systems f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  and defence c a l c u l a t i o n s .  Watson Snr 
ordered James Birkenstock , Watson J n r ' s  executive  a s s i s t a n t 2-*, t o  support :  
government c o n t r a c t s  in the  war e f f o r t .  Birkenstock was a champion of  
computers. He s t a r t e d  t a l k i n g  to  a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  government 
depar tments  about developing systems f o r  t h e i r  unique needs.  Birkenstock 
and a c o l le ag u e ,  Hurd, approached Watson Jn r  and put forward a submission 
t h a t  most of th e se  proposals  could  be adequate ly  covered by a s in g le  type 
of machine. They asked f o r  $3m to  s t a r t  the  production  of the  'Defense 
C a l c u l a t o r ' 25 . Before Watson would agree he t o l d  them to  go out and f in d  
s p e c i f i c  o rd e r s .  They came back with around t h i r t y  o rde rs  fo r  a machine 
t h a t  r e n te d  f o r  $8000 per month.
At t h i s  s tage ,  the  Defense Ca lcu la to r  c o n s i s t e d  of only a block 
diagram drawn by Palmer. I t  was not the  TPM, as t h i s  was designed f o r  
commercial use and was not f a s t  enough. As development advanced, i t  became 
apparent t h a t ,  t o  cover c o s t s ,  a r e n t a l  of  $22,000 per month would be 
needed. Unwill ing to t r i p l e  the  p r i c e ,  a $15,000 tag  was chosen as a 
compromise. 19 were e v e n tu a l ly  produced26. In IBM nomenclature the  
Defense C a lcu la to r  became the  701. I t  was based on the  Williams Tube memory 
system used in the  F e r r an t i  Mark 1 computer, indeed IBM was th e  f i r s t  
l i c en see  o f  t h a t  technology, though i t  lagged behind F e r ran t i  in the  
i n t ro d u c t io n  of  computers. The f i r s t  701 was not d e l iv e re d  u n t i l  1953, well 
behind UNIVAC and F e r r a n t i .
While the  cos t  overrun on the  system was of some concern,  the  machine 
was b u i l t  on the  b as is  of  ' b u i l d  i t  and s e e ' :  IBM was b u i ld ing  i t  f o r  the  
na t iona l  good, and fo r  the  b e n e f i t  o f  learning about the  new technology. 
The 701 was extremely r e l i a b l e  f o r  i t s  t ime, an IBM t r a i t  which would prove 
s i g n i f i c a n t  in winning o th e r  important m i l i t a r y  c o n t r a c t s 27.
The f i r s t  genera t ion  s c i e n t i f i c  machines continued to  be developed: 
the  701 was rep laced  by the  704, and then the  l a s t  in th e  l in e  of  f i r s t  
genera t ion  computers, the  709. The 704 g r e a t ly  ou tso ld  the  701. However, 
the  709, while  being a b ig  advance,  was qu ick ly  superseded by a 
t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  vers ion of i t s  a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  the  h igh ly  success fu l  7090. The 
704 in troduced magnetic core  memory to  IBM's range of s c i e n t i f i c  computers,
2AIb id  p39.
2Slb id p41.
26Ib id .
27John F.Jacobs The SAGE Air  Defense System: A personal  h i s t o r y .  
Boston, 1986. p47.
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some two years  a f t e r  UNIVAC's s c i e n t i f i c  1103A28. However, th e  704 was 
to  dominate the  market.  The 704 was f a s t  and had a l a r g e r  memory c a p a c i ty ,  
al lowing i t  to  be the  f i r s t  machine t o  u t i l i s e  the  IBM s c i e n t i f i c  computer 
language, FORTRAN29. The combination of  the  7 0 4 ' s hardware and so f tw are ,  
and IBM's presence  in the  s c i e n t i f i c  market,  al lowed i t  to  dominate the  
s e c to r .  I t  i s  notable  t h a t  the  709 was compat ible  with th e  o ld e r  704, 
showing IBM's e a r ly  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  i t  should be c a r e fu l  about making 
u s e r s '  sof tware  obso le te .
The development of  commercial processors  went down two sep a ra te  
ro u te s .  Confidence in computer technology was inc reased  by th e  701 
exper ience ,  and Palmer was re tu rn e d  to  the development of the  TPM, which 
became known as the  70230. However, i t  was immediately o u tc la s s ed  by new 
UNIVAC technology31. The 702 was qu ick ly  rep laced  by the  705 which was 
a g re a t  success .  I t  used b u f f e red  in p u t -o u tp u t ,  p e r ip h e r a l s  t h a t  were 
in te rchangeab le  with the  s c i e n t i f i c  l i n e  of machines,  and th e  new magnetic 
core memory technique32. This was two years be fo re  UNIVAC could  o f f e r  
t h i s  memory technology to  c i v i l i a n  u s e r s 33. This was IBM's development 
rou te  in l a rge  sca le  commercial systems.
IBM's second rou te  in to  commercial computing was the  product ion  of 
smal l ,  cheap, computers,  o f  a type more e a s i l y  usab le  by punched card 
customers.  In 1954, the  same year  t h a t  the  702 was f u l l y  developed,  the  650 
was completed. This was a simple punched card  in p u t -o u tp u t  machine t h a t  
used a drum memory f o r  hold ing programs and a c t i v e  d a t a .  Over a thousand 
were i n s t a l l e d ,  almost e x c lu s iv e ly  in the  bus iness  environment.  This was 
de sp i t e  the  f a c t  t h a t  i n i t i a l l y  i t  was envisaged as a machine a p p ro p r ia t e  
fo r  small s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n s 3*. The f a c t  t h a t  i t  was sm al l ,  simple ,  
and used punched cards ,  made i t  idea l  fo r  IBM's e s t a b l i s h e d  commercial 
customers.
IBM had r a p id ly  become the  b ig g e s t  computer manufacturer ,  with the  
la rge  s ca le  s c i e n t i f i c  704 and 709, th e  large  commercial 705, and th e  small
28Nancy Dorfman Innovation and Market S t r u c t u r e :  Lessons from the  
Computer and Semiconductor i n d u s t r i e s .  Cambridge Massachuse t ts .  1987, p54.
29Ib id .
3°Malik,  And Tomorrow the  World?. p55.
31Fishman, The Computer Es tab l i shm en t . p45.
32See below.
33Dorfman, innovat ion and market s t r u c t u r e . p55.
3*Ib id .
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650. The ques t ion  th a t  needs to  be answered i s  how IBM t r a n s f e r e d  from the  
unremarkable s a l e s  of the  701 to  mass product ion .  This process  i s  f a i r l y  
obvious f o r  the  650. There was simply no a l t e r n a t i v e  to  i t .  Users in the  
commercial market were used to  l e a s in g  from IBM, and IBM was o f f e r i n g  a 
machine with more advanced s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  than the  o ld  t a b u l a t o r  systems. 
IBM had f a r  more exper ience with e l e c t r o n i c s  than any of  th e  o ther  bus iness  
machines f i rm s .  I t  a l so  o f f e red  a degree of backward c o m p a t ib i l i ty  f o r  
d a ta ,  as the  main inpu t-ou tpu t  media was the  80 hole  punched card .
However, IBM had no sp ec ia l  advantage in the  a rea  of  la rge  s ca le  
systems: indeed, i n i t i a l l y  i t  was UNIVAC t h a t  was the  l a r g e r  producer.  I t  
seems t h a t  much of  IBM's a b i l i t y  in th e  area of  l a rg e  s c a le  computers came 
from th e  winning of a c o n t r a c t  to  bu i ld  the  computers fo r  th e  Semi- 
Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE). SAGE was to  be the  backbone of  North 
America 's  a i r  defences ,  s o r t i n g  information and he lp ing  to  con t ro l  a i r  
w a r f a re .
I t  was developed in the  Lincoln Air Defence Labora tory  of MIT, with 
the  computer s id e  supplied by Jay F o r re s te r  and the  D ig i t a l  Computer 
Laboratory35. The MITRE Corporation was appoin ted to  manage the  whole 
p r o j e c t .  To un i fy  the system a number o f  computers were needed. The main 
machines were the  FSQ-7s. I t  was one o f  the  f i r s t  r e a l - t i m e  computers,  able  
to  process  information  as soon as i t  was p resen ted  to  th e  computer. In 
October 1952 IBM was awarded an engineer ing  development su b -co n t rac t  f o r  
FSQ-736 . IBM bea t  o f f  a number o f  compet itors  f o r  t h i s  c o n t r a c t ,  
inc luding  UNIVAC and Raytheon. IBM won on a reas  such as management 
commitment to  th e  p r o j e c t ,  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of s k i l l s  w i th in  t h e  company, and 
production and se rv ice  o r g a n i s a t i o n s 37 .
The SAGE c o n t r a c t  proved to  be important to  IBM. FSQ-7's were b ig ,  
110-250 to n s ,  with 49,000-60,000 vacuum tubes ,  needing t h r e e  megawatts of 
power and massive a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g .  I t  a lso  in troduced Jay  F o r r e s t e r ' s  
magnetic core  memory system. The f a s t  memory on th e se  machines was ( f o r  
those t imes) a massive 64K. IBM used s im i l a r  memory on th e  704 s c i e n t i f i c  
and the  705 commercial computers, giving both systems s i g n i f i c a n t  
advantages over o ther  c o m p e t i t io r s .  IBM managed to  b u i ld  up mass production 
of core  memory and o f f e r  l a rge  memory c a p a c i t i e s  on i t s  machines. The FSQ 
7 in troduced many o ther  innovat ions .  I t  a lso  emphasised r e l i a b i l i t y :  FSQ-7
35John F.Jacobs ,  SAGE. p39-42.
36Ib id  p xv i .
37Ib id  p43.
313
down time was expected to  be fo u r  hours per y e a r38.
Of equal importance was th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  were around 24 SAGE, 
d i r e c t i o n  s i t e s  c o n s t ru c ted ,  each with  two $20m FSQ-7s. The sca le  of  the
p r o j e c t  enabled IBM to  b u i ld  up i t s  a b i l i t y  to  mass produce computers:
'A l o t  had to  be done be fo re  we could go in to  e l e c t r o n i c s  in 
a big way. We did  not know how to  mass-manufacture c i r c u i t  boards,  
f o r  example. We learned  by landing a c o n t r a c t  to  b u i ld  huge 
computers fo r  the  f i r s t  North American ear ly-warning  system a g a in s t  
bomber a t t a c k s ,  known as SAGE. The e n t i r e  f i e l d  of computer sc ience  
was as new to  us as i t  was to  everyone e l s e . 39
The 650 and SAGE gave IBM a s c a l e  of production q u i t e  beyond t h a t  of
o th e r  f i r m s .  The SAGE a l so  gave IBM a number of  t e c h n ic a l  advances with
which to  u nde r l ine  i t s  lead .  I t  seems from Watson's comment t h a t  the  SAGE
c o n t r a c t  was as va luable  in terms o f  moving IBM f u r t h e r  along the  learn ing
curve,  as i t  was in simple s a l e s  and p r o f i t  te rms.
3) The market coverage of  IBM's f i r s t  and second genera t ion  systems.
From t h i s  so l id  f i r s t  gene ra t ion  base,  IBM continued to  s t reng then  
i t s  ho ld .  Indeed i t  was th e  second genera t ion  of  computing in which IBM
became an o rde r  of  magnitude l a r g e r  than the  oppos i t ion :
a) Small-Medium scale commercial processors:
The 650 had put IBM well ahead in t r a n s f e r r i n g  t a b u l a t o r  users  to  
computers.  One of  the  f i r s t  IBM machines to  b u i ld  on t h i s  t a c t i c  was the  
305 RAMAC. This f i r s t  genera t ion  computer was based around a d isk  memory 
system, RAMAC, which had f i r s t  appeared on about 300 so c a l l e d  650 
RAMAC's40. This allowed users  to  access r e l a t i v e l y  l a rge  amounts of 
informat ion in any order  r e q u i r e d ,  a t  two hundred t imes the  speed of  
magnetic t a p e 41 . This was a s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  f o r  a number of  u se r s ,  
and around a thousand 305 RAMAC's were i n s t a l l e d .  IBM spent $10m on 
developing the  disk system, a technology t h a t  i t  would continue to  
dominate. The 305 RAMAC's d isk  and magnetic core  s to rag e  put i t  well ahead 
of the  compet i t ion ,  and with t h e se  f e a t u r e s ,  i t  was one of the  f i r s t  
computers to  be used f o r  commercial on - l in e  a p p l i c a t i o n s .
Even g r e a t e r  success was achieved with the  second genera t ion  1401, 
f i r s t  d e l iv e re d  in 1960. The 1401 was developed using IBM's compet it ive
38Ib id  p74.
39Thomas J.Watson J n r .  For tune . 31/8/87,  p27.
4°Dorfman, Innovation and market s t r u c t u r e . pl42 .
41 ibid.
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re sea rch  system, with IBM France winning w i th  i t s  p roposa l*2 . The 1401 
was s im ul taneous ly  b u i l t  in th e  USA and West Germany, with p r i n t e r s  coming 
from IBM France.  I t  was designed t o  be an improvement on th e  650 and b e t t e r  
able  to  work with magnetic t a p e .  I t  was a lso  l a r g e r  than the  650; i t  could 
be conf igured  up to  the medium sc a le  of  computing.
The 1401, and i t s  cousins  th e  1410 and 1440, were a g re a t  success ,  
o u t - s e l l i n g  the  650 t e n - f o l d ,  even to  IBM's s u r p r i s e * 3 . One of i t s  g r e a t  
advantages was in p e r ip h e ra l s :  not only did i t  o f f e r  good magnetic tape  
d r iv e s ,  but a l so  the bes t  p r i n t e r  on the  market,  the  1403, developed by IBM 
in France**. I t  a lso  improved th e  d i sc  d r i v e s  t h a t  were a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
t h i s  machine. By 1962 IBM was o f f e r i n g  the  1301 d i s c  f i l e ,  which made 
obso le te  many of  the  systems o th e r  companies were developing to  t a c k l e  the  
o lder  RAMAC and 1405 d isk  f i l e s .
With the  success of the  305, and the 10,000 s a le s  of  the  1401 and the  
best  range of  p e r ip h e r a l s ,  IBM had secured i t s  p la c e  as market l e ad e r .  Most 
e s t a b l i s h e d  da ta  processor use r s  adopted t h e  new IBM machines as the  
standard  upgrade course.
b) S c ien tific  systems and larger commercial systems.
IBM's f i r s t  foray  in to  second g enera t ion  computing was the  very 
ambitious STRETCH/7030*5 . This was IBM's a t t em p t  to  e n t e r  the  supe r ­
computer market.  The lead machine was ordered under a development c o n t r a c t  
by the  Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos Labora tory  in 1956. The aim 
was to  produce a computer a hundred t imes f a s t e r  than th e  704 computer,  
u t i l i s i n g  s o l i d  s t a t e  second genera t ion  components.
The Los Alamos c o n t r a c t  was worth $3 .5m, a lthough IBM r e a l i s e d  i t  
would c o s t  $15m to  develop and $ 4 .5m to  d e l iv e r  t h e  f i r s t  machine. However, 
the  company expected o rders  f o r  ano ther  20-30 such systems. This was not 
to occur ,  due to  the cos t  problems of  developing  and bu i ld ing  the  new 
components and the  new e i g h t - b i t  a r c h i t e c t u r e .  The f i r s t  STRETCH was not 
de l ive red  u n t i l  1961 and then IBM decided to  s to p  tak in g  o rders  f o r  the  
machines as i t  proved uneconomic to  b u i ld .
However, th e re  were a number o f  s p in -o f f s  from the  p r o j e c t .  Eight b i t
*2C .J .  Bashe e t  a l ,  IBM's Earlv  Computers. Cambridge, Mass., 1986, 
pp465-474.
*3Campbell-Kelly, ICL, p201.
**Ibid .
*5F.M. F ishe r ,  J.W. McKie, R.B. Mancke, IBM and the  U.S. da ta  
process ing indus t ry :  an economic h i s t o r y . New York, 1983, pp47-50.
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a r c h i t e c t u r e  was to be found in the  t h i r d  gene ra t ion  360 range.  The 
packaging techn iques  were used on o th e r  members of  the  7000 s e r i e s  of 
computers, as were many o the r  a sp ec t s  of  the  computer.  In t h a t  r e s p e c t  i t  
helped IBM to  advance i t s  technology.
IBM's main approach to  in t roducing  la rge  s ca le  second genera t ion  
computers was f a i r l y  s t r a ig h t fo rw a rd :  take the  700 s e r i e s  and b r ing  them 
in to  the  second genera t ion .  The major systems were the  7010, 7040, 7044s, 
7070/2 /4 ,  7080, and 7090/94. This p o l i c y  meant t h a t  the  various  machines 
were compatible  with t h e i r  old f i r s t  genera t ion  p a re n t ,  but were not 
compat ible with th e  o the r  second genera t ion  systems. However, a number of  
p e r ip h e r a l s  were common between the  second g enera t ion  machines and the  
adoption of  the  new FORTRAN language helped with some da ta  t r a n s f e r .  Nearly 
a thousand of th e  various 7000 s e r i e s  machines were produced.
Probably  th e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  o f  the  machines was th e  7090 and the  
improved 7094 I / I  I models. These were t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  709s and compat ible 
with i t ,  the  709 i t s e l f  had been compatible with the  e a r l i e r  success fu l  
704. The o r i g i n a l  7090 was developed fo r  the  b a l l i s t i c  e a r ly  warning 
system, DEWLINE, four  7090s being de l ive red  f o r  t h i s  purpose in 195946 . 
The c i v i l  ve r s io n s  became the  work-horses of s c i e n t i f i c  computing. One of  
the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  uses of  the  7090 was in th e  SABRE a i r c r a f t  s e a t  
r e s e r v a t io n  system fo r  American A i r l i n e s .  This was one of  th e  f i r s t  la rge  
sca le  i n t e r - a c t i v e ,  o n - l i n e  commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s .
The most no tab le  of the  bus iness  environment machines was the  7070 
s e r i e s ,  based on the  old  705. The 7070/2/4 was most su ccess fu l  when i t  was 
coupled to  a 1401, which was used to  con t ro l  p e r ip h e r a l  and communications 
f u n c t io n s ,  f r e e i n g  the  main p rocessor  fo r  c a l c u l a t i o n  t a s k s .  This meant 
7070 i n s t a l l a t i o n s  were very la rge  systems indeed, gen e ra t in g  large  incomes 
fo r  IBM. The 7040/44 was a new system, designed f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  work, though 
the p rov is ion  o f  a COBOL business  language compile r made i t  popular in the  
commercial market.
The f i n a l  computer of t h i s  pe r iod  was the  1620-1622. This was a small 
s c i e n t i f i c  computer,  designed to  g ive  d i r e c t  access  to  a computer f o r  
departmental  r e s e a rc h ,  1700 of which were produced47. This was a very 
re sp ec ta b le  performance compared to  many com pet i to rs ,  though in genera l  IBM 
was seen as weak in the  small s c i e n t i f i c  market.
46Ib id ,  p51.
47US vs IBM. pxl888, in t e r n a l  IBM r e p o r t ,  Manager Program P r o f i t  
Evaluation,  'Program p r o f i t  ev a lua t ion  on s e le c ted  1400/7000 s e r i e s  systems 
and component machine t y p e s ' ,  27 /9/66.
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Much of IBM's success in t h i s  period was due to  i t s  computer 
p e r ip h e ra l  products .  The b e s t  d isk  and tape d r iv e s  and p r i n t e r s  a l l  came 
from IBM. These s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improved the  f u n c t i o n a l i t y  o f  the  computers,  
and t h e i r  r e n t a l  va lue .  IBM's implementations of i t s  own FORTRAN 
eng ineer ing  language, i t s  own bus iness  language PL/1, as well  as the  COBOL 
bus iness  language, a l so  enhanced the  IBM r e p u t a t i o n .
During t h i s  period  IBM was func t ion ing  with t h r e e  domestic d iv i s io n s  
p lus  the  World Trade Corpora tion .  World Trade ' s  fu n c t io n  was to  c a r r y  out 
IBM's bus iness  on an in t e r n a t i o n a l  b a s i s .  However, i t  was not run along the  
l in e s  o f  GE's i n t e r n a t io n a l  ven tu re .  World Trade produced computers,  
i n i t i a l l y  in Germany and France and then in the  UK and Japan. However, the  
machines produced were s tanda rd i sed  with the  US ones.  As the  European 
ope ra t ions  gained in s t r e n g th ,  they con t r ibu ted  to  IBM's development cyc le .  
IBM Germany worked on the  1401, while France s p e c i a l i s e d  in p r i n t e r s .  When 
IBM tu rned  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  to  the  t h i r d  genera t ion  System 360, a number of  
the  components, p e r ip h e ra l s  and even some cpu 's  were designed in Europe. 
The B r i t i s h  Laboratory Systems Support Group even c o n t r ib u te d  to  the  log ic  
manual f o r  the  System 3604S, he lp ing def ine  the  a r c h i t e c t u r e  t h a t  IBM 
uses to  the  c u r r e n t  day. IBM ensured th a t  fo re ig n  o pe ra t ions  were f u l l y  
in t e g ra te d  with the  r e s t  of  IBM: co m p a t ib i l i ty  was worldwide.
The o th e r  th re e  components of the  company were th e  Data Systems 
Div is ion  (DSD), General Processing Divis ion (GPD) and the  Federal  Systems 
Div is ion (FSD). DSD was r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  s c i e n t i f i c  o r i e n t a t e d  machines, 
and the  l a r g e r  end of the  commercial da ta  process ing  market.  I t  covered the  
fo llowing f i r s t  and second genera t ion  computers49 :
Commercial S c i e n t i f i c
1410, 1410X 7070, 7072, 7074SO
705, 705 I I I ,  7080 704, 709, 7040/44, 7090/94
7030, 7034.
48US vs IBM. dxl404, IBM,'Final Report of SPREAD Task Group ' ,28/12/61 .
49Ib id .
s °Though most 7040/44s and 7070/2/4s were sold  as commercial systems.
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GPD, as would be expected,  covered the  sm al le r  end of  the  market,  
t o g e th e r  with the  punched card  bus iness ,  consumables and p e r ip h e ra l s  
o p e ra t io n s .  The fo llowing t a b l e  shows the  main p ro c e s s o r s 51:
Commercial S c i e n t i f i c
14LC, 1401 1620
650 
305
FSD covered sa le s  to  the  US government, inc lud ing  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of IBM 
technology to  m i l i t a r y  purposes.  I t  i s  uncer ta in  whether i t  a l so  covered 
sa les  of  s tandard  systems to  the  government f o r  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  data  
p rocess ing .  Notably IBM had a sm al le r  propor t ion  of the  government market 
than o th e r  markets,  though i t  was s t i l l  the l a r g e s t  s u p p l i e r .
Simple aggregated f i n a n c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  do not give a good in d ic a t io n  
of the  r e a l  p r o f i t a b l i t y  of IBM machines. However, IBM's own in te rn a l  
f ig u res  revea l  j u s t  how p r o f i t a b l e  IBM's core p roduc ts ,  th e  1400 and 7000 
computers and t h e i r  p e r i p h e r a l s ,  were:
51US vs IBM. dxl404 'F in a l  r e p o r t  of SPREAD ta sk  g ro u p ' .
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Table 8.1 P ro fita b ility  of IBM's second generation hardware.
P r o f i t  as a
Machine Revenue P r o f i t  %of revenue
$'m $'m
In te rm edia te  Systems
1401 1613 705 49.3
1440 277 133 48.1
1460 187 81 43.5
1410-7010 328 155 47.2
7070-7074 309 34 10.9
7080 145 57 39.3
Total 2859 1255 43.9
Large Systems
7040-7044 158 36 23.1
7090/94 540 227 42.12
Total 698 263 37 .752
Memory systems
1406 174.9 107.7 61.6
7301 106.4 56.7 53.2
7302 224.4 107.2 47.8
Total 505.7 271.6 53.7
Storage Products ;
Disks d r i v e s ,  tape  d r ives  e t c
Total 2149.5 913.3 42.5
Card Machine Products ;
Punch-card inpu t -ou tpu t
Total 387.8 94.9 24.5
P r in t e r s
Total 505.7 271.6 53.7
Communication Products
Total 51.5 3.8 7.4
Grand Total 7157.2 3073.2 42.93
Source: US vs IBM. pxl888, i n te rn a l  IBM r e p o r t ,  Manager Program P r o f i t  
Eva luation,  'Program p r o f i t  ev a lu a t io n  on s e le c te d  1400/7000 s e r i e s  systems 
and component machine t y p e s ' .  27/9 /66.
52In the  o r ig i n a l  IBM re p o r t  t h i s  was i n a d v e r t e n t ly  c a lc u la te d  a t  
27.7%.
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4)The Third Generation,  the  IBM 360 system.
IBM had the  bulk of  th e  computer market sewn up. However, th e re  were 
weaknesses in the  IBM l in e :
' I n  the  low performance end of our p re sen t  product  l i n e ,  we 
a re  s t rong  commercially with  th e  1401-10, but weak s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  
with a gap between the  1620 and 7040/44. At the  high performance end 
of  our p re sen t  product l i n e ,  we are  s t r o n g e s t  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  with 
the  7090/94, and r e l a t i v e l y  weak commercially with th e  7074, 7080. 
Throughout the  l i n e  t h e r e  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  r e a l - t i m e ,  
multiprogramming s y s t e m s . ' 53
The conclus ion  must be t h a t  GPD's emphasis was on the  commercial s e c to r ,
while DSD was more in t e r e s t e d  in th e  s c i e n t i f i c  market.  However, during the
second genera t ion  of computers commercial and s c i e n t i f i c  computing had
begun to  merge. Only in the  a reas  o f  very la rge  super-computers and very
small min i- type  computers had s c i e n t i f i c  computing main ta ined a s epa ra te
i d e n t i t y .  I t  was becoming ev iden t  t h a t  improved p e r ip h e r a l s  meant
commercial computers could make use of  f a s t e r  p rocesso r  speed, while new
s c i e n t i f i c  and s t a t i s t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  needed much g r e a t e r  inpu t -ou tpu t
suppor t .  A good computer should have been able  to  perform both t a sk s .
These f a c t o r s  led to  r a d i c a l  product reform. The SPREAD Task Group
is  renowned in the  h i s t o r y  of IBM. I t  was a p lanning group e s ta b l i s h e d  to
consider  how IBM should approach the  t h i r d  genera t ion  of  computing. At the
end of 1961 the  Task Group recommended e s t a b l i s h i n g  a new product l i n e
which was an expandable range of compatible machines, from th e  small s ca le
mainframe to  super-computer systems5"1; a plan t h a t  was adopted in e a r l y
1962 and announced in 1964. The twenty or so eng inee r ing  groups involved
in p rocesso r  design were to  be made subse rv ien t  t o  Corporate Processor
Control (CPC) which l a id  down the  new log ica l  a r c h i t e c t u r e  across  GPD, DSD
and WTC o p e ra t io n s 55. Not only was a r c h i t e c t u r e  to  be s tanda rd ized ,  but
so was programming, t e s t i n g ,  and even marketing.
CPC and WTC were to  work in tandem to  ensure  Worldwide s tandards .  A
t h i r d  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  th e  Component D iv is ion ,  was to  ensure  t h a t  the  'Design
Automation Procedure '  was a s tandard  maintained th roughout th e  company. The
Component D iv is ion  was important to  th e  plan as i t  was re s p o n s ib le  fo r  the
supply o f  So l id  Logic Technology, SLT56. This was a kind of hybrid
technology, t r a n s i s t o r s  being au to m a t ica l ly  i n s e r t e d  on a s i l i c o n  f i lm
53US vs IBM. dxl404, 'F in a l  r e p o r t  of SPREAD Task Group ' ,  1961.
54ib id .
5Slb i d .
56Ib id .
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which had pass ive  components, such as r e s i s t o r s ,  in teg ra ted  in to  the  
s i l i c o n .  I t  was hoped t h a t  t h i s  technique would not only inc rease  
computat ional speed, but a l so  lower p r i c e s .  IBM, by s tan d a rd i s in g  the 
computers in i t s  range,  could mass produce huge q u a n t i t i e s  of  standard  
c i r c u i t s ,  and SLT technology al lowed component assembly to  be f u l l y  
automated.  Though not f u l l y  t h i r d  genera t ion  components, SLT was q u i t e  f a s t  
enough and o f f e red  p o t e n t i a l l y  cheaper c i r c u i t s  f o r  a cons iderab le  length 
of  t ime.  In the  English E l e c t r i c  and RCA chap te rs  i t  was shown t h a t  e a r ly  
ICs proved too expensive f o r  small s ca le  systems. I t  was es timated  t h a t  
IBM's new range would o f f e r  systems cos t ing  one h a l f  of t h e i r  o ld  1400 or 
7000 e q u iv a l e n t57.
However, i t  was not j u s t  improved performance and cos t  t h a t  was to
a t t r a c t  new customers;  i t  was th e  whole system concept which rep resen ted
a complete up-date  of computer s tan d a rd s ,  though few of the  ideas were new.
The 360 S e r ie s  o f fe red  the  fo l lowing advantages:
a f u l l y  compatible range of  computers, 
in te r -changeab le  p e r ip h e ra l s ,  
b e t t e r  d isk  s to rage ,  
very la rge  memory,
b e t t e r  communication and p e r ip h e ra l  handling f a c i l i t i e s ,
32 b i t  da ta  pa ths  ( f i r s t  seen in STRETCH),
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  multi-programming (though t h i s  proved to  be one of the  
sys tem 's  major f a i l i n g s ) ,
a f u l l  o p e ra t ing  system ( t h i s  too  was a problem),
the  COBOL bus iness  language, and IBM's own PL/1 and FORTRAN languages,
The system was expected to  make obso le te  a l l  o th e r  computer systems. 
This was the  barb in the  t a i l  of the  p la n .  Not only would IBM bear  the  cos t  
of  developing the  system, to o l in g  up fo r  the  production of the  new 
technology, preparing new sof tware ,  accept ing  the  r e t u r n s  of old  leased 
machines f o r  new 360 machines, but i t  a l so  ran th e  r i s k  t h a t  users  would 
r e s i s t  changing to  a new system t h a t  was incompatible  with the  o ld .  The 
Task Group took the  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  to  provide the  g r e a t e r  f u n c t i o n a l i t y  of 
the  360, backward c o m p a t ib i l i t y  with  the  1400 and 7000 could not be 
o f f e r e d .  The p re fe r red  view was t h a t  u se r s  who requ i red  new fu n c t io n s ,  such 
as the  a b i l i t y  to  use l a rge  random access  s t o r e s ,  would in any case have 
to  reprogram t h e i r  old a p p l i c a t i o n s :  th e r e f o r e  g e t t i n g  users  to  up-grade 
would not p re sen t  an a d d i t io n a l  problem58.
Two companies t r i e d  to  e x p l o i t  IBM's lack of backward co m p a t ib i l i ty ,  
though t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s  were decided before  the  360 announcement. I t  w i l l
57In t e r n a t io n a l  Data Pub l i sh ing ,  EDP Indus t ry  and Market Report . Vol 
1, No 1, 23/3 /64 , p i .
58Ibid.
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be seen t h a t  Honeywell 's main 1960s s t r a t e g y  was to  o f f e r  a machine t h a t  
was program-compatible with th e  IBM 1401. With IBM abandoning the  1401 f o r  
the  360, Honeywell probably picked up ex t ra  o rde rs  f o r  t h i s  machine. IBM 
responded to  t h i s  by repackaging re tu rned  1400 machines and o f f e red  them 
as cheap a l t e r n a t i v e s  to  th e  Honeywell systems. I t  a l so  took s teps  to  
produce conversion programs to  t r a n s f e r  1400 da ta  to  360 machines.  I t  a l so  
produced software  emulators of  the  1400, which, due to  the  increased speed 
of th e  360, performed reasonab ly  w e l l .
GE was in a s im i la r  p o s i t i o n .  I t s  600 s e r i e s  was c lo se ly  program- 
compat ible with the  7090/94. I t  a l so  hoped to  b e n e f i t  from the  7090/94 's  
i n c o m p a t ib i l i ty  with the  360, though most of  GE's advantages came in the  
area  o f  multi-programming o p e ra t io n s .  The 600 was l e s s  success fu l  than the  
H200, mainly due to  the  sys tem 's  u n r e l i a b i l i t y .
Both chal lenges  led to  some re a c t io n  from IBM. Apart from the  
reworked 1401s, an SLT ve rs ion  o f  the  7090 was a l so  rumoured59, but never 
appeared.  IBM's g r e a t e r  s c a l e ,  and f u l l  l ine  concept of  c o m p a t ib i l i ty  coped 
adequate ly  with the  t h r e a t  posed by o th e r s  competing f o r  i t s  old customers.  
The 360 concept and a r c h i t e c t u r e  were well ahead of the  oppos i t ion :  th e re  
was no one o th e r  family t h a t  could o f f e r  a l l  th e  360' s  f e a t u r e s .  Matched 
to  t h i s  was a major program to  develop the  l a r g e s t  p o s s ib le  software 
l i b r a r y ,  f r e e i n g  users  from some of th e  burden of  programming.
The 360 programme did  have some problems. A major one,  and one t h a t  
became a common f e a tu r e  in the  computer in d u s t ry ,  was the  f a i l u r e  to  
d e l i v e r  the  opera t ing  system on t ime.  The 360 family  was to  o f f e r  a 
comprehensive con t ro l  program c a l l e d  OS 360SO, one of  the  f i r s t  major 
ope ra t ing  systems. However, i t  proved much more expensive and t ime- 
consuming than expected.  Eventua l ly  only  the  l a r g e r  machines in the  family  
had t h i s  comprehensive o pe ra t ing  system, the  r e s t  having a s im p l i f i e d  
system known as the  Disk Operating  System, an obvious re fe ren ce  to  th e  
p re fe r r e d  p e r ip h e r a l .  These problems led to  some delays  in 360 d e l iv e ry  
t imes.
However, the  360 was a g r e a t  success ;  indeed i t  had to  be. There a re  
var ious  e s t im a te s  of how r i s k y  and expensive th e  worldwide implementation 
of the  360 was. An R&D budget of $750m and a t o t a l  c o s t  f o r  development, 
t o o l in g ,  marketing,  e t c  in the  reg ion  of $4.5bn i s  quoted by Thomas J .
59IDC, EDP Indus t ry  and Market Repor t . 15/5 /64 ,  p2. 
soMalik,  And tomorrow the  wor ld? . pl41.
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Watson61 . Whatever the  t r u e  c o s t  i t  was a huge r i s k .  However, IBM was very 
p ro f e s s io n a l  in i t s  market a n a l y s i s ,  and c a r e f u l l y  analysed t h e  l i k e l y  
r e a c t io n s  of  th e  compet it ion .  IBM made the cons idered  judgement t h a t  by 
o f f e r i n g  t h i s  type of  family  ahead of com pet i to rs ,  even be fo re  IC 
components were an op t ion ,  IBM was s t r i k i n g  well  before  any compet i to r  
could a f f o r d  to  make o b so le te  t h e i r  e n t i r e  ranges .  IBM's lower c o s t  base 
and la rg e  u se r  base allowed i t  to  d ep rec ia te  i t s  machines f a s t e r  than 
com pet i to rs ,  so i t  could t a c k l e  such a rad ica l  change.
While i t  i s  not p o s s ib le  to  f in d  out the  ind iv idua l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of 
the  va r ious  System 360 computers,  i t  is  p o s s ib le  to  observe j u s t  how 
p r o f i t a b l e  IBM was compared to  i t s  compet i tors .  I t  managed to  main ta in  the  
p r o f i t  r a t i o s  i t  had achieved with th e  e a r l i e r  second genera t ion  systems.
Table 8.2
IBM p r o f i t a b i l i t y  compared to  ma.ior com pet i to rs .  1960.
Gross Incoie Net Earnings Net Earnings: HE per
$'000 After Tax Gross Income Employee
$'000
IBM 3,572,825 476,902 13.3 2,706
Burroughs 456,667 17,528 3.8 498
CDC 158,651 4,763 3.0 489
GE 6,213,595 355,122 5.7 1,134
Honeywell 700,357 37,500 5.3 686
NCR 736,849 24,725 3.3 339
RCA 2,042,001 101,161 4.9 1,012
SDS 43,999 3,372 7.7 1,421
Sperry 1,243,319 20,055 1.6 219
Source: US vs IBM. px3446, IBM,'Analysis of Major Computer M anufac tu re rs ' ,  
19/5/66.
The f i g u r e s  sugges t  two th in g s .  F i r s t ,  only th e  broad based 
e l e c t r i c / e l e c t r o n i c / c o n g l o m e r a t e  co rpora t ions  were in the  same league as 
IBM in terms of  s i z e .  Second, IBM's high r a t i o s  o f  p r o f i t  t o  tu rnove r  and 
employees were unchallenged by i t s  compet i tors .  In p r e - t a x  terms IBM p r o f i t  
to  tu rnove r  amounted to  a massive 2 6 . 1%62. Return on investment was a t  
17%63, n e a r ly  3 t imes most o f  the  oppos i t ion .
61Thomas J.Watson Jn r  and Pe te r  Pe t re ,  Fa ther  Son & Co.- mv l i f e  a t  
IBM and bevond. 1990, p347.
62US vs IBM. px3446, IBM, 'A nalys is  of Major Computer M anufac tu re rs ' ,
19/5/66.
63Ib id.
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Few f i g u r e s  are  a v a i l a b l e  regard ing  the  breakdown of s a l e s  wi th in  
th e se  companies.  However, one l a t e r  es t im ate  shows how revenue and p r o f i t s  
were d i s t r i b u t e d  with in  the  computer indus t ry  and es t im ated  t h a t  IBM was 
again  in a d i f f e r e n t  league of  o p e ra t io n :
Table 8.3
Worldwide EDP revenue and p r o f i t s  of  U.S. based mainframe manufacturers
Si- 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Total Revenue:
Non-IBM 1479 1874 2329 3032 3280 3547
IBM 2603 3562 4873 4935 5195 5400
Total 4082 5436 7202 7967 8475 8947
IBM 1 63.5 65.5 67.5 62.0 61.0 60.5
Pre-tax incone:
Non-IBM (88) 12 123 168 34 73
IBM 627 843 1343 1389 1412 1403
Total 539 855 1466 1557 1446 1476
IBM 1 116 99 92 89 98 95
Source: IDC, EDP Indus t ry  R epor t . 31/12/71,  p5.
This t i e s  in well with the  RCA and GE case s tu d ie s  which show t h a t ,  
f o r  most y e a r s ,  t h e i r  computer o p e ra t ions  were running a t  a lo s s ,  p u l l in g  
down th e  p r o f i t  f o r  th e  non-IBM p a r t  of  the  in d u s t ry .  No one turned in 
p r o f i t s  l i k e  IBM's, but given IBM's huge sca le  in th e  in d u s t ry ,  and i t s  low 
c o s t s ,  compet i tors  had to  forego IBM's high p r o f i t  r a t i o s  to  compete 
adequate ly  a g a in s t  i t .
I t  was s t a t e d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  Tom Watson Snr. had a p o l ic y  of ploughing 
back as much p r o f i t  as p o s s ib le  t o  fund i n t e r n a l  expansion. In te rn a l  
f ig u r e s  show t h a t  on average t h i s  was s t i l l  IBM's p o l i c y .  Very high p r o f i t s  
gave th e  company g re a t  scope f o r  investment,  in c lud ing  the  phenomenal 
investment in the  360. Even such a la rg e  expenditure  did not mean IBM had 
to  go in to  s u b s t a n t i a l  deb t .  Notably as  the  360 investment decreased, IBM 
increased  p r o f i t s  d i s t r i b u t e d :
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Table 8 .4  Percent  of  earn ings  d i s t r i b u t e d  bv US 
computer producers  1960-1965.
1960 61 62 63 64 65
IBM 27 25 27 32 38 44
Burroughs 72 63 70 83 73 42
CDC 4 3 1 1 1
GE 80 74 69 67 90 61
Honeywell 53 59 55 43 37 43
NCR 48 44 48 50 42 38
RCA 53 56 34 44 42 38
Sperry 63 2 3 2 2 2
Source: US vs IBM, px 3446, IBM, 1966.
Both Sperry and CDC were exper ienc ing  unusual c ircumstances  a t  t h i s  time. 
Sperry had unusual ly  low p r o f i t s  and was in th e  th ro e s  o f  changing i t s  
s t r u c t u r e  and in troducing  new products .  CDC, being a s t a r  of the  stock 
markets,  was u t i l i s i n g  a l l  i t s  re sou rces  in a meteor ic  r i s e .
The fo llowing t a b l e ,  f i r s t  shown in the  RCA c h ap te r ,  shows IBM's low 
debt dur ing  the  l a t e  1960s:
Table 8 .5  Debt/Equitv  Rat ios  of e l e c t r o n i c s  and computer companies.
'67 '68 '69 '70
RCA .79 .79 .77 .88
GE .32 .30 .27 .22
ITT .69 .56 .55 .52
Westinghouse .36 .32 .28 .44
Average .46 .39 .37 .39
Burroughs .48 .74 .57 .60
Honeywell .59 .61 .56 .87
IBM .14 .12 .11 .10
NCR .69 .42 .61 .82
Average .44 .44 .44 .51
Source :US vs IBM. px201, Chase Morsey, RCA Vice P r e s id e n t  Finance,  memo to 
Sarnoff and Conrad, 27/8 /71 .
So th e  mix with which IBM dominated the  market c o n s i s ted  of :
Es tab l i shed  market p lace s ,  both commercial and s c i e n t i f i c ;
Strong marke ting;
Knowledge of  th e  market;
Strong le ad e rsh ip  w i l l i n g  to  d i r e c t  the  company in to  r a d i c a l  reform; 
In te g r a t io n  of  co rpora te  e f f o r t  and c o n t ro l ;
Large s c a l e  production;
Strong f i n a n c i a l  base.
A nt i -com pet i t ive?
One ques t ion  remains:  was IBM using i t s  market p o s i t i o n  to  compete
u n f a i r l y  with i t s  opponents? During t h i s  period IBM has been accused of a
number of a n t i - c o m p e t i t iv e  a c t s ,  some ag a in s t  major hardware producers ,  and
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o the rs  a g a in s t  smal ler  producers and serv ice  companies. In the  following 
sec t io n  a number of  the se  a n t i - c o m p e t i t iv e  p r a c t i c e s  w i l l  be mentioned, 
e s p e c i a l l y  those  which were aimed a t  the  major hardware producers ,  GE, RCA 
and CDC. However, the  evidence on th e se  a n t i - c o m p e t i t iv e  a c t i o n s  i s  le ss  
than c l e a r .  While two cases  can be framed in such a way as to  appear as 
e x p l o i t a t i o n  of  monopolis t ic  power, equal ly  they  can be seen as IBM wishing 
to  main ta in  compet it iveness  by e s t a b l i s h in g  themselves in two a reas  which 
were widely  perceived as the  f u t u r e  technologies  o f  computing.
CDC had a big s take  in the  market fo r  la rge  s c i e n t i f i c  computers with 
the  1604 and the  l a t e r  3000 s e r i e s ,  bu t the  major problem f o r  IBM was the 
dominance of the  1960s super-computer market by the  CDC 660064. I t  has 
been argued t h a t  IBM t r i e d  to  undermine CDC in two ways. The 360 model 44 
has been desc r ibed  as a 360/50 a t  360/30 p r i c e s .  I t  has been suggested t h a t  
i t s  r o l e  was to  undermine the  CDC 3000 range of  medium sc a le  s c i e n t i f i c  
computers65 . Unusually i t  was not f u l l y  compatible with th e  r e s t  of the  
range,  being ' tweaked '  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  process ing .  I t  d id  not s e l l  in g rea t  
numbers due to  i t s  in c o m p a t ib i l i ty  with the  r e s t  of  the  fam ily .  To f i g h t  
o f f  the  l a r g e r  CDC 3600 computers,  IBM announced l a r g e r  members of  the  360 
range66 , the  /75 /85  and the  /195 ,  f o r  sa le  to  the  s c i e n t i f i c  market.
To head o f f  the  CDC 6600 super computer, IBM had a programme f o r  a 
family of  machines l a r g e r  than the  360 s e r i e s ,  c a l l e d  th e  S e r i e s  9067. 
Malik among o th e r s ,  argues t h a t  the  Ser ies  90 was a phantom product aimed 
a t  undermining CDC s a l e s .  I t  i s  argued th a t  i t s  main r o l e  was to  encourage 
users  t o  wait  f o r  an IBM product r a t h e r  than buy CDC. The S e r ie s  90 was to  
be based on so c a l l e d  Advanced SLT components. IBM worked on th e  p r o je c t  
with the  help of  the  National  Secu r i ty  Agency who r e q u i re d  la rge  computers 
fo r  code breaking .  According to  one s tudy,  the  S e r ie s  90 was announced in 
August 19646®. This was a number of  years be fore  machines could be 
d e l iv e red ,  and i t  was qu ick ly  found t h a t  the  ASLT was flawed and t h a t  the  
component design had to  be reworked. Yet the  marketing s t a f f  continued to  
d iscuss  i t  with u s e r s .  I t s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  seem t o  have s h i f t e d  
cont inuously :  Se r ie s  90 announcements were cance l led  and rep laced  by new 
models on a number o f  occas ions .  I t  seems to  have been a c h a o t i c  p r o j e c t ,
6*See below, CDC s e c t io n ,  pp350-354.
65Malik,  And tomorrow the  world? . p99.
66Ib id  pl04.
67Ib id .
6SF isher  e t  a l ,  IBM and the  US da ta  process ing  i n d u s t r y . pl57.
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and f i n a l l y  only 11 machines were produced: f a r  from cover ing the  
investment,  an ov e ra l l  lo ss  o f  $114.1m was made69 .
The main problem presen ted  by GE was the  dominance i t  had in the  area  
o f  m u l t i - a c c e s s ,  t ime-shared  computers70 . GE was perce ived  as a 
technology leade r  due to  i t s  involvement in the  P r o j e c t  MAC, MULTICS 
development programme a t  MIT. This perceived tech n o lo g ica l  l e ad e rsh ip  had 
rubbed o f f  on GE's s impler and sm al le r  s o lu t io n ,  based on the  Dartmouth 
BASIC t im e-sh a r in g  systems. IBM's r e a c t io n  was to  s t a r t  o f f e r i n g  ex tens ions  
to  the  360 range.  The i n i t i a l  announcements were the  /64 and /6 6 .  Like the  
Se r ie s  90, i t  was the  s a l e s  s t a f f ' s  concern t h a t  s a l e s  were being l o s t  
which led to  the  p ressure  to  announce such a system. This again  led to  the  
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  of s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 71 . Eventually  the  va r ious  promises were 
brought t o g e th e r .  The conventional  /60  and /62 were rep laced  by the  
success fu l  360/65 in Apri l  196572. This system in troduced an op t iona l  
c o m p a t ib i l i t y  with the  7000 s e r i e s ,  t o  compete with the  GE 600 machines. 
Linked to  t h i s  was the  extended t im e-share  ve rs ion  c a l l e d  the  /6 7 .  While 
the  hardware m odif ica t ion  was comparat ively easy and the  f i r s t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  
of /67 machines was in August 196673, the  software  proved next to  
impossible .  The problem was the  Time-Share System: TSS was the  opera t ing  
system. The s a l e s  s t a f f  had promised so many users  d i f f e r e n t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
t h a t  th e  TSS could not hope to  f u l f i l  them a l l 74 . Only a few of the  
systems were d e l iv e re d ,  mostly  to  u n i v e r s i t i e s .  Again t h i s  phantom product 
was seen as merely an a tt empt  to  undermine the  s a l e s  of  a r i v a l .
Another poss ib ly  a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e  p r a c t i c e  was IBM's p o l i c y  of  g iv ing 
huge d iscoun ts  to  co l leg es  and government l a b o r a t o r i e s .  The educa t iona l  
market was seen as important,  due to  the  f a c t  t h a t  those  t h a t  l e a r n t  on 
u n i v e r s i t y  machines would be the  customers of the  f u t u r e ,  and i t  was the  
major market f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  and t im e-share  systems. Some of  the  d iscount  
was paid  f o r ,  and j u s t i f i e d  by, the  high level of  tax  concession a v a i l a b le  
on s a l e s  to  educa t iona l  and n o n - p r o f i t  re sea rch  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  However, a 
hidden agenda may have been t h a t  IBM was cover ing up i t s  l a c k l u s t r e
69Ibid  p103.
7°See above, chap te r  7, pp273-274.
71Malik,  And tomorrow the  world? pplOl-103.
72US vs IBM. px226, IBM, 'System 360/65 F inanc ia l  A n a l y s i s ' ,  4/68.
73US vs IBM. px2227, IBM, 'System 360/67 F inanc ia l  A n a l y s i s ' ,  4/68.
74Ib id.
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performance in a reas  such as super-computing and t im e -sh a r in g ,  by o f f e r i n g  
low p r i c e s  f o r  i t s  s tandard  s c i e n t i f i c  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  to  a t t r a c t  noteworthy 
customers .
Malik es t im ates  t h a t  the  loss  incurred on the  phantom and a n t i -  
compet it ion machines, th e  S e r ie s  90,  360/44, /6 7 ,  /7 5 ,  /8 5 ,  /195 , over 500 
machines in t o t a l ,  was n e a r ly  $235m75. This was comparatively  small f r y  
to  IBM: l e s s  than 10% of a s in g l e  y e a r ' s  revenue.
However, th e re  a re  obvious defences  f o r  IBM's behaviour .  A number of  
companies in the  indus t ry  were working on t im e-shared  computers.  Time­
shar ing  was seen as the  next wave of  computing: i t  was th e  'b u zz '  concept 
of the  1960s, and IBM needed to  ge t  into  t h i s  a rea  to  main ta in  f u t u r e  
c a p a b i l i t y .  I t  was f a r  from the  only o rg an isa t io n  to  have problems in 
producing what i t  promised. IBM's next genera t ion ,  the  370, was a complete 
range o f  t ime-shared  systems, IBM having l e a r n t  much from the  TSS. Super­
computers were a lso  seen as an important technology. IBM may well have 
viewed super-computers in th e  same way.
Whether the  p ro je c t s  mentioned above simply show t h a t  IBM was capable  
of expensive f a i l u r e ,  o r  had d e l i b e r a t e l y  t r i e d  to  undermine opponents '  
s a l e s ,  i t  did br ing  a n t i - t r u s t  s c r u t i n y .  On 11 December 1968, CDC f i l e d  a 
damages claim to  recover  lo s se s  caused by IBM's phantom machines76. This 
was one of a number of cases  which led to  the  composite US vs IBM. Whether 
CDC, as the  f a s t e s t  growing computer company o f  the  1960s, r e a l l y  expected 
to  win i t s  claim is not known. However, th e  case did  s top IBM from 
announcing f u r t h e r  paper super computers and c l ea re d  th e  way f o r  CDC's 
1970s 7000 s e r i e s .
In ano ther  a rea ,  p e r i p h e r a l s ,  IBM may well  have t r i e d  to  l i m i t  
compet it ion .  There were two t a r g e t s ,  RCA and th e  so c a l l e d  Plug Compatible 
Manufacturers.  PCMs were small f i rms  t h a t  developed in th e  l a t e  1960s and 
produced low pr iced  p e r ip h e ra l s  f o r  at tachment t o  the  s tandard  360 in p u t - 
output i n t e r f a c e .  PCMs achieved t h i s  by ' r e v e r s e  eng in ee r in g '  IBM produc ts ,  
o f ten  employing ex-IBM engineers  to  do t h i s 77. The re fo re ,  development 
cos ts  were minimised. In IBM's view PCMs were p a r a s i t e s 78 .
The problem with RCA was t h a t  i t  was in d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  with IBM
75Malik,  And tomorrow the  world? p l03 -104.
76IDC, EDP Industry  Repor t . 23/12/68, pp l -3 .
77Dorfman, Innovation and market s t r u c t u r e . Chapter 10.
7SIb id .
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machinery; to  compete adequate ly  RCA needed to  keep up with IBM in a l l  i t s  
nuances. As was seen in the  RCA c h a p te r ,  IBM f i l i b u s t e r e d  about supplying 
i t  wi th d e t a i l s  of  the  new 3330 Merlin disk d r i v e s ,  preventing  RCA from 
making an e a r l y  s t a r t  on copying i t .  The argument IBM o f fe red  was t h a t  i t  
could not have been expected to  r e l e a s e  d e t a i l e d  te ch n ica l  da ta  be fore  the  
system was even on the  market.  I t  seems th a t  t h i s  was not the  f i r s t  example 
of IBM h o s t i l i t y  towards RCA. I t  has been recorded t h a t  Thomas Watson Jn r .  
was incensed when RCA en te red  th e  commercial computer ind u s t ry ;  General 
Sarnoff had p rev ious ly  assured him t h a t  RCA's only i n t e r e s t  was the  BIZMAC 
l o g i s t i c s  systems and o th e r  m i l i t a r y  computers79. With t h i s  a ssu rance ,  
IBM continued to  use the  management c o n su l t an t ,  Booz Allen ,  who were a lso  
RCA's a d v i s e r s .  Two years  l a t e r  RCA h ired  J .L .  Burns from Booz Allen as 
p r e s id e n t .  He had been the  c o n su l t an t  who had advised IBM on management 
o r g a n i s a t i o n 8 0 . IBM s a le s  s t a f f  were informed t h a t  they could undercut 
RCA by any means.
IBM's r e a c t io n  to  PCMs became apparent in the  e a r ly  1970s. I t  o f f e red  
a new r e n t a l  deal  on i t s  p e r i p h e r a l s ,  c a l l e d  the  Fixed Term Lease Plan.  I t  
o f fe red  a small d iscount on the  f i r s t  year  of  r e n t a l ,  which s t e a d i l y  
increased over th e  subsequent y e a r s ,  the  idea being t h a t  the  p r i c e  would 
be d e c l in in g  as r i v a l  PCM products  appeared81. IBM saw th e  p e r ip h e ra l  as 
v i t a l :  p e r ip h e r a l s  were becoming an increas ing  percentage  of  hardware 
value.  IBM's Fixed Term Lease Plan was the  major cause of the  Telex vs IBM 
a n t i - t r u s t  case .
IBM took s im i la r  ac t ion  a g a in s t  another group of  companies t h a t  
th rea ten ed  i t s  r o l e  as the  s u p p l i e r  o f  complete computer s e r v i c e s :  th e se  
were the  l e a s in g  companies. These f i rms bought a m anufac tu re r ' s  machines 
and then leased  them to  users  on t h e i r  own te rms, o f ten  with p e r ip h e r a l s  
from the  PCMs. IBM's a c t i o n s  a g a in s t  leas ing  fi rms led to  Greyhound vs IBM, 
another  case  which led to  US vs IBM.
However, IBM's underly ing compet it ive  advantage was the  company's 
conventional  computer ranges and i t s  a s so c ia ted  s e l l i n g  t a c t i c s ,  advantages 
t h a t  have a l re ad y  been considered .  IBM's a b i l i t y  to  progress  from one 
genera t ion  to  the  nex t ,  be fore  oppos i t ion  could adequate ly  recoup 
expenditure  from the l a s t  g en e ra t io n ,  was much more v i t a l  to  ensur ing the  
IBM lead . Underpinning a l l  i t s  s t r a t e g i e s  was i t s  la rge  s c a l e ,  low c o s t s
79W. Rodgers Think. p247. 
s o Ib i d .
s l Dorfman, Innovation and market s t r u c t u r e . p91.
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and high p r o f i t s .
IBM was an aggress ive  company, c l e a r l y  in the  s t ro n g e s t  p o s i t i o n  in 
the  market,  a p o s i t io n  which had been b u i l t  on i t s  h i s t o r i c  s t r e n g th  in the  
bus iness  machines market. No o th e r  l a rge  fi rm could match IBM's v i s io n  or 
i t s  focused a t t e n t i o n  on the  so le  market of da ta  p rocess ing :  t h i s  was 
c e r t a i n l y  the  case with the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  While o the r  bus iness  
machines f i rms and some s t a r t  up-companies d id  match IBM's commitment to  
the  computer market,  they only had l imi ted  resources  compared to  IBM. 
Though more success fu l  than the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  they  could not muster 
enough re sou rces  to  make a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on the  leading company.
IBM was the  dominant s u p p l i e r .  This in tu rn  meant t h a t  i t  had the  
longest  production runs ,  lowest c o s t s ,  and h ighes t  p r o f i t s ,  ensur ing  i t  
remained number one in th e  mainframe market.  Using i t s  market and 
production advantages,  IBM was ab le  maintain a s i g n i f i c a n t  compet i t ive  
advantage over the  smal le r  bus iness  machines f i rm s .  This forced  th e se  fi rms 
to  adopt s t r a t e g i e s  aimed a t  su rv iv ing  in a market dominated by a s in g le  
la rge  s u p p l i e r .  Both IBM's t r a d i t i o n a l  competi tors  and i t s  newer r i v a l s  
adopted niche t a c t i c s  to  enable them to  survive in t h i s  environment.
However, i t  is  not so easy to  put the  f a i l u r e  of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies down to  the problems of  small f irms tak ing  on a l a rge  monopol is t .  
The e l e c t r o n i c s  co rp o ra t io n s  were l a r g e r  than IBM and had a much g r e a t e r  
t echno log ica l  base to  draw s k i l l s  from. The f a i l u r e  of the se  fi rms to  
e s t a b l i s h  themselves in the  EDP market has been d iscussed  in the  o th e r  case  
s tu d i e s .  I t  i s  a l so  summarized in th e  conclus ion ,  which emphasizes t h e i r  
f a i l u r e  to  marshall  t h e i r  r e sou rces  t o  t a c k l e  IBM, the  problems they  had 
in supporting  so many techno log ies  and the  o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  
they had.
Smaller bus iness  machines f i rm s .
NCR.
The National  Cash R eg i s te r  company was one of th e  two niche bus iness  
machines f i rms t h a t  competed with IBM and Sperry-Rand. While NCR's e a r l y  
success had been b u i l t  on the  cash r e g i s t e r  bus iness ,  by th e  1950s i t  had 
earned more revenue from th e  production  of accounting machines.  Despite  
holding 75-85% of  the  cash r e g i s t e r  bus iness82, compet it ion  from the  
l ikes  o f  Monroe/Sweda had completely wiped out any monopolis t ic  p r o f i t s  and
a2US vs IBM. px2050, IBM Market Evaluation Department,  Data Processing 
Group, 'A company study of [ th e ]  National Cash R eg i s te r  Company', 1 /5 /67 .
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t h i s  p a r t  of  NCR's business  was not growing83. However, the  adding and 
accounting  machine market rep laced  cash r e g i s t e r s  as a source o f  growth. 
NCR en te red  th e  accounting machine bus iness  in th e  1920s, and enhanced i t s  
market share  with the purchase o f  th e  Allen-Wales Adding Machine Company 
in 19438*. Within ten years  of  e n t e r in g  t h i s  bus iness  NCR had managed to  
match and surpass  i t s  main r i v a l ,  Burroughs.  NCR's lead was b u i l t  on the  
P os t ron ic  accounting machine, which was widely seen as th e  b e s t  on the  
market8 5 . NCR was p a r t i c u l a r y  success fu l  in the  r e t a i l i n g  and banking 
markets.
By 1960 NCR employed 49,000, of  whom 23,000 were employed o u ts id e  of 
the  United S t a t e s 86. Of t h i s  workforce,  IBM be l ieved  the  main s t r e n g th  
was th e  huge marketing fo rce  needed to  s e l l  cash r e g i s t e r s  and accounting 
machines87 . NCR employed thousands o f  salesmen and s e r v ice  en g in ee r s88. 
IBM's Watson Snr.  himself  had been a graduate  of the  NCR marketing system, 
and i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  i t  was r a t e d  h igh ly  w i th in  IBM.
However, IBM bel ieved  the  f i rm  had one weakness. The t r a d i t i o n a l  
bus inesses  o f  cash r e g i s t e r s  and account ing machines did not g enera te  high 
p r o f i t  margins.  IBM viewed them as b a s i c a l l y  f i n a n c i a l l y  h ea l th y  but not 
genera t ing  th e  resources  to  develop and lease  a complete l i n e  of computers.  
The fo l lowing  graphs show t h a t  revenue increased  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  in the  
1960s, but t h a t  p r o f i t  f e l l  as a p ropor t ion  of th e se  e a rn in g s ,  IBM saw t h i s  
as a weakness, but t h a t  i t  was s t i l l  b a s i c a l l y  hea l thy :
83Ib id .
S4NCR, Celebra t ing  the  Futu re:  NCR 1884-1984. Booklet  two, '1923-1951,
The Accounting Machine Era '  Dayton, Ohio, 1984. This i s  a fo u r  bookle t
h i s t o r y  of NCR.
85lb i d .
86CBI Archive,  Auerbach E le c t ro n ic s  Corpora tion,  'A c o rpo ra te  bus iness  
s t r a t e g y  f o r  information p rocess ing ,  1960-1970' ,  Chapter IX 'NCR', 1960.
87US vs IBM. px2050, IBM 'NCR', 1/5/67.
88Ib id .
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Figure 8.6
NCR’s turnover, 1961-1970.
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Figure 8.7
NCR’s net profit, 1961-1970.
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Figure 8»8
Net profit as percentage of revenue.
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A second weakness IBM saw in the  company was i t s  conserva t ive  
management, which was unable t a  make r a d ic a l  d e c i s io n s  to  e x p lo i t  i t s  very 
la rge  marketing fo rce .
NCR en te red  the computer in d u s t ry  in the  1950s. Like o the r  business  
machine f i rms  i t  had a number of  reasons  to  do so.  The company had s t a r t e d  
e l e c t r o n i c s  resea rch  in the  1930s f o r  use in i t s  account ing products .  By 
th e  1950s, some of the  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  NCR's t r a d i t i o n a l  systems were 
being superseded by computer technology. A number o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
were becoming in t e r e s t e d  in using computers; t h e se  were NCR's core c l i e n t s .
NCR took a slow methodical  path in en te r in g  the  commercial computer 
b u s in e s s ,  and took a number of  a c t i o n s  to  keep down the  c o s t s  of doing so. 
The f i r s t  s t ep  i t  took was to  acquire  the  Computer Research 
Corpora tion8 9 . This was a small f i rm  making s p e c i a l i s t  computers. I t  
c o n s i s t e d  of  engineers  who had l e f t  th e  Northrop A i r c r a f t  Corporation when 
i t  ceased developing i t s  own computer to  guide th e  SNARK long range m is s i l e  
and opted to  buy the BINAC computer from the E le c t ro n ic  Control Company 
(Eckert  and Mauchly's UNIVAC f i r m ) .  NCR se t  t h i s  team to  work on developing 
a commercial computer. However, many of the  CRC engineers  l e f t  when NCR 
announced t h a t  the  opera t ion  was to  move away from C a l i fo rn ia  to  NCR's home 
town, Dayton, Ohio. By the  t ime t h i s  order was reve rsed ,  most of the  
eng ineers  had gone90.
For t h i s  reason ,  and to  l i m i t  the  f i n a n c i a l  impact of  producing the  
computer, NCR commissioned GE to  c a r ry  out a l l  the  engineer ing  and 
production  of  a system known as th e  NCR 304. As has been seen, GE had 
a l read y  made an impact on th e  banking market with  the  production of  the  
ERMA computers f o r  the  Bank of America91, and i t  seems n a tu ra l  t h a t  NCR 
should look to  i t  to  produce the  304. I t  was a f a i r l y  s u b s t a n t i a l  computer, 
c o s t in g  between $750,000 and $1.25m. I t  was a t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  machine, 
r e ly in g  on GE's c a p a b i l i t y  in t h i s  a r e a .  D e l ive r ie s  began in 1960; 33 were 
d e l iv e re d .
By 1960 NCR was developing two more arrangements with o ther  f irms to  
g ive i t  f u r t h e r  options  in the  da ta  process ing market.  In the  UK NCR went 
in to  p a r tn e r s h ip  with the  E l l i o t t  Automation company to  form National-  
E l l i o t t .  By 1960, E l l i o t t s  was d e l iv e r in g  the  405 computer in numbers, 
which NCR sold  to  commercial u se r s  in Europe. La te r  N a t i o n a l - E l l i o t t  sold  
a number of NCR systems in Europe. However, as i t  b u i l t  up i t s  presence,
89Auerbach, 'A co rpora te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y ' ,  chap te r  IX.
9° I b id .
91See above, chapter 7, pp259-261.
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NCR s t a r t e d  to  market i t s  own systems d i r e c t l y ,  and in the  mid-1960s the  
agreement ended. NCR had come to  a s im i l a r  arrangement with CDC. CDC had 
been s e l l i n g  the  160 computer in to  the  s c i e n t i f i c  market very s u c c e s s f u l ly .  
In J u ly  1960 a team from NCR v i s i t e d  the  CDC o p e ra t ion  in Bloomington, 
Minneapolis92. I t  was ar ranged  t h a t  NCR would s e l l  the  system to  the  
banking and r e t a i l  i n d u s t r i e s 93 . The system was sold  as the  NCR 310. 
However, i t  was not a huge succee,  45 being i n s t a l l e d  by 19649*.
Eventually  NCR s t a r t e d  to  produce and s e l l  i t s  own computers. The 
f i r s t  o f  these  was r e l e a s e d  in 1960. This was a small s c a l e ,  second 
genera t ion  system, the  NCR 390. I t  had paper tape  inpu t -ou tpu t  and op t iona l  
punched card p e r ip h e r a l s ,  but most important was the  p rov is ion  f o r  input-  
output  v ia  magnetic ledger  ca rd s ,  which the  Pos t ron ic  and Burroughs banking 
c a l c u l a t o r s  used fo r  t h e i r  in p u t -o u tp u t95 . Many hundreds of  these  
computers were sold .  The United S t a t e s  Air Force purchased 175 of  them fo r  
payro l l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a t  a i r  bases96 .
In 1962 the  NCR 315 was r e l e a s e d  as a replacement f o r  the  304. The 
315, to g e th e r  with the  small s c a l e  390, was to  remain the  s tanda rd  NCR 
computer throughout most of  the  1960s, though i t  was g rad u a l ly  enhanced, 
being o f f e red  in more s i z e s  and with more p e r i p h e r a l s .  By March 1968 NCR 
had 800 315s e i t h e r  i n s t a l l e d  o r  on o rd e r ,  and another  120 of  the  improved 
315 RMCs i n s t a l l e d  or on o rd e r97 .
This level of s a l e s  was way ahead of the  o r ig i n a l  p lan .  On i t s  
r e l e a s e ,  NCR had budgeted f o r  the  production of  200 3 1 5 ' s ,  of  which 90% 
were to  be leased to  customers .  By May 1961, with the  r e l e a s e  of  the  on­
l in e  ve rs ion  of the  machine, th e  planned production had been r a i s e d  to  500 
machines98. NCR was to  double t h i s  by the  end of  the  decade.
In 1965 NCR added th e  NCR 500 t o  i t s  range.  This was ano ther  system 
not compatible  with any of th e  o th e r  machines in i t s  range.  I t  was
92US vs IBM. dx330, Correspondents  from R.S. Oleman, NCR P re s id e n t ,  
to  W.C. N orr i s ,  CDC P r e s id e n t ,  8 /7 /6 0 .
93US vs IBM. dx331, W.C. N o r r i s ,  'Address to  [ the ]  Twin City  S ecu r i ty  
A n a ly s t s ' ,  2 /3 /61 .
9*IDC, EDP Indus t ry  and Market Report .  23 /3 /64 ,  p l l .
95Auerbach Corp, 'A co rp o ra te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y ' ,  chap te r  IX.
96US vs IBM. px4829, Arthur D. L i t t l e  Inc,  Serv ices  to  I n v e s to r s ,  'The 
Computer Industry-The Next Five Y e a r s ' ,  October 1964, th e se  were p r i v a t e  
market a n a ly s i s  papers.
97IDC, EDP Indus t ry  R epor t . 29 /3 /68 , p7.
98US vs IBM.dx746. NCR,'Financial  r e p o r t  on the  315program',  10/6/63.
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s p e c i f i c a l l y  aimed a t  handling the  type of da ta  generated  by i t s  
t r a d i t i o n a l  u s e r s " .  Over 1000 of  these  small machines were 
i n s t a l l e d 100, many being used in a core  area  of  NCR b us iness ,  pay ro l l  
c a l c u l a t i o n s .  One major f a i l u r e  f o r  NCR was the  CRAM memory dev ice .  This 
was a mass s to rage  system s i m i l a r  to  the  RCA RACE. I t  used s t r i p s  of 
magnetic tape  which were s to re d  in a la rg e  device  which would s e l e c t  a tape  
and read i t .  I t  was NCR's r i v a l  to  the  disk d r iv e  f o r  mass random-access 
s to rage .  While i t  could s t o r e  la rg e  amounts of d a t a ,  i t  was slower and l e ss  
r e l i a b l e  than the  disk  d r iv e .  I t s  one advantage of l a rge  cap a c i ty  was 
matched qu ick ly  by new IBM d isk  d r i v e s .  NCR stuck t o  the  product f o r  a long 
time, showing a conserva t ive  r e f u s a l  to  accept the  f a i l u r e  of  the  concept.
NCR computers were most success fu l  in i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  banking and 
r e t a i l i n g  markets .  Many of the  sm al le r  machines went to  sm al le r  banks.  The 
315 had a program f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  e a r ly  o n - l i n e  banking te rm in a ls  and 
automatic t e l l e r s ,  a f a c i l i t y  which helped i t  s e l l  to  banks.  The 315 RMC 
was given m u l t i - access  c a p a b i l i t y  to  improve NCR's p o s i t i o n  in t h i s  same 
market. NCR was more success fu l  in small and medium s ized  banks, while the  
la rge sca le  Burroughs equipment found i t s  way in to  l a r g e r  banks. This 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in the  following t a b l e :
Table 8 .6  NCR's computer customers.
Indust ry  % of  NCR com pute r /e lec t ron ic
accounting machine s a l e s .  1966.
51%
14 
9 
5 
4 
3 
3
3 
3 
_6 
100
Source: US vs IBM. px2050, IBM Market Evaluation Department, 'A company 
study of  [ th e ]  National  Cash R e g i s t e r  Company', 1 /5 /67 .
O vera l l ,  computers took a long time to  become an important revenue 
genera to r  f o r  NCR:
Banking 
D i s t r ib u t io n  
Manufacturing 
Federal Government 
S ta te  and loca l  Government 
Process 
Insurance 
Consultan ts  and 
se rv ice  bureau 
Medical 
Other
" F i s h e r  e t  a l ,  IBM and the  U.S. Data Processing In d u s t r y . p250.
100IDC, EDP.Industry R epor t . 29 /3 /68, p7.
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Table 8 .7  NCR products  as a percentage  of  revenue .
Product 1965 1966
Amount Sm % Amount $m %
Cash Reg. 190 26 200 23
Acc. Machines 246 33 319 37
Service 130 18 157 18
Suppl ies ( inc 113 15 131 15
NCR paper) 
EDP 58 _8 63 _7
Total 737 100 871 100
Source: US vs IBM. px2050, IBM Market Evaluation Department, 'A company 
study of  [ th e ]  National Cash R eg i s t e r  Company', 1 /5 /67.
This seems remarkably low, and i t  may have been the  case t h a t  the  390 was 
counted as an accounting machine.  However, i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  from t h i s  s tage 
onwards EDP became a more important product f o r  NCR101.
In 1968 the  company r e l e a s e d  the  f i r s t  members of the  Century Ser ies  
of t h i r d  genera t ion  computers. I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t ,  while  computers did 
not form a l a rge  p a r t  of  NCR s a l e s  before  t h i s ,  i t  had been able  to  keep 
s e l l i n g  second genera t ion  computing well  in to  the  t h i r d  genera t ion  per iod .  
NCR had milked as much as p o s s ib l e  out of i t s  investment in second 
genera t ion  equipment.
The Century S e r ie s  changed t h i s ,  and hera lded what IBM had fea red  in 
1966, a more p o s i t i v e  a t t i t u d e  towards the  computer in d u s t ry  on the  p a r t  
of NCR. NCR cont inued to  emphasise the  smal ler end of  the  market,  the  end 
where i t  a l r ead y  had s t rong  customer r a p p o r t102. However, i n c re a s in g ly  
NCR was s e l l i n g  the Century 100 and 200 computers to  a wider audience 
ou ts id e  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  markets103. There were probably two reasons fo r  
t h i s :  th e  d e s i r e  to  in c rease  market share ,  and the  need to  spread c o s t s  to 
maintain com pet i t iveness .  Sa les  of NCR computers rocketed by 98% in one 
year ,  but earn ings  f e l l  on the  back o f  the  la rge  c o s t  of  f inanc ing  so many 
new lease  agreements104. Rapid ly ,  e l e c t r o n i c  da ta  process ing  rose  to  
well over 25% of the  whole b u s in e s s 105. In the  main however, i t s  main
101See f i g u r e  8 .4 ,  p304.
1Q2US vs IBM. px2050, IBM, Market Evaluation Dept, 'A company study 
of NCR', 1 /5 /67 .  IBM conside red  NCR's r e p u ta t io n  to  have been e x c e l l e n t  
with u se r s .
103F ishe r  e t  al  IBM and the  US da ta  process ing i n d u s t r y . p252.
1Q4US vs IBM. dx340A, NCR annual r epo r t  1968.
l o s See f i g u r e  8 .4 ,  p304.
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markets s tayed  as banking, r e t a i l ,  payro l l  and accounting.
Computers were only a p a r t  o f  the  mix o f  technology t h a t  would
main ta in  NCR's place  in the  in format ion  process ing market of the  1970s. The 
company b e n e f i t e d  g r e a t ly  from o n - l i n e  a p p l i c a t io n s  of technology,  such as 
bank cash machines and automated r e t a i l  check-out systems and t i l l s .  Now 
a p a r t  of  AT&T, i t  i s  s t i l l  s t rong  in these  s e c t o r s .
NCR had a d i f f e r e n t  approach to  RCA and GE, and indeed IBM. I t  took
to  computers slowly,  expanding d e l i b e r a t e l y  on i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  u se r  base,  
a base which allowed i t  to  in t roduce  new technology slowly to  ensure  i t  
maximised r e t u r n s  from the  old  systems.  Yet even by 1964 NCR, d e s p i t e  i t s  
slow adoption of  computers,  i t s  concen t ra t ion  on a few niche markets ,  and 
i t s  small s i z e ,  had a l ready  matched GE's market s h a r e 106. By t h i s  
s tandard  NCR's approach seemed to  be successfu l  and allowed NCR to  be a 
p r o f i t a b l e  p la y e r  in the  new market.
Burroughs
Burroughs was s im i la r  to  NCR, but in the  1930s and 40s i t  was los ing  
market share  in i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  market,  and t h e r e f o r e  adopted computers a t  
an e a r l i e r  s t a g e .  Before NCR moved in to  accounting machines, the  D e t ro i t -  
based Burroughs company107 dominated the market.  I t  suppl ied  a wide 
a r r a y  of  account ing machines, adding machines and o f f i c e  s u p p l i e s .  Like 
NCR, the  main customers were accounts  departments and banks. However, by 
the  1940s NCR had s t r ip p e d  i t  o f  i t s  lead in t h i s  market.
IBM be l ieved  t h a t  Burroughs'  dec l ine  was due to  the  poor management 
s t r u c t u r e  of th e  company. I t  de sc r ib ed  Burroughs' management as having been 
' c a s u a l ' 108. The company was s p l i t  between manufacturing and marketing,  
and t h i s  s t i f l e d  the  flow o f  information between th e  key opera t ing  
fu n c t io n s .  I t  a l so  had a weaker f i e l d  s a l e s  fo rce  than NCR. B e t te r  
s t r a t e g i e s  and t i g h t e r  con t ro l  slowly came about in the  1960s. The company 
seemed to  become r e v i t a l i s e d  with th e  r i s e  of R.W. Macdonald to  the  post  
of Executive  Vice P res iden t  in 1964: ev en tua l ly  he became P res id en t  and 
CEO109. He cu t  h is  t e e t h  as an accounting machine salesman. The new 
management s p l i t  the  company in to  f o u r  groups:
1Q6US vs IBM. px4829, Arthur D. L i t t l e  Inc,  'The Computer Industry-The 
Next Five Y e a r s ' ,  October 1964.
1Q7US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, Market Evaluat ion Department, 'A Company 
Study of [ th e ]  Burroughs C o rp o r a t i o n ' ,  30/6/67.
l o s Ib id .
109Ib id .
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Business Machines,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,
Defence Space and Special  p roduc ts ,  
Business Forms and Supplies .
The fo l lowing t a b l e s  show Burroughs'  product and market breakdown. 
Notably,  computers became more important to  Burroughs a t  an e a r l i e r  s tage  
than a t  NCR, though o v e ra l l  Burroughs was sm al le r  and th e r e f o r e  the  
computer revenues were l i t t l e  more than those  o f  NCR:
Table 8 .8  Burroughs revenue bv product.  1966
Amount $'m %
Accounting Machines 194 39
Adding Machines 28 6
Data P rocessing 62 13
Serv ice 73 15
Supplies 76 15
Components/Mi sc 16 3
Total  commercial 449 91
U.S. Govt, c o n t r a c t 45 9
Total 494 100
Source: US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, Market Evaluation Department, 'A Company 
Study of  [ th e ]  Burroughs C o rp o ra t io n ' ,  30/6/67.
Table 8 .9  Burroughs revenue bv customer.
Banks and o th e r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  37%
Manufacturing and wholesales  27%
R eta i l  t r a d e  and general  22%
Government 11%
Public  u t i l i t i e s  3%
Source: US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, Market Evaluation Department, XA Company 
Study of  [ th e ]  Burroughs C o rp o ra t io n ' ,  30/6/67.
The f i rm  had 2,200 re sea rch  personnel  and an annual re sea rch  budget of 
$22m110. As most of the se  were committed to  some form of  da ta  process ing 
work, t h i s  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  R&D fo r c e .
Like NCR i t  was b a s i c a l l y  a f i n a n c i a l l y  sound company, e s p e c i a l l y  
a f t e r  McDonald's shake up. While not in the  league of IBM, i t  was moving 
in the  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n ,  and during in the 1960s a number of f i n a n c i a l  
i n d i c a to r s  s t a r t e d  to  look b e t t e r  than NCR's. The fo llowing graphs show 
Burroughs'  revenue, p r o f i t ,  and p r o f i t  to  revenue. The l a t t e r  showed a 
hea l thy  improvement as McDonald's programme developed:
11QUS vs IBM. px2082, IBM, 'A company study of Burroughs ' ,  30 /6 /67.
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Figure 8.9
Burroughs Revenue, 1962-1966.
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Figure 8.10
Burroughs Profit, 1962-1966.
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Figure 8.11
Pre-tax profits to revenue ratio.
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Burroughs approached computers from a d i f f e r e n t  angle to  NCR: i t  
tended to  manufacture l a r g e r  and more complex systems. On the  whole i t  
produced th e se  systems s u c c e s s f u l l y ,  though in the  l a t e  1960s i t  d id  have 
s e r ious  problems with i t s  very  la rg e  8500. IBM be l ieved  Burroughs was 
committed to  computer technology from an e a r l i e r  s tage  than NCR111, and 
saw t h i s  as an at tempt to  compensate fo r  i t s  d e c l in in g  fo r tu n es  in 
t r a d i t i o n a l  products .  I t  a l so  developed a la rge  bus iness  in small systems, 
designed to  rep lace  accounting machines.
Burroughs had two ro u te s  in to  computing, i t  took p a r t  in a number of 
high technology m i l i t a r y  c o n t r a c t s ,  and, secondly,  purchased computer 
s k i l l s  from o u ts id e .  All bus iness  machines f i rm s ,  except  IBM, had to  
acquire  e l e c t r o n i c s  and computer technology from o u ts id e  when i t  s t a r t e d  
to  impinge on t r a d i t i o n a l  te ch n iq u es .  At the  end of June 1956, Burroughs 
bought a small computer company c a l l e d  E lec t roD a ta112. This f irm was 
formed in 1954113 and had developed the Datatron  computer,  d e l iv e r in g  
9 of  them in the  1954, and a f u r t h e r  13 in 195511*. I t  a l so  supplied 
some of the  e a r l i e s t  magnetic tape  d r iv e s .  Under Burroughs7 con t ro l  the  
o r i g i n a l  machines, the  203 and 204, were rep laced  by the  205 and l a t e r  the  
220 computer.  The l a t t e r  in troduced magnetic core  memory ins tead  of the  
magnetic drum memory used in the  e a r l i e r  systems115.
The ElectroData Divis ion  of Burroughs a l so  absorbed Burroughs7 own 
e a r l y  computer developments, namely th e  E-101. The E-101, was aimed a t  the  
s c i e n t i f i c  marke t116 and was b a s i c a l l y  a simple e l e c t r o n i c  c a l c u l a t o r .  
Burroughs i t s e l f  had had a growing i n t e r e s t  in e l e c t r o n i c s  s ince  the  Second 
World War. I t  had made a number of  s p e c i a l i s t  components f o r  o the r  f irms 
and had s t a r t e d  work on a i r  defence and communications p r o j e c t s 117. Like 
IBM, Burroughs bene f i t ed  from the  SAGE c o n t r a c t .  Burroughs was re sp o n s ib le  
f o r  th e  b u i ld in g  of the  AN/FST-2, which was the  main computer f o r
111US vs IBM. px2050, IBM, 'A company s tudy of NCR7, 1967.
112US vs IBM. tr9185 ,  M cColl is te r ,  Elec troData  Marketing vice  
p r e s id e n t .
113US vs IBM. dx698, E lec t roData  annual r e p o r t  1954.
1X*US vs IBM. dx700, E lec t roData  annual r e p o r t  1955.
115US vs IBM. t r9181,  M cC ol l i s te r .
116CBI Archive,  Auerbach E lec t ro n ic s  Corpora tion,  'A co rpora te
bus iness  s t r a t e g y  fo r  informat ion process ing ,  1960-19707, Chapter I I I  
'Burroughs C orpora t ion7, 1960.
117Ib id .
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process ing  r a d a r  in format ion118. This c o n t r a c t  led to  the  growth of the  
Paoli  e l e c t r o n i c s  lab o ra to ry ,  th e  es tab l i shm ent  o f  a l a rg e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
f a c i l i t y  in D e t r o i t ,  a la rge  defence  s e rv ice  o rg a n i s a t i o n ,  and the  
a c q u i s i t i o n  of  c o m p u te r - l i t e r a te  pe rsonnel .  By 1959 Burroughs'  revenue from 
SAGE had reached $155m and i t  had rece ived  ano ther  $35m t h e r e a f t e r  f o r  an 
a i rbo rne  ve rs ion  of the  AN/FST-2 f o r  the  Airborne ex tens ion  to  SAGE, 
ALRI119. La te r  in the  1950s, Burroughs was awarded a c o n t r a c t  to  bu i ld  
the  nav iga t ion  computers f o r  th e  ATLAS b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s .  This led to  
Burroughs'  f i r s t  so l id  s t a t e  m i l i t a r y  computer; by 1959 t h i s  had earned 
$77m f o r  the  company. IBM b e l ieved  t h i s  was the  f i r s t  la rg e  s c a le  so l id  
s t a t e  computer ever  b u i l t ,  and gave Burroughs r e a l  p r e s t i g e 120.
The merger of Elec troData  and Burroughs' own computer o pe ra t ions  made 
a good deal o f  sense.  Elec troData  was t r y i n g  to  s e l l  to  both the  commercial 
and sc ience  market,  t ak ing  on both the  IBM 650 and 704121. This was 
expensive f o r  a small company, e s p e c i a l l y  given the  slow re tu r n s  from 
leased machines.  Burroughs took the  oppor tun i ty  to  i n t e g r a t e  Burroughs' own 
computer developments in to  the  more commercially o r i e n t a t e d  Elec troData  
o rg a n i s a t i o n .  I t  i s  i ro n ic  t h a t  what was b a s i c a l l y  a bus iness  machines fi rm 
needed to  buy in commercial computer s k i l l s .
The fo llowing t a b l e  shows how many f i r s t  g enera t ion  computers 
Burroughs so ld :
Table 8 .10 Accumulated i n s t a l l a t i o n s  of Burroughs computers.
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
E-101 65 130 165 180 205-product ion ended
205 7 20 50 85 100 120
220 2 31
Source: CBI Archive,  Auerbach E lec t ro n ic s  Corpora t ion ,  'A co rpora te  
bus iness  s t r a t e g y  f o r  informat ion process ing ,  1960-1970' ,  Chapter 3 
'Burroughs C o rp o ra t io n ' ,  1960.
Burroughs took a l l  t h i s  and produced a computer o pe ra t ion  of  small 
s iz e  compared to  IBM, only s e l l i n g  around 250 computers per year  in the  
mid-1960s,  bu t  with an extremely loya l  customer ba se122. By the  e a r ly
118Ib id .
119Ib id .
12° US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, 'A company s tudy of  Burroughs ' ,  30/6 /67.
121US vs IBM. t r9180,  M cCol l is te r .
122US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, 'A company s tudy of  Burroughs ' ,  30 /6 /67.
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1970s i t  was a contender f o r  the  number two spot in the  US market.  By 1977 
i t  had e q u a l l ed  the  i n s t a l l e d  base o f  Honeywell and Sperry123.
Yet i t  was a small company compared to  the  l i k e s  of IBM, RCA, GE, and 
Sperry.  I t  only had a small computer bus iness  in th e  l a t e  1950s and was not 
g r e a t ly  p r o f i t a b l e  in the  e a r l y  1960s. As has been s t a t e d ,  t h i s  changed 
with MacDonald taking co n t ro l  and recovery was g r e a t l y  helped by the  
success  of  Burroughs' second and t h i r d  genera t ion  computers.
The machines t h a t  gave i t  i t s  p o s i t io n  were on the  whole l a r g e r  than 
NCR's, and they  had s i g n i f i c a n t  advanced f e a tu re s  over the  op p o s i t io n .  One 
area  in which i t  fa red  well  was in la rge  commercial computers and more 
impor tant ly  th e  concepts t h a t  went with them. The b a s i s  of t h i s  was 
m i l i t a r y  work. In 1962 i t  r e ce ived  an order to  supply the  m i l i t a r y  with the  
D825 la rg e  s c a le  computer to  co n t ro l  the Back-up In te rc e p t io n  Contro l ,  
BUIC12*. This was a sm al le r  s c a le  SAGE-type system. I t  allowed Burroughs 
to  fund th e  development o f  a computer with m u l t ip l e  p ro cesso rs ,  advanced 
communications and s o p h i s t i c a t e d  memory. This gave i t  a very advanced r e a l ­
time computer,  which Burroughs u t i l i s e d  in a number of ways. In 1965, as 
the  D830, i t  was used to  supply TWA with a l a r g e - s c a l e  f l i g h t  r e s e r v a t i o n  
system. I t  was up-dated as the  B8500 c i v i l  computer,  announced in 1965, 
u t i l i s i n g  in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t  technology and advanced t h i n - f i l m  memory. The 
B8500 was t o  be a very la rge  t im e-sha red  computer system, the  l a r g e s t  of 
the  x500 fam i ly  though not f u l l y  compatible with th e  r e s t  o f  the  family .  
B8500s were ordered by the  U n iv e r s i ty  of  Wisconsin and U.S. S t e e l .  However, 
the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  o rde r  was from Barclays Bank in the  UK125. A 
c e n t r a l l y  loca ted  8500 was to  communicate with Burroughs TC 500 t e rm in a ls  
in almost a l l  2,500 of  i t s  b ranches .  This was t o  be the  l a r g e s t  On-Line 
Transact ion  Processing (0LTP) banking system in the  world,  an a p p l i c a t i o n  
f i rm ly  based on Burroughs' t r a d i t i o n a l  market. The 8500 never became a 
s tandard  p roduc t ,  and most were not d e l iv e red ,  as was the  case with the  
Barclays i n s t a l l a t i o n .  Indeed th e  Barclays e f f o r t  became something of  an 
embarrassment. However, i t  gave Burroughs communication and 0LTP knowledge 
t h a t  was t o  be the  s t r e n g th  of  th e  r e s t  of the  x500 range.
The x500 s e r i e s  a r c h i t e c t u r e  proved to  be a success fu l  range of  la rge  
sca le  systems. I t  was based on the  B5000 f i r s t  d e l iv e red  in 1961 and 
th e r e f o r e  p reda t ing  the  8500. The B5000 was updated in 1964 and became th e  
B5500, and th en ,  in 1966, i t  was brought in to  the  t h i r d  genera t ion  of
123See f i g u r e  8 .2 ,  p301.
12* US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, 'A company study of Burroughs', 30/6/67.
125Ib id.
346
computing as th e  6500. The 5500 's  g rea t  advantage was t h a t  i t  could 
communicate with  15 independent t e r m in a l s ,  and consequently  sold  reasonably  
wel l .  The 6500 o f fe red  g r e a t e r  power, equ iva len t  to  th e  IBM 360/65, and 
again was reasonably  su c c e s s fu l .  Burroughs' p e r ip h e ra l  systems were geared 
to  support  the  advantages t h a t  the  x500 a r c h i t e c t u r e  o f f e r e d .  Burroughs'  
d isk  d r iv e s  had a f ixed  pick-up head on each groove of  th e  d i sk .  While t h i s  
meant they  could not s to r e  as much informat ion as c o m p e t i to r ' s  moving head 
systems, i t  d id  make them very f a s t .  Together with  good communications 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h i s  f e a tu re  g r e a t l y  improved the  a b i l i t y  of  the  x500 range to  
a c t  in th e  0LTP r o l e .  This was a s i g n i f i c a n t  market which o th e r  f i rms had 
d i f f i c u l t y  supplying products  f o r .
Burroughs quickly  in troduced smal le r  systems compatible with the  
6500, the  ad d i t io n s  to  the  range were the  medium sc a le  B2500 and B3500, 
seen by IBM as th e  b e s t  compet it ion  to  the  360/30 and / 4 0 126. While t h i s  
concept meant i t  was tak ing  on IBM's medium and la rge  sca le  p roducts ,  
Burroughs ensured i t  d id  not o v e r - s t r e t c h  i t s e l f .  Components came from 
ou ts id e :  i t  purchased the  most advanced chips t h a t  F a i r c h i l d  had to  o f f e r  
and, while  i t  provided i t s  own f ix e d  head disk d r i v e s ,  p r i n t e r s  were bought 
in .  The 2500/3500 was very  s u c c e s s f u l 127. A.D. L i t t l e  I n c . ,  saw the  
2500/3500 as a la rge  system a t  moderate p r i c e s ,  u t i l i s i n g  advanced 
components and concepts .  I t  had v i r t u a l  memory der ived  from the  6500, 
g iv ing i t  advanced m u l t i - u s e r  a b i l i t i e s .  In 1970 the  6500 and 2/3500 
machines were rep laced  by th e  x700 s e r i e s ,  a l so  de sc r ibed  by A.D. L i t t l e  
as the  most s o p h i s t i c a t e d  on the  market.
Below t h i s  l e v e l ,  Burroughs o f fe red  a sep a ra te  range of  smal le r  
computers.  Announced a t  the  same time as the  B5000 in 1961, the  B200 fa red  
moderately  w e l l .  By 1967 about 500 had been p laced  on th e  market.  However, 
t h i s  had been g r e a t l y  a ided by Burroughs winning th e  c o n t r a c t  f o r  the  Air  
Force Base Level Program, Phase 1A128. This accounted f o r  30% of s a l e s ,  
and put a B200 in most la rg e  USAF bases .  This i s  ano ther  example of how 
la rge  US m i l i t a r y  expendi tu re  on conventional  computers was helping to  
inc rease  th e  economies of  s c a le  of  th e  US in d u s t ry .  Another 40% of  B200 
s a le s  went to  the  f i n a n c i a l  in d u s t ry .  The reason the  system did  well in 
both s e c t o r s ,  was t h a t  th e  B200 was designed with  an o pe ra t ing  s e t  t h a t  
allowed d i r e c t  access  by t e rm in a l .  In banks, t h i s  was used fo r  d i r e c t  on­
126Ib id .
127US vs IBM. px4835, A .D .L i t t l e  Inc, 'The computer indus try  1970-
1975' ,  Apri l  1971.
128US vs IBM. px2082, IBM, 'A company study of Burroughs', 30/6/67.
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l in e  access  by bank t e l l e r s .  Though crude,  t h i s  was an a t t r a c t i v e  f e a t u r e  
fo r  sm al le r  banks. A sm al le r  compat ible  ve rs ion ,  th e  B100, was added to  the  
range.  The B200 was rep laced  by the  B300 in 1965.
An even smal le r  machine was th e  TC500. This was the  s o - c a l l e d  
Terminal Computer fo r  the  l a rge  s c a le  x500 range.  The 8500 i n s t a l l a t i o n  a t  
Barclays was to  have 2,500 of  t h e se  in branches:  they were to  a c t  as 
i n t e l l i g e n t  t e rm in a ls .  While t h i s  c o n t rac t  never came to  f r u i t i o n ,  many 
TC500s were so ld  in s im i l a r  r o l e s .
Burroughs had two o th e r  no tab le  p roducts .  F i r s t ,  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
accounting machines were superseded by the  e l e c t r o n i c s  based E and L ranges 
of c a l c u l a t o r s 129. They were s e l l i n g  a t  around 20,000 per  year  by 1970, 
and A .D .L i t t l e  saw t h i s  as a l a rg e  p o te n t i a l  up-grade market f o r  any small 
t h i r d  g enera t ion  computer t h a t  Burroughs could t u rn  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  t o .  This 
was a p o t e n t i a l  market f o r  th e  B500, a small s ca le  member of the  x500. 
Second, t h e r e  was the  much vaunted ILLIAC IV. This was Burroughs' supe r ­
computer v en tu re .  The p r o j e c t  was funded by [DJARPA, the  [Defence] Advanced 
Research P r o j e c t  Agency, and was being cons t ruc ted  a t  the  U n ive rs i ty  of 
I l l i n o i s ,  f o r  NASA use.  I t  was t o  provide la rge  sca le  i n t e r - a c t i v e  super 
computing, to  improve the  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of NASA eng inee rs :  in t h i s  r e s p ec t  
i t  was s i m i l a r  t o  MIT/GE's p r o j e c t  MAC, which was a l so  funded by [DJARPA. 
This p r o j e c t  s t a r t e d  in the  1960s and la s ted  well in to  the  1970s, but was 
not s u c c e s s f u l .
Thus Burroughs was a growing fo rce  in the  indus t ry  and was 
o u t s t r i p p in g  g i a n t s  l i k e  RCA and GE. Despite t h i s ,  i t  i s  ev iden t  t h a t  i t  
was not competing fo r  a l l  a sp ec t s  of the  market: in s tead  i t  concen tra ted  
on such a reas  as banking and m i l i t a r y  systems, and ignored some p e r ip h e r a l s  
and components. Yet i t  seems t h a t  Burroughs was somewhat l e s s  e n t h u s i a s t i c  
about i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  use r  base than NCR. I t  was not u n t i l  the  l a t t e r  h a l f  
of the  1960s t h a t  the  f i rm  s t a r t e d  o f f e r in g  small s ca le  computers f o r  i t s  
account ing machine user  base .  Burroughs was co n cen t ra t in g  on two b as ic  
product l i n e s :  la rge  s c a l e  commercial computing, l a t e r  jo ined  by a range 
of small s ca le  computers f o r  accounting  purposes.
A breakdown of Burroughs'  computer sa le s  in 1967 shows t h a t ,  indeed, 
the  f i rm  had a f inance  and government emphasis. Figure 8.11 shows a simple 
breakdown of Burroughs' cus tomers .  I t  should be noted t h a t  the  f i g u r e s  f o r  
1967 a re  not r e p r e s e n t i t i v e  as they  over-emphasises the  importance of  non­
government and n o n - f in an c ia l  customers due to  the  inc lu s ion  of two la rge  
orders  f o r  th e  8500 systems from manufacturing and educa t iona l  u se r s :
129US vs IBM. px4835, A . D . L i t t l e ,  'The computer ind u s t ry  1970-75 ' ,  
Apri l  1971.
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F ig u re  8 . 1?
Burroughs EDP Customers.
Financial services. (37.4%)
Other customers, all under 8%. (38.4%)
Federal. (24.2%)
US vs IBM, Px 2082, IBM, Market Evaluation Dept. "A company study of Burroughs Corp". 6/30/67,.
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In the  IBM sec t ion  i t  was shown th a t  NCR and Burroughs were f a i r l y  
h igh ly  geared compared to  IBM. This under l ines  th e  f i n a n c i a l  burden placed 
on them when they  t r i e d  to  expand t h e i r  computer user  base .  They needed 
long term debt to  fund high l e v e l s  o f  R&D, expensive s a le s  networks,  and 
to  cover l e a s e s .  This seems to  have been one of  the  f a c t o r s  t h a t  prevented  
e i t h e r  f i rm  from being ab le  to  t a c k l e  IBM head on. The niche  s t r a t e g y  was 
more success fu l  than the  broad a t t a c k  of the e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, but i t  
a l so  showed the  t r a p  they were in which prevented them ch a l l en g in g  the  
market l e ade r .
CPC and DEC.
The s t a r t - u p  firms CDC and DEC, though completely d i f f e r e n t  types  of  
o rg a n i s a t i o n  and opera t ing  in d i f f e r e n t  areas of computing, a l so  followed 
niche s t r a t e g i e s .  Deta il  on th e se  f i rm s  wil l  be l im i ted :  they  w i l l  merely 
be c o n t r a s te d  to  the  e l e c t r o n i c / e l e c t r i c a l  co rpo ra t ions  to  show t h e i r  more 
focused approach.
D ig i t a l  Equipment Corp made i t s  r e p u ta t io n  bu i ld in g  minicomputers f o r  
the  s c i e n t i f i c  community. DEC then reached the  number two p o s i t i o n  in the  
computer market,  having extended i t s  machinery in to  every aspec t  of  small 
to  medium s c a le  computing. DEC was formed by engineers  from the  Lincoln 
Labora to r ies  of  MIT, p a r t  of the  computer team supporting  MIT's a i r  defence 
developments, working on such famous p ro je c t s  as Whirlwind and SAGE. In the  
l a t e  1950s th e  f u tu r e  head of  DEC, Kenneth Olsen130, worked on 
developing MIT's TXO and TX1 computers.  While o the rs  were s t a r t i n g  to  
develop l a r g e ,  t ime-shared  computers t o  s a t i s f y  the  need f o r  i n t e r a c t i v e  
computer access  fo r  e n g in e e r s 131, the  TXO team took the  oppos i te  
approach. The TXO provided a small departmental  machine f o r  engineers  to  
i n t e r a c t  w i th ,  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  as opposed to c e n t r a l i s e d  computing.
A f te r  the  formation of DEC in 1957, the  f i rm  r a p id ly  expanded from 
making s p e c i a l i s t  r e sea rch  equipment to  producing th e  PDP s e r i e s  of  
computers which were small s c a l e  machines f o r  eng inee rs .  The f i r s t  PDP 
machines d id  w e l l ,  s e l l i n g  in la rg e  numbers to  the  s c i e n t i f i c  and re sea rch  
community. Throughout the  1960s th e  company grew r a p id ly ,  but s t e a d i l y .  
There were two no tab le  f e a t u r e s  of  computers of  t h i s  c l a s s :  f i r s t l y ,  they  
were purchased r a t h e r  than re n te d ,  and secondly,  they  were so ld  to  advanced 
u s e r s ,  t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r in g  only  l im i t e d  programming and s e r v ice  suppor t .
13°G.Rifk in  & G.Harrar ,  The Ultimate  Entrepreneur:  the  s to rv  of Ken 
Olsen and D ig i t a l  Equipment C o rp o ra t io n . Chicago, 1 1 1 . , 1988.
131Indeed MIT i t s e l f  was th e  p r o je c t  manager f o r  the  la rge  t im e ­
shar ing  system P r o jec t  MAC/MULTICS.
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The purchasers  of  these  systems were w i l l i n g  to  develop t h e i r  own programs, 
most of  the  t a sk s  t h a t  the  machines were used f o r  were h igh ly  s p e c i f t c .  DEC 
did not have to  f ind  the  c a p i t a l  t o  fund leases  or to  develop la rge  
software  and se rv ic in g  o p e r a t io n s .  This meant t h a t  the  f i rm  avoided the  
cash-f low problems which fo rced  th e  f i r s t  genera t ion  of small computer 
producers to  s e l l  out to  th e  bus iness  machines f i rm s .
Another advantage t h a t  the  company had was th e  f a c t  t h a t  many of i t s  
machines were sold on an OEM b a s i s 132, as a p a r t  of  another  f i r m ' s  
commercial a p p l i c a t i o n .  Many f i rm s  used an embedded DEC computer as the  
c o n t r o l l e r  device  fo r  i n d u s t r i a l  and m i l i t a r y  systems, a good source of 
cash s a l e s .
From t h i s  so l id  base the  company expanded in to  l a r g e r  s ca le  systems 
f o r  the  sc ience  market, and l a t e r  i t  s t a r t e d  t o  support  and market i t s  
mini-computers f o r  the  commercial market.  The mini-computer market of the  
1970s i s  where DEC managed to  score  i t s  major v i c t o r y ,  b u i ld ing  on the  
niche base i t  had developed in th e  1960s. The f i r m ' s  g re a t  success  was 
producing a product which tapped a huge pent-up demand from advanced users  
not s a t i s f i e d  by the  l a r g e r  t im e-sha re  computers.  I t  did  so without  
encounter ing  c r ip p l in g  cash-f low problems of the  type encountered by the  
more ambitious approach taken by a f i rm  l ike  RCA.
Before the  minicomputer boom of  the  1970s, Control  Data Corp had been 
th e  most d ra m a t ic a l ly  success fu l  f i rm  in the in d u s t ry .  CDC worked a t  both 
ends of  the  s c i e n t i f i c  market,  bu t  has s ince  been most renowned f o r  i t s  
1960s range of super-computers ,  though a t  the  t ime i t s  i n s a t i a b l e  d e s i r e  
f o r  a c q u i s i t i o n  c rea ted  as much f u r o r e .
CDC was formed by many of the  people who had a l so  s t a r t e d  Engineering 
Research A sso c ia te s133. ERA was a small high technology company in 
Minneapolis formed by a number of  ex-US Navy code b reak e rs ,  who s t a r t e d  to  
a c t  as the  USN's c ap t ive  computer and e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm .  Remington bought 
ERA and merged i t  in to  UNIVAC13*; t h i s  caused some d i s co n ten t  in 
Minnesota. In general  UNIVAC's Ph i l ade lph ia  opera t ion  got the  general  
purpose computer work, UNIVAC/ERA tended to  ge t  the  s p e c i a l i s t  m i l i t a r y  
work, though they  managed on occas ion to  pre-empt t h e i r  co l leagues  in
1320 r i g i n a l  Equipment Manufacture,  is  the  term used f o r  desc r ib in g  
c o n t r o l l e r s  o r  o the r  equipment which i s  embedded in a l a r g e r  system.
133D.E. Lundstrom, A few good men from UNIVAC. Cambridge,
Massachusett s ,  1987.
13*See the fin a l section of th is chapter.
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P h i lad e lp h ia  with well timed commercial machines135. William C. N orr i s ,  
while  a s e n io r  o f f i c i a l  with UNIVAC, was one of  th e  most 
d i s c o n te n te d 136. He led the  ERA men into  a new f i rm ,  CDC, which was 
backed by loca l  venture c a p i t a l 137.
The core  reason f o r  CDC's meteor ic  success was i t s  c h i e f  des igne r ,  
Seymour Cray. Discontented  with UNIVAC, Cray phoned Norr is  and t o l d  him he 
would s t a r t  work a t  CDC th e  next morning138. Cray 's  bus iness  plan was 
simple:
'F iv e -y e a r  goal:  Build the  b ig g e s t  computer in the  world.
One-year goal:  Achieve o n e - f i f t h  of the  above .139
CDC's f i r s t  major product ,  the  1604, was snapped up by the  US Navy; 
the  second was bought by the  UK Government f o r  code breaking .  CDC was 
producing a l a rg e ,  powerful machine, cheaply.  I t  avoided the c o s t s  of 
developing huge amounts of a p p l i c a t i o n s  software and t a r g e t t e d  the  highly  
advanced sc ience  market. Sperry t r i e d  to sue CDC f o r  using knowledge 
acquired  from UNIVAC. However, i t  was th e  next l a rge  machine i t  b u i l t  which 
proved the  small company's a b i l i t y ,  and the genius of  Cray. New c i r c u i t  
techn iques ,  cryogenic  coo l ing ,  the  s h o r t e s t  p o s s ib le  connections  between 
c i r c u i t  boards ,  led to  the  6600 super-computer,  the  f i r s t  r e a l l y  success fu l  
su p e r - s c a le  computer. As has been seen,  IBM's r e a c t i o n  to  t h i s  was a mere 
paper phantom. Before the  r e l e a s e  of  th e  follow-up 7600 machine in the  l a t e  
1960s, CDC s t a r t e d  a n t i - t r u s t  proceedings a g a in s t  IBM, p u t t i n g  'Big  Blue'  
o f f  announcing another unbui ldab le  machine. IBM has not s e r i o u s l y  ventured 
in to  t h i s  market s ince .  The 6600 became a range of  super-computers,  the  
s in g l e  p rocesso r  6400 and the  m u l t i -p ro ces so r  6500 ( b a s i c a l l y  two 6400s 
coupled to g e th e r )  and the  6700 (two 6600s t o g e t h e r ) .
CDC was ab le  to  o f f e r  e x c e l l e n t  price /per formance  r a t i o s 1*0 . As 
in th e  case  of DEC, t h i s  was because,  by o f f e r in g  the  machines to  exper t  
u sers  who had unusual a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  CDC did not have t o  provide the  vas t  
backup and sof tware  s e r v ice s  needed elsewhere.  At the  same time i t  supplied
135See below pp359-360.
136CBI Oral H is to ry  C o l l e c t i o n ,  W.C. Norr is  in te rv iewed by A.L. 
Norberg,  28/7 /86 .
137James C. Worthy, William C. Norr is:  P o r t r a i t  o f  a Maverick. 
Cambridge Massachuse tt s ,  1987.
138Ib id  p38.
139Ib id  p39.
14°Nancy Dorfman, Innovation and Market S t r u c t u re :  Lessons from the 
Computer and Semiconductor I n d u s t r i e s . Cambridge Massachuse tt s ,  1987, p59.
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what were probably the  most t e c h n i c a l l y  advanced systems then a v a i l a b l e .
However, CDC did  not j u s t  b u i l d  super-computers.  The sm al le r  160., 
l ik e  the  l a r g e r  1604, was sold in to  th e  science market,  though NCR sold  a 
few commercially.  These machines were replaced by the  3000 s e r i e s  in the  
mid-1960s.  These were comparable to  l a rg e r  360 machines, but were mainly 
sold t o  s c i e n t i f i c  u se r s .  CDC was one of  the  most agg ress ive  companies in 
the  computer market,  acqu i r ing  dozens of  companies. From 1957 to  1973 IBM 
lawyers c a l c u l a t e d  CDC had purchased 60 companies a t  a va lue  of 
$951.4m141. This included the  minicomputer arm of  Bendix, the  s c i e n t i f i c  
computer bureau,  CEIR, and the  Commercial C red i t  Corp worth $.75bn. Bendix 
gave i t  a s take  in the  market f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  mini-computers ,  and i t  was 
success fu l  in OEM markets.
I t  moved only slowly in to  th e  commercial market: i t  opened up 
computer da ta  networks, computer bureaus ,  and became th e  l a r g e s t  su p p l ie r  
of OEM p e r ip h e r a l s  to  o the r  p roducers .  While f irms l i k e  Memorex and Telex 
are  famous f o r  o f f e r i n g  plug compat ible  disk and tape  d r iv e s  to  end u se r s ,  
CDC was supply ing the  producers ,  inc luding  Burroughs, ICL, Honeywell and 
many o t h e r s .  In the  1970s i t  continued  to  supply super-computers,  rep laced  
the  3000 range with machines of broader  appeal,  and even s t a r t e d  producing 
IBM-compatible computers.
CDC's f a l l  from grace ,  under competi t ion from the  l ik e s  of Cray 
Research,  was equa l ly  dramat ic .  CDC was b u i l t  on the  back o f  a s t a r  r a t i n g  
in the  investment market. The loss  o f  Cray, and the  f i n a n c i a l  f a i l u r e  of 
the  huge i n t e r a c t i v e  education system, PLUTO, undermined t h i s  s t a t u s  as 
e a r ly  as the  mid-1970s, and by the  l a t e  1970s t h i s  made suppor t ing  i t s  debt 
an extremely d i f f i c u l t  p rospec t .  CDC i s  now a shadow of  i t s  former s e l f .
These f i rms  only competed in an oblique  way with IBM. DEC proved the  
most su ccess fu l  in the  long run.  However, they  both d isp layed  an a b i l i t y  
to  c ap tu re  a n iche and to  b u i ld  on t h a t  niche to  e n t e r  th e  more mainstream 
markets.  They had s o l id  cash flows from the tendency of s c i e n t i f i c  and OEM 
users  to  purchase  systems. R&D was focused on th e  hardware.  B e t t e r  sof tware 
and suppor t  came as the  companies grew and enough funds became a v a i l a b l e  
to  provide  t h e se  e x t r a  f a c i l i t i e s .
This i s  not d i s s i m i l a r  to  NCR and Burroughs. The accounting machine 
fi rms d id  have the  expense of  l e a s in g  systems, but they  were ab le  to  
concen t ra te  on e s t a b l i s h e d  n iches ,  g iv ing them a s o l id  base to  bu i ld  on, 
a major c o n t r a s t  to  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s.
1A1US vs IBM. dx296, IBM attorney's estimates.
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Honevwell and Sperry Rand
Unti l  the  1980s t h e re  were two o the r  no tab le  su rv iv o rs  in the  
computer in d u s t ry  which f e l l  somewhere in between th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies 
and the  bus iness  machine f i rm s .  Sperry-Rand was a major bus iness  machine 
company, but was a l so  h eav i ly  involved in m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  farm 
equipment and a number of o the r  a r e a s .  Honeywell, by a combination of  a 
shrewd approach to  the  market,  and a slow b u i ld  up of  i t s  computer market 
coverage,  managed to e s t a b l i s h  a l a rge  computer op e ra t io n .
These were the two f i rms which b e n e f i t t e d  most d i r e c t l y  from the 
demise of RCA and GE. Sperry acquired  the RCA use r  base ,  making i t  once 
more the  number two computer company and Honeywell absorbed GE's op e ra t io n .
Honevwell
Honeywell 's  en t ry  in to  the  general  purpose computer bus iness  was via  
a j o i n t  ventu re  with Raytheon142. In the l a t e  1940s and e a r l y  1950s, 
Raytheon had undertaken some e a r l y  computer developments with m i l i t a r y  
sponsorship .  However, once these  sources  d r ied  up i t  was not i n t e r e s t e d  in 
continuing  with computers on a s p ec u la t iv e  b a s i s .  Raytheon was a completely 
m i l i t a r y  o r i e n t a t e d  company: by th e  1980s i t  was one of  the  l a r g e s t  
m i l i t a r y  c o n t r a c to r s  in the  USA143. Honeywell was a l so  in the  m i l i t a r y  
bus iness ,  bu t i t  was eq u a l ly  involved in c i v i l  in s t rum en ta t ion  and 
i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t r o l .  In 1955 Honeywell formed DATAmatic with  Raytheon144. 
Raytheon suppl ied  150 eng inee rs ,  Honeywell supplying j u s t  12 s t a f f ,  but 
Honeywell took 60% of the  s tock  and quickly  took f u l l  c o n t r o l 145.
The f i r s t  product was the  D-1000, a very la rge  bus iness  machine. 
Seven were b u i l t ,  two f o r  use by Honeywell and f i v e  were leased  out a t  an 
annual income of  $3m146. However, the  major e f f o r t  t o  e n t e r  the  market 
was in 1960, and l ik e  so many of th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, i t  was based 
on second genera t ion  technology. The H400 and H800 were designed to  run 
m ul t ip le  programs, t h e r e f o r e  being ab le  to  perform such th in g s  as input-  
output  fu n c t io n s  while a main program was running.  They were compatible 
machines, a f a i r l y  advanced f e a t u r e  f o r  the t ime.  They had l im i ted  success
142Auerbach 'A corpo ra te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y ' ,  Chapter V 'Minneapolis -  
Honeywell Regulator Company', 1960.
143D. Todd, The world e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry .  1989, pl55.
144Auerbach Corp, 'A co rpora te  business  s t r a t e g y ' ,  chap te r  V.
145US vs IBM. t r7573,  R.M. Bloch, a t  the  t ime of the  merger Bloch had
been head of th e  Raytheon Computer Div is ion.
146Ib id.
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with over 120 H400's and 12 upgraded H1400 systems i n s t a l l e d  by la te -1966 
and 89 H800's and 21 upgraded H1800's147. However by t h i s  t ime the 
upgraded models had been e c l i p s e d  by th e  next Honeywell range ,  th e  H200.
Simultaneously,  Honeywell produced the  i n d u s t r i a l  con t ro l  H290 
computer, which was used by Honeywell 's  Brown Instrument D iv is ion .  In the 
mid-1960s the  i n d u s t r i a l  process  co n t ro l  d iv i s io n ,  the  computer department,  
the  computer bureau ope ra t ion  and some o ther  a c t i v i t i e s  were merged in to  
one: l a t e r ,  with GE and Bull added to  i t ,  i t  become known as Honeywell 
Information Systems.
Even by 1960 the  Auerbach Corpora t ion148 had noted t h a t  Honeywell 
was b u i ld in g  up a very la rge  marketing fo rce .  In 1967 IBM es t imated  t h a t  
the  s i z e  of the  f i e l d  fo rce  had rocketed  to n e a r ly  5,500; the  t h i r d  l a r g e s t  
in the  in d u s t r y 149.
In 1962 the  company took a r a d ic a l  d ec i s io n  to  a t t a c k  IBM's user 
base,  but in a way which s t i l l  avoided d i r e c t  compet it ion  with  IBM's 
systems. The H200 was in troduced a few weeks before  th e  IBM 360150. 
Honeywell recognised t h a t  IBM was l i k e l y  to merge the  commercial 1400 range 
with the  l a r g e r  7000 machines,  and th e re fo re  th e  new range would not be 
compatible with the old systems. The H200 was designed so t h a t  a 1400 
program could be e a s i l y  run on i t ,  in the  hope t h a t  t h i s  would e n t i c e  some 
of the  10,000 1401 users  in to  us ing Honeywell 's implementation of  second 
genera t ion  a r c h i t e c t u r e .  The hope was t h a t  many users  would not want to  
change to  IBM's new a r c h i t e c t u r e  as i t  e n t a i l e d  la rge  a l t e r a t i o n s  to  
sof tware ,  bu t  they  s t i l l  wanted access  t o  more advanced components t o  speed 
the  system up. In many r e s p e c t s  the  H200 was not as advanced as the  400/800 
range,  bu t  i t  hoped t h i s  would not worry many u s e r s .
This  worked. A s i g n i f i c a n t  number of IBM 1400 use r s  wanting to  
upgrade to  more capable  systems opted f o r  the  H200. The scope of  th e  range 
grew with the  a d d i t io n s  of  the  sm a l le r  H120, and l a r g e r  H1200 and H2200:
147IDC, EDP Indus t ry  and Market Repor t . 29/12/66, p2
148Auerbach, VA c o rpo ra te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y ' ,  ch ap te r  V.
149US vs IBM, dx? (due to  the  poor q u a l i t y  of t h i s  document the  number 
i s  not l e g i b l e ) ,  IBM Market Evalua tion  Department, VA company s t u d y  of 
Honeywell I n c . ' ,  29/12/69.
15°IDC, EDP Indus t ry  and Market Report 29/12/66, ppl-12 .
Table 8.11 Honevwell 200 Series Sales, up to December 1966.
Machine I n s t a l l e d  base
H120 350
H200 1014
H1200 65
H2200 20
Source: IDC, EDP Indust ry  and Market Repor t , 29 /12/66, ppl-12.
One source  es t imated  t h a t  by 1966 Honeywell had i n s t a l l e d  $270 . lm worth of 
systems, 7.4% of  the market,  p u t t i n g  them a d i s t a n t  second to  IBM (a t  
68 . 3%)151.
By t h i s  s tage  Honeywell was a l so  o f f e r in g  a la rge  range of i n d u s t r i a l  
and m i l i t a r y  con t ro l  computers. I t  a l so  moved in to  minicomputers.  These 
computers were used throughout Honeywell 's o p e ra t io n s ,  being suppl ied  as 
imbedded c o n t r o l l e r s  in i n d u s t r i a l  systems, as well  as being so ld  in t h e i r  
own r i g h t .
Honeywell had a good r e p u ta t i o n  among i t s  u s e r s .  IDC found t h a t  most
Honeywell u se r s  ra ted  i t s  machines and s e r v ic e s  as e x c e l l e n t 152.
However, i t  had cut some co rne rs  to  ensure c o s t s  did  not mushroom. Users
found t h a t  Honeywell's  t r a i n i n g  was l im i t ed ,  and some advanced software  was
not a v a i l a b l e .  More im por tan t ly ,  l i k e  o ther  f i r m s ,  Honeywell was r e ly in g
on o u ts id e  sources  fo r  some p e r i p h e r a l s ;  CDC was again the  d isk  s u p p l i e r .
Some p e r i p h e r a l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Honeywell 's  punched card reading  equipment,
were seen as being weak. Honeywell was a lso  t a r g e t i n g  i t s  computers a t
c e r t a in  markets .  IDC be l ieved  t h a t  th e  emphasis was on:
manufactur ing,  r e t a i l i n g ,  in su rance ,  s t a t e  government, t r a n s p o r t  and 
f in a n c e 153.
In 1966, Honeywell planned to  in c rease  i t s  investment in programming and 
a p p l i c a t io n  software  f o r  th e se  s p e c i f i c  markets by 50%. The emphasis was 
commercial r a t h e r  than s c i e n t i f i c 154.
There fo re ,  i t  seems t h a t  Honeywell was much more market-dr iven  than 
o ther  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s.  I t  had a l a rg e  marketing o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  and was 
w i l l i n g  merely to  update second genera t ion  a r c h i t e c t u r e  and to  a t t a c k  a 
c e r t a i n  a sp ec t  of  the  market;  i t  was not techno logy- led .  I t  t a r g e t e d  a 
c e r t a i n  type of  computing and b u i l t  th e  scope of  the  opera t ion  s t e a d i l y ,  
un l ike  th e  o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s .  Honeywell's  EDP and co n t ro l  computer
1S1Ib id .
152 lb i d .
153Ib id .
154Ib id .
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a c t i v i t i e s  were covered by the  same ope ra t iona l  group; in o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  
fi rms they  tended to be sep a ra te  p r o f i t  c e n t r e s .  As i t  p rogressed  in the  
in dus t ry ,  Honeywell improved i t s  p e r ip h e ra l s  and increased  sof tware  support  
f o r  i t s  t a r g e t  groups: te chn iques  more in keeping with  the  bus iness  machine 
f i rm s.
A f i n a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between Honeywell and GE and RCA was th e  g r e a t e r  
importance of  th e  computer o pe ra t ion  to  the company. IDC e s t im ated  t h a t  by 
1967 EDP s a l e s  would r e p r e s e n t  26% of Honeywell 's  revenue155. IBM 
est imated  t h a t  Honeywell 's computer group was p r o f i t a b l e  by the  l a t e  mid- 
1960s156, something few o th e r s  could achieve.  Computers were much more 
important to  Honeywell than to  GE and RCA.
However, IBM be l ieved  t h a t  Honeywell 's r a p id  growth would slow down 
in the  1970s. The H200 range had been a g rea t  market ing success  but o f f e red  
l i t t l e  to  users  wanting more advanced f e a t u r e s .  This was probably the  
underly ing impetus behind Honeywell 's  purchase of  GE's computer d i v i s i o n .  
In the  l a t e  1960s, Honeywell was cons ider ing  what type of  equipment i t  
needed to  compete adequate ly  in the  1970s. I t  be l ieved  t h a t  even the  H200 
success would not give i t  a la rge  enough user base adequate ly  to  spread the  
R&D c o s t s  involved157. The Honeywell 200 was b a s i c a l l y  not advanced, and 
i t s  e f f o r t s  to  b r ing  the  H200 range and H400/800 systems to g e th e r  proved 
to  be impossible .  I t  s t a r t e d  developing the very la rge  8200 computer to  do 
t h i s ,  but i t  was ev en tu a l ly  c a n c e l l e d 156. Thus Honeywell needed a more 
advanced o f f e r i n g .  I t  a l so  be l ieved  t h a t  a wider i n t e r n a t i o n a l  base was 
needed to  spread R&D burdens.
GE could o f f e r  a l l  t h i s .  In 1970 the  success fu l  marketeer Honeywell 
acquired GE's computer d iv i s io n  f o r  an exchange of  s h a r e s 159. This not 
only gave Honeywell the  market share  i t  perceived was needed, but i t  gave 
i t  computers of  more advanced concept.  The t ime-shared  GE 600 a r c h i t e c t u r e  
was maintained as a product,  d e s p i t e  th e  problems GE had with i t .  The H6000 
followed i t ,  which in tu rn  led to  Honeywell 's main 1970s p roduc ts ,  the  
Level 66 and Level 68 machines160, which o f fe red  support  f o r  d i s t r i b u t e d  
p rocess ing .  Honeywell 's  mini-computer technology was a p a r t  of  the
155Ib id .
156US vs IBM, dx?, IBM, 'A company study of  Honeywell I n c . ' ,  29/12/69.
157US vs IBM. tr4990 ,  C.W. Spangle,  a Honeywell manager.
158Ib id ,  t r4989.
159Ib id  tr4990.
16° Ib id , tr4961.
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d i s t r i b u t e d  process ing concept and i t  s t rengthened i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  in t h i s  
f i e l d .  Honeywell updated th e  200 s e r i e s  with  the  2000 range ,  which 
continued as an important product range.  Even th e  small s ca le  G100 was 
main ta ined as a product.  The advanced GE 600 o p e ra t in g  system, GCOS, became 
the  main Honeywell opera t ing  system.
Honeywell was more committed to  surv iv ing  in t h i s  market than GE, 
which had o th e r  burdens such as n u c lea r  power and j e t  eng ines .  Computers 
r e p re se n te d  a l a rg e  p a r t  of Honeywell 's  bus iness  and were t i e d  in to  many 
of i t s  o th e r  op e ra t io n s .  GE's technology added t o  Honeywell's  o p e ra t io n s :  
the  H200/IBM 1400 c o m p a t ib i l i ty  being a somewhat s t a l e  marketing coup by 
the  1970s. Much of  Honeywell 's work in the  1970s was spent in ensur ing t h a t  
the  u se r s  of the  var ious  GE and Honeywell systems upgraded to  the  
GE600/Honeywell L66/68 a r c h i t e c t u r e 161.
Sperrv  Rand.
In 1955 Sperry-Rand 's  share  o f  computer market revenue was 30%; 
however, in the  next f i f t e e n  years  t h i s  share  f e l l  r a p i d l y .  By 1977 the  
value of  i t s  i n s t a l l e d  base was the  same as Honeywell and Burroughs. Before 
1955 th e  company was even more powerful in the  f l e d g l in g  computer market,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in the  f i e l d  of  l a rge  s c a l e  systems:
Table 8.12
D e l iv e r i e s  of e a r l y  l a rge  s c a le  computers in the  USA.
Year Total  Computer D e l iv e r i e s  Remington Rand
in the  USA Computers d e l iv e red .
1950 1 1
1951 4 4
1952 5 5
1953 7 7
1954 9 8
1955 32 9
Source: CBI Archive,  Auerbach E lec t ro n ic s  Corpora tion ,  'A co rpo ra te  
b us iness  s t r a t e g y  fo r  informat ion p rocess ing ,  1960-1970' ,  Chapter 2 'Sperry  
C o r p o r a t io n ' ,  1960.
Sperry Rand was formed in 1956 a f t e r  the  merger o f  the  defence 
e l e c t r o n i c s ,  c o n t r o l s ,  h y d rau l ic s  and farm equipment company, Sperry ,  and 
the  second l a r g e s t  bus iness  machine company, Remington Rand162. The
161US vs IBM. dx230, i n t e r n a l  Honeywell memo from, R.A. Kovak to  R.R. 
Douglas,  20 /5 /75 ,  This memo d iscussed  methods o f  ensur ing t h a t  GE 400 users  
t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the  L66, r a t h e r  than to  a r i v a l  product.
162CBI Archive,  Auerbach E lec t ro n ic s  Corpora tion,  'A co rpo ra te  
bus iness  s t r a t e g y  fo r  in format ion p rocess ing ,  1960-1970' ,  Chapter 2 'Spe rry  
C o r p o r a t io n ' ,  1960.
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breakdown of the company's 1959 revenue shows the m ilita ry  dominance:
Table 8.13  
Revenue source:
Defence: 52%
Domestic, commercial 30%
I n te r n a t i o n a l  18%
Total Sperry Rand revenue: $l,173m
Source: Auerbach, 'A co rpo ra te  business  s t r a t e g y  f o r  informat ion
p r o c e s s in g ' ,  Chapter 2 'S p e r ry  C orpo ra t ion ' ,  1960.
I t s  dominance of  the  e a r l y  la rge  s ca le  computer market was a r e s u l t  of 
Remington Rand a c q u i s i t i o n s  in the  ea r ly  1950s. I t  purchased two of 
America 's  leading computer e n t e r p r i s e s .  These were the  Eckert  and Mauchly 
Computer Corpora tion ,  developers  of  th e  ENIAC and BINAC m i l i t a r y  computers 
and the  commercial UNIVAC163, and Engineering Research A ssoc ia te s ,  
developers  of  th e  1101 system used by the  US Navy and the  National  S ecu r i ty  
Agency164. ERA was p a r t i a l l y  absorbed in to  UNIVAC. Af te r  Sperry 
purchased Remington Rand, the  p o s i t i o n  of the  computer opera t ion  was 
complex. James Rand was allowed to  run Remington as a s e l f -gove rn ing  
o p e ra t io n ,  so th e  computer opera t ion  was in e f f e c t  th e  UNIVAC d i v i s i o n  of 
the  Remington Rand group of  Sperry Rand165.
The purchase  of UNIVAC and ERA gave Remington-Rand con t ro l  of two of 
the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  e a r l y  computer systems, the  UNIVAC I and the  ERA 1100 
s e r i e s 166. The former tended to  be used by commercial c l i e n t s ,  while  the  
1100 range was favoured f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  c a l c u l a t i o n .  The UNIVAC successor  
was th e  UNIVAC I I ,  engineered by the  ERA team in Minnesota, which had 
b a s i c a l l y  the  same lo g ic ,  but added magnetic core s to rag e  and improved tape  
speeds.  However, problems seem to  have occurred in coo rd ina t ing  the  two 
halves of  the  UNIVAC d i v i s i o n  and th e  UNIVAC I I  was not r e l e a s e d  u n t i l  
1957, when o th e r  f i rms were s t a r t i n g  to  o f f e r  second genera t ion  computers.  
By 1960 only  33 had been s o l d 167.
163Nancy S te rn ,  From ENIAC to  UNIVAC-An a p p ra i sa l  of  the  Eckert  and 
Mauchlev computers . Bedford Mass, 1981.
164Hakala Assoc ia tes  I n c . ,  Engineering Research A ssoc ia tes :  The 
well sp r ing  of  Minnesota 's  computer i n d u s t ry . St  Paul Minnesota,  undated.  
This pamphlet was commissioned by the  Sperry Corp.
165Auerbach, 'A co rp o ra te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y ' ,  chap te r  2.
1S6Ib i d .
167Ibid.
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On the  ERA s ide ,  the  1101 was rep laced  by the  1102 which was widely 
used f o r  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l .  This was then r e p laced  by the  1103-A and the 
upgraded 1105, which, while  s i m i l a r ,  were not compat ible  with th e  o lder  
machines.
The UNIVAC opera t ion  was slow to  produce a small computer, and was 
slow to  e x p l o i t  the  l a rge  Remington Rand t a b u l a t o r  use r  base .  The f i r s t  
o f f e r in g  was the  UNIVAC F i l e  Computer o f  1956. This machine again came from 
the Minnesota s id e  of the  o p e ra t io n .  The F i l e  Computer had t o  compete with 
the IBM 650 and 305 RAMAC, but i t  was not the  success  t h a t  might have been 
expected: l i k e  th e  la rge  UNIVAC I I ,  i t  was r e l e a s e d  too l a t e .  I t  d id  not 
match th e  s a l e s  of IBM machines,  and only 130 were made168.
I t s  f i r s t  r e a l l y  s u ccess fu l  small-medium sca le  computer was the  
UNIVAC S o l i d - S t a t e .  This was a semi-second g enera t ion  machine from the 
P h i lade lph ia  h a l f  of UNIVAC, which s u r p r i s i n g l y  used IBM s tandard  80 hole 
punched cards  f o r  inp u t -o u tp u t .  I t  drew on technology developed f o r  a US 
Air Force sponsored computer f o r  i t s  Cambridge Research C en t re169. I t  
used magnetic core  lo g ic ,  and presumably had IBM punched cards because 
these  were s tandard  a t  t h a t  r e s ea rc h  f a c i l i t y .  In many r e s p e c t s  i t  was l ik e  
the EMI Aust in machine, us ing magnetic lo g i c ,  but with vacuum tubes 
elsewhere.  I n i t i a l l y  i t  was only  marketed in Europe; a l l  s a l e s  e n q u i r ie s  
in the  US were re fused  u n t i l  1959170. There appear to  have been two 
reasons f o r  t h i s :  f i r s t ,  i t  would have undermined s a l e s  of the  delayed F i l e  
Computer, and, second, i t  would a l s o  have undermined th e  core  Remington 
product l i n e ,  t h e  90 hole  card  punches and t a b u l a t o r s 171. Eventually  
somewhere in th e  region of  600 of  th e s e  machines, inc lud ing  both th e  80 and 
90 hole ve rs ion  and the  SSII u p -d a te ,  were i n s t a l l e d 172. However, while 
the SS range g r e a t l y  ou tso ld  the  F i l e  Computer, i t  f a i l e d  to  reach the  
sca le  of  production  IBM was ach iev ing  with th e  1401.
Other second genera t ion  equipment was g e n e r a l ly  no more su cc e ss fu l .  
One excep t iona l  success was th e  1004. This was a small punched card  based 
ca lcu la to r /com pu te r .  I t  was idea l  f o r  the  l a rge  Remington t a b u l a t o r  user  
base t h a t  wanted to  have improved f u n c t io n s ,  but d id  not d e s i r e  a l a rg e r  
computer. Many thousands of  th e se  were so ld ,  and i t  became a v i t a l  product
168Ib id .
169Ib id .
170lb i d .
171F ishe r  e t  a l ,  IBM and the  US da ta  p rocess ing  i n d u s t r y . p59.
172Ib id ,  p60.
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to  Sperry-Rand. The 1005 and the  medium sca le  1050 computers were added to  
the range ,  g iv ing  an upgrade path f o r  1004 u s e r s .  This low end range was 
the most success fu l  p a r t  of  the  UNIVAC opera t ion .
However, t h e  r e s t  of  th e  second genera t ion  computer range was r a t h e r  
confused. The UNIVAC II  was rep laced  by the t r a n s i s t o r i s e d  I I I ,  while the  
1107 became th e  new s o l i d  s t a t e  ERA o f f e r i n g 173. These were jo ined  by 
the 490, a l a r g e - s c a l e  r e a l - t im e  computer used f o r  such th in g s  as a i r l i n e  
booking and r e s e r v a t i o n  systems17*. F in a l ly ,  l a r g e r  than a l l  the se  was 
the LARC, S p e r r y ' s  tu rn  to  f a i l  in th e  super-computer market.
The LARC was ordered under a development c o n t r a c t  by the  Livermore 
Atomic Research Laboratory.  Sperry  i s  est imated  t o  have ove r - sp en t  by $10m 
on the  f ix e d  p r i c e  c o n t r a c t 175. I f  Sperry got anyth ing from t h i s  e f f o r t ,  
i t  was only  one or  two s a l e s  and some ex t ra  c i r c u i t  know-how.
Outs ide general  purpose computing, the  UNIVAC Div is ion  and the  r e s t  
of Sperry Rand b u i l t  many s p e c i a l i s t  computers. Most of th e se  were m i l i t a r y  
systems: t h i s  i s  not s u r p r i s in g  given the  m i l i t a r y  connections  of both the  
UNIVAC Div is ion  and the  r e s t  of Sperry .  UNIVAC was the  l a r g e s t  producer of 
s p e c i a l i s t  m i l i t a r y  computer systems in the USA. This gave the  company both 
access  t o  m i l i t a r y  R&D sponsorship  and a good market f o r  h igh-va lue  high- 
p r o f i t  systems.
Yet d e s p i t e  i t s  e a r l y  s t r e n g th  Sperry-Rand had gone from the  number 
one spot  in th e  in d u s t ry  to  a poor second. The problems seem to  have f a l l e n  
in to  two c a t e g o r i e s :  f i r s t ,  e a r l y  products  were not d e l iv e re d  on t ime and 
were poor ly  supported; second, t h e r e  were se r io u s  problems with the  
o rg a n i s a t i o n  of  the  c o rp o ra t io n ,  problems which mir rored  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
found in o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies.
Product fa ilu re .
UNIVAC was undermined by the  p u b l ic i s ed  f a i l u r e  of  some of i t s  e a r ly  
p roduc ts .  One o f  the  most d iscussed  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  o f  the  UNIVAC I ,  was a t  
the  GE Appliance Park in L o u i s v i l l e ,  th e  f i r s t  commercial e l e c t r o n i c  da ta  
process ing  system176. However, i t  took much more than i n s t a l l i n g  the
173US vs IBM. dx8, J . P .  Ecker t ,  i n t e rn a l  memo to  H.B. Horton 7 /4 /61 ,  
o u t l i n in g  th e  c h ao t i c  s t a t e  of the  Sperry computer range and th e  wasted 
e f f o r t  t h i s  e n t a i l e d .
17* Ib id .
175Auerbach, 'A co rpo ra te  bus iness  s t r a t e g y ' ,  chap te r  2.
176R.F. Osborn, GE and UNIVAC: Harnessing the  high-speed computer, 
Harvard Business Review. July-August 1954, pp99-107.
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computer to  give GE, and th e  o th e r  e a r ly  u s e r s ,  an o p e ra t io n a l  da ta  
p rocess ing system. The Auerbach Corpora tion  be l ieved  UNIVAC was d e l iv e r in g  
computers be fo re  the customers were ready, and then not o f f e r i n g  the 
se rv ice  and programming suppor t  needed to  make th e  computers u se fu l  to  
t h e i r  new owners177. I t  was a new technology being used fo r  a new type 
of a p p l i c a t i o n :  users  needed he lp  in ach ieving t h i s .  A second problem was 
with the  UNIVAC II  and th e  F i l e  Computer, which were both promised well 
before  they  were d e l iv e red .  P o t e n t i a l  customers l o s t  f a i t h  in the  a b i l i t y  
of the  f i rm  to  d e l i v e r ,  and when they  did  f i n a l l y  appear they  were too  l a t e  
fo r  the  f i r s t  genera t ion  o f  computing.
IBM was much more success fu l  a t  o f f e r in g  s e r v ic e  and suppor t .  I t s  
follow up machines to  the  701 and 702, which were i n f e r i o r  to  th e  UNIVAC 
I,  were much b e t t e r  than the  slow-to-emerge UNIVAC I rep lacements .
Organisational confusion.
The major f a i l u r e  seems to  have been the  i n a b i l i t y  of Remington to  
in t e g r a t e  the  two computer o p e ra t io n s  with each o th e r  or  with i t s  bus iness  
machines o p e ra t io n .  At the  t ime of  th e  Sperry purchase of Remington, the  
company was desc r ibed  thus :
'Washington has a name f o r  i t :  a 'cong lom era te '  merger,  the  
union o f  two non-competi t ive  companies with  nothing in common except 
the  d e s i r e  to f ace  the  f u t u r e  to g e th e r .  Sperry-Rand i s  1955 's 
b ig g e s t  conglomerate to  d a t e . . . ' 178
I t  was headed by Harry F. V ickers ,  with James Rand s tay ing  in charge of the
Remington D iv is io n ,  and with Remington's ex-chairman,  General Douglas
MacArthur, becoming the  chairman of  Sperry-Rand. The lo g ic  fo r  the  merger
was seen in the  combination of  UNIVAC and the  Sperry m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s
ope ra t io n s .
However, William Norr i s  viewed th e  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  d i f f e r e n t l y :
' . . H a r r y  Vickers  [Sper ry  CEO] d i d n ' t  unders tand what he 
bought.  He thought he bought in to  the  computer b us ines s .  What he 
bought was a chance to  ge t  in to  the  computer bus iness  by inves t in g  
a h e l l  of  a l o t  more in R&D. And he w a sn ' t  p repared to  spend the  
money.
Norris was p laced  in o p e ra t io n a l  charge of the  UNIVAC d i v i s i o n ,  but h is  
con tro l  seems to  have been very  l i m i t e d ,  with UNIVAC's Eckert  a c t i n g  as the  
d i v i s i o n ' s  p re s id e n t .  Despi te  an e a r l i e r  s ta tement  by Vickers t h a t  he
177Auerbach Corp, 'A co rp o ra te  business  s t r a t e g y ' ,  chap te r  2.
178E.L. Van Deusen, 'The Two-Plus-Two of Sperry Rand' ,  Fo r tune . August
1955, p88.
179CBI Oral History Collection, William Norris.
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wanted to  bu i ld  up the  EDP o p e ra t io n ,  Sperry management were not pleased 
by th e  heavy R&D costs  and the  lo s se s  incurred in t h i s  d i v i s i o n .
Coord ination between s ec t io n s  of both the  company and th e  u n i t s  
w i th in  th e  UNIVAC d iv i s io n  seems to  have been l im i t e d .  When ques t ioned  as 
to  how much cooperation th e r e  was between ERA, P h i l ad e lp h ia  and th e  punched 
card o pe ra t ion  in Norwalk, Norr is  gave a long d i scou rse  on th e  bad 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  the  company:
'Very l i t t l e .  P re s id e n t  Eckert  took th e  view t h a t  what ERA was 
doing was not s t a t e  of the  a r t .  There fore ,  he d i d n ' t  want to  waste 
h i s  t ime with us.  Norwalk was le ss  involved in e l e c t r o n i c s .  They 
were s t i l l  in the  t a b u l a t o r  e r a . ' 180
Eckert  seems to  have had a s im i l a r  view, but not s u r p r i s i n g l y  saw
P h i l ad e lp h ia  as the  hard-done-by o rg a n i s a t i o n .  Eckert  a l so  blamed the
f a i l u r e  to  e x p l o i t  i t s  p o s i t i o n  on the  poor s t r u c t u r e  of the  company. Until
h is  r e t i r e m e n t ,  James Rand was running Remington Rand as a s ep a ra te  e n t i t y
with in  Sperry Rand181. This meant t h a t  the  Sperry management did  not
have d i r e c t  con t ro l  over th e  computer opera t ion  and y e t  they  were expected
to  f in d  the  funding necessary  to  cover the  l o s se s .  From 1953 to  1958 Sperry
Rand s a l e s  had increased by 39%, but earnings  f e l l  by 19%182. The cause
was the  c o s t s  of  developing and marketing computers.  A f u r t h e r  problem was
the  d i v i s i o n  of  the  s a l e s  o pe ra t ions  from the computer manufacturing u n i t s .
Sa les  s t a f f  were s p l i t  between such th ings  as ty p e w r i t e r s  and o f f i c e
equipment. I n i t i a l l y  t h e r e  were few fo r  computers,  and even by 1962
computer salesmen numbered only  500183.
I t  i s  not s u r p r i s i n g ,  given th e  d iv i s io n  between the  ERA and
P h i lad e lp h ia  o p e ra t io n s ,  t h a t  UNIVAC supported a number o f  incompat ible
computer a r c h i t e c t u r e s  w i th in  the  company. This meant t h a t  i t  l o s t  the
economies o f  s c a le  and scope t h a t  should have been made with th e  merger of
UNIVAC and ERA. I t  a l so  f a i l e d  to  u t i l i s e  the  oppor tun i ty  t h a t  IBM had so
well e x p lo i t e d :  s e l l i n g  systems to  the  f i r m ' s  v a s t  t a b u l a t o r  user  base .  I t
was not u n t i l  th e  low-technology 1004 t h a t  the  company had a small machine
i t  could s e l l  t o  i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  customers.
Sperry had made the  fo llowing major e r r o r s :
i )  I t  d id  not e s t a b l i s h  c e n t r a l  con t ro l  of a r c h i t e c t u r e s ,
i i )  t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  was producing m u l t ip le  and incompat ible systems,
18° I b id .
181J .P  Eckert  in te rv iewed in 'Pos t-Mortem',  Forbes 15/9 /61, pp35-6.
182Ib id .
183Ib id .
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m ul t ip ly ing  R&D c o s t s .
i i i )  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  mergers led  to  no manufacturing economies.
iv) programming, support  and s e r v i c e  cos ts  were m u l t i p l i e d .
v) and i t  d id  not u t i l i s e  the  marketing advantage of  having a la rge  
and well  e s t a b l i s h e d  t a b u l a t o r  user  base .
This i n t e r n a l  chaos w i th in  th e  UNIVAC d i v i s i o n  was pe rpe tua ted  a f t e r  
Norris had taken his  eng ineers  away. Eckert  became a d i r e c t o r  without 
p o r t f o l i o  and t r i e d  on many occas ions  to  persuade th e  company to  coord ina te  
i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  b e t t e r :
'Back when Mr Schnackel was p re s id e n t  o f  Univac, i t  was
proposed t h a t  we b u i ld  a 490, a UNIVAC I I I  and an 1107. I s t ro n g ly
opposed t h i s  i d e a  U nfor tuna te ly ,  the  p o l i t i c a l  na tu re  of  Univac
prevented a r e s o lu t io n  of  t h i s  problem and we went ahead and b u i l t  
t h r e e  l o g i c a l l y  u n re la ted  machines.  At t h a t  t ime t h e r e  were severa l  
meetings and d i s cu s s io n s  on th e  matte r but the  s i t u a t i o n  was never 
re so lv ed .  All t h i s  occurred over ten years  ago  /1S*
N ever the le ss ,  Sperry remained a compet itor f o r  the  number two
p o s i t io n  in the  indus t ry ,  and UNIVAC became the  l a r g e s t  s in g l e  component 
of the  conglomerate.  In 1963, a f t e r  a major conference ,  Sperry f i n a l l y
ended one of  i t s  ranges by dec id ing  not to  update th e  UNIVAC I I I .  The
success fu l  1004 was jo ined  by the  updated 1005. A new medium sca le  machine, 
the  1050, proved reasonably  s u c c e s s f u l ,  thanks to  i t s  c o m p a t ib i l i t y  with 
the  1004/5.  The 490 medium sca le  r e a l - t im e  systems con t inued .  The 1107 
s c i e n t i f i c  computer was rep laced  in 1964 by the  success fu l  t h i r d  genera t ion  
1108 and t ime-shared  1108 I I .  These a l so  had a g r e a t  deal  of r e a l - t im e  
cap a c i ty ,  and were used in la rge  s c a l e  a p p l i c a t io n s  t h a t  th e  490 was not 
a p p ro p r ia te  f o r .  The 490 surv ived  throughout the  1960s and the  1108 
a r c h i t e c t u r e  remained S p e r r y ' s  s c i e n t i f i c  and r e a l - t i m e  system well in to  
the  1970s.
However, the  main t h i r d  g e n e ra t io n  i n i t i a t i v e  was th e  small-medium 
sca le  9000 s e r i e s ,  which rep laced  th e  1005, 1050, and So l id  S t a te  computers 
and to  some degree i t  a l s o  r e p laced  the 490 machine. This system was 
recommended by the  Product Line Task Force of  1964-5185, four  years  
a f t e r  IBM's SPREAD committee. I t  recommended bu i ld in g  a machine t h a t  was 
compatible with the IBM 360 and t o  form the  bottom h a l f  of  the  Sperry 
range; the  490 and 1108 computers would form th e  upper h a l f  of the
18AUS vs IBM. dxlO, Eckert  memo to  Sperry CEO R.E.Macdonald, 19/7/71.
185US vs IBM. dxl5 ,  Product Line Task Force,  r e p o r t  no. 2 . ,  9 /2 /65 .
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range186. What i t  a c t u a l l y  came up with was a near  IBM compat ible 
machine, which was not compat ible with the  o th e r  Sperry  machines187. 
However, i t  d id  give Sperry a range of small and medium s c a le  t h i r d  
g enera t ion  computers f o r  the  mass market of th e  l a t e  1960s.
Another problem f o r  Sperry was i t s  poor p e r ip h e ra l  performance,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in mass s to rage  d ev ices .  I t  p e r s i s t e d  with drum memories in to  
the  1960s, when o thers  had adopted the  disk  d r iv e .  Drums did give  f a s t  
access ,  and were useful  f o r  o n - l i n e  op e ra t io n s ,  a Sperry s p e c i a l i t y ,  but 
were not much use fo r  r e a l l y  l a rge  da ta  bases.
What probably  made a l l  t h e se  d i s p a r a te  and l e s s  than aw e- insp i r ing  
o f f e r i n g s  success fu l  enough to  keep Sperry in the  bus iness  were two areas  
in which i t  d id  r a t h e r  w e l l .  These were s a l e s  o f  computers t o  the  US 
government and th e  market f o r  o n - l i n e  r e s e rv a t io n  systems. Sperry was a 
leading s u p p l i e r ,  indeed the  leading  s u p p l ie r  of m i l i t a r y  computer systems, 
and t h i s  seems to  have rubbed o f f  on the  commercial computers.  Sperry had 
double th e  share  of  the  government market as i t  had of th e  general  market. 
In terms of  th e  numbers of computers i n s t a l l e d ,  Sperry was IBM's only c lose  
r i v a l :
Table 8.14
IBM and Sperrv shares  of  US government i n s t a l l a t i o n s .
% 1966 1967 1968 1969
IBM 34.3  29.9 28.4 28.1
Sperry 19.8 21.6 21.3 20.4
Source: General Serv ices  Adm in is t ra t ion  Federal Supply Serv ice .  Inventory 
of  au tomatic  d a ta  process ing  equipment in the  United S t a t e s  Government. 
1969, Washington.
Like many o th e r  American companies, i t  ben e f i t ed  from th e  s a l e  of  big 
numbers of  computers to  the  US armed forces  f o r  uses t h a t  what were 
e s s e n t i a l l y  bus iness  type a p p l i c a t i o n s .  An example of  t h i s  was th e  s a l e  of 
150 1050s and t h r e e  1107s f o r  l o g i s t i c s  work a t  a i r f o r c e  bases .  This was 
about h a l f  th e  1050s so ld .  The company a lso  developed, under c o n t r a c t ,  many 
sp ec ia l  purpose m i l i t a r y  computers which helped to  extend i t s  techno log ica l  
base.
The second s t rong a rea  was in r e a l - t im e  computers,  the  490 and 1108, 
and t h e i r  use in t i c k e t  r e s e r v a t io n  systems. This included an o rde r  f o r  
$39m worth of  1108 computers from United A i r l i n e s  f o r  i t s  r e s e r v a t io n
186US vs IBM. t r2882 ,  Macdonald.
187US vs IBM. Eckert  memo, 19/7 /71 .
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system. Sperry claimed t h i s  was the  l a r g e s t  commercial computer c o n t r a c t  
ever183. Sperry extended the  1108 by adding a t im e-shared  vers ion  to  the  : 
range,  th e  1108 I I ,  and, in 1969,. i t  a l so  r e l e a s e d  a sm al le r  s c a le  vers ion  
c a l l e d  the  1106. During 1966-67 the  1108 r ep re sen ted  h a l f  of the  UNIVAC 
D iv i s io n ' s  s a l e s .
Despite  the  l im i ted  success o f  the  r e a l - t i m e  systems, Sperry had 
f a i l e d  to  main ta in  i t s  p o s i t i o n  in th e  market.  I t s  f a i l u r e  to  i n t e g r a t e  i t s  
ope ra t ions  was rem in iscen t  of  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies,  r a t h e r  than 
bus iness  machines f i rm s.  Eventua l ly  Sperry did  s t a b i l i s e  i t s  p o s i t i o n .  In 
1971 i t  bought the  computer opera t ion  of  RCA, which f i t t e d  in q u i t e  we l l .  
The Spectra/RCA s e r i e s  was a much b e t t e r  implementation of IBM 
c o m p a t ib i l i ty  than the  9000, and o f fe red  a number of l a rg e r  machines. 
Sperry managed to  hold on to  the  RCA user  base ,  ensur ing  t h a t  i t  kept up 
with Honeywell and Burroughs in the  1970s.
The S e r ie s  9000 was rep laced  by th e  Se r ie s  90 g iv ing  an upgrade path 
fo r  the  RCA u s e r s .  However, the  main focus  was the  1100 s e r i e s .  In genera l ,  
both ranges  f a r e d  well enough to  main ta in  S p e r r y ' s  p o s i t i o n  as one of  the  
leading f i rms  in the  so c a l l e d  'BUNCH', the  sm al le r  compet i tors  to  IBM. Yet 
i t  had f a i l e d  to  make good i t s  e a r l y  p o s i t io n  and had f r i t t e r e d  away the 
o ppor tun i ty  to  be the leading  p layer  in the  w o r ld ' s  f a s t e s t  growing market.
When Burroughs and Sperry merged to  form Unisys i t  was Burroughs t h a t  
was in the  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n .  However, i t  seems obvious t h a t  some of the  
lessons  t h a t  Sperry should have l e a r n t  were ignored. Unisys '  c u r re n t  
product l i n e  inc ludes  a v a s t  a r r a y  of both companies ' systems, inc luding  
the 1100 and 90 a r c h i t e c t u r e s ,  and the  A s e r i e s  of  Burroughs equipment, as 
well as a big  range of UNIX systems. Unisys has not f a r e d  w el l ,  and seems 
to  have su f f e r e d  from many of the  problems desc r ibed  in th e  Sperry and GE 
h i s t o r i e s .
All the  f i rms in t h i s  chap te r  were more committed t o  the  commercial 
computer market than RCA, GE, Engl ish E l e c t r i c  F e r r a n t i  and EMI. For 
Burroughs and NCR i t  was an e s s e n t i a l  technology i f  they  were going to  
surv ive  in t h e i r  major market,  bus iness  accounting machines.  CDC and DEC 
were t o t a l l y  o r i e n t a t e d  to  e x p lo i t i n g  the new technology and bu i ld ing  on 
the  niche  markets t h a t  they  had i d e n t i f i e d .  For Honeywell and Sperry,  
commercial computers were t h e i r  major commercial d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  r e l a t e d  
to  t h e i r  e s t a b l i s h e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  and con t ro l  t e chno log ies  bu t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
new dimension to  t h e i r  companies. The sheer speed with which the  computer
188US vs IBM. dx61, Sperry annual rep o r t  1966.
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market expanded meant t h a t  the  computer o pe ra t ions  became the  most 
important d i v i s i o n  w i th in  a l l  t h e se  companies. The e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms 
s tud ied  d id  not have t h i s  commitment to  the  new in d u s t ry ,  f o r  them i t  was 
only a s p e c u la t iv e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  which had to  compete w i th in  the  f irm fo r  
funds a g a in s t  o th e r  d iv i s io n s .
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Chapter 9
Conclusion: concen t r ic  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  versus  market s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  and 
the  problem of resource  a l l o c a t i o n .
The case  s tu d ie s  provide  the  raw m ate r ia l  f o r  an exp lana t ion  of the  
f a i l u r e  of broad-based e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms in the  new market f o r  commercial 
computers.  We can now analyze more sy s te m a t i c a l ly  the  weaknesses o f  these  
f i rm s ,  b r ing  out t h e i r  common f a u l t s  and then c o n t r a s t  t h e se  f a i l i n g s  with 
the  systems adopted by the  more success fu l  f i rm s .  The evidence provided by 
the  case  s tu d i e s  is  v a r i e d ,  po in t ing  to  a whole v a r i e t y  of p o s s ib le  causes 
fo r  f a i l u r e .  There a re  t h r e e  p o s s ib le  reasons f o r  t h i s :
F i r s t l y ,  the  sources f o r  such a s tudy , covering so many of the  major 
p layers  in two c o u n t r i e s ,  a re  va r ied  and are  not n e c e s s a r i l y  uniform in the  
d e t a i l  t h a t  they  provide.  This can give a d i s t o r t e d  view: information 
provided by a government sponsor emphasises d i f f e r e n t  a spec t s  from the  kind 
of d e t a i l  provided by i n t e r n a l  management documents. However, i t  i s  the  aim 
of t h i s  t h e s i s  to  have drawn on a l a rg e  enough v a r i e t y  of  a rc h iv a l  sources 
to  revea l  the  c o n s i s t e n t  themes.
Secondly,  i t  could be t h a t  the  c ircumstances of  f i rms in the  two c o u n t r ie s  
were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t .  However, i t  i s  the  con ten t ion  of t h i s  t h e s i s  
t h a t  th e  e x i t  o f  B r i t i s h  and American e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms from the computer 
in dus t ry ,  while  occurr ing  a t  d i f f e r e n t  times and dr iven  by a number of 
t a c t i c a l  and s t r a t e g i c  r ea sons ,  had some common elements .  This chap te r  w i l l  
emphasise th e  growing opp o r tu n i ty  c o s t s  of  s tay ing  in th e  computer indus t ry  
faced by th e se  f i rm s ,  and the  p o l i t i c a l  and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  which 
encouraged e x i t  from the  market.
Th i rd ly ,  each company had some freedom of choice :  f i rms could choose 
between a v a r i e t y  of courses  o f  a c t i o n .  Managements had th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  to  
choose between a number of  s t r a t e g i e s ;  some f irms used s t r a t e g i e s  which 
were s u c c e s s f u l .  The b e s t  example of  t h i s  was Honeywell, which,  by 
emulating some of  the  te chn iques  of the  business  machines f i rm s ,  managed 
to  su rv ive  in the  in d u s t ry .  There is  an i n f i n i t y  o f  o the r  p o s s ib le  
responses ,  some i l l u s t r a t e d  by the  c i r c u m s ta n t i a l  d e t a i l  in the  n a r r a t i v e  
accounts  t h a t  have been p resen ted .  Se lec t in g  a handful o f  con t ro l  themes 
may be imposing an a r t i f i c i a l  s i m p l i c i t y  on the  complexity of h i s t o r i c a l  
exper ience .
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Yet some key conclus ions  can be drawn. In th e  next t h r e e  s ec t io n s  of 
t h i s  c h ap te r ,  some of the  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  fi rms w i l l  
be noted.  The f i r s t  s ec t io n  w i l l  look a t  the  e n t ry  of f i rms in to  the  
computer market.  Second, the  product p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  var ious  types  of f i rms 
w i l l  be considered .  The t h i r d  s e c t io n  looks a t  t h e  place  of the  computer 
ope ra t ions  w i th in  the  co rpo ra te  s t r u c t u r e .  I t  a l s o  cons iders  th e  f a i l u r e  
of th e se  f irms to  u t i l i s e  v e r t i c a l  and ho r izon ta l  l inks  between d i v i s i o n s .
These p o in t s  w i l l  then be considered in terms of  the  o v e ra l l  
s t r a t e g i c  chal lenges  faced  by the  companies. The a l t e r n a t i v e  investment 
o p p o r tu n i t i e s  open to  th e  companies were a s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  in the  
development of  the  computer o p e ra t io n s  and played a major r o l e  in the  
eventual d e c i s io n  to  leave th e  market.
Three major conclusions  a re  drawn from the  case  s tu d i e s :
a) That,  a p a r t  from lowering the  b a r r i e r s  to  e n t e r in g  the  computer market, 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies b e n e f i t t e d  l i t t l e  from th e  economies of scope and 
s c a le .  I t  i s  argued t h a t  they  f a i l e d  to  apply th e  app ro p r ia te  
o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  to  f u l l y  b e n e f i t  from t h e i r  v e r t i c a l  and 
h o r iz o n ta l  d i v e r s i t y .
b) That the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms adopted the  wrong product  s t r a t e g y ,  both in 
terms o f  th e  s t a t e  of the  market and in terms of  the  o v e r a l l  p o s i t i o n  of 
the  c o rp o ra t io n .  Business machines f i rm s  adopted s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  r e f l e c t e d  
t h e i r  knowledge of  the  market p l a ce .
c) That the  c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms su f fe red  from 
c a p i t a l  r a t i o n i n g  due to  t r y i n g  to  suppor t  too many high technology growth 
pa ths .  This problem was exaggera ted by the cho ice  of the  wrong computer 
s t r a t e g y .
11 Market en t rv :  in cen t ives  to  innovate and th e  f i r s t  phase product 
s t r a t e g y .
The s t a r t i n g  po in t  f o r  t h i s  a n a ly s i s  i s  to  cons ide r  the  incen t ives  
t h a t  f i rm s  had f o r  e n te r in g  the  i n d u s t r y .  The main s p l i t  i s  between those  
fi rms t h a t  s t a r t e d  bu i ld ing  computers as an ex tens ion  to  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
e x p lo i t i n g  te c h n ic a l  knowledge in a con cen t r ic  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  and those  
t h a t  were fo rced  to  develop commercial computer technology to  mainta in 
t h e i r  c u r r e n t  market p o s i t i o n .  The former case  d e sc r ib e s  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies and th e  l a t t e r  th e  bus iness  machines f i rm s .
The m a jo r i ty  of e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  did not j o in  the  computer indus t ry  
a t  i t s  in cep t ion ;  most e i t h e r  jo in e d  the in d u s t ry  or extended t h e i r  
computer a c t i v i t i e s  a t  the  cusp o f  th e  f i r s t  and second genera t ions  of 
computers.  This was when computers s t a r t e d  to  become a s i g n i f i c a n t
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commercial too l  and became a mass produced c a p i t a l  good. I t  is  p o s s ib le  to  
sp ecu la te  on why many of them chose to  jo in  the  market a t  t h i s . t i m e .  These 
firms had in-depth  knowledge of e l e c t r o n i c  components and used d i g i t a l  
technology elsewhere w i th in  the  company, o f ten  in m i l i t a r y  p roducts .  
Whether by s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s io n ,  or through t a c t i c a l  expediency, these  s k i l l s  
were put to g e th e r  to  develop computers fo r  the  r a p i d l y  growing commercial 
computer market.
In general  the  l a t t e r ,  t a c t i c a l  p a t t e r n ,  was dominant: development 
of the  f i r s t  general  purpose computer was u s u a l ly  undertaken to  f u l f i l  a 
s p e c i f i c  c o n t r a c t .  Examples of  t h i s  include the  GE ERMA, RCA BIZMAC, and 
the EMI BMC computers.  The bu i ld ing  of these  machines r e l i e d  on the  
enthusiasm of a handful of people wi th in  an o p e ra t ing  d iv i s io n  of the  
company. La te r ,  a second dec is ion  was made to  cont inue  to  bu i ld  on t h i s  
base and to  add more re sou rces  to  i t  to  bu i ld  i t  up. This dec is ion  was 
followed by the  s e t t i n g  up of  an ope ra t ing  u n i t  t o  mass produce second 
genera t ion  computers f o r  th e  r a p id ly  growing commercial market.  These fi rms 
were e x p lo i t i n g  tech n o lo g ica l  s k i l l s  in what was becoming a major market 
fo r  e l e c t r o n i c s .  The d e c i s io n  to  b u i ld  computers was f a c i l i t a t e d  by the  
large  p r o f i t s  being earned in o the r  a re a s  of e l e c t r o n i c s  which helped fund 
t h i s  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  Another f a c t o r  was t h a t  t h e se  companies a l ready  had 
the t e c h n i c a l  re sou rces  to  bu i ld  computers and, t h e r e f o r e ,  had a low 
i n i t i a l  e n t ry  b a r r i e r  to  th e  market.
This process  was not the  same f o r  a l l  companies. EE, f o r  example, was 
involved in the  very e a r l y  development o f  computer technology in B r i t a i n 1 . 
EE was a major producer of medium s c a l e ,  f i r s t  g enera t ion ,  s c i e n t i f i c  
computers in the  UK. However, i t  made no g rea t  d r iv e  to  bu i ld  commercial 
machines u n t i l  the  second genera t ion  of  computers. At t h i s  s tage  i t  b u i l t  
RCA designed computers and bought th e  LEO computer o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  g r e a t l y  
extending i t s  da ta  p rocess ing  o p e ra t io n s .  Therefore ,  while i t  had a 
p ioneer ing  i n t e r e s t  in computers, i t s  major push in to  th e  market a l so  came 
a t  the  t ime of the  second genera t ion  machines.  An even e a r l i e r  e n t r a n t  was 
F e r r a n t i 2 . This f i rm  en te red  the  in d u s t ry  a t  the  e a r l i e s t  s t age ,  mainly 
because th e  head of an ope ra t ing  d i v i s i o n  wanted to  keep to g e th e r  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  team b u i l t  up during the  war, but f o r  which th e re  was l i t t l e  
work l e f t .  Government development funds given to  the  company to  b u i ld  
computers allowed the  d iv i s io n  to  su rv ive .  S e l f  p re se rv a t io n  led the  
Instruments  Department to  become an e a r l y  computer p ioneer ,  but i t  too  was
1See above, chapter 4, ppl56-160.
2See above, chapter 2, pp55-65.
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e x p lo i t i n g  i t s  t e chn ica l  s k i l l s ,  and the whole p r o je c t  r e l i e d  on the  
enthusiasm of a handful of managers.
The s e l f  p re se rva t ion  motive was even c l e a r e r  in the  en t ry  of the  
bus iness  machine firms in to  the  computer in d u s t ry .  For th e se  f i rms  the  
i n cen t iv e  was the  encroachment of d i g i t a l  technology on the  punched card 
market; t h e i r  main problem in e n t e r in g  the  in d u s t ry  was the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
t e ch n ica l  knowledge. Two f i rm s ,  Remington Rand and IBM, en tered  the  
indus t ry  a t  a f a i r l y  e a r ly  s tage .
IBM was by f a r  the  s t r o n g e s t  bus iness  machines company when i t  came 
to  th e  new technology. I t  had a l r e a d y  been working on incorpora t ing  
e l e c t r o n i c s  in to  i t s  c u r r e n t  punched card product l i n e ,  i t  a l so  had a 
t r a d i t i o n  of  producing machines f o r  th e  science market3 . Production  of  the  
Defense C a lcu la to r  enabled IBM to  b u i ld  up i t s  d i g i t a l  computer a b i l i t y  
qu ick ly ,  d e sp i t e  having lagged Remington in the  i n i t i a l  s tages  of  the  
computer in d u s t ry .  By using i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  marketing channels fo r  i t s  
range o f  small computers, such as the  650, i t  achieved a s ca le  of 
production well ahead of i t s  c o m p e t i to r s4 .
Remington Rand took a d i f f e r e n t  approach, n e c e s s i t a t e d  by i t s  
r e l a t i v e  lack o f  te chn ica l  r e sou rce s  in t h i s  f i e l d .  Remington bought two 
lead ing-edge s t a r t - u p  companies, ERA and UNIVAC. Remington seems to  have 
t r i e d  t o  use computers to  a t t a c k  IBM in the  market f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  
c a l c u l a t i n g  equipment5 . Remington was t ry in g  to  usurp IBM's p o s i t io n  in 
one o f  th e  sm al le r  p a r t s  of  the  market f o r  punched card equipment,  hoping 
to e s t a b l i s h  a lead in the  niche sc ience  market.  This i s  confirmed by 
Remington's s in g u la r  lack of  success  in i n t e g ra t in g  i t s  computer ope ra t ions  
with i t s  o ld  t a b u l a t o r  market,  d e s p i t e  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  UNIVAC people saw 
t h e i r  product as being p r im a r i ly  aimed a t  the  commercial market.
The a c q u i s i t i o n  of s k i l l s  was a l s o  necessary f o r  sm al le r  f i rm s .  NCR 
and Burroughs copied Remington's s t r a t e g y  when i t  became necessary  f o r  them 
to  o f f e r  computers to  t h e i r  niche market c l i e n t s 6 . For NCR and Burroughs 
the  move to  the  new technology was de fens ive .  I t  was a mat te r  of s e l f  
p r e s e rv a t io n :  th e  market f o r  bus iness  machines was s h i f t i n g  from e l e c t r o ­
mechanical systems to  computers.  Both fi rms had to  acqu ire  these  s k i l l s  to  
su rv ive .  In B r i t a i n ,  ICT a l so  adopted computer technology when i t  became
3pp347-350.
4See above, pp357-358.
5See above pp407-410.
6See above, pp375-396.
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necessary  to  the  business  machine market.  Like th e  American f i rm s ,  i t  a l so  
had t o  buy in the  necessary s k i l l s  to  bu i ld  computers7 . However, f o r  ICT/L 
the  main source  of bought-in technology came from buying the  computer 
d iv i s io n s  sold  by the  B r i t i s h  e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry .
Most of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies en tered  th e  computer indus t ry  as 
a co n ce n t r i c  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  They had e s t a b l i s h e d  te chno log ica l  s k i l l s  
which could be used in the  development of commercial computer hardware,  
reducing the  e n t r y  b a r r i e r s  to  t h i s  new and expanding market.  For the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  developing a commercial computer was a r e l a t i v e l y  cheap 
e x e r c i s e .  The bus iness  machines companies became in c re a s in g ly  involved in 
the  new computer technology as i t  s t a r t e d  to  invade t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  
market p lace .  I t  is  t h e r e f o r e  not s u rp r i s in g  t h a t  th e  a t t a c k  of the  
bus iness  machines firms on the  market f o r  computers was slow to  s t a r t  wi th .  
I t  took o f f  with IBM's l a t e r  f i r s t  genera t ion  systems, e s p e c i a l l y  the  650 
which was the  f i r s t  computer to  reach 1000 i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  From t h i s  po in t  
a l l  th e  bus iness  machines f i rms  were forced to  r e a c t .
While the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies had the advantage of having te ch n ica l  
re sou rces  a v a i l a b l e ,  the  bus iness  machines companies had the  advantage of 
e s t a b l i s h e d  marketing and s e r v ice  networks. These o rg a n i s a t i o n s  were l a rge  
and gave the  fi rms a method o f  p lac ing  equipment on the  market,  
unders tanding  how t h i s  process  worked. E l ec t ro n ic s  f i rms  seemed to  lack 
t h i s  unders tanding  of how to  market commercial d a ta  p rocess ing  equipment, 
an i s su e  which i s  taken up in the  next s ec t io n .
21 'Second Phase'  Product and marketing s t r a t e g i e s .
The d i f f e r e n t  t r a d i t i o n s  of  the  f i rm s,  and the  t ime a t  which the  
fi rms en te r ed  th e  new in d u s t ry ,  a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  product s t r a t e g i e s .  The 
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms had c e r t a i n  advantages in e n t e r in g  the  computer market 
by e x p l o i t i n g  t h e i r  g r e a t  t e ch n o lo g ica l  exper ience ,  in th e  ' f i r s t  phase '
of t h e i r  h i s t o r y  in the  market.  The ir  'second phase '  product and marketing
s t r a t e g i e s  were not as success fu l  as those  adopted by the  bus iness  machines 
companies. This s ec t io n  p re sen ts  th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  the  adoption of  
the se  s t r a t e g i e s ,  but a l so  p o in t s  t o  th e  inheren t  weaknesses.  Section fo u r  
of t h i s  chap te r  takes  the  po in ts  made in t h i s  s e c t io n  and puts  them in the  
con tex t  th e  co rpo ra t ion  as a whole. I t  e s p e c i a l l y  looks a t  the  
in ap p ro p r ia ten es s  of the  s t r a t e g i e s  chosen by the  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms in the  
con tex t  o f  th e  many c a l l s  on th e se  companies ' c a p i t a l  r e so u rce s .
Firms in the commercial computer market tended e i t h e r  to  o f f e r
7See above, chapter 5, ppl94-201.
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machines f o r  general  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  o r  to  s p e c i a l i z e  in a niche market.  To 
be in th e  general  a p p l i c a t io n s  market a f irm needed a range of computers,  
from the  small to  the  la rge s c a l e .  From the e a r ly  1960s onwards, t h i s  range 
had to  take  th e  form of a compat ible family ,  with a wide range of 
p e r i p h e r a l s .  More impor tantly ,  i t  had to  be provided with a massive amount 
of  sof tware ;  a l so  i t  had to  be marketed to  every  poss ib le  computer u se r ,  
and on an in t e r n a t io n a l  s c a l e .  The f i rm  had to  achieve a la rge  number of 
s a le s  to  recover  the  very high c o s t s  o f  developing such a range.  A f irm 
which coveted a la rge  market share  would have to  provide such a family ,  so 
t h a t  i t  could p e n e t r a te  a broad spectrum of the  market and stand a chance 
of  winning m u l t ip le  s a le s  from la rge  computer u se r s .  The problem with t h i s  
technique was t h a t  i t  was very expens ive .  Families  of compatible machines 
were very  c o s t l y  to  develop, the  p rov is ion  of a f u l l  range of p e r ip h e ra l s  
adding s i g n i f i c a n t l y  to  the  c o s t s .  J u s t  as important was the  c o s t  of 
supplying the  necessary  sof tware to  c a r r y  out a l l  the  t a sk s  d e s i r ed .  On top 
of  th e se  c o s t s  was the  huge expense of marketing and support ing  such 
systems. F ie ld  support  to  cover a la rg e  number of  machines was expensive,  
and the  s a l e s  and marketing s t a f f s  had to  be la rge  enough to  p en e t r a te  
every niche of th e  market.  Success in s e l l i n g  systems to  new types of users  
meant under tak ing  more software development, and suppor ting  high cos t  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  design .  A f u r t h e r  expense came from the  high percentage of 
commercial machines t h a t  were p laced on the market under l e ase  agreements. 
This meant t h a t  f irms wanting a l a rge  and r a p id ly  expanding user base had 
to  f i n d  la rg e  amounts of c a p i t a l  funds to  f inance  these  l e a s e s .
A number o f  f irms f e l t  t h a t  th e  general  purpose course  was the  bes t  
rou te  t o  t a k e .  IBM, Sperry Rand and l a t e r  ICT took t h i s  course  because they 
had to  f u l f i l  the  requirements  of t h e i r  many customers who wanted computer 
technology to  rep lace  t h e i r  punched card systems. They a l so  wanted to 
compete f o r  the  business  of  new use r s  a t t r a c t e d  to  da ta  process ing  by 
computer technology. RCA and General E l e c t r i c  a l so  adopted such a p o l i c y ,  
in t h e i r  case  because they lacked any niche market to  b u i ld  upon. They 
t h e r e f o r e  be l ieved  t h a t ,  t o  ga in  l a rg e  enough production runs f o r  t h e i r  
systems, they  needed to  s e l l  to  the  widest  p o s s ib le  number of  u se r s .  EMI 
and EE a l s o  adopted t h i s  po l icy  when they  made t h e i r  major pushes in to  the  
market,  EMI with  the  second genera t ion  1100s and EE with the  t h i r d  
g enera t ion  System 4®. The general  purpose commercial market was the 
l a r g e s t  p a r t  of  the  computer market and o f fered  the  qu ickes t  rou te  to  la rge
sSee above, chapter 3, ppl28-134.
9See above, ppl67-170.
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market share .
The e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms not only had to  develop computer systems, where 
undoubtedly t h e i r  t e ch n ica l  s k i l l s  helped; they  a lso  had to  develop 
marketing and support  o p e ra t ions  t h a t  could compete with the  vas t  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  a l ready  opera ted  by th e  l ik e s  of IBM and Sperry Rand.
The a l t e r n a t i v e  was to  aim a t  a niche market.  Burroughs and NCR are  
the  b e s t  examples of t h i s .  Their  t r a d i t i o n a l  u se r  bases were a l ready  
concen t ra ted  in s p e c i f i c  i n d u s t r i e s .  NCR had an e s t a b l i s h e d  base in 
r e t a i l i n g ,  and, more impor tan t ly  f o r  computers,  in small s ca le  banking 
systems and accounting machines10. Burroughs was the  e s t a b l i s h e d  leader 
in banking systems, though h eav i ly  pressed  by NCR11. NCR's f i r s t  systems 
were small  and well s u i t e d  to  the  kind of c l i e n t s  t h a t  i t  had. Burroughs' 
l a rg e r  systems were provided with e a r l y  t ime-share  f a c i l i t i e s ,  which was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  usefu l fo r  o n - l i n e  banking a p p l i c a t i o n s .  I t  a l so  had a well 
t a r g e t e d  m i l i t a r y  computer development which enhanced i t s  o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s .  
However, t h e se  firms s t i l l  had a l l  t h e  cos ts  of  developing f u l l  computer 
l in e s  f o r  t h e i r  niche c l i e n t s  to  use ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Burroughs which even tua l ly  
o f f e red  the  whole range of  computer s i z e s .  The big  advantage both had was 
t h a t  th ey  had well  e s t a b l i s h e d  marketing ope ra t io n s .  This meant they  could 
t a r g e t  t h e i r  marketing and sof tware  development to  s p e c i f i c  types  of 
c l i e n t .  From t h i s  base they  could then s t a r t  to  s e l l  the  systems they  had 
developed to  a wider audience,  and t h e r e f o r e  spread t h e i r  cos ts  over a 
l a rg e r  market than j u s t  t h e i r  niche groups.
A second group of niche marketeers  e x i s t e d :  the  second genera t ion  
s t a r t - u p  f i r m s .  Prime examples were CDC and DEC12. These fi rms were 
g r e a t l y  in f luenced  by t h e i r  founding e n t rep reneu rs  and by some of t h e i r  key 
employees, such as Seymour Cray o f  CDC. They used a number of  methods to  
cu t the  c o s t s  of  both e n te r in g  and then  opera t ing  in the  computer market. 
They t a r g e t e d  s p e c i a l i s t  t e ch n ica l  u s e r s .  One s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  of  these  
users  was t h a t  t h e i r  requirements  were so s p e c i f i c  t h a t  they  expected to  
w r i t e  t h e i r  own sof tware .  Science u s e r s  a l so  tended to  buy the  machines 
they used . This reduced the  c a p i t a l  o u t l a y  requ i red  by the  producer,  as 
they  d id  not have to  f i n d  f inance  to  cover le a s ing  d ea l s  o r  develop 
sof tware .  An e x t r a  dimension was t h a t  th e re  were only a few users  in t h i s  
ca tegory  and they  were a t i g h t - k n i t  community, which kept marketing co s t s  
down.
10See above pp375-385.
x l See above, pp835-397.
12See above, pp397-401.
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Few e l e c t r o n i c s  firms made th e  decis ion  to  use the  niche technique.  
English E l e c t r i c  had an e s t a b l i s h e d  s take  in th e  medium sca le  s c i e n t i f i c  
market,  but a f t e r  the  purchase of  LEO i t  s t a r t e d  to  move towards the  
general  market13. As i t  happened, th e  medium s c a l e  sc ience  market was 
superseded by th e  t h i r d  genera t ion  o f  general  purpose machines,  which were 
q u i te  capable  o f  t h i s  kind of s c i e n t i f i c  p rocess ing .  However EE did have 
the  op t ion  of  expanding i t s  s take  in the  s c i e n t i f i c  market by producing 
small s c a le  sc ience  machines, akin t o  DEC, or s u p e r - s c a le  systems l i k e  CDC. 
Ins tead  i t  s t a r t e d  to  develop th e  System 4 family .
A f irm t h a t  was a more c l e a r - c u t  candida te  f o r  t h i s  niche rou te  was 
F e r r a n t i .  F e r r a n t i ' s  f a i l u r e  to  develop i t s  base in the  sc ience  market must 
be counted one of the  major s t r a t e g i c  f a i l u r e s .  However, th e re  were many 
f a c t o r s  which reduced F e r r a n t i ' s  commitment to  the  s tand-a lone  computer 
market which have been d iscussed  in chapter  two.
The only r e a l l y  success fu l  product s t r a t e g y  adopted by a broad based 
fi rm was Honeywell 's t a c t i c  of  producing machines based on old IBM 
computers14. The s t r a t e g y  f o r  th e  H200 family was to  emulate the  IBM 
1401, o f  which 10,000 had been i n s t a l l e d .  I t  was hoped t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
number o f  these  users  would not want a l l  the  software  and da ta  t r a n s f e r  
problems t h a t  moving to  the  new IBM 360 family would e n t a i l .  Honeywell was 
o f f e r i n g  a 1401 compatible system which was newer, f a s t e r  and l a rg e r  than 
the  o ld  IBM systems. Not only d id  i t  provide Honeywell with a n iche ,  i t  
a l so  meant sof tware  expenses were kep t  down: users  merely wanted to  run the  
la rge  1401 ca ta logue  of  programs on b e t t e r  machines. While t h i s  ploy was 
only usefu l  f o r  a few y e a r s ,  i t  d id  g ive  Honeywell a use r  base to  bu i ld  on. 
However, Honeywell had to  have a l a rg e  enough s a l e s  e f f o r t  t o  co n tac t  the  
1401 use r s  and persuade them to  exchange t h e i r  old  machines fo r  the  
Honeywell 200, r a t h e r  than s tay in g  with  IBM and t r a n s f e r r i n g  to  the  more 
advanced IBM 360. The f i rm  recognised  t h i s  and put l a rge  resources  in to  i t s  
s a le s  f o r c e .  IBM noted t h a t  by the  end of the  1960s Honeywell had b u i l t  up 
one o f  th e  l a r g e s t  s a le s  teams in t h e  in d u s t ry 15.
The o the r  broad based f irms decided on a wider a t t a c k .  Most chose to  
do so by e x p lo i t i n g  t h e i r  t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  to  o f f e r  an e a r ly  second 
genera t ion  commercial system, to  which l a rg e r  and sm al le r  s ca le  ranges were 
added. RCA took t h i s  process  f u r t h e s t  by moving from i t s  l a rge  range of
13See above, pp l63-167.
14See above, pp402-407.
15See above, pp403.
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second genera t ion  systems to  i t s  t h i r d  genera t ion  SPECTRA fam i ly 16. 
English E l e c t r i c  took the  same course .  These two f irms consc ious ly  chose 
a path of fol lowing IBM, im i ta t ing  i t s  technology t o  the  po in t  of 
co m p a t ib i l i ty .  Most f i rms imita ted  IBM's method of  o f f e r i n g  i n t e r ­
compatible f a m i l i e s  of t h i r d  genera t ion  computers,  but i t  was RCA and EE 
which opted fo r  f u l l  c o m p a t ib i l i ty  with the IBM 360 i t s e l f .  As s t a t e d  in 
the r e l e v a n t  ch ap te r s ,  n e i t h e r  RCA nor EE managed to  achieve  much b e n e f i t  
from t h i s  policy* The hope was t h a t  they  would become the  second source fo r  
the  IBM a r c h i t e c t u r e .  They a l so  hoped t h a t  development cash would be saved 
by not having to  develop so much software .
These f irms were adopting a p o l icy  which c lo s e ly  resembled the  
s t r a t e g y  o u t l in e d  by Baldwin and Childs c a l l e d  th e  ' f a s t  second 
s t r a t e g y ' 17. This requ i red  a f a s t  response to  changes made by the  market 
le ader .  They had quickly  to  emulate the  advances made by IBM so t h a t  t h e i r  
customers had a product equal to  IBM's. However, RCA and EE, and indeed a l l  
the e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  made a number of e r r o r s  which n u l l i f i e d  the  
advantages such a po l icy  was meant to  give them. The RCA/EE a r c h i t e c t u r e  
was unique; i t  was not a mat te r  of reve rse  eng inee r ing .  RCA and EE were 
high technology companies: they had advanced techniques  t h a t  they wanted 
to b u i ld  in to  t h e i r  computers.  Therefore ,  la rge  sums were needed to  develop 
what, t o  the  u se r ,  was a machine e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same as IBM's. This meant 
th a t  RCA had to  develop a unique o p e ra t ing  system which worked in the  same 
manner as IBM DOS, a la rge  expense. On top of t h i s  the  two fi rms wasted 
large amounts of  development funds on dead-end p r o j e c t s .  RCA t r i e d  to  
develop the  RACE s to rage  system, wast ing a l o t  of money and p u t t in g  i t  a 
long way behind IBM in th e  area of  d i sk  s to r a g e 13. EE spent r e l a t i v e l y  
la rge sums on t r y i n g  to  use advanced Marconi chips  to  make the  System 4 the 
f i r s t  range of computers to  use in t e g ra te d  c i r c u i t s  throughout ;  ev en tu a l ly  
t h i s  was found to  be uneconomic19.
The RCA/EE s t r a t e g y  would only have succeeded i f  they  had made enough 
savings from being a fo l lo w er .  They had to  have a lower c o s t  s t r a t e g y  in 
order t o  compete a g a in s t  IBM's g r e a t e r  sca le  in t h i s  market.  They were the  
most vu ln e rab le  to  IBM's c o s t  and technology advantages,  as t h e i r  machines 
were the  most d i r e c t l y  comparable to  IBM's computers.  RCA and EE hoped to
16See above, pp261-271.
17W.L.Baldwin and G.L.Childs ,  'The f a s t  second and r i v a l r y  in resea rch  
and development ' ,  Southern Economic J o u r n a l . 1969, 36, ppl8-24.
18See above, pp257-259.
19See above ppl67-171.
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make savings  on a p p l i c a t io n s  c o s t s ,  e x p lo i t in g  programs developed fo r  the  
IBM systems, but they s t i l l  had t o  support  a l l  t h e  o the r  a reas  needed to  
be i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  compet i t ive .  They needed to  b u i ld  up la rge  marketing 
o p e ra t io n s ,  c o n t in u a l ly  to  develop new systems and techn iques ,  t o  bu i ld  
modern p l a n t s ,  and to  f inance  lease  c o n t r a c t s  on computer i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  
They could  have achieved some savings  through economies o f  scope,  but i t  
seems t h a t  t h i s  was only a f a c t o r  when the  f i rms  were en te r in g  the  
in d u s t ry ;  'm' form d e c e n t r a l i s e d  o rg a n is a t i o n  l im i ted  any on-going 
economies.
The few marginal savings t h a t  RCA and EE made were not enough to  
outweigh IBM's huge sca le  advantage; e s p e c i a l l y  as both f i rms  were wasting 
la rge  sums on dead-end p r o j e c t s .  At l e a s t  f i rms l i k e  ICT, Burroughs,  NCR, 
Honeywell and even GE had locked in u s e r s ,  whose c o s t s  of  moving to  another 
company's a r c h i t e c t u r e  would have been high. Another problem was t h a t  RCA 
and EE were accept ing  a f o l l o w e r ' s  r o l e  in a r a p i d l y  changing techno log ica l  
environment.  They had to  mimic the  advances made by IBM t o  ensure t h a t  
t h e i r  computers could perform a t  l e a s t  as well as IBM's. While a l l  f i rms 
faced th e  problem of keeping up with techno log ica l  advance,  RCA and EE had 
a compounded problem. The f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  computers were p i tched  d i r e c t l y  
a g a in s t  IBM meant they had to  respond to  changes a t  IBM qu ick ly ,  but t h e i r  
unique a r c h i t e c t u r e  meant t h a t ,  l i k e  a l l  the  o th e r  f i rm s ,  t h e i r  machines 
had to  be designed from the  ground up; they c o u l d n ' t  j u s t  copy new IBM 
equipment. EE's p o s i t io n  was even worse.  I t  fol lowed RCA, which in tu rn  
followed IBM. What was more, EE went about redes ign ing  RCA's systems. The 
consequence was t h a t  the  System 4 reached the  market too  l a t e .  The l a t e r ,  
more s u c c e s s f u l ,  'p lug-compat ib le  manufac tu rers '  made sure  t h e i r  equipment 
could work d i r e c t l y  with IBM equipment, so use rs  could mix and match the  
b es t  machines.  The RCA/EE s t r a t e g y  was not well  s u i t e d  to  t h e i r  r o l e  as 
t e ch n o lo g ica l  innovato rs :  t h e i r  technology was not r i g h t  f o r  f i rms with a 
fo l lo w er  s t r a t e g y .
While RCA and EE made the  most d i r e c t  a t t a c k  on IBM, most of the  
o the r  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms a l so  had a p o l ic y  of  producing computers f o r  the  
l a r g e s t  s ec t io n  of the  market.  Though the o th e r s  d id  not become IBM- 
compat ib le ,  t h e i r  product ranges were mir rors  of i t .  EMI t r i e d  to  e n t e r  the  
l a r g e s t  s ec t io n  of the  market,  medium sca le  commercial systems, abandoning 
i t  when i t  became obvious t h a t  the  requ i red  investment was huge. GE t r i e d  
to  market a d iv e r s e  range of general  purpose systems, though i t  did develop 
a t im e -sh a r in g  niche.
As s t a t e d  e a r l i e r  the  reason t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms t r i e d  to  
t a c k l e  th e  l a r g e s t  s ec t ion  of  the  market was t h a t  t h i s  was the  only way to
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get a s i g n i f i c a n t  market share .  This was seen as a p r e - r e q u i s i t e  fo r  
gen e ra t in g  enough income to  fund f u t u r e  developments. The companies were 
t r y i n g  to  e s t a b l i s h  s i g n i f i c a n t  new o p e ra t io n s .  The e x p l o i t a t i o n  of t h e i r  
e l e c t r o n i c s  knowledge in the  commercial computer market was the  s t r a t e g y  
adopted fo r  t h i s  expansion. The t a r g e t  t h a t  RCA and GE had was to  reach the 
number two p o s i t io n  in the  market.  They both aimed a t  a 10% market share ,  
which was seen as the  long run minimum e f f i c i e n t  s c a l e .  Given the  s ize  of 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms and t h e i r  r e s o u rc e s ,  such a p o l icy  seemed a t t a i n a b l e .  
However, to  achieve the  rap id  growth needed, i t  was necessary  to  t a c k l e  as 
much o f  the  market as p o s s ib le ,  a t  l e a s t  t h i s  was the  view w ith in  the 
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s20. A second reason f o r  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  was t h a t  the  niche 
markets were a l ready  occupied by f i rm s  such as NCR and Burroughs.
The problem with t h i s  s t r a t e g y  was t h a t  i t  meant tak ing  on IBM, the 
e s t a b l i s h e d  leader  in commercial d a ta  p rocess ing ,  with  the  l a r g e s t  
marketing opera t ion  in the  in d u s t ry ,  a very p r o f i t a b l e  l i n e  of products ,  
and a very  ab le  management. The t a c t i c s  adopted by the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms 
e v id e n t ly  f a i l e d  to  take  on t h i s  g i a n t .  However, a t  the  beginning of the 
pe r iod  s tu d ie d ,  RCA, GE and even Engl ish  E l e c t r i c  were much l a r g e r  than 
IBM; i f  they had been able  to  tu rn  t h e i r  f u l l  re sou rces  a g a in s t  IBM, su re ly  
they could  have achieved the  10% market s take  t h a t  was the  perceived 
t a r g e t .
I t  i s  the  content ion  of t h i s  t h e s i s  t h a t  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies 
adopted the  wrong 'second phase '  p roduct  s t r a t e g y .  In th e  f i r s t  s tage  of 
the  in d u s t ry ,  computers b u i l t  were f o r  one-off  o rd e r s .  As i t  was r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  th e  computer market was going t o  be la rge ,  f i rms wanting a big  s take 
in th e  in d u s t ry  aimed to  cap ture  market share qu ick ly ,  u s u a l l y  with general  
a p p l i c a t i o n  second and t h i r d  g e n e ra t io n  computers.  This 'second phase'  
product s t r a t e g y  was inapp rop r ia te  t o  the  f i n a n c i a l  commitment t h a t  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms wanted to  make.
The s t r a t e g y  desc r ibed  above was very c lose  to  what P o r t e r  desc r ibes  
as th e  'pu re  spending '  method of a t t a c k in g  a market l e a d e r21. I t  was 
in a p p ro p r i a t e  because of the  many o t h e r  c a l l s  on the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s '  
c a p i t a l  budgets.  In s ec t io n  four  o f  t h i s  c h ap te r ,  th e  p re ssu re  of 
suppor t ing  m u l t ip le  expansion paths  i s  d i s cu s sed 22. I t  i s  argued t h a t
2°See f o r  example pp323-336, above, f o r  GE's Advance Product Line 
p lan .  I t  was argued t h a t  only a broad a t ta ck  on the  market could achieve 
a l a rg e  enough market share to  fund f u r t h e r  computer developments.
21M.E.Por te r ,  Competitive advantage,  c r e a t in g  and su s ta in in g  super io r
advan tage . New York, 1985, chap ter  15, pp513-536.
22pp383-391, below.
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t h i s  broad a t t a c k  on such a la rge  market was not th e  r i g h t  p o l icy  f o r  f irms 
t h a t  were a l so  t ry i n g  to  expand in a;number of  o th e r  d i r e c t i o n s .  Secondly, 
i t  meant t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms were following th e  same t a c t i c s  as IBM, 
t ry in g  to  s a t i s f y  most of the  market.  However, they  were bear ing a l l  the  
cos ts  of  doing t h i s  with production  lev e l s  t h a t  were well  below those  of 
IBM. The economies of scope open to  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms were only r e a l l y  
u t i l i s e d  when en te r in g  the  market,  when the f irms were t ry i n g  to  c o l l e c t  
a p p ro p r ia te  s k i l l s  t o g e th e r .  Such savings  were marginal compared to  the  
economies of s ca le  being achieved by IBM.
The e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms were adopt ing  the most expensive  product p o l icy  
poss ib le  in the  computer market,  by producing a broad l i n e  of systems. This 
'second phase '  product s t r a t e g y  thus  su f fe red  both from having to  compete 
ag a in s t  the  low cos t  production base of  IBM and from having to  compete fo r  
investment funds with o the r  d i v i s i o n s  with in  the  company.
3) The p o l i t i c a l  and s t r u c t u r a l  p o s i t i o n  of commercial computer technology 
within  th e  f i rm .
To understand the  choices  faced  by f i rms,  th e  p lace  of  computers in 
the  co rp o ra te  s t r u c t u r e  has t o  be understood. Most commercial computer 
developments in the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms  s t a r t e d  as t a c t i c a l  expedien ts .  This 
meant t h a t  the  dec is ion  to  undertake  th e  development and bu i ld ing  of e a r l y  
systems was taken by departmenta l  or  d iv i s io n a l  leve l  management. GE's ERMA 
computer was b u i l t  thanks to  th e  enthusiasm of depar tmental  s t a f f ,  mainly 
Barney O ld f i e ld 23; F e r r a n t i ' s  connection with the  Mark 1 was due mostly 
to  th e  Instruments  Department manager, Grundy24; and EMI's BMC machine 
was produced f o r  a one -o ff  c o n t r a c t  nego t ia ted  by th e  E lec t ro n ic s  Divis ion 
management25. The o the r  developments were equa l ly  small compared to  the  
company as a whole, and none appears  to  have rece ived  much a t t e n t i o n  a t  
co rpo ra te  l e v e l .  This inc ludes  th e  BIZMAC26 and EE's involvement in the  
P i l o t  ACE27. Given t h i s  p a t t e r n  i t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t ,  f o r  most 
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  the  i n i t i a l  product champions were from the  o p e ra t iona l  
u n i t s  of  the  company. One excep t ion  was Honeywell. I t s  e n t ry  in to  the  
computer market involved the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of Raytheon 's  computer opera t ion
23See above, chap te r  7, pp293-296.
24See above, chap te r  2, pp51-55.
25See above, chap te r  3, ppl26-131.
26See above, chap te r ,  pp235-237.
27See above, chapter 4, ppl56-160.
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and th e  formation of a new d i v i s i o n 23. Such a d ec i s io n  requ i red  a high 
level o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  implying a s t r a t e g i c  move agreed a t  a sen io r  level in 
t h i s  company.
As computer technology developed and the  market s t a r t e d  to  blossom, 
the  computer opera t ions  a l so  grew. These o pe ra t ions  soon won d iv i s io n a l  
s t a t u s  in t h e i r  own r i g h t ,  and those  t h a t  surv ived  in to  the  l a t e  1960s 
became whole groups with in  the  c o rp o ra t io n s .  Each genera t ion  of computers 
became more expensive to  develop and was produced on a g r e a t e r  s ca le .  This 
e n t a i l e d  an e v e r - in c rea s in g  r i s k  and an ever-growing oppor tun i ty  c o s t .  In 
tu rn ,  the  s t a t u s  accorded to  the  computer opera t ion  inc reased .  The computer 
d iv i s io n  was made a d e c e n t r a l i s e d  p r o f i t  making c e n t r e  and, as the  
technology became more complicated,  i t  e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s  own sub -u n i t s  ac t ing  
as p r o f i t  c e n t r e s .  An example of  t h i s  was RCA's Information Systems Group, 
which had a number of d iv i s io n s  (by th e  end of  th e  1960s f i v e  d i v i s i o n s ) .  
As the  s c a le  of computer a c t i v i t i e s  grew, these  d i v i s i o n s  s t a r t e d  to  adopt 
the  m-form s t r u c t u r e  descr ibed  by Will iamson29, a process  which c lo se ly  
resembles the  s t r u c t u r a l  development descr ibed  by Chandler30.
However, ou ts ide  of  the  i n t e r n a l  sub-departments  of the  computer 
d i v i s i o n s ,  th e r e  was l i t t l e  c oo rd ina t ion  of e f f o r t  w i th in  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies. The m-form s t r u c t u r e  i s o l a t e d  d iv i s io n s  from each o ther :  t h i s  
made th e  achievement of  economies of scope very d i f f i c u l t .  Even i f  the  fi rm 
did achieve  some h o r izon ta l  or v e r t i c a l  l inkages ,  they  were j u s t  as l i k e l y  
to  have been a disadvantage  as an advantage.
The evidence f o r  t h i s  i s  anecdo ta l ,  b u t ,  c e r t a i n l y  in the  cases  
mentioned, the  l inks  between var ious  depar tments w i th in  the  company were 
sometimes as l i k e l y  to  have been a r e a l  handicap as an advantage.  The f i r s t  
example of  t h i s  comes from the  comments of F e r r a n t i ' s  ex-computer manager 
a f t e r  he jo ined  Burroughs31. He c r i t i c i s e d  the  B r i t i s h  indus t ry ,  and here 
he must have had F e r r an t i  in mind, f o r  t ry in g  to  make every p a r t  of the  
computer.  He pointed to  the  f a c t  t h a t  American bus iness  machines fi rms 
bought many sub assemblies from s p e c i a l i s t s ,  thus  b e n e f i t i n g  from the 
s k i l l s  of  these  s p e c i a l i s t s .  These su p p l i e r s  could  have high production
2SSee above, chapter  8, pp402-404.
29O.E. Williamson, Markets and h i e r a r c h i e s ,  a n a ly s i s  and a n t i t r u s t  
i m p l i c a t i o n s . New York, 1975, pp!48-154.
3°A.D. Chandler j r ,  S t r a t eg y  and S t r u c t u r e . New York, 1966.
31Brian P o l l a r d ,  'A comparison o f  computer i n d u s t r i e s  in the  US and 
the  UK', Datamation. May/June 1960, pp51-52.
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runs by producing fo r  a number of f i r m s .  In the  RCA chapter  i t  i s  seen t h a t  
the  memory products  supplied t o  the  Information Systems Group by th e  Memory 
Divis ion  of  the  Components Group were not well  su i t e d  to  the computers 
being produced32 . One of the  g r e a t  weaknesses of RCA systems was the  poor 
r e l i a b i l i t y  of memory s t a c k s .  Another company faced with the  
in app rop r ia teness  of i n t e r n a l l y  sourced components was English E l e c t r i c ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  when i t  decided to  use advanced ch ips  from Marconi in i t s  System 
4 computers^ Not only did t h i s  g r e a t l y  slow the  development p rocess ,  but 
the  ch ips  tu rned  out to  be uneconomic to  use in smal ler  computers of  the  
range.
The company th a t  c l e a r l y  had the  most problems with i t s  o rg an is a t io n  
was General E l e c t r i c ,  which i r o n i c a l l y  had the  most developed 
o rg a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y .  Despite  i t s  system of d e c e n t r a l i s e d  con t ro l  w ith in  
a framework of  product depar tments  and groups,  coupled to  a very la rge  
i n t e r n a l  management consult ancy  o p e ra t io n ,  i t s  computer d iv i s io n  was 
c h a o t i c a l l y  run.  Out of i t s  one computer group (which conta ined  th re e  US 
development teams, one French team and one I t a l i a n  team) i t  managed to  
c r e a t e  a la rge  range of incompatible  systems. This led to  m u l t ip l i e d  
development c o s t s  and destroyed  any chance of  ga in ing  economies of  s ca le  
on shared  sub-systems. GE f a i l e d  to  become a success in the  computer 
market,  a g re a t  r e l i e f  to  IBM, which fea red  GE above a l l  o the rs  due to  i t s  
s i z e .
Two po in ts  can be deduced from t h i s .  F i r s t l y  t h e re  was l i t t l e  
advantage f o r  the  computer department in being l inked to  a semiconductor 
d i v i s i o n  t h a t  i t s e l f  was not a very success fu l  p layer  in the  component 
in d u s t ry .  In genera l ,  the  broad-based e l e c t r o n i c s  companies were as 
unsuccess fu l  in main ta in ing a long term s take  in the  components market as 
they were in the  computer in d u s t ry 3 3 . The v e r t i c a l  l ink  was a l ink  
between one problem area  and ano ther ;  bus iness  machines fi rms could pick 
and choose s u p p l i e r s .  A second problem f o r  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms was t h a t ,  
whi le  they  were t i e d  in to  buying in t e r n a l  components, the  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  
s t r u c t u r e  meant t h a t  the  requirements  o f  the  computer ope ra t ions  were not 
always synchronized with the  developments being made in the  component 
o p e r a t io n s .  E lec t ron ic s  f irms could lose  both ways.
The s in g le  product bus iness  machines company tended to  have a 
d i f f e r e n t  s t r u c t u r e  from t h a t  of the  m ul t i -p roduc t  f i rm .  They had le s s  
d i v i s i o n a l i s a t i o n  and a more fu n c t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  a f in d in g  t h a t  Channon
32See above, chapter 6, p268.
33See below, pp447-448.
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confirmed when studying the  o rg a n is a t io n  o f  B r i t i s h  in d u s t ry 34. The 
bus iness  machines firms had a c e n t r a l  e lec t ro -m echan ica l  technology before  
the  d i g i t a l  computer. These f irms adopted e l e c t r o n i c s  e i t h e r  to  improve the  
f u n c t i o n a l i t y  of t h e i r  systems, l i k e  IBM, or  as a de fens ive  measure to  
p ro t e c t  themselves from the  encroachment of o th e r  computer producers on 
t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y ,  an example being Burroughs. These f irms were more l i k e l y  
to  be f u n c t i o n a l l y  organised ,  with th e  computer d i s p l a c in g  the  t a b u l a t o r  
as th e  core  of  t h e i r  manufactured ou tpu t .
Representa t ion  of commercial computer i n t e r e s t s  was l i k e l y  to  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  between the  two types  of  company. Commercial 
computers were an ad junct  to  the  r e s t  o f  the  d i v e r s i f i e d  company's product 
l i n e .  Commercial computers,  while expected to  f i t  in with the company's 
p o r t f o l i o  and to  b e n e f i t  from economies of scope w i th in  th e  f i rm ,  were not 
very c lo se  to  the  company's t r a d i t i o n a l  product l i n e s .  Commercial computers 
were a l so  not e s s e n t i a l  to  the  whole product l i n e .  Firms l i k e  RCA and EMI 
had bases in consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  and p ro fes s io n a l  and defence e l e c t r o n i c s .  
GE and EE were more f a m i l i a r  with consumer e l e c t r i c a l  p roduc ts ,  e l e c t r i c a l  
power gen e ra t io n ,  and p ro fe s s io n a l  and defence e l e c t r o n i c s .  Computers 
became important in a number of  the se  a c t i v i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  as they became 
used in m i l i t a r y  and i n d u s t r i a l  con t ro l  systems. However, commercial 
computers occupied an unusual p o s i t i o n .  While th e  computer market was 
booming, i t  was s t i l l  a very com pet i t ive  a c t i v i t y .  The computer was un l ike  
the  consumer products t h a t  th e se  f i rm s  made; computers were very la rg e ,  
complex and expensive p ro f e s s io n a l  products35. However, they a l so  
d i f f e r e d  from the  o the r  c a p i t a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms 
made; computers had to  be mass-produced and supported by v a s t  marketing and 
development ope ra t ions  in a h igh ly  compet i t ive  market.
The commercial computer was something of an a l i e n  product  f o r  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm .  However, f o r  the  bus iness  machines fi rms computers became 
the  core  technology. This had a knock on e f f e c t  on th e  s t a t u s  of the  
computer w i th in  each type of company. As the  computer was a new product 
developed on th e  i n i t i a t i v e  of low level  people w i th in  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  
f i rm,  computer product champions seem to  have been few and f a r  between a t  
the  board l e v e l .  Most board members came from the  t r a d i t i o n a l  product 
d i v i s i o n s .  They of ten  favoured investment proposals  from th e se  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  r a t h e r  than from the  new computer d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  The oppos i te
34D.F. Channon, The s t r a t e g y  and s t r u c tu r e  of B r i t i s h  e n t e r p r i s e .
1973.
35Few of the se  fi rms survived in the  consumer products  markets a f t e r  
the  1960s and 1970s.
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u su a l ly  occurred  in the  bus iness  machines f i rm ,  where th e  computer 's  core  
place  in the  business  machines market put i t  a t  th e  c e n t r e  of a t t e n t i o n .
The e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms opted to  take  IBM on with a broad a t t a c k ,  a 
method t h a t  implied committing la rg e  resources  t o  t a c k l e  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  
market l e a d e r 36. This was an a t tem pt  to  develop r a p i d l y  a major new 
product l i n e  f o r  the  company. Yet the  computer ope ra t ion  was not 
r e p re se n te d  a t  the  h ighes t  level  in the  f i rm ,  and i t  seems t h a t  most 
computer d iv i s i o n s  su f fe red  from in c o n s i s t e n t  support  f o r  t h i s  'spending 
method' o f  cap tu r ing  market share .  Even in a f i rm  l i k e  RCA, in which the  
Sarnoffs  were very e n t h u s i a s t i c  about having a l a rge  computer o p e ra t io n ,  
the  funding f o r  t h i s  major d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  f l u c t u a t e d  g r e a t l y  as the  f i rm  
t a r g e t e d  o th e r  growth op t io n s .  Again i t  seems t h a t  the  second phase p o l i c y ,  
of t r y i n g  r a p i d l y  to  become a major p layer  in the  market,  was out of l i n e  
with th e  na tu re  of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm  and i t s  o th e r  commitments.
41 Options f o r  a f i r m ' s  c a p i t a l  budget:  oppor tun i ty  c o s t s  of  s taving in the  
computer in d u s t ry .
A conclus ion  of t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  a c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d ,  
high technology company faces  a major problem in d e a l in g  with the  many 
c a l l s  on i t s  c a p i t a l  re so u rce s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between the  m ul t i -p roduc t  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm  of the  t ime and most o ther  innovato rs  was t h a t  they had 
adopted a s t r a t e g y  of  suppor t ing  m u l t ip l e  h igh- technology  growth p a th s .  
Having a choice  of  growth pa ths  can be seen as an advantage .  I t  can lead 
to  i n t e r n a l  compet it ion  f o r  funds ,  making ope ra t iona l  u n i t s  more e f f i c i e n t  
and f o r c in g  them to  develop good p lans  t o  win f i n a n c i a l  backing. A f irm can 
then chose th e  option which i t  a n t i c i p a t e s  w i l l  give the  h ighes t  long-term 
r e t u r n .  This i s  the  main d e c i s io n  t o  be made when comparing the  r e l a t i v e  
advantages  of  the  numerous innovations  t h a t  high technology firms genera te .  
However, problems do occur  when the  wrong choices  a re  made. A number o f  
these  f i rm s  opted to  support  too many of  these  innovat ions  in the  market 
p lace ,  whereas the  e f f i c i e n t  course  of a c t i o n  would have been to  
c o n ce n t ra te  resources  from the  beginning on one or  two techno log ies .  The 
pre-war philosophy of many of  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms  t h a t  th ey  should be in 
every th ing  e l e c t r o n i c  or e l e c t r i c a l  c a r r i e d  over to  the  post-war pe r iod .  
This led  them to  support  too many products ,  to  th e  detr iment of  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  themselves in any one of  the  new e l e c t r o n i c s  markets.
Computers were an expensive development and, as the  market grew, they  
became in c r e a s in g ly  c o s t l y  to  b r ing  onto the  market.  The f u l l  cos t  of
36P o r t e r ,  Competit ive advantage . pp528-529.
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s e l l i n g  mainframe computers i s  m u l t i - f a c e t e d .  In the  e a r ly  s tages  of the  
in d u s t ry ,  when demand was l im i ted  to  s c i e n t i f i c  u s e r s ,  most of  the  c o s t  was 
in developing and producing the  computer hardware.  As the  computer market 
advanced, the  co s t  of producing and s e l l i n g  computers grew. The machines 
had to  o f f e r  more f e a tu r e s  and had to  be much more r e f in e d .  One-off designs 
were superseded by programmes to  develop whole s e r i e s  of  machines t h a t  had 
to  be i n t e r n a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t ,  and which had to  r e l a t e  to  the  o u ts id e  world 
in e x a c t ly  the  same way. Computers had to  have an ever wider  range of 
f a c i l i t i e s .  Improvements included more advanced e l e c t r o n i c  and e l e c t r o ­
mechanical mass s to rage  systems, conmunications p e r i p h e r a l s ,  log ic  
improvements to  allow o n - l i n e  and r e a l - t im e  p rocess ing ,  and ever f a s t e r  
c a l c u l a t i o n  speeds and memory c a p a c i t i e s .
As the  market developed o th e r  co s t s  grew to  out-weigh development 
expenses.  The s ca le  of the  in d u s t ry  was inc reas ing  a l l  th e  t ime37, 
r e q u i r in g  the  bu i ld ing  of s p e c i a l i s t  p lan ts  and an inc reas ing  level of 
mechanisat ion.  The manufacture of  one-off  or  shor t  production run 
e l e c t r o n i c  equipment was (and is  s t i l l )  s u r p r i s i n g l y  unmechanised. With 
computers becoming mass production  i tems, g r e a t e r  investment in p la n t  was 
r e q u i r e d .  An ad d i t io n a l  c o s t  came from the e v e r - in c rea s in g  complexity of 
sof tware ,  and the  v a r i e t y  of i t .  One o f  the  most complex, and o f ten  most 
expensive p ieces  of software  to  develop, was the  ope ra t ing  system. This was 
the  program which enabled th e  system t o  communicate with the  o u ts id e  world 
and which had to  allow access  to  an ever  more complex a r r a y  of f e a t u r e s .  
Many f i rm s  had problems with c r e a t i n g  ope ra t ing  systems capable  of 
e x p lo i t i n g  the  advantages of  the  hardware a r c h i t e c t u r e .  Among these  were 
IBM and RCA, which both had problems in d e l iv e r in g  t im e-share  systems to 
the  market when promised. Costs a l so  increased  as th e  number of 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  programs ro s e ,  and as th e  sca le  o f  marketing the  machines 
grew. With the  growing s c a le  of p roduct ion ,  companies had to  look more and 
more t o  overseas  s a le s  to  ensure  the  production runs t h a t  they  wanted. That 
meant r e p l i c a t i n g  a l l  the  s a le s  and support  f a c i l i t i e s  overseas .
One s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t  t h a t  has been h igh l igh ted  in some of the  case 
s tu d ie s  was f inanc ing  leases  f o r  r en ted  machines.  As the  number of 
i n s t a l l e d  machines inc reased ,  more c a p i t a l  was needed to  fund th e  bu i ld ing  
of r e n te d  computers.  Income from th e s e  leased systems was spread over a 
number o f  ye a r s .  Some of the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  RCA, had 
d i f f i c u l t y  dea l ing  with t h i s  system of  ope ra t ion ;  f o r  the  bus iness  machines 
fi rms i t  was a l ready  s tandard  p r a c t i c e .
37See above, figure 1.3, p42.
384
I t  cos t  j u s t  £220,000 to  produce the  f i r s t  fo u r  F e r r an t i  Mark 1 
computers3S, but the  IBM 360 is  e s t imated  to  have co s t  up to  $4.5 bn to  
b r ing  to  the  market39 . Thus the  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  o f  s tay in g  in th e  market 
was growing. Business machines f i rms requ i red  the  computer as the  core 
f e a tu r e  of  t h e i r  product mix. They a l l  had la rge  i n s t a l l e d  bases of 
bus iness  machines, both new computers and old e lec t ro -m echan ica l  systems, 
which provided steady lease  incomes. For IBM t h i s  was more than enough to  
enable  i t  to  be the g r e a t e s t  producer  of general  purpose commercial 
computers.  For Burroughs and NCR i t  was enough f o r  them to  continue to  
bu i ld  on niche markets.
The s i t u a t i o n  f o r  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms was very d i f f e r e n t .  The ever 
r i s i n g  c o s t s  had a much more profound e f f e c t  on f i rms t r y i n g  to  develop a 
l a rg e ,  across  the  board,  computer c a p a b i l i t y  from s c r a t c h .  Of the  fi rms 
s tu d ie d ,  the  f i r s t  to  leave were EMI and F e r r a n t i .  They were the  two 
sm a l le s t  f i rms in the  study,  F e r r a n t i  being family  owned, and EMI only 
having an e l e c t r o n i c s  a c t i v i t y  equal to  roughly 20% of  the  company. They 
chose to  leave the  market before  they  had to  bu i ld  the  t h i r d  genera t ion  of 
computers. This i s  not s u r p r i s in g ;  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e sou rces  were l im i ted  
and th e  product  champions of the  computer ope ra t ions  were always low in the 
company h ie ra rchy .  F e r r an t i  had problems with i t s  second genera t ion  
systems, and was probably not making any p r o f i t  on them. At the  t ime of 
e n te r in g  the  indus t ry ,  Vincent F e r r a n t i  had shown an extremely negative  
a t t i t u d e  towards commercial systems40. The idea of  committing the  huge 
re sou rces  needed to  develop t h i r d  genera t ion  computers was not contemplated 
by th e  f i rm .  Fe r r an t i  was a f i rm  t h a t  prided i t s e l f  on being on the  edge 
of technology and i t s  l im i ted  re sources  had to  be c a r e f u l l y  marshal led  to  
remain in a number of high technology a reas .
At EMI the  1100 and 2400 had made only slow in-roads  in to  the  
computer market,  and only one overseas  sa le  was made. The income from these  
systems was smal l ,  nowhere near  enough to  cover the  c o s t  of developing 
t h i r d  g enera t ion  commercial systems. Again s en io r  management, inc luding 
Lockwood, p re fe r r e d  to  inves t  in o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s  r a t h e r  than in computers,  
d e s p i t e  th e  huge p o te n t i a l  of t h i s  market.  EMI appears  t o  have p re fe r r e d  
f u r t h e r  re in forcement o f  the  records  bus iness ,  and i t s  m i l i t a r y  and
38See above, f ig u r e  2 .1 ,  p64.
39Thomas J.Watson J r  and Pe te r  P e t r e .  Father Son & Co. - mv l i f e  a t  IBM 
and bevond. 1990, p347.
4°See above, chap te r  2, pp65-69.
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pro fess iona l  e l e c t r o n i c s  o p e ra t io n s 41 .
I t  i s  not s u rp r i s in g  t h a t  B r i t i s h  firms were fo rced  out f i r s t .  They 
were ope ra t ing  in a smal le r market than  the US f i rm s  and were achieving  few 
overseas s a l e s .  This small market was not l a rge  enough to  support  many 
firms bear ing  the  cos ts  of developing t h i r d  gene ra t ion  systems. Both fi rms 
had o th e r  op t ions  fo r  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  and could expand in o the r  d i r e c t io n s  
which were l e s s  expensive and l e s s  r i s k y ,  a t  l e a s t  in th e  eyes of the  
sen ior  management.
The p i c tu r e  becomes c l e a r e r  when looking a t  th e  l a r g e r  f irms t h a t  did 
go in to  the  t h i r d  genera t ion .  I t  i s  p oss ib le  to  fo l low  th e  decision-making 
process and to  see the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  support ing a number of high co s t  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s .  All the  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms involved in t h i s  s tudy had 
m ul t ip le  growth paths  open to  them, and t h i s  had a profound e f f e c t  on the  
computer d i v i s i o n s .  RCA's computer department was in v a r i a b ly  dependent on 
the s t a t e  of p lay  in the  f i r m ' s  t e l e v i s i o n  ope ra t ion  f o r  i t s  funds,  as well 
as being a f f e c t e d  by the  component and m i l i t a r y  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  were going 
on42. GE was a l so  heav i ly  involved with  a number o f  ' v e n t u r e '  p r o j e c t s ,  
namely j e t  engines  and nuc lear  power43 . Both th e se  f i rms went through a 
per iod of s e l f  examination dur ing the  l a t e  1960s and e a r l y  1970s: the  main 
quest ion was whether enough cash could be genera ted  to  fund a l l  the  
developments t h a t  were in hand.
Both RCA and GE s tud ied  t h e i r  borrowing l e v e l s  and r e tu rn s  to  
inves to rs  and decided they could not support  a l l  t h e i r  developments; th e re  
is  evidence t h a t  Engl ish E l e c t r i c  did the  same. The c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  
d i v e r s i f i e d  f i rm ,  which could have been expected to  b e n e f i t  from economies 
of scope,  in s tead  su f fe red  from having to  support  m u l t i p l e ,  h igh-cos t  
development op t io n s .  The case s tu d i e s  o f  RCA, GE and to  a l e s s e r  degree EE, 
desc r ibe  the  f i n a n c i a l  in t r o sp e c t io n  t h a t  was going on a t  th e  time t h a t  the  
firms l e f t  th e  computer in dus t ry .  They a lso  show t h a t ,  even before  t h i s  
p o in t ,  investment in computers had been sub jec t  to  developments elsewhere 
in the  company. This po in t  i s  made more c l e a r l y  f o r  the  US f irms than in 
the  EMI and F e r r an t i  chap te rs  where m ate r ia l  on management dec is ion  making 
is  more l im i t ed .  However, i t  seems l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  sm a l le r  B r i t i s h  fi rms
were faced with e x ac t ly  the  same problem, but t h a t  they  had to  face  i t
e a r l i e r  because both the  fi rms themselves and the  market they  opera ted  in 
were sm al le r .
41See above, chap te r  3, p p l4 3 -149.
42See above, chap te r  6, pp250-256 and pp281-286.
43See above, chapter 7, pp229-336.
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The next question  to  ask i s  why, given t h a t  f inance  was l im i ted ,  was 
the  computer opera t ion  dropped and no t  one of  the  many o th e r  equa l ly  
expensive developments t h a t  the se  f i rm s  had in hand? The exp lana t ion  l i e s  
in th e  arguments a l ready  p re sen ted  - the  product s t r a t e g i e s  were 
inap p ro p r ia te  given the  low p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s  of the  computer d iv i s io n s .
The schemes adopted by RCA, GE and EE were grandiose  a t tempts  to  take  
on an e s t a b l i s h e d  market leade r .  These fi rms t r i e d  to  produce a broad range 
of computers d i r e c t l y  p i tched  a g a in s t  IBM, with l i t t l e  a t tempt  a t  product 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  While the  computer indus t ry  was one of  the  f a s t e s t  growing 
i n d u s t r i e s  in the  world,  i t  was s t i l l  r i s k y .  The f a i l u r e  t o  adopt a niche 
s t r a t e g y  meant t h a t  f u r t h e r  investment had to  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  keep up with 
the  l a r g e s t  f i rm  in the  s e c to r ,  y e t  up t o  t h i s  po in t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms 
had not made a p r o f i t  on t h e i r  computer ope ra t io n s .  Given t h i s  f a c t ,  i t  was 
a reasonab le  dec is ion  to  drop t h i s  d iv i s io n  r a t h e r  than t o  continue  to  
support  i t .  The co rpora te  s t a f f  had l i t t l e  evidence t h a t  the  computer 
d iv i s io n  could be p r o f i t a b l e .
I t  has a l ready  been argued t h a t  product champions f o r  computers were 
not r ep re sen ted  a t  the  h ighes t  level  in the  company. There fo re ,  i t  may have 
been p o l i t i c a l l y  expedient to  drop th e  one opera t ion  in which the  sen io r  
management had th e  l e a s t  personal s t a k e ,  r a t h e r  than one of  th e  o th e r  major 
investment schemes t h a t  the  fi rms had in hand. This does not r e a l l y  hold 
t ru e  f o r  RCA, where the  younger Sarnof f  had p e r so n a l ly  supported the  rap id  
expansion of the  computer department a t  the  end of th e  1960s, but t h i s  was 
a d i s a s t r o u s  p o l ic y 44. A f te r  t h i s ,  he was s id e - l i n e d  and again  th e re  were 
no o th e r  computer people on the  board.
There were o the r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  fo r  the  p re fe ren ce  fo r  the  non­
computer investments .  The o th e r  new a c t i v i t i e s  tended to  be e i t h e r  c lo se r  
to  th e  o r i g i n a l  core products  of  th e  company, or  in i n d u s t r i e s  where 
e s t a b l i s h e d  market leade rs  were l e s s  dominant. The l a t t e r  case  can be made 
fo r  GE's i n t e r e s t  in commercial j e t  engines ,  remembering t h a t  i t  was 
a l ready  an e s t a b l i s h e d  producer o f  m i l i t a r y  j e t  eng ines .  The core 
technology argument c e r t a i n l y  a p p l i e s  to  GE's i n t e r e s t  in nuc lea r  power, 
because o f  i t s  la rge  s take  in the  e l e c t r i c a l  equipment market.  In RCA's 
case ,  co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  development b u i l t  on i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  s t r e n g th  in 
the  f i e l d  of broadcas t  equipment.
Disposal of  the  computer o p e ra t io n  was comparatively  easy to  ca r ry  
ou t,  because d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  kept i t  s epara te  from th e  co rpo ra t ion  as a 
whole. The product c en t r e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  makes i t  e a s i e r  to  o f f - lo a d
44See above, chapter 6.
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d i f f i c u l t  s ec to r s  without d e s t a b i l i s i n g  the r e s t  o f  the  company.
Thus one of the  major conclus ions  of t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  t h a t  compet it ion 
fo r  funds wi th in  the  m ul t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms  undoubtedly ex i s t ed  
and d i r e c t l y  led to  t h e i r  abandoning a p o t e n t i a l l y  p r o f i t a b l e  product l i n e .  
Poor management of  t h i s  in te r n a l  competi t ion f o r  funds was a g re a t  weakness 
of the  f i rms  in ques t ion .  The main problem was support ing  too many p r o j e c t s  
fo r  too long. When dec is ions  had to  be made to  so lve t h i s  problem, the 
so lu t io n  r e f l e c t e d  the  s t r u c t u r a l  and p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  of  the  company. 
While computers were p o t e n t i a l l y  the  most dynamic of  the  op t ions  they could 
t a k e ,  computers were a l so  the  most r i s k y  and l e a s t  f a m i l i a r  to  the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  This a n a ly s i s  resembles the r i s k  reduc t ion  theory  of 
company s t r a t e g y  ou t l in ed  by P r a i s 45 .
P r a i s '  work can a l so  throw l i g h t  on why a c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  
fi rm s u f f e r s  from in te rn a l  cash flow problems. P r a i s  p re d ic ted  t h a t  th e re  
would be a h igher l ik e l ihood  of a p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between the r a t e s  
of  r e t u r n  from a f i r m ' s  var ious  product l in e s  than a nega t ive  c o r r e l a t i o n  
between the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of i t s  p roduc ts .  There fore ,  i f  one p a r t  of a f i rm 
is  undergoing d i f f i c u l t y  or  success ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  the  r e s t  of the  fi rm 
is  in the  same s i t u a t i o n .  In h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  P ra is  sees t h i s  as a r e s u l t  of 
products  being exposed to  the  same general  economic c o n d i t io n s ,  and the  
same management approach. In the  case  of  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies t h i s  
c o r r e l a t i o n  between a f i r m ' s  va r ious  product l in e s  could have been 
exacerbated by the  common core technology.  The in t ro d u c t io n  of a new type 
of component meant t h a t  the  components d iv i s io n  needed to  develop and 
in troduce  the  new device .  Following t h i s  i t  was l i k e l y  t h a t  a l l  the  var ious  
end product d i v i s i o n s ,  such as the  m i l i t a r y  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  p ro fes s io n a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  and computer d i v i s i o n s ,  would want to  develop products  based 
on th e  new component. This implied t h a t  a l l  the  d iv i s io n s  would want an 
i n j e c t i o n  of  funds a t  the  same time to  in troduce  new produc ts .  I t  i s  
p o s s ib le  to  envisage an e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm  which has a number of d iv i s io n s  
which a re  very near ly  a t  the  same s tage  of the  product l i f e - c y c l e .  This 
would mean t h a t  on occasion the  f i rm  would have a su rp lus  of cash from 
'cash  cows' ,  but could a l so  be faced by simultaneous demands f o r  cash to  
develop and market new produc ts .  While t h i s  sounds u n l ik e ly ,  t h i s  i s  very 
much the  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  h i t  RCA (and in the e a r l y  1980s the  B r i t i s h  f i rm  
STC). The case  s tu d ie s  show how e l e c t r o n i c s  companies were s t r a i n e d  by the  
i n t e r n a l  p ressu res  a s s o c ia t e d  with having to  support  a number of 
development pa th s .  Computers added g r e a t l y  to  t h i s  s t r a i n .  Computers were
45S . J .  P r a i s ,  The evo lu t ion  of  g i a n t  f irms in B r i t a i n . Cambridge 1976,
p93.
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a product with a rap id  techno log ica l  tu rnover ,  r e q u i r in g  la rge  re search  
commitments, while  simultaneously  having high marketing c o s t s .
In essence t h i s  argument runs  counter  to  the  Schumpeterian t h e s i s  of 
la rge f i rm  s i z e  leading to  market power and to  the  a b i l i t y  to  fund 
innovat ion46. Galb ra i th  has made s i m i l a r  arguments to  Schumpeter47. The 
argument i s  t h a t  a la rge  firm can b e n e f i t  from economies of  s i z e  and scope, 
giving i t  an advantage in the  process  o f  innovation.  Large f i rm s  are  b e t t e r  
able  to  fund re sea rch  and development, can a f fo rd  to  support  a number of 
te chnolog ies  and, adding the  advantages  of scope48 , can b e n e f i t  from the 
cross  f e r t i l i s a t i o n  of developments from one technology/product  to  another .  
At the  beginning of the  computer e ra  th e  l a r g e s t  f i rms to  e n t e r  the  market,  
in both the  US and the  UK, were th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s .  They had the  
advantages of s i z e ,  b enef i ted  from ra p id  growth in t h e i r  o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c  
products and b e n e f i t ed  from the in -dep th  te ch n ica l  knowledge they*had of 
e l e c t r o n i c s  technology.
Yet the  f i rm  which came to  dominate the  market was sm al le r  and had 
less  background in e l e c t r o n i c s :  t h i s  was IBM. I t  d id ,  however, have 
exper ience of th e  market fo r  computers. The market f o r  d a ta  process ing 
equipment c o n s i s te d  of la rge  commercial and government o rg a n i s a t i o n s  with 
big da ta -keep ing  requirements;  an a rea  in which IBM had wel l  e s ta b l i sh e d  
connec tions .  This i s  why IBM had the  p o t e n t i a l  to  lead the  computer market. 
What i s  more s u r p r i s in g  i s  t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms were a l so  beaten in 
the market by a hos t  of  even smal ler  companies. Business machines fi rms and 
the  success fu l  s t a r t - u p  companies concen tra ted  a l l  t h e i r  re sources  on 
general  purpose computer technology; e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms n u l l i f i e d  the  
advantages t h a t  Schumpeter and G a lb ra i th  might have accorded them, by 
support ing so many techno log ies  f o r  too  long and by adopting a poor product 
s t r a t e g y .  IBM and the  o the r  f i rm s ,  while  having n e i t h e r  th e  technolog ica l  
background nor th e  g re a t  s i z e  of  th e  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies, concentra ted  
re sources  on a s in g le  a c t i v i t y ,  and brought to  bear  a g r e a t e r  knowledge of 
the  market.
Rather  than using t h e i r  d i v e r s i t y  as a compet i t ive  weapon to  gain the
46J.A Schumpeter, Capi ta l i sm.  Socia lism and Democracy. 1961.
47J.K. G a lb ra i th ,  American Capi ta li sm: The concept o f  coun te rva i l ing  
power. Boston, 1952, pp91-5; O.E Williamson, Markets and H ie ra rch ies ,  
an a ly s i s  and a n t i t r u s t  im p l i c a t io n s . New York, 1975, p p l7 8 -179.
48E.E. Bai ley  and A.F. F r ied laender ,  "Market s t r u c t u r e  and m u l t i - 
product i n d u s t r i e s " ,  Journal of Economic L i t e r a t u r e . 1982, 20, ppl024-48. 
W.J. Baumol, J .C .  Panzer,  R.D. W il l ig  Contestable  Markets and the  theory  
of i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e . New York, 1982.
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economies of s ca le  and scope i t  appears  t h a t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms  were t r y i n g  
to  reduce t h e i r  r i s k s  by having a broad spread of  p roduc ts .  I t  has been 
seen t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms were l e s s  than succe ss fu l  in a number of 
markets, making them somewhat embat tled .  In t h i s  c ircumstance 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  became a de fens ive  measure: t h e re  was a worry t h a t  i f  they 
concentra ted on one market they  could  s t i l l  lo se  i t  and t h e r e f o r e  d ie .  
However, i t  can be argued t h a t  i t  i s  not the  r o l e  of  th e  f irm to  spread 
r i s k :  shareholders  can do t h i s  by a d ju s t in g  t h e i r  own p o r t f o l i o  of 
hold ings .  Any d e s i r e  f o r  f irms to  do so i s  led by management's own 
a s p i r a t i o n s  f o r  s u rv iv a l ,  r a t h e r  than as a means of  p ro te c t in g  the  
shareho lder .
The one e l e c t r o n i c s  company t h a t  did have a ' b e t  the  company' 
a t t i t u d e ,  l ik e  IBM, was RCA. I t  put huge resources  in to  such p r o j e c t s  as 
colour  t e l e v i s i o n ,  video d i s c  p l a y e r s 49, and even f o r  a sh o r t  while  in to  
computers. However, these  p r o j e c t s  overlapped and i t  too found i t s e l f  sho r t  
of c a p i t a l  and cash to  cover a l l  i t s  p r o j e c t s .  This was damaging a t  the  
beginning of the  computer d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  as well as leading  to  i t s  f i n a l  
abandonment. This was because the  development of co lour  t e l e v i s i o n  dra ined 
the computer opera t ion  o f  funds a t  a c r i t i c a l  t ime in i t s  e a r ly  
development: indeed, t h i s  i s  one of th e  c l e a r e s t  examples o f  t h i s  problem 
in the  t h e s i s .
T r ad i t io n a l  f i n a n c i a l  theory  would d ispu te  the  idea t h a t  c a p i t a l -  
r a t i o n in g  e x i s t s .  I t  i s  argued t h a t  f o r  p ro je c t s  t h a t  a re  expected to  o f f e r  
a reasonable  r e tu r n ,  necessary  funds can always be r a i s e d  from the  market.  
However, r e c e n t ly  t h i s  view has been quest ioned and th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
c a p i t a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w i th in  a d i v e r s i f i e d  company has been cons ide red50. 
This t h e s i s  supports  the  view t h a t  such firms do in f a c t  s u f f e r  from, or 
a t  l e a s t  perce ive  t h a t  they  s u f f e r  from, a l im i ted  a b i l i t y  to  fund m u l t ip le  
high technology p r o j e c t s ,  and t h a t  t h i s  i s  a major co n s id e ra t io n  in 
abandoning o pe ra t ions .  S p e c i a l i s t  f i rm s  have the  problem of  r a i s i n g  c a p i t a l  
to  support  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  in one market; the  d i v e r s i f i e d  f irm can be 
faced with  a s i t u a t i o n  where i t  has t o  r a i s e  c a p i t a l ,  e i t h e r  from the  
market or  using pas t  r e s e r v e s ,  to  fund many p r o j e c t s  a t  th e  same time.
49M. Graham, RCA and the  Video Disc: the  bus iness  of r e s e a r c h . 
Cambridge, Mass. 1986.
5°C. Tomkins, Corporate Resource A l loca t ion :  f i n a n c i a l ,  s t r a t e g i c  and 
o rg an iza t io n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s . Oxford,  1991, pp!79-180.
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The combined a f f e c t  of c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  and poor management s t r u c tu r e s  on 
the  e l e c t r o n i c s  c o rp o ra t io n s .
A r ecen t  r e p o r t ,  commissioned by the NEDC's E lec t ro n ic s  Indus t ry  
Sector Group51 , found t h a t  one of the  weaknesses of  the  B r i t i s h  
e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry  was i t s  o v e r - d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  I t  recommended t h a t  
B r i t i s h  f irms concen t ra te  on a few core  p roduc ts ,  in which they should 
bu i ld  up exper t  knowledge and t h e i r  s c a le ,  so as to  be ab le  to  compete in 
the  world market fo r  th e se  c e n t r a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  These case  s tu d ie s  show 
t h a t ,  indeed, t h e r e  were weaknesses in the  m u l t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm. 
Despite the  chance they had to  e x p lo i t  the  economies o f  s i z e  and scope,  too 
of ten  they  su f fe red  the  problems of  being over-committed to  too many 
p roducts .  This ap p l ie s  not j u s t  to  B r i t i s h  f i rm s ,  but a l so  to  t h e i r  l a rg e r  
US cous ins .  The m ul t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies were g r e a t ly  
handicapped by t h e i r  a t tempts  to  support  so many techno log ica l  growth 
pa ths .  Most abandoned computers due to  p ressures  on cash flow caused by 
support ing a l l  these  a c t i v i t i e s .
Why did t h i s  general  d i f f i c u l t y  almost always lead to  the  abandonment 
of the  computer department and not o th e r  ope ra t ions?  The following l in e s  
of thought  c lo s e ly  resemble the  f in d in g s  of the  SAPPHO p r o j e c t  c a r r i e d  out 
by th e  Science Pol icy  Research Unit in the  e a r l y  1970s52. This p r o je c t  
found t h a t  success fu l  product innovation came from such th ings  as c lo se  
market and use r  awareness and having powerful product champions. I t  i s  the  
con ten t ion  of t h i s  t h e s i s  t h a t  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i r m s ,  by t ry in g  to  develop 
the  computer as a t e chno log ica l  s p in - o f f  from t h e i r  o th e r  e l e c t r o n i c s  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  were weaker in these  a reas  than the  bus iness  machines f i rm s .  
This meant t h a t  the  computer was the  na tu ra l  t a r g e t  f o r  c u t t i n g  when the  
company needed to  reduce i t s  commitment to new investment.
The bus iness  machines fi rms s t a r t e d  from a p o s i t i o n  where an in-depth  
knowledge of the  market fo r  commercial computers a l ready  ex is t ed .  The 
problems of  s e l l i n g  mass produced complex p ro fes s iona l  machines had a l ready  
been d e a l t  w i th .  IBM used t h i s  knowledge and i t s  market presence to  move 
from dominance of  the  punched card  market to  dominance o f  the  computer 
market. I t s  systems were well engineered,  b u i l t  with the  knowledge of 
bus iness  u s e r s '  needs,  and i t  could feed i t s  computers in to  the  market 
using i t s  e x i s t i n g  huge s a le s  network. IBM was e s t a b l i s h e d  as the  most
51McKinsey & Co., f o r  the  NEDC's E lec t ro n ic s  Indus t ry  Sector Group, 
Performance and Competit ive Success:  S trengthening Competit iveness in UK 
E l e c t r o n i c s . 1988.
S2R. Rothwell e t  a l ,  'SAPPHO Updated - P r o je c t  SAPPHO Phase I I ' ,  
Research P o l i c y . 1974, vol 3, pp258-291.
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t r u s t e d  su p p l i e r  of bus iness  machines: i t s  computers b enef i ted  from the  
p u r c h a se r ' s  f a m i l i a r i t y  with IBM's q u a l i t y  p roduc ts .  All the  bus iness  
machines fi rms could bu i ld  on a s i m i l a r ,  though sm al le r ,  base.  I t  a l so  
meant t h a t  the  smal le r bus iness  machines firms were used t o  ope ra t ing  in 
a world dominated by IBM; NCR and Burroughs could e a s i l y  switch t h e i r  niche 
markets from e lec t ro -mechanical  systems to  computers. ICT had a s im i l a r  
advantage in t h a t  i t  had a geographical  niche which afforded  i t  p a r t i a l  
p ro te c t io n  from domination by IBM.
N ever theless ,  the se  advantages and d isadvantages  did not 
a u to m a t ica l ly  mean success f o r  one s e t  of f irms and f a i l u r e  f o r  o th e r s ;  
th e re  was freedom of a c t i o n .  Honeywell entered th e  indus t ry  by acqu i r ing  
the  computer d iv i s io n  o f  another  company, Raytheon, adopted a c lev e r  
product s t r a t e g y ,  put huge resources  in to  a l a rge  s a l e s  o rg a n is a t io n ,  and 
saw th e  computer d iv i s io n  become over one t h i r d  of  the  company. I t  achieved 
success and had l i t t l e  need to  r e a s s e s s  the  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in to  computers. 
I f  Honeywell had had to  r e a s s e s s  i t s  investment p lan s ,  the  computer 
department might have rece ived  more backing due to  i t s  c en t r a l  s t a t u s  as 
a core  product.
With t h i s  one excep t ion ,  the  o ther  e l e c t r o n i c s  firms adopted 
inap p ro p r ia te  product s t r a t e g i e s  by t r y i n g  to  cap tu re  market share qu ick ly ,  
while not having the  long term commitment to  back-up t h i s  expensive p o l icy .  
The p re s su re s  of  mult ip le-growth  p a th s ,  f a i l u r e  t o  produce quick p r o f i t s  
from computers,  and lack of  c e n t r a l  commitment, earmarked the  computer fo r  
abandonment in t imes of s t r e s s .  Despite  t h e i r  m-form o rg a n i s a t i o n ,  they 
were not able  to  take  the  ap p ro p r ia te  dec is ions  o r  ev a lu a te  the  choices f o r  
i n te r n a l  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  e f f i c i e n t l y ,  which i s  the  goal of  such a 
s t r u c t u r e 53. I f  the  f irms were not w i l l in g  to  back the  product s t r a t e g y  
they had adopted,  they should not have entered i t  a t  a l l .
One s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  of the  f a i l u r e  of e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms was t h a t  the  
same process  occurred in a number of t h e i r  product a r e a s .  One of the  most 
d i r e c t l y  comparable i n d u s t r i e s  to  th e  e a r ly  mainframe indus t ry  is  the  
a c t i v e 54 semiconductor s e c t o r .  The comparisons a re  many. The development 
of the  t r a n s i s t o r  marked a quantum leap in e l e c t r o n i c  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  j u s t  
as the  computer was a massive leap forward in c a l c u l a t i o n  power. Like the  
computer ( indeed the  two th in g s  a re  c lo se ly  l in k e d ) ,  th e  p r in c ip a l  a c t i v e  
component technologies  have advanced in f a i r l y  d e f in a b le  genera t ions .  The 
main gene ra t ions  were:
53Williamson, Markets and h ie r a r c h y . pl49.
54By a c t iv e  we mean c i r c u i t s  which can ac t  as lo g ic a l  c i r c u i t s .
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1) the  vacuum tube,
2) s in g le  t r a n s i s t o r  c i r c u i t s ,
3) i n t e g ra te d  c i r c u i t s ,
4) Large Scale In te g ra t io n  (LSI) ,
5) Very Large Scale In t e g r a t io n  (VLSI),
B as ic a l ly  t h i s  meant t h a t  c i r c u i t  d e n s i t i e s  have in c reased ,  r e p re sen t in g  
ever g r e a t e r  power and a f a l l i n g  p r i c e  per c i r c u i t .  There were a l so  a 
number o f  new types of  c i r c u i t  developed, such as th e  TTL, ECL and CMOS 
ch ips ,  each having d i f f e r e n t  p r o p e r t i e s .  This process  of changing 
genera t ions  has been o u t l in e d  by a number of  a u th o r s 55 and is  s im i l a r  to  
the  development of computers,  which themselves were b u i l t  using the 
changing genera t ions  of  semiconductors .  The main d i f f e r e n c e  between 
computers and chips i s  in terms of  s c a le ;  semiconductors a re  produced in 
t h e i r  m i l l i o n s  and sold  f o r  very low p r i c e s .  Apart from t h i s ,  the  r a t e  of 
change of  the  technology and the  importance of  keeping pace with the  
technology was s im i la r  between computers and semiconductors .
An even more important comparison can be found when looking a t  the  
firms t h a t  were involved in the  two i n d u s t r i e s .  When the  main components 
were vacuum tubes ,  the  market was dominated by th e  same broad-based 
e l e c t r o n i c s  f irms t h a t  have been s tu d ie d  in t h i s  t h e s i s .  The in t roduc t ion  
of the  t r a n s i s t o r  did not g r e a t l y  damage t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  of  leade rsh ip ,  
though th e  US indus t ry  d id  pu l l  s l i g h t l y  ahead o f  th e  European indus t ry .  
However, the  advent of the  in t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t  he ra lded  the boom of 
s p e c i a l i s t  manufacturers  such as Texas Instruments ,  Motorola and F a i r c h i ld .  
By the  1970s most of the  broad based firms had been marginali sed  in to  
s p e c i a l i s t  markets,  mostly f o r  th e  m i l i t a r y ,  o r  what Scibberas  desc r ibes  
as th e  l i t t l e  league56. Since then the  s t a r  performers in the  
semiconductor market have been s p e c i a l i s t  companies.
This bears  a s t r i k i n g  resemblance to  the  development o f  the  computer 
market. Many of  the  same p re s su re s  were p re sen t .  The in t ro d u c t io n  of ranges 
of components was very expensive.  To win market acceptance  of a new range 
of ch ip s ,  the  company had to  produce them on a v a s t  s c a l e  and s e l l  them a t  
a low p r i c e ,  even though t h i s  e n t a i l e d  a shor t  term loss  due to  the  low
S5F. Malerba The Semiconductor Indus try :  the  economics of rap id  growth 
and d e c l i n e . Madison, Wisconsin, 1985; A. Golding, 'The semiconductor 
indus t ry  in B r i t a in  and the  United S t a t e s :  a case  s tudy in innovation,  
growth and the  d i f f u s io n  of  t e c h n o lo g y ' ,  PhD, U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Sussex, 1971.
56E. Scibberas  M ul t ina t iona l  e l e c t r o n i c  companies and na t iona l  
economic p o l i c y .  Greenwich, Conn., 1977.
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y i e l d  o f  usable  chips a t  the  beginning of the  l e a rn ing  curve.  Given the 
cash flow disadvantages  of suppor t ing  so many te ch n o lo g ie s ,  i t  i s  not 
perhaps s u r p r i s in g  to  see B r i t i s h  f i rms l ik e  F e r r a n t i ,  GEC, and Plessey 
opt ing  to  become smal le r s p e c i a l i s t  manufacturers57, and o th e r s  l i k e  GE 
and RCA having g rea t  d i f f i c u l t y  in main ta in ing a c r e d ib l e  market share .  The 
s p e c i a l i s t  chips they made were those  most d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  to  t h e i r  
m i l i t a r y  and telecommunications markets .  The newer f irms reac ted  b e t t e r  to  
changing market demand. Even tua l ly  th e  s p e c i a l i s t  f i rms came to  dominate 
the market,  bar the  mass production memory market which i s  c o n t ro l l e d  by 
the  Japanese e l e c t r o n i c s  indus t ry .
Government p o l icy  and the computer in dus t ry .
The apparent weakness o f  the  m ul t i -p roduc t  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rms in the  
EDP and o the r  e l e c t r o n i c s  markets has impl ica t ions  f o r  the  a n a ly s i s  of the  
e f f e c t  o f  government p o l i c i e s  on th e  indus try :  le ssons  which a re  s t i l l  
va luab le  when cons ider ing  new po l icy  op t ions .  The b a s ic  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
the  r o l e  of the  American and B r i t i s h  governments was t h a t  the  US 
government 's  main inf luence  was through purchasing huge q u a n t i t i e s  of 
technology and funding the  development of new computer concepts .  The 
B r i t i s h  government t r i e d  a more d i r e c t  method of  in f luenc ing  the indus t ry  
through in te rv en t io n  in the  market place  and support ing  hardware 
developments. The US government bought equipment from market leaders  to  
meet i t s  demand f o r  computer equipment, supporting  i t s  indus t ry  by buying 
product .  The B r i t i s h  government t r i e d  to help B r i t i s h  f i rms to  compete 
a g a in s t  the  l a rge  American ind u s t ry  by underpinning companies which were 
bu i ld in g  computers; u n t i l  the  l a t e  1960s t h i s  meant support ing the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  fi rms t h a t  were t r y i n g  to  bu i ld  a s take  in th e  computer s e c to r .
The US computer indus t ry  rece ived  s u b s t a n t i a l  support  from the  
government, much o f  i t  through s a l e s  t o  the  armed f o r c e s .  The d r iv in g  fo rce  
was th e  need to  support  a massive m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  dur ing the  cold war, 
r a t h e r  than as a method of  c r e a t i n g  a new in d u s t ry .  Arguments have been 
cons t ruc ted  which sugges t  t h a t  th e  purchase of m i l i t a r y  systems is  so 
obl ique  to  the  commercial market t h a t  i t  has l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on the  general  
indus t ry :
'Most m i l i t a r y  (and space)  hardware i s  designed f o r  s p e c i f i c  
a p p l i c a t io n s  under severe  environmental  c o n d i t io n s .  I t  i s  u su a l ly  
f a r  more expensive than any comparable c i v i l  p roduc t .  Not only the  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  but method of  manufacture,  t e s t i n g  and s e l l i n g  are
57Ibid.
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very d i f f e r e n t  from those  of  th e  normal c i v i l  m a r k e t . ' 58 
However, evidence gathered in t h i s  s tudy  shows t h a t  the  US government was 
indeed very important in the  growth o f  the  market f o r  s tandard  computer 
equipment. A number of  examples a re  given of the  American government buying 
l a rge  q u a n t i t i e s  of  computers f o r  m i l i t a r y  uses which were f o r  e s s e n t i a l l y  
commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s .  These included sa le s  of  NCR machines f o r  payro l l  
t a s k s ,  Burroughs computers f o r  accounting a t  m i l i t a r y  bases and RCA systems 
f o r  s t o r e  keeping. These sa le s  were o f  a la rge  magnitude and helped fi rms 
e s t a b l i s h  s e r i e s  production of  s tanda rd  commercial models:
'Another hot government t r e n d - - f l e e t  purchases  of computers,  
with the  Air  Force playing th e  lead r o l e .  Following up th e  AFLC 
o rde r  f o r  30 3 0 1 ' s ,  the  Air  Force has announced plans  to  i n s t a l l  
between 160 and 174 NCR 390 's  f o r  payrol l  p rocess ing  a t  some 105 US 
and 25 overseas  bases .  The two orders  sandwiched a dinky order  fo r  
19 CDC 160A's f o r  an AF S a t e l l i t e  Control  F a c i l i t y  t r a c k in g  
n e tw o rk . ' 59
This s c a l e  of purchasing was much l a r g e r  than the  output  o f  the  whole of 
the  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  a t  t h i s  t ime.
This anecdota l  evidence of b ig  government purchases of s tandard  
machines is  supported by s t a t i s t i c a l  d a t a .  The fo llowing graph ( f ig u r e  9.1) 
shows t h a t  the  US government was the  d r iv in g  fo rce  behind e a r l y  demand. I t  
bought th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  e a r ly  computer systems, he lp ing to  e s t a b l i s h  the 
technology. The US government continued  to  buy an ever growing number of 
computers,  bu t ,  as f i g u r e  9.2 shows, i t s  r e l a t i v e  importance decreased as 
computers were taken up by p r iv a t e  in d u s t ry .  P r iv a t e  f irms could only buy 
EDP equipment once the  computer in d u s t ry  had l e a r n t  how to  make r e l i a b l e ,  
cheap equipment.  This was achieved by s a t i s f y i n g  e a r l y  government demand:
5aC. Freeman, 'Research and Development in E lec t ron ic  Capi ta l  Goods' , 
National I n s t i t u t e  Economic Review. November 1965, pp40-91.
59Pa tamat ion . Ju ly  1963, pl9 .
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Figure 9.1
Number of computers used by 
US federal government.
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Figure 9.2
Proportion of US computers used by 
federal and state government.
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I t  has to  be emphasised t h a t  the  US government was not concen t ra t ing  
i t s  spending on s p e c i a l i s t  computers; most systems t h a t  i t  bought were 
s tandard  commercial or s c i e n t i f i c  machines. This i s  borne out by looking 
a t  th e  weighting of a d m in i s t r a t i v e  systems to  sp ec ia l  purpose machines:
Table 9.1 Types o f  computers in use bv the  US
fe d e ra l  government 1967-72.
Year General Management Specia l  Management Class ,  Total
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  Contro l ,  C la s s i f i e d  & Mobile
1967 2754 938 3692
1968 2909 1323 4232
1969 3039 1627 4666
1970 3404 1873 5277
1971 3389 2545 5934
1972 3433 3298 6731
Source: CBI Archive,  General Serv ices  Adminis t ra t ion ,  Inventory  and summary 
of f e d e r a l  ADP a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  f i s c a l  year 1972.
General management systems were used f o r  standard a d m in i s t r a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  
and very  s i m i l a r  to  the  uses made of  computers by commercial companies. I t  
a l so  has to  be remembered t h a t  many of  the  spec ia l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  systems 
were s tandard  s c i e n t i f i c  machines used fo r  such th in g s  as r e a l - t im e  
s t r a t e g i c  con t ro l  systems.
The importance o f  s tandard  bus iness  a p p l i c a t i o n s  to  the  US armed 
fo rce s  a l so  shows through in the  type of  resea rch  t h a t  they  funded. I t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  i t  was IBM t h a t  developed the s tandard  s c i e n t i f i c  computer 
language, FORTRAN, while  i t  was the  US armed fo rce s  t h a t  paid f o r  the  
development of  the  bus iness  language COBOL. Even la rg e  m i l i t a r y  p r o j e c t s  
l i k e  th e  ComLogNet communications system60 were, in f a c t ,  developed fo r  
t a sk s  c lo se  to  those  t h a t  bus iness  could use.  ComLogNet gave the  USAF a 
method of  a llowing stock con t ro l  computers to  t a l k  to  each o the r  to  allow 
the  a i r f o r c e  to  con t ro l  i t s  in v e n to r i e s  on a worldwide s c a l e ;  i t  was one 
of the  f i r s t  such developments.  Not only  was the  government helping the  
in d u s t ry  by buying la rge  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  hardware, i t  was a l so  developing 
commercially usefu l a p p l i c a t i o n s .
The US government a l so  had a s im i l a r  e f f e c t  on the  bas ic  component 
market.  I t  was government purchasing o f  such th ings  as in te g ra te d  c i r c u i t s  
t h a t  al lowed p r i c e s  to  f a l l  t o  a leve l  low enough f o r  commercial use:
6°See above, chapter 6, pp237-239.
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Table 9.2 Average price of integrated circuits and the
propor t ion  of production purchased bv th e  
US m i l i t a r y .  1962-1968.
Average P r ice  $ Percent used by M i l i t a r y
1962 50.00 100
1963 31.60 94
1964 18.50 85
1965 8.33 72
1966 5.05 53
1967 3.32 43
1968 2.33 37
Source: John T i l t o n ,  I n t e r n a t io n a l  D iffus ion  of  Technology, the  case  of 
semiconductors .  1971, p91.
The analogy between the r o l e  of the  US government in the  
semiconductor and computer i n d u s t r i e s  i s  s t r i k i n g .  In n e i t h e r  case  did  the  
government favour i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u p p l i e r s ,  the  defence e l e c t r o n i c s  
companies. Ins tead  i t  bought chips  or  computers from th e  b e s t  source;  
in c re a s in g ly  t h i s  meant s p e c i a l i s t  producers .
In c o n t r a s t  the  B r i t i s h  government 's  r o l e  was o f ten  r e a c t i v e .  B r i t i s h  
po l icy  was based on meeting the  cha l lenge  of  competing with the  advancing 
US in d u s t ry .  B r i t i s h  government purchasing was low, while d i r e c t  
i n t e rv e n t io n  was more common. I t  i s  no table  t h a t  much o f  the  B r i t i s h  
in t e r v e n t io n  was aimed a t  keeping up with technology, r a t h e r  than in 
developing new a p p l i c a t i o n s  concepts as in the  USA.
P ro f .  B la ck e t t ,  an NRDC board member, prepared a r e p o r t  on the  use 
of computers by var ious  governments61. B lacke t t  r epo r ted  t h a t ,  by 1964, 
1565 computers were being used by the  US government and th e  French s t a t e  
used 111. The B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  used only 88 computers,  81 of  which were 
do m es t ica l ly  produced62. However, th e  l i s t  of machines included some 
dubious e n t r i e s ,  l i k e  th e  E l l i o t t  153 con t ro l  computer,  and th e  Powers PCC 
c a l c u l a t o r .
One obvious exp lana t ion  of the  slower B r i t i s h  government purchasing 
of computers was t h a t  the  UK economy was much smal ler  than th e  US economy, 
and t h e r e f o r e  government purchasing was p r o p o r t io n a t e ly  sm al le r .  However, 
i f  the  B r i t i s h  indus t ry  was held back by one general  economic problem, i t  
was t h a t  the  adoption of  computers was much slower in B r i t a i n  than America.
61NRDC, 86/35 /4 ,  Prof .  P a t r i ck  B la ck e t t ,  19 /5/64.  B lacke t t  prepared 
t h i s  r e p o r t  a f t e r  re c e iv in g  a memo on the  sub jec t  from Pro f .  G i l l ,  a long
time ad v iso r  to  the  NRDC.
62 lb id .
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This i s  seen when comparing the  number of computers used per b i l l i o n  US 
d o l l a r s  of GNP:
Table 9 .3
Computers per $bn of GNP.
Year 1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
USA 5.7 23.4 36.3 43.1 52.4 58.3 66.8 76.0 84.7
OK 1.8 11.4 15.8 19.9 27.0 38.9 46.2 52.7 50.4
Source: H. Phister Jnr., Data Processing, technology and econoaics. 2nd ed., Santa Monica, 1979, p289.
The UK economy was small compared to  the  US and i t  was not tak ing  to  the  
new technology as f a s t .  In th e se  circumstances i t  would be expected t h a t  
a government t h a t  wanted to  encourage a domestic in d u s t ry  would consider 
purchasing computers or methods of encouraging t h e i r  use by indus t ry .  This 
would not only b e n e f i t  the  computer s ec to r ,  but wider use of computers 
would lead  to  g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y  in both government and in d u s t ry .  However, 
i t  was not u n t i l  the  l a t e  1960s t h a t  the B r i t i s h  government s t a r t e d  a 
programme to  inc rease  demand f o r  B r i t i s h  computers.  At t h i s  t ime i t  
i n i t i a t e d  a more a c t i v e  purchasing po l icy ,  d i s c r im in a t in g  in favour of 
B r i t i s h  computers in government purchasing63 and o f f e r i n g  tax  re b a te s  to  
encourage p r i v a t e  indus t ry  to  purchase  systems64.
Before t h i s  change, the  B r i t i s h  government 's  p o l i c y  was to  in te rvene  
d i r e c t l y  to  underpin th e  f i rms making computers. Unt i l  the  end of the  
1960s, the  main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  car ry ing  out t h i s  p o l i c y  was with the  
National  Research and Development Counci l .  The main concern o f  the  NRDC was 
t h a t  th e  UK was f a l l i n g  behind th e  USA. I t  was the se  concerns t h a t  led i t  
to  support  the  F e r r a n t i  Mark 1 and Atlas  computers65 and the  EMI 
240066 . This same concern a l so  led to  the government supporting  ICT in 
the mid-1960s,  when t h e r e  was widespread concern t h a t  IBM was s t a r t i n g  to  
dominate the  in d u s t ry 67. However, r a t h e r  than t r y i n g  to  beef  up demand, 
most a c t i v i t y  was d i r e c t e d  a t  support ing core  technology.  Po l icy  was 
o r i e n t a t e d  to  keeping the  UK i n d u s t r y ' s  hardware up to  d a te  and, u n t i l  the
63E. Moonman, B r i t i s h  computers and i n d u s t r i a l  innovation:  the  
im p l ica t ions  of the  Par l i am en ta ry  S e le c t  Committee. 1971, p i .
64Martin Campbell-Kelly,  ICL: a business and te ch n ica l  h i s to r y .
Oxford, 1989, p247.
65See above, chapter 2, pp51-65 and pp93-100.
66See above, chapter 3, ppl28-133.
67See above, chapter 5, pp210-216.
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mid-1960s, t h i s  meant suppor ting  the  computer d i v i s i o n s  of  the  e l e c t r o n i c s  
f i rm s .  There were two reasons  f o r  t h i s .  F i r s t l y ,  th e  B r i t i s h  bus iness  
machines f irms were not as i n t e r e s t e d  in the e a r l y  computer indus t ry  as the  
equ iva len t  f i rms in the  USA. These f i rms were a l r e ad y  busy e s t a b l i s h in g  
themselves as independent punched card  manufacturers ,  fo llowing t h e i r  
sep a ra t io n  from t h e i r  US p a r tn e r s  a f t e r  the  war. Secondly,  e l e c t r o n i c s  
firms looked on computers as a way of extending  t h e i r  scope in the  
e l e c t r o n i c s  market and a way of  making use of t h e i r  e x p e r t i s e .  They were 
used to  r ece iv in g  government funds to  develop m i l i t a r y  equipment and were 
w i l l i n g  to  rece ive  i t  t o  suppor t  t h e i r  p o l i c y  of  concen t r ic  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .  The f a c t  t h a t  computers had a major m i l i t a r y  r o l e  f i t t e d  
well in to  t h i s  framework.
The consequences of  t h i s  were two-fo ld .  F i r s t l y ,  a t t e n t i o n  went on 
developing hardware r a t h e r  than on production techn iques  and commercial 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  s k i l l s .  Government support  tended to  go on the  development of 
new computers;  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  support  went to  p e r ip h e ra l s  and
a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  and what support  t h e r e  was in t h i s  area  tended to  be 
wasted6 3 . This seems in a p p ro p r ia te ,  as the main weakness of  these  fi rms 
was not in developing e l e c t r o n i c  systems, but r a t h e r  was t h e i r  lack of 
unders tanding of the  market p lace :  t h i s  was where they needed help .  
Secondly,  i t  meant t h a t ,  in what was a l ready  a market t h a t  was much slower 
to  develop than the US market,  f irms th a t  were in h e re n t ly  weak were
re c e iv in g  support  to  s t ay  in the  indus t ry .  This was a problem t h a t  was 
recognised  e a r ly  on. Halsbury,  the  NRDC's managing d i r e c t o r ,  had always 
seen th e  importance of  g e t t i n g  th e  bus iness  machines f i rms involved in the  
computer market and he f e l t  f r u s t r a t e d  t h a t  they  were slow to  do so69. 
However, h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g y  of support ing the  e l e c t r o n i c s  companies 
on the  b a s i s  t h a t  they were a t  l e a s t  w i l l i n g  to  take  government cash to  
bu i ld  computers, only d i l u t e d  the  s i z e  of the  market open to  the  bus iness  
machines f i rm s .  When the  bus iness  machines f i rms  d id  become involved in 
computers,  t h i s  only increased  the  competi t ion t h a t  they  had to  deal w ith .
B r i t i s h  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l i c i e s  were le ss  su ccess fu l  a t  developing the
UK in d u s t ry  than the simple mass purchasing of the  US government. This
buying of  computers not only supported hardware developments,  but a l so  led
63Examples of t h i s  inc lude  the  NRDC's support  of the  abandoned Epsylon
and Pye tape  d r ive  systems, and the  f a i l e d  stock c o n t ro l  experiment a t  the
Siemens Edison Swan f a c t o r y  in Woolwich in the  1950s; see John Hendry,
Innovating f o r  f a i l u r e :  Government p o l ic y  and th e  e a r l v  B r i t i s h  computer
in d u s t r y . Cambridge, Massachuse tt s ,  1989, chap te r  11.
69Ib id , chapters 5 and 6.
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to economies of  sca le  and to  conceptual  improvements in the  use of 
computers.
Conclusion
The d i v e r s i f i e d  e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s  f a i l e d  to  gain  the  economies of 
sca le  and scope t h a t  might have been expected.  They chose over-ambitious 
product p lans ,  while a t  the  same time l im i t in g  the  amounts of c a p i t a l  
invested  in developing t h e i r  computer o pe ra t ion ,  so as to  marshal resources  
fo r  o th e r  high technology developments.  Capi ta l  r a t i o n i n g  prevented them 
from f u l l y  e x p lo i t in g  a l l  t h e i r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s .
This a n a ly s i s  of the  computer indus t ry ,  supported by o ther  s tu d ie s  
c a r r i e d  out on the  semiconductor in d u s t ry ,  po in t s  to  the  weakness of  the  
m u l t i -p ro d u c t ,  c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d ,  e l e c t r o n i c s  company. I f  t h i s  i s  
c o r r e c t  i t  has an important lesson f o r  some e x i s t i n g  high technology f i rm s ,  
as well  as f o r  governments.
European firms are  becoming in c re a s in g ly  d i v e r s i f i e d .  The number of 
f irms involved in e l e c t r i c a l ,  e l e c t r o n i c  and computer engineer ing  is  again 
growing, and na t iona l  s t a t e s  a re  support ing the  formation of la rge
c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  e l e c t r i c a l  conglomerates.  Consolidation is  a l so  
occur r ing  in o th e r  a r e a s ,  such as th e  growing t r en d  of merging car  and 
aerospace i n t e r e s t s .  The lesson of t h i s  study is  t h a t  f i rms of t h i s  na tu re  
cannot be s u cc e ss fu l ,  unless  the  h o r iz o n ta l  and v e r t i c a l  s t r u c tu r e s  are  
c o r r e c t ,  and c o r r e c t  informat ion i s  a v a i l a b l e  to  the  co rpo ra te  management. 
While success  seems to  have been achieved in the Japanese
e l e c t r i c a l / e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry ,  th e  lesson of  the  Anglo/American computer 
indus t ry  is  t h a t  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  and complete co rpo ra te  commitment to  a 
market i s  l i k e l y  to  achieve g r e a t e r  success .  D i v e r s i f i e d  firms a re  not 
n e c e s s a r i l y  success fu l  in main ta in ing  t h e i r  markets a g a in s t  s p e c i a l i s t s .  
The governments t h a t  encourage f i rm s  to  merge to  form huge engineer ing  
conglomerates a re  doing so in the  hope t h a t  s t r a t e g i c  te chnolog ies  w i l l  be
p ro t e c t e d .  The opposite  could well  be t r u e .  Every f i rm  faces  problems from
time to  t im e, and i t  has been seen t h a t  a t  such t imes  firms a re  o f ten  
forced to  drop an opera t ion  which i s  s t r a i n i n g  the  f in an ces  of  the  company. 
Indeed th e re  is  a p ropens i ty  f o r  such c o n c e n t r i c a l l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  fi rms to  
s u f f e r  p e r io d i c  c r i s e s :  i t  i s  an i n h e re n t ly  le ss  secure  s t r a t e g y  than f u l l  
conglomeration of  unre la ted  a c t i v i t i e s .  There fore ,  i t  seems t h a t  by merging 
whole segments of a c o u n t ry ' s  in d u s t ry  in to  one, a government could see a 
s in g le  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  give up a whole market segment in order  to  
p r o t e c t  i t s  investment in o the r  a r e a s .  To many governments t h i s  would be 
unacceptable  and would lead to  d i r e c t  in te rv e n t io n  to  underpin these  la rge
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firms.
Broad-based firms have d i f f i c u l t i e s  in c o n ce n t ra t in g  on ind iv idua l  
markets and can s u f f e r  from th e  i n a b i l i t y  to  fund m u l t ip l e  growth pa ths .  
Before c o n ce n t r ic  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  tak es  p lace ,  the  f i rm  has to  cons ider  the  
amount o f  e x p e r t i s e  i t  can b r ing  to  th e  market and whether i t  can a f fo rd  
to  fund a l l  i t s  developments.  Even Japanese e l e c t r o n i c s  f i rm s ,  o f ten  seen 
as the  most success fu l  group of  companies in the  world ,  a r e ,  in the  
re c e s s io n  of  the  e a r ly  1990s, having to  r e a s se s s  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i e s .  At the  
end of the  day i t  might be b e t t e r  to  r e in v e s t  p r o f i t s  in to  c u r r e n t  a reas  
of a c t i v i t y  to  preserve  a market p o s i t i o n ,  or even to  d i s t r i b u t e  p r o f i t s  
to  s h a r eh o ld e r s ,  r a t h e r  than to  pursue inapp rop r ia te  markets f o r  a f i r m ' s  
s k i l l s .  This po l icy  could be b e t t e r  than t r y i n g  to  take  on s p e c i a l i s t  
producers and t ry in g  to  overcome the  problems of  c a p i t a l  r a t i o n in g  t h a t  
f u r t h e r  expansion could lead t o .
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Biographical  notes on some of  the  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  mentioned in t h i s  t h e s i s .
The fo llowing notes o u t l i n e  t h e  r o l e  of the  main managers, eng ineers  
and s c i e n t i s t s  mentioned in t h i s  t h e s i s .  These a re  only o n e - l in e  no tes  f o r  
guidance,  and a re  not n e c e s s a r i l y  the  formal p o s i t i o n  t h a t  they he ld ,  but 
desc r ibe  t h e i r  func t ion .
S i r  Alexander Aikeman. pos t-war EMI chairman.
S i r  Leon B a a r i t . managing d i r e c t o r  of E l l i o t t  Automation/Brothers .
Dr Walter Baker, general  manager of GE's E le c t ro n ic s  Div is ion  during the  
mid-1950s.
W.G. Bass . F e r r an t i  D i rec to r  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  the  computer department in the  
e a r ly  1950s.
Arthur Beard. Senior engineer a t  RCA, manager in charge of  development in 
RCA's Computer Systems Div is ion  and one of  the  o r ig i n a l  Advanced 
Development Group eng ineers .
James B irkens tock . Thomas J .  Watson J n r ' s  execu t ive  a s s i s t a n t  in the  l a t e  
1940s and e a r l y  1950s, proposed the  manufacture o f  the  IBM 701 'defence  
c a l c u l a t o r 7.
S i r  William Black . NRDC chairman from 1957.
Prof.  P .M .S .B lacke t t . P ro fe sso r  a t  Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  and NRDC board 
member.
R.Bloch, head of the  Advanced Development and Resource Planning Divis ion  
in GE's Computer Divis ion in th e  l a t e  1960s, produced the  Advanced Product 
Line p lan .
J .R .Bradburn . general  manager of RCA's Computer Systems D iv is ion .
L.J .  Brown, appointed as EMI managing d i r e c t o r  in 1952.
Norman Brown. EMI engineer who worked on the  BMC computer and the  2400.
S i r  David B run t , c h a i r  of the  Brunt committee which advised the  government 
on e a r l y  computer po l icy .
(Lordl Vivian Bowden, f i r s t  s a l e s  manager f o r  F e r r a n t i  computers.
H.G. C a r p en te r , member of  the  e a r l y  E l l i o t t  B ro th e r s '  design team, l a t e r  
a NRDC employee.
R.T.Clavden. EE engineer who worked on the  P i l o t  ACE and DEUCE, then worked 
fo r  EMI and developed the  EMI BMC machine.
A.L.Conrad, appointed as RCA's CEO in the  e a r l y  1970s fo llowing the  
problems th e  f i rm  encountered under Bob S a rn o f f ' s  management.
R.J.  C o rd in e r . GE's post-war  CEO.
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John Crawlev. NRDC employee, heavily involved in the computer a c tiv ity .
Sevmour Cray, des igner  of  CDC's super computers, founder o f  Cray Research 
and Cray Computers.
Hershner C ross . GE's fou r th  general  manager of the  Computer Div is ion from 
1965 to  1966.
S.A. Dakin. head of the  Board of Trade in the  e a r l y  1950s.
John Duckworth. NRDC MD from 1959.
J .P .  E c k e r t , co - inven to r  of a number of e a r ly  computers,  inc luding the  
UNIVAC, and co-founder of the  Eckert  and Hauchly Computer Corporation which 
became th e  foundation of Sperry-Rand 's  UNIVAC Div is ion .
W.S. E l l i o t t , f i r s t l y  developer  of E l l i o t t  B ro the rs '  f i r s t  computers,  then 
leader  of  F e r r a n t i ' s  London development team, working on the  Pegasus.
Dr Elmer W. Enostrom. RCA P res id en t  during the  ear ly -mid  1960s.
Sebas t ian  Ziani de F e r r a n t i , founder  of F e r r a n t i .
Vincent de F e r r a n t i . MD and chairman of Fe rran t i  from the  1930s to  l a t e  50s 
Sebas t ian  de F e r r a n t i , took over from Vincent when he died in the  l a t e  
1950s.
Basi l  de F e r r a n t i . F e r r a n t i ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on the  ICT board,  and MD 1964- 
65.
S i r  Ernes t  F i s k , post-war EMI managing d i r e c t o r .
Jav F o r r e s t e r . MIT academic, worked on the Whirlwind, and SAGE computers 
as well  as inventing magnetic core  memory.
J .G .F . F r a n c i s , c o n su l t an t  employed by the NRDC to  in spec t  EMI's computer 
o p e ra t io n s .
R . J . F r o a a a t t . EMI engineer who worked on the BMC and 1100 p r o j e c t s .
Eric  Grundv. manager o f  th e  F e r r a n t i  Instrument Department a f t e r  the  war.
Lord Halsburv . managing d i r e c t o r  of the  National Research and Development 
Corpora tion .
John H aan s t ra . GE Computer D iv i s io n ' s  manager of  development.
Derek Hemv. sof tware eng ineer  f o r  LEO then EMI.
Dennis Hennessey. NRDC deputy managing d i r e c t o r ,  g r e a t l y  involved in the  
computer a c t i v i t i e s .
Norman H i l l , head of EMI's Computer Div is ion.
B r ig ad ie r  G.H. Hinds, head of  the  Minis t ry  of Supply dur ing  the  bu i ld ing  
of the  F e r r a n t i  Markl computers.
Herman H o l l e r i t h , inven tor  o f  punch card t a b u l a t i o n  and founder of IBM.
Godfrey Houndsf ie ld . developed the  pe r iphe ra l  c on t ro l  u n i t  of the  EMI BMC 
computer and then developed the  EMI 1100 system using magnetic core  lo g ic .
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Arthur Humphrvs. d i r e c t o r  of BTM, ICT and managing d i r e c t o r  of ICL.
George J a c o b i . GE Engineer.
Harrv Johnson. F e r ran t i  salesman who produced th e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  
F e r r an t i -P acka rd  FP6000, which l a t e r  became the  core  o f  th e  ICT1900 range.
R.H. J o n es , headed GE's Ventures Task Force and recommended the  abandonment 
of the  computer d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  l a t e r  became GE's CEO and Chairman.
Dr.Tom K i lb u rn . Manchester U n iv e r s i ty  s c i e n t i s t ,  worked with Williams on 
the  Markl and the  Williams Tube, designed the  MEG (Mercury),  MV950, MUSE 
(ATLAS) and the  MU5 (which in p a r t  became the  ICL 2900)
Charles Kramskoy, head of  EMI's Spec ia l  Products U ni t ,  and manager o f  the  
EMI 2400 and 3400 p r o j e c t s .
C la i r  Lasher , second general  manager of GE's Computer Department,  and one 
of the  f i r s t  to  support  such a d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n .
S i r  Ben Lockspe ise r . Chief S c i e n t i s t  o f  the  M in is t ry  o f  Supply, re sp o n s ib le  
fo r  th e  MADAM c o n t r a c t .
S i r  Joseph Lockwood. NRDC board member, and one t ime c h a i r  o f  the  computer 
sub-committee,  appointed chairman of  EMI in 1955.
Arthur L. Malcarnev. RCA v ic e - p r e s id e n t  with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  
Computer Systems Div is ion .
Col. T.A. Maxwell, head of  Power Samas, then c h a i r  o f  ICT.
Edwin S. M cC ol l i s te r . RCA, Computer Systems D i v i s i o n ' s  d i r e c t o r  of 
marketing.
R.W. Macdonald. CEO of  Burroughs
John W. Mauchlv. co - inven to r  of a number of e a r ly  computers,  inc luding the  
UNIVAC, and co-founder of  the  Eckert  and Mauchly Computer Corporation which 
became the  foundation of  Sperry-Rand's  UNIVAC D iv is ion .
George M etca l f , general  manager o f  the  General E l e c t r i c  E lec t ro n ic s  
D iv i s io n ' s  Commercial and Government Equipment Department.
C l i f f o r d  M etca l fe , managing d i r e c t o r  of EMI Engineering and l a t e r  EMI 
E le c t r o n ic s ,  he was in charge when EMI s t a r t e d  computer development.
S i r  Percy M i l l s , f i r s t  chairman of th e  NRDC and l a t e r  a member of  the  EMI 
board.
Chase Morsev. RCA's co rpo ra te  v ice  p re s id en t  f o r  marke t ing ,  r e c r u i t e d  from 
Ford in th e  l a t e  1960s, r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  the  Computer Systems D iv i s io n ' s  
rap id  growth in the l a t e  1960s and one of the  key p la y e r s  in RCA's e x i t  
from the  in d u s t ry .
C.R. Morton, c o n su l t an t  employed by the  NRDC to  in s p e c t  EMI's computer 
o p e ra t io n s .
1st  Lord Nelson of S t a f f o r d , managing d i r e c t o r  of Engl ish  E l e c t r i c  u n t i l  
1956, and chairman u n t i l  1962.
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2nd Lord Nelson of S t a f f o r d , rep laced  h i s  f a t h e r  as head of  EE, became MD 
in 1956 and chairman on h is  f a t h e r ' s  death in 1962.
William C. N o r r i s , founder o f  Control  Data Corp.
H.R. (Barnevl O l d f i e l d , founder and f i r s t  general  manager o f  GE's Computer 
Department.
Kenneth Olsen , founder of D ig i t a l  Equipment Corp.
Ralph Palmer, des igner  of IBM's e a r l y  computers.
Brian P o l l a r d , manager of  the  F e r r a n t i  Computer Department, l e f t  to  work 
f o r  Burroughs in the  USA. Notably wrote an a r t i c l e  in Datamation, 
c r i t i c i s i n g  the  e f f o r t s  of the  B r i t i s h  e l e c t r o n i c s  in d u s t ry  in the  computer 
market.
Prof .  Arthur P o r te r ,  e l e c t r o n i c s  academic who inf luenced  F e r r a n t i ' s  
d ec i s io n  to  s t a r t  the  manufacture of  computers.
D .P .P r in z . engineer employed by F e r r a n t i  on the  recommendation of Prof.  
P o r te r  t o  in v e s t ig a t e  computing techniques .
Lou Raeder. t h i r d  manager of GE's Computer Div is ion .
James Rand, head of Remington Rand, and then c o n t r o l l e d  the  Remington 
Divis ion  of Sperry-Rand a f t e r  the  merger with Sperry.
J.W. Roonev. RCA Computer Systems Div is ion  marketing d i r e c t o r  in the  l a t e  
1960s.
General David S a rn o f f . Leader and a u to c r a t  a t  RCA.
Robert S a rn o f f . rep laced  Gen. Sarnof f  as head of  RCA.
Isaac  Shoenbero. EMI t e l e v i s i o n  d e s ig n e r .
M.E. S io n s . d i r e c t o r  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  computers a t  F e r r a n t i .
J .S .  Smith, f i f t h  general  manager o f  GE's Computer D iv i s io n ,  from 1966.
George S n iv e lv . head of  accounting in GE's e l e c t r o n i c s  lab o ra to ry  during 
the  1950s.
R .E.Spencer. EMI employee c r e d i t e d  with  encouraging the  development of 
commercial computers by the  company.
S i r  Edward de S t e i n , board member of  EMI and the  NRDC in th e  e a r ly  1950s.
C hr is topher  S t rachev . c h i e f  t e c h n i c a l  advisor  in th e  NRDC, helped design 
a number of  systems, r a t e d  as a b r i l l i a n t  l o g i s t i c i a n .
Bernard Swann. Computer s a l e s  manager a t  F e r r a n t i .
S i r  Henry T i z a rd . Member of the  Advisory Council on S c i e n t i f i c  Po l icy ,  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  1945 Labour government.
Harry F. V ickers , head of Sperry-Rand.
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S i r  John Wall . Managing D irec to r  of EMI E lec t ro n ic s  and l a t e r  EMI, jo ined  
ICT board a f t e r  a c q u i s i t i o n  of EMI's computer d i v i s i o n ,  and became f i r s t  
Chairman of  ICL.
Thomas Watson S n r . head of IBM, led i t  to  dominate the  bus iness  machines 
in dus t ry .
Thomas Watson J n r . headed IBM throughout  most of  th e  computer e ra .
John Will iam Weil , engineer in GE's Computer D iv is ion ,  head of  the  GE600 
program and the  f a i l e d  WXYZ p r o j e c t .
Eugene R. White. GE eng ineer .
Prof M.Wilkes. Cambridge computer academic,  developer of the  EDSAC.
P ro fe sso r  F.C. Wil l iams, developed th e  MADAM and F e r r a n t i  Markl computers,  
inven tor  of  the  Williams Tube e l e c t r o - s t a t i c  s to rag e  technique.
F. W ith ina ton . c h i e f  computer s t r a t e g y  adv ise r  f o r  A.D. L i t t l e  Inc.
V.O. Wright. RCA Computer Systems D iv i s io n ' s  v ice  p r e s id e n t  r e sp o n s ib le  f o r  
government marketing.
Dr Zworvkin. RCA t e l e v i s i o n  de s igne r .
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